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Abstract
Two competing hypotheses with regard to market structure and performance
are the traditional structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and the
efficiency hypothesis. This thesis presents results for tests of both
hypotheses with respect to the European banking industry using pooled
and annual data for the period 1986 to 1989. The cross-sectional and
pooled results generally support the traditional SCP paradigm as an
explanation for the market behaviour of European banks, with little
evidence to suggest that the efficiency hypothesis holds. We also find
that changes in market demand conditions, the equity-to-assets ratio and
the staff expenses ratio appear to be significant and positively related
to banking industry performance. In the majority of cases the loans-to-
assets ratio exerts a negative influence on banks' profitability. The
individual country estimates find evidence that the SCP paradigm
unambiguously seems to hold in Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands
and Spain. These findings are in line with the Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini study which identified the same countries, apart
from the Netherlands, as the markets which would experience the largest
financial service price falls post 1992. As such, these banking markets
appear to offer the greatest incentive for new entrants to benefit from
(and compete away) high average industry margins.
The second part of this thesis adopts a methodology which allows us
to test for inter-firm behaviour between leading banks across European
bankir- *markets. The initial findings indicate that a large leading
bank appears on average to promote cooperation with other leaders and
this, on average, increases banking industry profitability. A large
second bank, however, seems on average to induce rivalry with leaders
rather than cooperation. The impact of more distant rivals does not
seem to affect the profitability of banks in the industry. Further
investigation of these results however, reveals that there are
estimation problems brought about by the way in which the interactive
market share variables - which test for cooperation and rivalry - are
calculated. The nature in u,iich these variables are constructed implies
a collinearity bias when the market shares of the largest firms are of a
similar size. As a result, the Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) approach
adopted to test for cooperative and rivalrous behaviour in European
banking may be inappropriate. If we re-specify the model, however, to
take account of this collinearity problem, we still observe evidence of
duopoly behaviour in European banking thus confirming our earlier
findings.
xvi i
Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background to the Study
Banking markets in the European Community (EC) have experienced marked
changes over the last few years as a result of the completing of a
single market in financial services. Substantial restructuring has also
taken place in other European banking markets.	 The single European
market study, undertaken by Price Waterhouse (1987) and updated and
published in the Cecchini Report (Commission of the European Communities
(1988a)), is predicated on the a priori assumption that competitive
conditions are different across banking and financial systems. 	 Other
researchers, such as Neven (1990) and Vives (1991), have also noted that
significantly different competitive conditions exist across European
banking systems, yet few studies directly address the problem of
estimating competitive conditions across and within individual banking
markets.
Vie primary purpose of this thesis is to investigate competitive
conditions across European banking markets by using the structure-
conduct-performance (SCP) methodology.	 There are two important
rationales for testing the SCP hypothesis in European banking markets.
First, very little empirical work has been undertaken investigating the
competitive behaviour of European ba-_:king systems and such. an
 empirical
investigation may yield interesting insights that could be of interest
1
to academics, bankers and policymakers.
Secondly, the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study on completion of an
EC internal financial market drew attention to the fact that aspects of
the SCP framework could be used to evaluate the evidence of oligopoly
profits in EC banking systems. 	 If oligopoly profits are present in
these banking systems then producer surplus losses may be substantial
after integration.	 Or to put it another way, banking industry
profitability (in the short-term) would be eroded in these countries as
a result of the increased competition resulting from the single market
proposals. An analysis of the SCP relationship in European banking may
help us to shed light on these issues.
The SCP approach has long been the predominant methodology in the
study of industrial economics. Simply stated, the conduct or rivalry by
firms in a market is determined by market structure conditions,
especially the number and size distribution of firms and the conditions
of entry.	 Thi^ rivalry leads to unique levels-of profits, prices,
advertising and other aspects of market performance. Through the link
of conduct, the performance of firms in a particular market is tied to
the structure of that market. 	 The reason for testing the SCP
relationship in banking markets, as identified by Heggestad (1979,
p.450) is to address three main issues:
1.	 Does market structure matter in banking markets, or is the industry
so highly regulated that market structure is not an
important/relevant factor in determining market performance?
2
2. .Which aspects of market structure are the most important,. and,
therefore, which type of regulations or regulatory reform have the
greatest impact?
3. What aspects of bank performance are most sensitive to differences
in market structure?
In general, analysis of the SCP relationship in banking is used to help
evaluate the main policy issue of which type of banking structure best
serves the public in terms both of the cost and availability of banking
services.
There	 have	 been
	 many	 emp...rical	 studies	 of	 SCP
relationships in the United States banking industry, as identified in
Gilbert (1984). Early studies, for example, Heggestad and Mingo (1977),
Spellman (1981) and Rhoades (1982a) suggested that collusive profits
occur in US banking markets, whereas later studies, for exampl.: Osborne
and Wendel (1983), indicate that the literature contains too many
inconsistencies and contradiction. to provide a satisfactory description
of the SCP relationship in banl .ing. More recent attempts at explaining
the link betwe--n market structure and performance have concentrated on
an alternative efficiency hypothesis.
The efficiency hypothesis maintains that an industry's structure
arises as a result of superior operating efficiency by particular firms.
Accordingly, a positive relationship between firm profits and market
3
structure is attributed to the gains in market share by more efficient
firms; in turn these gains lead to increased market concentration. In
other words, increased profits are assumed to accrue to larger firms
because they are more efficient and not because of collusive activities.
In support of this approach, Brozen ( 1982), Smirlock ( 1985) and Evanoff
and Fortier (1988) find that `firm-specific efficiency' seems to be the
dominant variable explaining bank performance in studies of the US
banking industry.
Additionally, studies undertaken by inter al ga Kwoka and
Ravenscroft ( 1986) in the industrial economics literature suggest that
SCP relationships are more complex than the traditi—ial paradigm or the
efficiency hypothesis would suggest.
	 They find evidence of both
cooperative and rivalrous behaviour between the largest firms across
industries and suggest that these interrelationships have a significant
impact on average industry performance.
1.2 Aims, Methodology and Structure Plan
The main aim of this thesis is to examine evidence of the
traditional SCP and efficiency hypothese•,, as well as rivalrous and
cooperative behaviour be ^:ween large banks, across European banking
markets between 1986 and 1989. The methodological approach adopted in
this thesis is similar to previous studies undertaken by Short (1979),
Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992), where multiple
regression analysis is used to investigate the SCP model across
different countries' banking systems. This stuay, however, differs in
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an important respect. The aforementioned authors primarily focused on
explaining the determinants of bank profitability using a measure of
market structure as one of the explanatory variables in their equations.
These studies placed greater emphasis on explaining bank profitability
rather than on the SCP relationship. A concern of this thesis is to
place greater emphasis on the structure
-performance interactions and to
extend analysis of this relationship for banking markets.
	 This is
undertaken in two ways. First we develop a model for testing both the
traditional SCP and efficiency hypotheses across European banking
markets. As far as we are aware there is no other study that provides
international evidence of this relationship. Second, a methodology will
be analysed for testing for rivalrous and cooperative in'^.;ractions
between the largest banks across European markets from the approach
outlined in industrial economics by Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986;.
The thesis is divided into nine chapters. Chapter ?. provides an
analysis of current trends in European banking and financial systems.
These trends parametise the `laboratory' of our risearch into European
banking systems. Against the background of this overview, Chapter 3
explores in greater detail some important, releva r _ structure and
performance characteristics of European banking. Particular attention
is also paid to the analysis of comparative competitive conditions
across European banking markets as provided in the Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini study. We note in Chapter 3 that the analysis of
the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study
	 illustrates that different
competitive conditions exist across European banking and fim ancial
markets and the consumer surplus gains from financial sector integration
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after 1992 appear to be substantial. Estimates of the economic gains
from integration, however, may be overstated because the final estimates
did not take into account producer surplus losses. The aforementioned
study suggested that a Cournot-Nash model of non-competitive behaviour
could be estimated to evaluate evidence of oligopoly profits, from which
producer surplus losses from integration would be calculated, although,
this was not included in the final analysis. As a result, the Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini methodology provides us with an important
justification as to why it is useful to examine the structure- conduct-
performance relationship across European banking markets - the
prevalence of significant oligopoly profits across European banking
markets would imply substantial producer surplus losses in the event of
financial integration.
The following two chapters examine the theoretical basis of the
structure-performance relationship and show how it is empirically
evaluated.	 Chapter 4 examines the relationship from an industrial
organisatiin viewpoint, and Chapter 5 demonstrates how the
performance model has been tested for banking markets.
Chapter 6 outlines the methodology this study adopts for evaluating
the SCP relationships in European banking.
	
-hapter 7 analyses the
variables use6, and Chapter 8 reports the results. In the first part of
Chapter 8 results are presented for tests of both the SCP paradigm and
the efficiency hypothesis with respect to the European banking industry,
using pooled and annual data for the period 1986 to 1989. The cross-
sectional and pooled results generally support the traditional SCt
6
paradigm as an explanation for the market behaviour of European banks,
with little evidence to suggest that the efficiency hypothesis holds.
We also find unambiguous evidence that the traditional SCP paradigm
holds for the Belgium, French, Italian, Dutch and Spanish banking
systems between 1986 and 1989.
	
These results imply that producer
surplus losses (a decline in banking industry profitability) brought
about by financial sector integration after 1992 could be significant in
these banking markets. These results closely confirm the findings of
the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study which suggested that overall price
falls in the financial services sector, on the whole, would be the
largest in these countries, with the exception of the Netherlands. Our
results also show that changes in market demand conditions, the equity-
to-assets ratio and the staff expenses ratio appear to be significant
ana positively related to banking industry performance. In the majority
of cases the loans-to-assets ratio exerts a negative influence on banks'
profitability.
The second part of Chapter 8 reports the results which test for
inter-firm behaviour between leading banks across European banking
markets. On first inspection the results indicate that a large leading
bank appears on average to promote cooperation with other leaders and
this increases banking industry profitability.
	 A large secund bank,
however, seems, on average, to induce rivalry with leaders rather than
cooperation. The impact of more distant rivals does not seem to affect
the profitability of banks in the industry. Larger second banks induce
rivalrous conjectures which reduce industry profitability, but this
reduction is not large enough to bring about a negative relationship
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between industry profitability and the market concentration variable.
Further investigation of these results, however, reveals that there is
serious estimation bias brought about by the way in which the
interactive market share variables - which test for cooperation and
rivalry - are calculated. The nature in which these variables are
constructed implies a collinearity bias when the market shares of the
largest firms are of a similar size. As a result, the approach adopted
to test for cooperative and rivalrous behaviour in European banking may
be inappropriate. Further empirical analysis, however, reveals that if
we take account of this collinearity problem we still observe evidence
of duopoly behaviour in European banking markets.
Chapter 9 is the conclusion which also identifies the limitations
and tentatively suggests policy implications of our findings.
3
Chapter 2
Current Trends in European Banking and Financial Systems
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to identify the major trends that have
affected European, as well as worldwide, banking and financial systems
during the past two decades. These trends parametise the 'laboratory'
of our research into European banking systems and set the scene for our
later SCP analysis in this area. The chapter is divided into three main
sections. Section 2.2 deals with the most important real and financial
trends that have helped stimulate change in European banking markets.
Section 2.3 is concerned with the influence of the European Community
and other international organisations on banking trends. Section 2.4
provides a short history of banking in Europe and briefly examines
structural differences between European banking systems.'
2.2 Real and Financial Developments: Stimulants of Banking Change
2.2.1 Economic and related sectoral trends
The economic environment of Western Europe has undergone considerable
change since the early 1970s. High and volatile rates of inflation
experienced in many countries during the early 1970s, together with
increased budget deficits and balance-of-payments disequilibria,
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stimulated European banks to reassess their attitudes towards risk and
uncertainty. These factors, coupled with the increased volatility of
interest and exchange rates, were clear indicators that the overall
macroeconomic environment had become much more uncertain.	 An OECD
(1985) study pointed out that probably the most important 'hangover'
from the inflation experienced during the 1970s has been to introduce
much greater uncertainty into business and household expectations, be
they concerned with prices, market outlets, exchange rates or interest
rates.
The high and more volatile rates of inflation and interest,
resultinô mainly from the agency of changed economic policy, during the
1970s were major contributory forces leading up to the recession years
of the lase 1970s and early 1980s. The structural slowdown of economic
growth and the deep-seated disequilibria of the period strongly affected
the size, direction and variability of both domestic and international
financial flows. This slowdown is witnessed in Table 2.1, which
provides a summary of annual real GDP growth rates for a variety of
European countries. The average annual GDP growth for virtually all
,juntries has been lower during the 1980s than in the second half of the
1970s. Only Luxembourg and the United Kingdom (as well as the United
States) experienced higher GDP growth in the 1980s.
Throughout Europe the household sector has remained the major
surplus sector, although the size of these surpluses has fallen relative
to national income. Conversely, although the corporate sector has
traditionally been the most important deficit sector in almost all
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European countries since the 1960s, it now competes with the government
sector for the major debtor status. The increased debtor status of the
Table 2.1 Gross domestic product at constant market prices
(percentage change)
1961-70 1971-80 1981-90
Belgium 4.9 3.2 2.0
Denmark 4.5 2.2 2.1
Germany 4.5 2.7 2.1
Greece 7.6 4.7 1.4
Spain 7.3 3.5 2.9
France 5.5 3.2 2.2
Ireland 4.2 4.7 3.1
Italy 5.7 3.8 2.3
Luxembourg 3.6 2.6 3.4
Netherlands r.1 2.9 1.8
Portugal 6.4 4.7 2.7
UK 2.9 1.9 2.6
EC12 4.8 3.0 2.3
i'lA _.8 2.7 2.9
Japan 10.5 4.6 4.3
Source: European Economy (1991, p.223)
public sector has been primarily a result of increased government
spending throughout the 1970s and 1980s, although there has been a
reversa -' of the overall trend in some European countries, most
noticeably in the United Kingdom.
It is also the case that debt-to-income ratios of the household and
public sectors have risen in the major economies during recent years.
The rapid growth of personal sector debt in various European countries
has had important policy implications for controlling the money supply.
The BIS (1987) notes that the overall growth in sectoral debt since the
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mid-1970s has aroused concern in many quarters. For the public sector
debt, concern focuses on the possibility of `crowding out', whereas
growth in private sector debt raises questions about increased default
rates. Davis (1986) finds that the non-financial private sector's
portfolio behaviour has become more unstable since the 1960s and he
suggests that many of these changes are contemporaneous with innovation
and regulation.
While household savings rates declined or remained relatively
stable during the 1970s and 1980s, the real stock of consumer credit
grew sharply and the ratio of consumer debt to income rose in most major
industrial countries. Tor example, between 1980 and 1989 `total
consumer credit in the United Kingdom increased from 4.75 per cent of
GDP to 9 per cent, while In France loans to households by financial
institutions, excluding real estate lending, rose from 2.25 per cent of
GNP to 6 per cent' (IMF 1991, p.109). Stevenson (1986) however, pointed
out that the increased in debtedness of consumers could be explained by
the fact that household financial assets wer: growing faster than
liabilities in the major European economies and this trend, together
with the increasit,,ly more sophisticated demands of the retail bank
customer and the change in individuals attitudes towards debt, have been
important forces generating change in retail banking markets throughout
Europe. In contrast to household debt, corporate debt to equity ratios
(leverage) appear to have remained stable in most countries except in
the United States and the United Kingdom where they increased
dramatically in 1989.	 In Germany and Italy (and Japan) leverage
actually declined during the 1980s as firms used internally generated
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funds to retire short-term debt. A summary of debt to asset ratios of
firms in production industries is shown in Table 2.2. In general.it
 is
difficult to evaluate the effects of increased corporate leverage
although one can conclude that greater corporate leverage can lead to
increased sensitivity of variables such as investment and employment to
cyclical downturns (see Cantor, 1990).
There have also been substantial changes in national savings rates
over the last three decades in various European countries. Table 2.3
shows that a decline in net national saving between 1960-69 and 1980-89
is evident in all the major industrial countries, with the largest fall
in Germany (8.25 percentage points). The average decline for the seven
countries shown was 3.75 percentage points. It is clear from this table
Table 2.2 Selected industrial countries:
firms in production industries
(In per cent)
debt to asset ratios of
1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 19891
Belgium 64.9 62.4 59.3 56.5 54.6 53.8 54.4 54.1
France 69.2 70.7 76.6 73.3 71.0 70.2 66.4 --
Germany 62.0 60.E 59.7 53.8 57.1 55.6 55.7 --
Italy 70.4 68.2 67 . 5 67.1 67.3 66.9 68.8 --
Japan 73.4 73.2 7,-.6 71.5 70.5 70.1 69.6 68.5
Netherlands 2 55.4 55.1 X3.9 54.3 52.4 52.3 52.9 --
United
Kingdom2 49.6 48.5 48.7 48.3 48.0 48.9 40.8 55.1
United
States 2 -- 39.4 40.6 42.1 43.3 44.3 45.3 --
Source: IMF (1991, p.110)
1 The lags involved in collecting and reporting the data on a comparable
basis mean that complete figures are not yet available for 1989.
2 Subsidiaries' balance sheets weie consolidated with those of parent
companies.
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Table 2.3 National saving rates in major industrial countries
of which
Memo:
Net	 Private	 General
Countries and	 Gross	 national	 govern-
periods	 national	 saving	 Public2	 House-	 Business ment net
	
saving 	 Total
	 holds	 enter-
	 lending'
prises3
as a percentage of national income
United States
1960-69 19.7 10.8 0.8 10.0 6.2 3.8 -0.4
1970-79 19.4 9.1 -1.2 10.3 7.6 2.6 -1.2
1980-89 16.3 4.0 -3.8 7.8 6.0 1.9 -3.4
Japan
1960-69 34.5 25.2 6.6 18.6 11.9 6.6 1.0
1970-79 35.3 25.6 5.0 20.6 16.5 4.1 -1.7
1980-89 31.6 20.9 5.1 15.7 13.1 2.6 -1.4
Germany
1960-69 27.3 19.9 6.3 13.5 7.6 6.0 0.7
1970-79 24.3 15.2 3.7 11.5 9.7 1.7 -1.7
1980-89 22.5 11.6 1.5 10.1 8.9 1.2 -2.0
France
1960-69 4 26.2 19.2 4.5 11.1 3.6 0.4
1970-79 25.8 17.0 2.7 14.4 11.9 2.5 -0.4
United Kingdom
1960-69 18.4 10.9 2.7 8.2 4.3 3.9 -1.0
1970-79 17.9 8.3 1.4 6.8 4.3 2.5 -2.6
1980-89 16.6 5.5 -0.8 6.3 3.7 2.6 -2.4
Italy
1960-69 4 28.1 19.8 1.6 18.2 15.9 2.3 -1.9
1970-794 25.9 16.2 -5.2. 21.4 21.3 0.1 -7.0
1980-89 21.9 11.0 -7.7 18.7 15.9 2.8 -11.1
Canada
1960-69 21.9 11.3 2.6 8.7 4.0 4.8 -0.4
1970-79 22.9 13.1 1.4 11.7 6.0 5.6 -0.9
1980-89 20.7 9.9 -3.4 13.3 9.2 4.2 -4.8
Averages
1960-69 22.3 13.8 2.3 11.5 7.4 4.1 -0.3
1970-79 23.4 13.6 0.8 12.8 10.1 2.7 -1.7
1980-89 21.5 10.0 -0.9 10.9 8.8 2.1 -3.2
B As a percentage of GNP.
2General government
3 Includes public enterprises
4Based on the old system of national accounts
5Calculated using GDP weights and exchange rates in 1963 for the 1960-69 period, in 1975
1970-79 period and in 1988 for the 1980-89 period.
Source: Hutchinson (1992, p.9)
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that there is a persistent wide variation of the level of national
saving across countries. Japan had by far the highest saving rate in
the 1980s, at 21 per cent of national income, while the United States
had the lowest at 4 per cent. In general, the United States and the
United Kingdom were continually at the low end of the spectrum between
1960 and 1990, while Germany, France and Italy have quite similar net
national saving rates, falling in the middle of the range. An important
point to note is that the decline in national savings in most countries
was mainly attributable to the contraction in government net saving.
In particular, the contraction in government net saving between 1960-69
and 1980-89 at 3.25 per cent accounted for most of the decrease in
national saving, while the fall in private saving accounted for onl; .25
percentage points. The decline in public sector saving (current revenue
less current expenditure) and public finances in general:
was largely concentrated in the middle and late 1970s
following the first oil shock, but continued in most cases in the
1980s despite some progress in consolidating budgetary positions in
the latter half of the decade (Hutchinson, p.10).
During the 1980s public dissaving was marked in the United States,
France, the United Kingdom and Italy and all of the majo ,
 industrial
countries were substantial net borrowers. In short, fr,)m this brief
analysis it is clear that policies designed to reduce budget deficits on
current account would cause the total saving rate to rise.
Morgan Stanley (1991) identified that by the end of the 1980s there
was a low level of saving ratios in most developed countries and a world
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capital shortage of significant proportions, and these factors coincided
with world banking capital inadequacy; most noticeably in the Japanese,
US and Scandinavian banking markets. They suggest that:
The overriding need to increase saving rates to finance the global
capital shortage inevitably means an era of high real interest
rates. This issue is further aggravated by the demographic changes
taking place in the world: people are living longer and therefore
are spending savings, which means the need to save by the
remaining, principally working, population is even greater. Those
banking systems which have traditionally been a conduit for savings
should be well placed to garner deposits in this type of
environment. However, there is another side to the coin;
competition for deposits and deregulation will drive the cost of
deposits up. Where a banking system has benefited from cheap
deposits this is changing; France and Spain are good examples. The
cost of deposits will therefore rise, but we believe that the
capital constraints on the industry will mean that this will be
passed on to the borrower and margins will be maintained.
Moreover, any increase in the deposit cost will be limited by a
general slackening of loan demand in a number of markets.
	 We
anticipate that the main loan demand will be Eastern European
driven, with local domestic demand much more modest.
	 Deposits
rising faster than lending also tends to be good for margins.
Morgan Stanley (1991) p.5
In the international economic area, the increased scale and volatility
of capital flows across countries, coupled with widescale financial
liberalisation, has encouraged the integration of international
financial markets (see Pecchioli, 1983). The OPEC surpluses generated
in the post-1973 era were replaced (up until the late 1980s) by surplus
international capital flows mainly emanating from Western European an(:
Japanese savers.
	 The United States has changed its position within
twenty-five years from being the largest creditor nation to the largest
debtor nation, The US household sector surplus in 1986 was the lowest
percentage of GDP since 1963 (see Davis, 1986).
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The major methods of international finance have also changed.
Rapid economic growth and an even faster rate of expansion of world
trade in the late 1960s and early 1970s ensured a continuous demand for
funds from the corporate sector as well as many governments and public
corporations that had embarked on large investment programmes in both
developed and less developed countries.
	 The recycling of funds for
balance-of-payments finance as well as the increased management of
foreign-exchange reserves also helped to increase international lending
activity. Between 1976 and 1989 real activity in the major financial
markets expanded at a faster rate than real output in the major
industrialised countries (see IMF 1991).
The macroeconomic climate experienced by European banks throughout
the 19*/Js and 1980s has been of a much more volatile nature than that
characterised by the economic environment of the 1950s and 1960s. The
increased variability of almost all macroeconomic variables - interest
rates, exchange rates, budget deficits and surpluses - has produced a
much more uncertain environment.
In addition, the greater issuance of debt by households and
enterprises, the declining savings rate, increased financial
liberalisation and growing evidence of weak earnings and balance sheet
positions of major financial institutions, especially commercial banks,
have led some commentators (see, for example, Lamfalussy (1991) and IMF
(1991)) to suggest that international financial systems are becoming
more fragile. In the latter half of the 1980s the poor performance of
many international banks have been the result of an extended period of
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low profits, weak capital positions and, `most importantly, growing
problems with nonperforming loans ... (although) Continental European
banks have had fewer problems with non-performing loans than banks in
other regions' (IMF, 1991, p.11l); see also Leipold (1991) for further
details. Table 2.4 provides a snapshot of the change in real
profitability of banks in the major industrialised countries, and it
shows real profitability declined in all systems between 1988 and 1989,
the most marked falls being in the United Kingdom and the United States.
The decline in the performance of the major banks in these
respective countries is attributable according to the IMF (1991) to:
-	 cyclical economic development at the national or regional level
-	 increased ccaipetition brought about by financial liberalisation,
such as the breakdown in traditional legal segmentation of
financial activities (such as in Japan and the United States), and
in continental Europe, where financial innovations (such as the
development of commercial paper ma-_kets) have created new, nonbank
sources of funds.
-	 sect,_itisation, corporate and sovereign borrowers have found it
less expensive to obtain funds from the securities markets.
-	 increased competition between banks and other deposit-taking
institutions.
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Table 2.4
	 Selected industrial countries: financial indicators for
banks'
(In per cent)
Country
(End of latest fiscal year) Z
Canada-Oct. 31, 1989
France-Dec. 31, 1989
Germany-Dec. 31, 1989
Italy-Dec. 31, 1989
Japan-March 31, 1990
United Kingdom-Dec. 31, 1989
United States-Dec. 31, 1989
Change in Real Profits3
Current	 Previous
fiscal
	 fiscal
year	 year
-33.8 13.2
17.3 20.6
18.2 24.3
4.4 10.6
-17.6 20.5
-36.7 65.6
-71.0 130.9
Source: IMF (1991) p.112
t Figures in the table repre„ent the average for the largest ten banks
in each country. When data are not available for all of the ten largest
banks, the average was taken over available data. Aggregate figures
such as the ones in this table much be interpreted with caution, owing
to differences across national groups of banks and over time in the
accounting of bank assets and capital. In particular, provisioning
practices vary considerably across these countries as do the definitions
of capital.	 Therefore, cross-country comparisons may be less
appropriate than developments over time within a single country.
Z Note that the figures relate to the latest fiscal years of banks in
each country.
3 Profits deflat-:d by the consumer price index in each country.
-	 banks responded •.j the loss of their most creditworthy customers by
focusing on financing activities in which they felt they had
specialised knowledge (eg. property sector loans) or in the
development of new products of activities (eg. leveraged buyouts)
-	 while problem loans and low earnings have reduced bank capital
adequacy, the decline in global equity prices since the beginning
of 1990 has also weakened capital adequacy in those banks that
have traditionally incorporated unrealised capital gains on
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securities holdings in their capital ratios (eg., before the
decline in Japanese equity prices in 1990, most large city banks
had capital ratios that	 exceeded the Bank for International
Settlements (1988) interim capital adequacy target of 7.25 per
cent. However, the nearly 40 percent decline in equity prices in
the first three-quarters of 1990 forced Japanese banks to seek
additional capital and to restrict asset growth ..)
One of the most widely voiced concerns raised by the current
weakness of financial institutions is that it could lead to a credit
'crunch'.	 Friedman (1989) has also argued that the weakness of
financial institutions and the high dL3t-saving obligations of
households and firms could make it increasingly difficult for
authorities to tighten monetary policy in order to counter higher
inflation without causing widespread corporate failure and a downturn in
the economy.
2.2.2 Financial systems and the macroeconomy
The financial services sector is becoming more important to the
macroeconomies of individual European countries. The recent EC Cecchini
study (Commission of the European Communities, 1988a) noted that the
financial services sector contributed 6.5 per cent of total value added
and accounted for around 3 per cent of total employment within member
countries. A summary of the size characteristics of various financial
services sectors in European countries is provided in Table 2.5.
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Table 2.5 Economic dimensions of the financial services sector 1985a
Gross value added
as a % of GDP b
Employment as a %
total employment°
Compensation of
employees as a % of
total for the economy
Belgium 5.7 3.8 6.3
Germany 5.4 3.0 4.4
Spain 6.4 2.8 6.7
France 4.3 2.8 3.8
Italy 4.9 1.8 5.6
Luxembourg4 14.9 5.7 12.2
Netherlands 5.2 3.7 4.9
United Kingdom 11.8 3.7 8.5
EC8 e 6.4 2.9 6.2
% of GDP
Insurance	 Bank loans 9	Sto-ic market
premiums 	 capitalisation 
Belgium 3.9 142' 92
Germany 6.6 139 89
Spain 2.5 99 69
France 4.3 93 85
Italy 2.2 96 75
Luxembourg 3.1 6,916 11,125
Netherlands 6.1 130 165
United Kingdom 8.1 208 149
EC 8 i 5.2 142 116
Source:	 Commission of the European Communities 1988a, p.87)
Notes:
	
a	 Defined in the narrow sense :,s credit and insurance
institutions
b	 Including net interest payments.
c	 Employees in employment plus the self-employed.
d	 1982.
e	 This aggregate accounted for 95% of total Community GDP
in 1985.
f	 Average 1978-84.
g	 1984.
h	 End-1985.
i	 1982.
j	 Weighted average.
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In terms of total employment, Germany, France and the United
Kingdom have by far the largest amount of workers in the financial
sector: estimates range from around 600,000 for France to 800,000 for
Germany and the United Kingdom lies somewhere between. In most European
countries, banking and finance appears to contribute around two-thirds
of the employment of the financial services sector, with insurance
making up the remainder. This is also generally confirmed by Gardener
and Teppett (1990) who examine the European Free Trade Association's
banking and insurance sectors. Two extremes from the EC study seem to
be the United Kingdom and Luxembourg. In the United Kingdom the split
is nearer fifty-fifty, whereas the employment contribution made by the
insurance sector in Luxembourg is around 8 per cent. 	 (Gardener -nd
Teppett (1990)), find employment in banking and insurance is split
fifty-fifty in Switzerland and Austria). Employment in the banking-Ld
finance sector has increased in all European economies since the late
1970s, with the growth rates experienced in Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden
and the United Kingdom being the highest: these are shown in Table 2.6.
The value added figure provides some indication, together with the
compensation of employees' data, as to the relative importe_ce of the
financial sector. Table 2.5 clearly shows that gross va1L-! added as a
percentage of GDP (at market prices) is roughly the same for most of the
EC countries listed, the two major exceptions being the United Kingdom
and Luxembourg, where value added amounts to 11.8 and 14.9 per cent of
GDP, respectively. The Gardener and Teppett (1990) study also find that
Switzerland's value-added for the credit and insurance sector is
atypical at 10.4 per cent for 1985. 	 In terms of compensation of
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employees, these three countries also stand out.
Table 2.6 Rate of employment growth in banking and insurance by country,
1978-1985
Country
	
Banking and	 Insurance	 Total
Finance
Austria 5,9 2,8 4,3
Belgium 11,0 8,3 10,2
Germany 15,0 -5,7 8,4
Spain .. 0.7
France 8,6 23,9 12,2
Finland 21,0 6,8 17,4
Italy .. 25,5
Iceland 9,2 12,3 9,6
Luxembourg 50,0 50,0 50,0
Norway 34,4 36,4 34,8
Netherlands 15,1 11,9 14,2
Sweden 71,4 5,4 47,1
Switzerland 7,62
UK 24,0 21,3 23,1
Source: Gardener and Teppett (1990)
Notes:	 PW growth rates are computed using the following method:
Total growth in employment (1978-1985)
Z.)tal employment in 1978
1. Employment data excludes pension funds
2. Due to a change in this series, Swiss data prior to 1985 were
not comparable.
It seems unusual that three such markedly different financial
systems should exhibit similar characteristics. One justification that
could be put forwe-rd to explain these similarities relates to the
comparative advantage of trade in financial services. A recent article
by Arndt (1988) examined cross-border bank credit flows of twenty
countries from which he identified five main categories:
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industrial countries with relatively small cross-border bank credit
flows (United States, Japan, Germany, Italy and Spain).
industrial countries with more substantial but moderate cross-
border bank credit flows (France, Netherlands and Austria).
industrial countries and newly industrialised countries (NICs) with
very large cross-border bank credit flows (United Kingdom, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Singapore).
booking or reporting centres (Bahamas, Cayman Islands).
oil exporters with surplus petro-dollars (Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates).
Arndt suggested that countries in the first two categories have
been responsible for bank lending abroad in the same proportion relative
to t_ size of their financial systems, whereas those in the other three
categories have, 'in one way or another', specialised in international
bank lending 2 . It could well be that this 'specialisation' explains why
countries such as the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Switzerland exhibit
markedly higher value adde . and compensation of employees figures than
other European countries.
2.2.3 Banking regulatory and policy trends
Most European governments confined their macroeconomic policy attention
towards dampening down inflationary pressures and expectations during
the late 1970s and early 1980s. In addition, they also began to aim at
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reducing market supply-side constraints, thus placing greater emphasis
on the allocative powers of the market. Throughout Europe there has
been a noticeable rise of market-based methods of economic, financial
and monetary control. The 1980s witnessed a liberalisation of worldwide
financial markets as well as liberalisation in the traditional banking
arena (see IMF, 1991 and Leipold, 1991).
Worldwide financial liberalisation has been characterised inter
al ga by widespread capital market reforms, governments encouraging
equity participation, privatisation programmes and the dismantling of
the traditional barriers between commercial banking and the securities
market. Liberalisation in traditional banking markets has been evident
through policies directed at increasing price competition as well as
changing officias' attitudes towards the type of business activities in
which banks and non-bank financial institutions can engage.
Regulators are finding it increasingly difficult to identify the
relevant regulatees (those who are l.egulated). As the traditional
barriers that used to segment financial business undertaken in different
current; .s and countries break down, so do those characteristics which
used --o differentiate financial and non-financial institutions.	 The
blurring of distinctions between financial institutions is most
noticeable in those countries which attempt (or have attempted) to apply
a 'rigid compartmentalisation of financial institutions' (Pecchioli,
1987, p.65), as, for example, in the case of France, Italy and Spain.
25
This process of change is also at work where banks are already allowed
to operate as multi-purpose or universal financial organisations. The
blurring of distinctions between financial institutions is usually
referred to as the universalisation of banking business, after the
universal banking structures found in Germany, Switzerland and the
Benelux countries. Even in those countries which were already perceived
to have universal banking systems there has been a noticeable shift of
emphasis towards capital market activities during the 1980s and more
recently a renewed emphasis on `core' domestic banking business.
In countries like France, where there had been a distinct legal
separation between banking and securities business, new laws (see
Economist, 1986a, 1986b and Euromoney, 1988) have enabled banks to
participate more actively ii. capital markets business. Restrictions on
securities underwriting are now `virtually non-existent' (Pecchioli,
1987, p. 58) in European countries, and in the great majority of
countries securities business is regarded as an important element of
commercial banking.	 Another example of the df A ine in traditional
demarcation lines in banking relates to the separation of short-,
medium- and long-t , --m business.	 Up until the early 1970s, banking
business in FraT.ce, Italy and Spain was clearly segmented, with
different institutions doing the various types of term business. This
distinction has almost disappeared in France and Spain.
Throughout the major European economies, `t is possible to discern
a long-term trend towards a regulatory framework which ;flows more
effective competition between the various partic-l.pants in the financial
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services industry' (OECD, 1985, pp.21). Nevertheless, a concomitant
policy reaction to the liberalisation of both financial and banking
markets has been the supervisory re-regulatory response. There has been
a general increase in the supervision of financial markets and
institutions. The recent international co-ordination of banking
supervision and the increased concern of regulators with systemic risk
have heightened both regulators' and regulatees' attitudes towards the
solvency, liquidity and profitability of financial institutions. As
financial institutions continue to undertake a wider range of
activities, there is an associated need for co-ordination between
banking and financial market supervisors, especially as:
... the problem of systemic risk in capital markets may require
tighter supervision of market makers' capital and liquidity whether
market-making is undertaken as past of a banking conglomerate or
not	 (BIS, 1987, p.87).
In particular, there is still considerable confusion as to which
should bear ultimate regulatory responsibility if a bank fails, due to
its capital markets business3.
As European macroeconomic policy attention in the late 1970s and
early 1980s concentrated on dampening inflation and price expectations
through tight monetary policy methods, experience throughout the 1980s
has now convinced policymakers that even the largest countries must take
their exchange rates into consideration when formulating monetary
policy. The link between exchange rates and monetary policy has become
increasingly evident through explicit and implicit exchange-rate
targeting.	 In the area of exchange-rate co-ordination, the European
Monetary System (EMS) has been relatively effective at stabilising
member countries' exchange-rate parities (at least up until September
1992 when the EMS was in disarray in the run-up to and after the French
referendum on Maastricht). The widespread adoption by governments of
co-ordinated exchange-rate intervention on a large scale has been an
important feature of recent macroeconomic policymaking. The Plaza
Agreement  of September 1985 and the Louvre Accord, confirmed by the
Group of Seven in September 1987 5 were both directed at the problems
associated with current account imbalances and stabilising exchange-rate
parities.
International co-ordination has since the early 1980s been
dominated by the problems associated with the geographical pattern of
payments imbalances between the industrialised _ountries and the
indebtedness of developing countries. There is no doubt that the next
few years will experience an ever-increasing movement towards the
internationalisation of regulatory frameworks. Nowhere will this be
more apparent than in Europe where the EC governments aim to complete an
internal market in financial services by the end of 1992. The
intentions - as set out in the 1985 EC Wh = :e Paper on Completing the
Internal Market (Commission of the Europe,^.n Communities, 1985) - are to
eliminate all restrictioi..on capital tlows 6 and create an internal
market in financial services by 1992.
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2.3 European Institutions and International Influences
2.3.1 The European Community (EC)
Various institutions and international organisations have had a
significant influence in moulding the financial and economic
characteristics of European countries over the last thirty years. The
establishment of the European Community, the European Monetary System
(EMS) and moves toward Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) deserve a
special mention, given the possible eventual outcome of an integrated
European financial system and the significant impact of such an event on
different countries banking systems. The signing of the Treaty of Rome
in 1957, establishing the Community, was a watershed in the development
of pan-European economic and monetary unification. The commoi, market
came into being on 1 January 1958 with six member countries: Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. It was this
group that established the foundations for the ultimate goal of a
unified internal market.
Under the Treaty of Rome the internal market wa- viewed as one
which allowed `free movement of goods, persons and services'.
Throughout the 1960s, however, greater emphasis appeared to be placed on
the real sector and intra-industry trade in general, and it was not
until the late 1960s that European monetary integration was discussed in
substantial detail. The establishment of the Committee of Governors of
the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Communities in
1964, however, added a fillip towards these discussions. 	 The most
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important factor influencing the move towards integration at the end of
the 1960s was what various commentators, like Tsoukalis (1977) and
Ypersele and Koeune (1984), have referred to as the `cumulative logic of
integration'. That is, the natural consequence of a common market in
real goods calls for some form of monetary/financial integration,
because the integration of markets makes economies more interdependent.
In addition, the idea that EC countries could collectively lessen the
adverse impact of external shocks by means of monetary integration was a
further important factor supported by proponents of integration.
In early 1968 the Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Pierre Werner,
issued a plan containing proposals for fixing exchange rates between
Community currencies, a European unit of account and a European Monetary
Fund. This led to a flurry of activity which resulted in a series of
'plans' on the co-ordination of economic policies and monetary co-
operation within the Community. The Barre Plan (named after Raymond
Barre, then the EC Commission's vice -president), submitted to the
Council c- EC Ministers on 12 February 1969, conspired to reawaken
interest in monetary integration by proposing, among other things, that
the Community should introduce a system for short-term monetary s,_jport
as well as examining ways to eliminate fluctuation margins oetween
European currencies. Other plans followed7
 and these formed the basis
for examination by the Werner Group and the Werner Report, published in
May 1970, which proposed that economic and monetary union should be
achieved within ten years (ie. by 1980). A second Werner Report,
published in October 1970, reiterated the same points as the first, but
introduced some minor qualifications (see Coffey and Presley, 1971,
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pp. 49•-56) .
At the beginning of 1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom
joined the European Community, but `the progress towards economic and
monetary union amounted to little over the period 1973 to 1977'
(Yperslee and Ioeune, 1984, p.43).	 At the meeting of the European
Council on 6-7 July 1978, the heads of state and government of the
member countries decided to create a European Monetary System, whose
main operational principles were defined later that year. The EMS had
two main concerns: 	 firstly, to stabilise exchange rates via an
exchange-rate mechanism and, secondly, thereby to improve monetary
integration and thus increase prospects for economic progress $ . Members
of the EMS now include Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Germany, France,
Breland, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United Kingdom and Portugal.
Greece joined the European Community in 1981 but iE not yet in the EMS.
Although the EMS was introduced as an exchange-rate regime, an
intervention system cf central banks and a credit and settlement
arrangement between central banks and governments, the system does have
important implications for commercial banking. It provides a framework
which affects:
... phenomena and attitudes in several markets in which commercial
banks are active, viz the foreign exchange markets, the loan and
deposits markets, the bond markets. The EMS bears on the relations
between banks and public authorities. It means official.
interference in some financial markets, which the bankers usually
dislike, but it also promises official backing and support for some
financial activities and innovations, which the banters usually
like and request (Abraham et a1., 1984, p.7)
J ^
De Boissieu (1988)	 provides a detailed analysis of financial
liberalisation and the evolution of the EMS.
The ECU (European Currency Unit) is at the heart of the operations
of the EMS, and is used to determine central rates in the exchange-rate
mechanism as well as a means of settlement between EMS monetary
authorities. The increased official usage of ECUs has led to a
widespread literature (Moss, 1984; Micossi, 1985; Jager and de Jong,
1988) on developing its private usage as well as proposing that the ECU
become an International Currency. By the end of 1989 progress towards a
European Monetary Union (EMU) was gathering pace.
The Treaty on European Union, which was agreed at Maastricht on 11
December 1991 a,,d officially signed by the Heads of State and Government
of the 12 Member States on 7 February 1992, marks the culmination of two
decades of moves to create a single integrated European market. From
the point of view of European Monetary Union, the process entails in
particular the achievement, possibly by 1 January 1997 and, at the
latest, by 1 January 1999 - a of a single monetary policy controlled by
an indr .,endent European Central Bank (ECB) and, shortly thereafter, the
adopt-.Lon of the ECU as the single currency of monetary union. The
blueprint for EMU which was set out in the Maastricht Treaty is the
product of a number of reports (for example, the Werner Report (1970)
and the Delors Committee Report (1989)), various European Council
meetings and an intergovernmental conference.
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Table 2 . 7 The three stages of EMU
Time period Objectives
Stage 1	 December 1991 to Closer	 economic	 and monetary	 co-
1 January 1994 operation
	
between	 member
	 states
within the existing institutional
framework
	 aimed	 at	 greater
convergence of economic performance.
It	 includes	 the	 completion	 of	 the
Single Market and the	 strengthening
of Community competition policy.
Stage 2	 January 1994 to no Will	 reinforce economic	 convergence
later than 1 beyond
	 Stage	 1,	 including	 the
January 1999 necessary institutional developments:
mainly a European Monetary
	 Institute
(EMI), with an advisory role,
	 taking
over	 the functions of the
	 Committee
of	 Governors	 of	 EC	 Central	 Banks.
Aims to strengthen the co-ordination
of member
	 states	 monetary policies,
while	 still	 leaving	 ultimate
responsibility	 for	 policy	 with
national
	 authorities,	 will	 also
involve technical preparations for
Stage 3.
(It was agreed by member states at Maastricht that full EMU - known as
Stage 3 - should commence for those judged eligible to participate, no
later than 1 January 1991. But if the heads of state or government-
decide, by qualified majority, they may set an earlier date for the
start of Stage 3. Stage 3 could begin as early as 1997, or earlier if
the necessary conditions are met).
Stage 3 1 January 1999 at the
la' :st
Full EMU whic. includes:
-	 irrevocable locking of exchange
rates between participating
currencies and a single monetary
policy leading to the adoption of
single currency in due course
- the European Central Bank (ECB)
and European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) will be responsible for
issuing and managing the single
currency - the ECU - that will
replace national currencies
- the primary objective of the ECB
and the ESCB in undertaking monetary
policy will be to maintain price
stability - they will also be
required to support the general
economic policies in the Community.
Note:	 Fo-- a detai'...-i exposition of the three stages, see the Bank of
Ei.^land Qua Y `erly Bulletin, February 1992, pp. 64-68
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The Delors Report set out three stages leading to EMU, which were
included in the Maastricht Treaty, and these are shown in Table 2.7. In
general the Maastricht agreement envisaged that the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM) would harden progressively into a single currency from
the beginning of 1994 and that member states would do all that was
possible to reduce their budget deficits and meet the best rates of low
inflation and interest rates by the end of 1996, in accordance with the
convergence criteria of the treaty. By early 1992 European financial
markets had appeared to have accepted the eventual advent of EMU, but
had been sceptical about it being achieved within the timetable set.
The timetable now seems even more unlikely to be achieved since the
Danish electorate cast a 'No' vote 	 2 June 1992 on the Maastricht
Treaty on European union. Apart from the possibility of a second Danish
referendum, the only way EMU can conti... ,e on its `fast track' is for all
twelve member states to agree a new treaty with amendments and various
opt-out clauses designed to overcome the Danish opposition. 	 This
however, would be a practical and political minefield. 	 Despite the
`yes' vote cast by the Irish Republics electorate on 18 J •.ne and the
French 'yes' vote on 20 September 1992, there is now much greater
uncertainty regarding the inir - - al timetable for EMU.
The target date for the beginning of Stage 2 of EMU, which
envisages greater stability of exchange rates within the ERM and closer
co-ordination and convergence of economic and monetary policy, is 1
January 1994. This, in fact, now seems unattainable, given the hurdles
that have to be cleared before the Maastricht Treaty can be ratified by
all twelve member states. In addi ^:ion, the turmoil in foreign exchange
markets brought about by the referendum in September which led to; the
suspension of sterling and the Italian lira from the ERM; introduction
of foreign exchange controls in Ireland and Portugal and capital
controls to protect the Spanish peseta. These factors have cast a
shadow of doubt over the likelihood of foreign exchange rate convergence
within the EMS by January 1994. Despite probable delays to the
timetable, however, the institutions and momentum of EMU appear to
remain intact.
The commitment to EMU will continue to be driven by both political
motives and economic benefits such as lower transaction costs, the
elimination of currency risk as a result of the L ' -igle currency and the
policy disciplines aimed at maintaining low rates of interest and
inflation. The move towards a single currenc) will have the most
immediate impact on the banking sector. Stage 2 will be the preparatory
period for implementing the single currency during which the newly
established European Monetary Institute (the forerunner of the European
Central Bank (ECB) and European System of Central Banks) (ESCB) will,
among its many tasks, be required:
-	 to facilitate the use of the EC1' and oversee the development,
including the smoot=h functioning, of the ECU clearing system;
-	 promote the efficiency of EC cross-border payments;
-	 to 'consult' with central banks on issues affecting the stability
of financial institutions and markets;
-	 co-ordinate monetary policy between member states.
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Burani (1992) has noted that, during this preparatory phase, banks
will have to undertake many changes relating to the integration of the
ECU which concern;
-	 translation of accounting records and systems, monetary
instruments, documentation of all kinds;
drafting of legal rules in contracts;
-	 software conversion and adaptation;
-	 changes in hardware, to accept and distribute new ECU notes (ATMs
and counting machines);
-	 training of bank staff;
-	 provision of information to customers.
These changes, as well as the cost of manufacturing, w.__ehousing
and distribution of ECU denominated notes and coins, will impose burdens
on the banks and will undoubtedly cause confusion, given that there will
be two legal tenders - the ECU and the national currency - in
circulation at the same time. Management of notes and coins, in ECU and
national currency will cause problems if a dual circulation system
develops, this is especially the case if the demand f- • ECU currency by
retail banks customers is negligible. Customers wil -_ only shift to ECUs
if the benefits of using this currency outweighs the costs of using
national currencies. This may well be the case in wholesale and capital
markets business where costs and foreign exchange risk car_ be reduced by
using ECU denominated transactions - the appeal to retail customers is
far less certain. Obviously, once a single currency is in place, there
will be no need for exchange operations between the _ur=ences of
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countries within the single monetary area and banks will suffer loss of
income as a result.
Hislop (1992) shows that the overall loss of revenue for European
banks vary widely - from the ECU 8-13 billion per annum estimated by the
EC Commission in 1989, to ECU 150-220 million per annum for UK
manufacturers alone estimated by the CBI in 1990. The latter estimate,
which relates to UK manufacturers' savings on intra European cross-
country deals is equivalent to around ECU 1-2 billion on a Europe-wide
basis.	 In addition Hislop (1992) also notes that without any
compensating factors, the introduction of a single European currency
covering all EC countries, including the Swiss Franc (assuming
Switzerland joins the EC) would reduce foreign exchange trading volumes
in London by over 30 per cent (in fact Swiss voters voted against closer
links with the EC in a referendum held at the beginning of December
1992). Other potential costs to banks include:
redu(cion in need for specialist currency teams to advise
corporates on EC currency swap and forward transactions.
-	 the risk of having to undertake greater trading risk in ord • _- to
make-up for lost income (the adverse selection problem);
-	 increased competition. At present no single bank has more than a 2
per cent share of the overall European foreign exchange market and
no one financial centre currently enjoys a significant competitive
advantage;
diversion of capital flows from outside the EC to intra-conununity
transactions because of the lower risk and attractiveness of the
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larger single market;
risks associated with financial instruments denominated in national
currencies whose maturity dates exceed the conversion to single
currency date;
decline in business for banks who dominate the lead management and
underwriting of issues denominated in their national currencies.
(See Lomax (1992), Wilmot (1992), Hislop (1992), Adlercreutz
(1992), and the ECU Banking Association (1992) for further
details).
Many of the above factors will primarily affect the larger
.iternational banks, although it is these banks that are more likely to
benefit from the increased scope of ECU lending and investment
orportunities throughout member states brought about by greater intra-EC
trade and investment. Larger banks will be more inclined to undertake
business throughout the EC, especially given that they will no longer
need to match currency denominations or to incur risk on an open foreign
exchange position. The benefits accruing to these banks will clearly be
closely related to the scale of cross-border provision of services.
Various studies reported in De Pecunia (1992) note that moves
towards a single currency will also require that efficient arrangements
for cross-border payments and settlement are in place. A discussion
paper published by the EC Commission in September 1990 called 'Making
payments in the internal market' noted that existing cross-border retail
payments systems are deficient in transparency (consumers do not know
which system is the best), speed, reliability and cost. Further work
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undertaken by the Commission suggests that electronic funds transfer
systems developed by competing private sector networks appear to be the
best way to improve cross-frontier payments for consumers. In the case
of wholesale payments, the ECU Bankers' Association EC clearing system
has been successful in facilitating the growth in the private use of the
ECU, but with the increased volume of business envisaged in the run-up
to EMU, and given the EMI's brief to develop clearing and settlement
systems, it is uncertain as to whether the system should be privately
operated or run by the EMI or its successor the ECB. It might even be
the case that two systems - one private and one public - evolve. It
also needs to be considered as to who will have access and membership to
such a systee and who decides on these issues. Probably EC competition
policy wilt have influence in determining some of these matters.
At the time of writing, the momentum for the creation of monetary
union is moving ahead, yet the optimistic timetable laid-out by the
Maastricht Treaty is unlikely to be achieved.
2.3.2 European Free Trade Association and the European Economic Area
The twelve member states of the European Community (EC) and the seven
members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) (comprising,
Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and
Switzerland) reached an agreement in December 1991 which would result in
the creation of a 19-nation European Economic Area (EEA). The EEA would
become the largest free trade area in the world, accounting, by some
measures, for nearly half of all world-trade. At the time of writing,
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the parties have postponed the ratification of the final text pending
developments at the EC Court of Justice which has been asked to examine
the compatibility of the agreement with EC law. The EEA Agreement:
... does not automatically extend future EC legislation to the EFTA
countries, but rather establishes a procedure under which agreement
must be reached between the EC and EFTA countries for incorporation
of this future EC legislation in the EEA Agreement.
(Sussmann and Webb (1991 p.24)
In the financial services sectors, the incorporation in the EEA
agreement of the rules contained in the EC Treaty regarding the right of
establishment and the freedom to provide cross-border services and of
much of the related EC legislation implementing it are of significant
importance.	 For banks, t1- 4 s means, for example that the rules and
regulations set out in the EC Second Banking Directive (discussed in
more detail in Chapter 3) would now enable them to operate throughout
the EEA under the supervision of the banking authorities in the EC or
EFTA country in which their head office 	 based.	 During the
transitional F age various EFTA countries can retain certain existing
restrictions c._i foreign investment in domestic financial institutions
and in addition the EEA Agreement permits Switzerland certain
privileges relat -_ng to their bank secrecy laws. The effect of the EEA
Agreement on the insurance and it-vestment services sector is unclear
because the third non-life and life insurance directives as well the
investment services directive has not yet been adoptec. by the EC.
Eventual implementation of these directives by the EFTA countries will
require further consultation between the parties. 	 Moves towards LEA
were dealt a se-rere blow when the Swiss electorate: voted 'No` to closer
Elm
European integration in a referendum held on the 6 December 1992. The
planned introduction of the EEA on 1 January 1993 will be delayed for at
least six months while other EFTA countries renegotiate the details of
EEA entry.
2.3.3 Bank for International Settlements
Another organisation that is increasing in importance in relation to
European banking matters is the Bank for International Settlements
(BIS). Based in Basle, Switzerland, this organisation is the central
bankers' central bank. It has for some time monitored international
banking and financial business by of aining data which banks in
different countries report to it 9 .	 the collapses of Bankhaus I.D.
Herstatt and Franklin National Bank in 1:.4 led to the establishment of
the Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory practices (better
known nowadays as the Basle Committee, but formerly the Cooke Committee
and initially the Blunden Committee), under the auspices of the BIS.
The principal objective of this committee was to establish retailed
supervisory practices to ensure that the foreign operations of banks
could not escape the supervisory - 3t.
The Cooke Committee" endorsed a concordat on international bark
supervisory co-operation in 1975 which indicated the relevant
supervisory responsibilities of parent and host country supervisors.
During 1978 the Governors of the EIS endorsed the Cooke Committee
proposals that banks' capital adequacy should be monitored entirely on a
consolidated basis.	 Nevertheless, ..he collapse of Banco Ambrosiana
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Holdings in 1982 indicated certain failings of the supervisory framework
and this led to a revised version of the 1975 concordat. In 1986 the
Cooke Committee published a further documentation (BIS, 1986a) concerned
with the prudential features associated with off-balance sheet
exposures.
The harmonisation of international capital adequacy standards took
a further step forward in December 1987 after the BIS outlined proposals
to unify capital requirements for banks in the industrialised world. Of
these, the European element refers to banks in Belgium, France, Italy,
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, West Germany and
Switzerland. The role of the BIS as a co-ordinac r and standard-setter
for bank supervisors will undoubtedly continue as capital adequacy
continues to be one of the most important issues _.acing European banks
today.
2.3.4 International Monetary Fund
Finally, we should at least note another prominent international
organisation that influences European bank 4 ig and which has an important
role to play in the world financial system. The International Monetary
Fund's (IMF) main aim ie to promote an international monetary system in
which payments adjustment fosters international prosperity.	 Its
objectives are to improve exchange-rate stability, to manage
international liquidity and to deal effectively with debt restructuring
programmes. Although the IMF provided the forum and staff input for the
Plaza and Louvre agreements, and has increasin,,ly stressed the need for
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structural reform in both developed and less developed countries, it
appears to have little influence in the surplus countries (Hains, 1988).
Nevertheless, its role as a multilateral lending institution, and the
principal co-ordinator of Third World debt, together with the World Bank
group, will influence the problems associated with Third World debt and
this affects the provisioning responses of European banks.
2.4 Select Perspectives of European Banking Systems
2.4.1 A short history of banking in Europe
History shapes where we are at today and as such it is import—it to
provide a brief history of European banking to illustrate how various
systems have developed. The historical development of European
countries' banking and financial systems has been moulded by a wide
range of diverse socio-economic, political and geographical factors.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify various broad banking trends
tLat have been experienced in many of the indus rrialised European
countries since the seventeenth century.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries all European
banking systems were unit-based. Banks were predominantly small private
institutions that specialised in serving the needs of local markets. A
small proportion of these banks were engaged in financing international
trade and these tended to be based in the main financial centres.
Revell (1987, pp.17-18) identified that by the first ha-,.f of the
nineteenth century banking systems were characterised by two main
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banking groups; those based in large towns financing both domestic and
international trade and those groups dispersed throughout the country
financing local industry, which was predominantly agricultural.
Kindleberger (1984, pp.73) argues that, even by this stage, in many
cases banking business was no more than an additional activity
undertaken by goldsmiths, merchants, notaries, industrialists and tax
farmers.
As the Industrial Revolution gained momentum it encouraged the
establishment of new, large, joint-stock banks based in metropolitan
areas. These banks competed with the unit banks which were country-
based as well as with a whole range of (mainly) newly-established mutual
bodies such as savings banks, building societies, co-operatives,
agricultural credit associations and the like. The private country
banks gradually declined in numbers, partially because the larger
metropolitan joint-stock banks acquired them, and also as a result of
the desire of the larger banks to establish substantial branch networks.
As industry began to spread to new areas and also became more
concentrated, banks increased their geographical coverage through
branching and also grew in size so as to provide the funds required Jy
their large industrial customers. In the last quarter of the nineteenth
century nationwide branch networks were created by the large banks in
most European countries.
Kindleberger (1984) identified the nineteenth century as also
witnessing the rise of `single financial centres', such as London and
Paris, which tended to dominate national finance. The same process was
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at work in countries like Germany and Italy where `political unification
came later'. It was in these centres that groups of dominant or `core
banks' were based:
Between about 1880 and 1920 there appeared in all countries a
recognisable group of dominant or `core' banks, recognised both by
the authorities and by the general public. They were referred to
popularly as the Big Three, the Big Five, or whatever the number
may have been (Revell, 1987, pp.21)
As the branch networks of the larger banks became dominant at the
turn of the century, there were two main factors that restricted their
growth. Firstly, there had been a trend in various Continental European
countries, like France, for the local and regional banks to create
groups that could compete effectively with the larger national banks in
their own region.
	
Secondly, political factors in various countries
sought to encourage (protect) competition between -regional and national
banks. In those countries with Federal governments, like Germany and
Switzerland, regional institutions will play a more important role. It
is still the case that, up until recently, in countries such as France,
Italy and Spain banks registered at a local, regional and national
level.	 In addition, branching restrictions that remained in many
European countries up until the 1960s also helped to preserve the status
of various regional and local institutions.
Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the
relationship between banking and commerce differed substantially from
country to country. In the United Kingdom banks mainly financed trade,
and most industrial finance came via the capital markets or from
internal funding. Occasionally UK banks undertook industrial lending
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but only on a short-term basis. In contrast, Continental banks fostered
much closer relations with industry. Kindleberger (1984) notes that
industrial banking began in Belgium in the second quarter of the
nineteenth century. Banks in Germany, Austria, Sweden and, up until the
1930s, in Italy formed the closest links with industry. The twentieth
century has witnessed the polarisation of many of these trends. Banking
markets have become more concentrated, sectoral ownership has continued
to change and universal-type banking is becoming the `norm' rather than
the exception.
2.4.2 Structural differences between European banking systems
The study of structural development in European banking markets involves
an examinatio., of the changes in the size, numbers and comparative
significance of banks and other financial institutions within a
financial system as well as embracing those institutional changes which
alter the ways in which financial services are demanded, used, developed
and delivered. Although every -'uropean banking system has its
distinguishing features, there are various characteristics that help to
disti, -uish Continental banking systems from those based on the British
modr.i 11 . Revell (1987) identified five common elements of Continental
banking systems:
-	 the presence of various special credit institutions which are
usually publicly owned and provide funds for various sectors such
as industry, agriculture and property.
-	 the increased importance of savings banks, co-operative (popular)
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banks and co-operative credit associations, together with their
central institutions.
-	 a long history of commercial banks' participation in the ownership
and management of industrial enterprises, `relics of which still
linger on'
the importance in many European countries of banks and other
institutions which are organised on a local or regional basis,
`usually reflecting the prevalence of small enterprises in both
industry and agriculture'
and a degree of similarity between the new banking laws that were
enacted in many countries following the crisis during the early
1930s.
Sometimes a distinction is made between the role that commercial
banks in different countries play in financing industry.
	 Some
commentators (Frazer and Vittas, 1984; Rybczynski, 1984) distinguish
between bank-based systems, such as those found in Germany, France, the
Netherlands and Sweden, and market-based systems such as those found in
the United Kingdom (and the United StatEJ).
	 In the former group of
countries, commercial banks have traditionally been strongly orientated
towards the corporate sector, and this has provided opportunities for
public se ,.tor and mutual institutions to adopt a more significant role
within the banking system, through concentrating their business on the
retail customer and small to medium corporate clients.
Frazer and Vittas (1984) explain that commercial banks in Germany,
the Netherlands and Sweden made a concerted effort to improve their
standing in the retail banking market from the late 1950s onwards. They
also f and tha. Suring the 1960s similar developments took place in
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Northern and Central European banking systems. This they have termed as
the 'start of the retail banking revolution'. Changes in the
competitive environment for retail banking took longer to emerge in
Southern Europe (because of regulatory constraints and low standards of
living) and in the United Kingdom (where there was less incentive for
the clearing banks to move into retail banking business).
With regard to the sectoral ownership of banking institutions in
various European countries it can be seen from Table 2.8 that private
domestic sector banks accounted for over 60 per cent of total banking
sector assets in Denmark, Ireland, and the Netherlands, and around 50
per cent in Spain, Sweden and Switzerland in 1988 12 . On the other hand,
Table 2.8 Summary of sector ownership of European banking institutions,
1988 (% of aggregate total 2çsets
Country Private Public (Central & Mutual Foreign
local government)
Austria 0.4 43.8 55.8 -
Belgium 37.0 16.8 11.0 35.2
Denmarka 69.5 1.3 29.2 -
Finland 44.5 10.5 44.2 0.8
France 24.2 42.2 20.2 13.5
German 32.0 49.5 16.7 1.8`
Greece 11.0 8'.7 - 5.3
Ireland 61.7 4.0 12.9 21.4
Italy 12.3 67.9 16.8 3.0
Netherlands 61.2 8.1 17.7 13.0
Norway 41.2 19.9 38.9 -
Portugal 6.8 87.1 1.9 4.2
Spain 49.0 2.3 37.7 11.0
Sweden 52.9 19.3 24.9 2.9
Switzerland 53.4 19.6 15.8 11.2
United 31.8 1.0 14.0 53.3
Kingdom
Source:	 Gardener and Molyneux (1991, p.21)
Notes:	 a Figures for pe-centage of total deposits.
b Figures for F.rcentage •f total credit.
c Branches of )reign b-- .s .
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in 1988 public sector organisations 13 controlled over 70 per cent of
banking sector assets in Portugal and Greece over 40 per cent in Italy,
France (through the wholesale nationalisation in 1981) and Germany. In
Germany nearly 50 per cent of banking sector assets are controlled by
public sector institutions, but they have a different significance from
the same statistical phenomenon evident in France and Italy. Savings
banks in Gemany are under the control of local Under governments.
Their central institutions, the Girozentralen, are organised on a
Federal basis and are very large international banks. Although they are
in the public sector, these institutions cannot be regarded as
nationalised institutions or under the direct control of the central
government.
In Italy the central institutions of the savings banks, co-
operative banks and rural banks are less important. The public sector
in Italy is dominated by public law banks 14 , national interest
banks 15 and the savings banks. In Belgium the public sector consists of
only three banks 16 which are controlled by central government. In
Sweden there is only one state-owned commercial bank and the postal
giro. Switzerland has a similar propor t .on of public sector banking
institutions: these are the cantonal Danks, which have been set up
under cantonal law and occupy a similar position to savings banks in the
German system. Finally, with regard to the public sector, Table 2.8
shows that it is relatively unimportant in Denmark, Ireland, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
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The mutual sector 17 differs in importance and composition across
European countries' banking systems, ranging from 1.9 per cent of
banking sector assets in Portugal to 55.8 per cent in Austria. 	 In
France (through Crédit Agricole) and the Netherlands (through Rabobank),
the agricultural credit co-operatives dominate the mutual sector,
although savings banks are relatively more important in France. 	 In
Denmark, Finland, Spain and Sweden, savings banks tend to dominate.
The relative importance of foreign banks also differs in European
banking systems. It can be seen that foreign banks dominate in the UK
banking system and also control a large proportion of banking sector
assets in Belgium and Ireland. In Luxembourg, foreign banks account for
somewhere around 90 per cent of the banking system's assets and most of
their capital is held in currencies other than the Luxembourg franc (see
OECD, 1987). Foreign bank penetration appears to be very low in Germany
and Italy and other evidence suggests it is even lower in Denmark and
Austria.
The marked increase in the number of foreign banks and other
financial institutions doing business in European arkets has led to
increases in:
-	 the importance of foreign assets and liabilities of domestic
banks (Harrington, 1987, p.24)
-	 the number and type of foreign institutions operating in
domestic banking markets (BIS, 1986b, p.151)
-	 the assets of foreign banks operating in European banking
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markets (BIS, 1986b, p.152)
The outcome of these trends is that foreign banks increasingly pose a
threat to domestic banks in European banking markets. Although some
commentators may disagree (Arthur Andersen, 1986), there appears to be a
definite trend towards outsider penetration in these markets, especially
when the incumbent domestic banks are perceived as lacking expertise.
Walter and Smith (1990, p.37) suggest that eurocurency banking business
will also continue to displace domestic currency banking business in the
balance sheets of many European banking sectors.
Table 2.9 illustrates the change in market shares by ownership
category between 1983 and 1985.	 The public sector has declined in
virtually all European banking markets. 	 The notable exception being
Italy where this sector increased its share by 7.5 per cent. 	 The
significant fall in the size of the public sector (and subsequent rise
in the private sector) in France is attributable to the privatisation of
five larga banks in 1986. Private sector banks' share of teal banking
sector assets has increased in the majority of European countries, the
exceptions being Austria, Denmark, Italy, Spain, Sweden a d the
Netherlands. In all but Italy and Sweden, the private banks lc,t ground
to the mutual institutions. In fact, the mutual institutions, contrary
to popular belief, appear to have fared quite well in maintaining market
shares throughout the 1980s.	 Table 2.9 also shows tha t, foreign bank
presence has increased in nearly all European banking market-,,
confirming the internationalisation trend.
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Table 2.9
	 Changea in market shares of European banks by ownership
category 1983-8(%)
Country Private Public Mutual Foreign
Austria
-1.2 -0.2 1.4 -
Belgium b 1.5 -5.2 2.4 1.3
Derunark` -0.1 -1.0 1.1 -
Finland b 1.0 -1.3 1.0 -0.6
France 19.7 -20.3 -2.7 3.4
Germany 0.9 0.4 0.7 -2.Oe
Greece 2.9 -5.1 - 2.2
Ireland 6.0 -0.2 0.7 -6.5
Italy -9.1 7.5 1.2 0.4
Netherlands 2.5 1.0 -5.8 2.3
Norway 5.9 -11.6 5.7 -
Spain -4.3 -5.6 6.2 3.7
Sweden -1.6 0.7 -2.0 2.9
Switzerlardd 2.0 -2.2 1.1 -0.8
United Kingdom -1.4 0.0 0.8 0.7
Source: Gardener and Molyneux (1991, p.22)
Notes:	 a Percentage share of total banking sector assets in 1988
minus percentage share of total banking sector assets in 1983.
b 1982-8
c Change in market shares relate to total deposits (Denmark)
and total credit (Greece).
d 1985-8
e Foreign bank branches only.
2.4.3 European banking compared to US and Japanese banking
One of the most noticeable differences between European banking systems
and those of the United States and Japan is that in the latter two
countries banking and securities institutions are separated by law,
whereas in most European countries these activities can be undertaken
within the same institution. 	 It is also the case that if this
institution happens to be a bank, it is subject to a uniform bank
supervisory framework. In the United States, however, banking business
is supervised by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance
52
Corporation and state authorities, and securities business is supervised
by the Securities and Exchange Commission. In Japan, banking activities
are regulated by the Bank of Japan, whilst securities business is
supervised by the Securities Bureau of the Ministry of Finance. Dale
(1987) argues that the separation of commercial and investment banking
is more artificial in Japan than in the United States. Nevertheless,
these mandatory divisions contrast markedly with the universal-type
banking undertaken in Germany, Switzerland, the Benelux countries and
(to a lesser extent) the United Kingdom.
Similarities may be drawn between the Japanese and various European
banking systems be•ause of Japan's comparable size to the larger
European nations. 	 Probably the closest parallel system is that of
Gemany where banks _orm close links with industrial customers. 	 The
Zaibatsu groups that have dominated commercial activities in Japan for
over 40 years often have large banks as their controlling elements.
Similarly, in Germany the banks' controlling interests in industry are
nurtured through cross-shareholdings and interlinking directorships.
The sectoral ownership of the Japanese banking system is different,
however, wit the private sector (dominated by the 13 city and 60 or so
regional hanks) controlling around 50 per cent of banking sector assets.
In addition, the mutual sector, through the credit co-operatives,
controls around one-third of the banking system. 	 The public sector
which dominates in Germany, is less influential in Japan because it
consists of only one institution - the Postal Savings Bank. This bank.
nevertheless, is the largest deposit-taking institution in the world and
controlled aroun,_ 18 per cent of the banking sector's total assets in
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1987. The only other similarity to the German system is that foreign
banks are relatively unimportant. 	 (See Suzuki (1987) for a detailed
account of the Japanese financial system).
In contrast to the relatively concentrated European banking
systems, the United States is characterised by a fragmented, unit-based
banking system consisting of some 14,130 institutions at the end of 1986
(OECD, 1988). This has been brought about by the dual system of bank
chartering and regulation and by various state branching laws. 	 The
state branch laws limit inter-state branching and some even restrict
intra-state branching. Although these geographic restrictions can be
circumvented (to a certaii. degree) through the establishment of
reciprocal agreements, banking holding companies, and corespondent and
chain banking activities, no JS bank can be said to have a nationwide
branch network. The US authorities recently set the legislative wheels
in motion to dismantle branching restrictions by the early 1990s. In
Europe every country apart from Italy had abandoned branching
restrictions by 1 988.	 Italy's branching restricti.ns were removed in
1991.
The introduct 4 on of a single banking licence in the European
Community by 1992 and the increased possibility of large cross-border
bank mergers may well encourage US legislators to break down the
considerable barriers to branching still evident in the United States.
In terms of banking structure, the large money-centre banks and the so-
called super-regionals have tended to dominate the commercial banking
scene over the last five years or so. (See Chew (1991)). The number of
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banking institutions in Japan has stayed relatively constant since the
early 1980s, although there has been a substantial decline in the United
States, especially with the demise of the US savings and loans industry.
2.5 Conclusion
It is clear that the environment of European banking is complex and
changing. Two major policy trends that have influenced significantly
both the structure and strategies of European banks have been the dual
forces of structural deregulation and supervisory re-regulation. 	 The
former has created a more competitive environment and allowed banks to
offer a broader range of products and se•',rices by dismantling certain
demarcation lines between particular types of business. Banks in most
European countries have been able for some ._ime to participate freely in
capital markets and investment banking business. On the other hand, the
non-bank competitors have been allowed to offer banking-type services
creating a major competitive threat, especially in retail banking
markets. Financial innovations and technological developments in the
provision of financial services have been the main underlying economic
motives forcing these changes. Po' ed on the brink of 1992 and the road
to EMU European banking is now a- a very important crossroads. Against
the background cf this overview, the following cnapter will explore in
greater detail some of the important structure and performance
characteristics of European banking.
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Notes
1.	 Note that all references to Germany in this Chapter and the
remainder of this thesis refer to W. Germany - pre-unification.
2. Although there are various problems associated with this type of
analysis, the pattern indicated by cross-border bank credit flows
is 'probably as close as we can get towards ident i fying the major
trade flows'.
3. Fry (1988, p.255) also notes the lack of theory and discussion on
the effects of simultaneous deregulation and reregulation in
banking markets.
4. The Plaza Agreement was made between the United States, Japan,
Germany, the United Kingdom and France, and its aim was to lessen
current account imbalances by an agreed change in par^t4es.
5. The Louvre Accord, as confirmed by the Group of Seven, (United
States, Japan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada)
aimed to stabilise the dollar vis -à -vis member currencies.
6. As at the beginning of 1990 capital movements are completely free
in Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom and subject to the applicatio.. o_ zhe two-tier exchange
market in Belgium and Luxembourg. Apart f om Spain and Portugal,
the most recent members to the EC, only G eece and Ireland maintain
restrictions.
7. The 'other' plans were, the Schiller Plan for Monetary, Economic
and Financial Co-operation, the Second Barre Plan and various
suggestions set out by M. Giscard d'Estaing for the creation cf a
European. Reserve Fund.
8. Countries that are members of the EMS a r-t entitled to take part in
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discussions on the functions and developments of the system,
including the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), and to attend
conferences to alter central exchange rates, whether or not they
are members of the ERM.. All members of the EMS are allowed to join
the ERM which obliges them to maintain their exchange rates within
certain bands. Each ERM currency has a central rate of exchange
against the other currencies in the mechanism.	 The European
Currency Unit (ECU) is used as the numéraire where all
participating currencies have an ECU-related central rate. Central
rates are expressed as a certain quantity of currency per ECU.
Currencies are permitted to move up to 2.25 per cent above or below
their central rate, although the lira and peseta have a wider
margin of 6 per cent. Central banks agree to maintain the value of
their currencies within these limits. If exchange rates cannot be
maintained within these bands a realignment conference may be
called to consider changes in central rates.	 Central rates can
only be altered with the mutual agreement of the members of the
—er-hanism. Up until September 1992, the EMS had experienced eleven
such realignments.
9. The BIS includes the Group of Ten (G10) countries (Be_gium, Canada,
France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingd,,L, United
States and West Germany) as well as Luxembourg, Austr = a, Denmark,
Finland, ireland, Norway, Switzerland and Spain.	 It also covers
various banks engaged in international business in the Bahamas,
Cayman Islands, Hong Kong and Singapore, all offshore banking units
in Bahrain, all offshore banks operating in the Netherlands
Antilles and branches of US banks in Panama.
10. The members of the Cooke Committee consisted of representatives of
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the G10 countries and Luxembourg and Switzerland.
11. The distinction is made between those banking systems that follow
the British model: Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand and
South Africa and those that have Continental banking system
characteristics. The US banking system is viewed as a kind of
hybrid.
12. Gardener and Molyneux (1991)
13. Public sector institutions include nationalised commercial banks,
postal giros and postal savings banks and specialised banks which
deal mainly with export finance and long-term finance to industry.
14. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Banco di Sardegna, Istituto Bancario
San Paolo di Torino, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Banco di Napoli and
Banco di Sicilia.
15. These comprise Banca Commercial Italiana, Banco di Roma and Credito
Italiano, which are state-owned but have a monitory private sector
shareholding.
16. The two largest public sector banks are Crédit Communal, which
transacts business ..,a i.nly with provincial and local authorities but
has been increasing its general banking business, and Caisses
Generales d'Epargne et de Retraite (CGER), the same as a post
office or national savings bank, which was made into a public bank
in 1980.	 The Office des Cheques Postaux (OCP) provides postal
chequing facilities and is the third major public sector bank.
17. Mutual institutions include savings banks, building societies, co-
operative banks. Raiffeisen credit co-operatives and credit
unions, together with their central organisations.
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Chapter Three
Structure and Performance in European Banking Markets
3.1 Introduction
The preceding Chapter alluded to considerable differences in the
structure and performance characteristics of various European banking
markets. This Chapter examines some of these major differences and also
identifies features that influence the relationship between banking
structure and performance. 	 Particular attention is also paid to the
analysis of comparative competitive conditions across European banking
markets as provided in the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study.
Section 3.2 examines the regulatory framework in European banking
and shows how it impacts on market structure; Section 3.3 describes
competitive pressures in th_^ 1990s and focuses on the recent growth of
bank cross-border activity.
	 Section 3.4 examines the size and
concentration characteristics of European banking markets between 1986
and 1989.
	 This section illustrates some of the market structure
variables within the same time period in which the later SCP empirical
research of this thesis will be undertaken. 	 Sections 3.5 and 3.6
examine performance and ownership characteristics in European banking.
Finally, Section 3.7 examines the competitive environment in European
banking and analyses the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study on EC financial
sector integration after 1992. It is illustrated how this latter study
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incorporated an industrial organisations methodology which was used to
provide estimates of oligopoly profits in EC financial sectors and,
subsequently, producer surplus losses brought about through integration.
This approach, however, was de-emphasised by Cecchini, and only consumer
surplus gains were reported in the final analysis; although others have
suggested that the corresponding producer surplus loss estimates are
also important. The Price Waterhouse/Cecchini methodology, therefore,
provides us with an important justification as to why it is useful to
examine the SCP relationship across European banking markets: namely,
because the prevalence of significant oligopoly profits across European
banking markets would imply substantial producer-surplus losses in the
event of financial integration.
3.2 Market StructL._e and the Regulatory Environment
3.2.1 A brief historical and evolutionary perspective on structural
developments
One general view (Rybczynski, 1984; 1988) of the modern evolution of
banking ar •. financial systems is to identify the broad stages of
structural development in a kind of 'logical historical order'. From
the bank-orientated stage, a system develops through the market-
orientated stage to the so-called securitised phase.
	 In the bank-
orientated stage the majority of external funds raised by non-financial
companies are obtained from the banking system in the form of loans. An
exception to this is countries with universal banking systems, such as
in Germany and the Benelux countries, where banks supply risk capital in
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some form or another. In the bank-orientated era the degree of risk an
economy bears is primarily determined by the owners of the productive
resources and the banks.
The next stage of development is known as the market-orientated
phase. Here external funds obtained by non-financial firms are obtained
primarily through the capital markets. These latter markets channel a
growing proportion of savings of the personal sector, and non-bank
institutions like life assurance companies, investment trusts and other
portfolio-type institutions become more important. In the final
securitised (or 'strongly market-orientated') phase the majority of
external funds raised by non-Financial firms are acquired through the
capital and credit markets. During this period, non-bank institutions
such as finance companies and .3uilding societies rely more on funds
raised through the open credit markets. Depository institutions move an
increasing proportion of assets off their balance sheets and trade in
them. Securitisation and the rapid development of sophisticated off-
balance sheet (OBS) techniques are characteristic of t_iis stage.
It is argued that as a financial system moves from the bank-
orientated to the securitised stage the capacity of an economy to assume
risk increases; it -is also the active and indispensable ingredient of
re-structuring all mature and de-industrialising economies if all its
constituent parts (that is primary and secondary capital and credit
markets, markets for corporate control and markets for venture capital)
function effectively' (Rybczynski, 1988, p.11). 	 In Europe, only the
United Kingdom has reached this securitised phase. 	 Regulations have
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recently been passed in France, Italy and Spain that aim to move the
respective financial systems towards more market-orientated systems.
Germany's financial system is still heavily entrenched in the bank-
orientated phase of development (See Vittas (1986) and Mayer (1987) for
a comparison of the major European banking system which also supports
this view). Despite these very broad but important differences in the
evolution of financial systems, all European countries have experienced
marked structural developments during recent years.
3.2.2 The structure and performance relationship
The structure of any market is determined b.• a broad range of economic
as well as non-economic factors.	 These non-economic factors include
various geographical, legal, philosophical, political and social forces
which mould the institutional character of banking markets over time.
Consequently, European banking systems are characterised by a complex
array of institutions, organisational forms and legal frameworks, all of
which have contributed to the myriad forces that have created neir
different market structures.
The aforementioned background begs the question: `Why does
structure matter?'. Industrial economic theory suggests that there is a
causal link between market structure and bank conduct and performance.
More specifically, it has been argued that, in concentrated markets,
banks may earn collusive profits and thus antitrust policy should be
aimed at discouraging increases in market concentration (Weiss, 1974;
Heggestad and Mingo, 1977; Spellman, 1981; Rhoades, 1982a). 	 A
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substantial literature has burgeoned that is aimed at testing the
theoretical SCP (structure-conduct-performance) relationship. It has
been argued, however, that this literature contains too many
inconsistencies and contradictions to provide a satisfactory description
of the SCP relationship in banking (Gilbert, 1984; Osborne and Wendel,
1983). Contemporary approaches to the explanation of the link between
market structure and performance have emphasised an alternative
'efficient structure' hypothesis. This postulates that an industry's
structure arises as a result of superior operating efficiency by
particular firms. As a result, a positive relationship between bank
profits and structure can be attributed to gains made in market share by
more efficient banks. Various studies undertaken on i;,e US banking
industry (Brozen, 1982; Smirlock, 1985; Evanoff and Forter, 1988)
suggest that firm-specific efficiency seems to be the dom--ant variable
explaining bank profitability. (These issues will be covered in much
more detail in Chapter 4 and 5 of this thesis).
To date only one study, Ruthenberg (1991) has tested the structure-
performance relationship across European banking markets, using a
methodology similar to the US studies (See Chapter 3 for a more detailed
exposition). Ruthenberg (1991) finds par-ial evidence of the
traditional structure-performance relationship in that performance
increases with an increase in concentration for those banking markets
that have concentration levels above some critical value. The banking
markets which consistently fall above the 'critical level' of
concentration are Ireland, Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal.
Ruthenberg concludes:
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In sum, it appears that only relatively small, concentrated banking
markets; with an Herfindahl index greater than 0. 13, that are
characterised with relatively few competitors, and high entry
barriers can offer banking organisations that expand their
activities across borders a potential for decreased profits.
(pp.21-22).
The Molyneux and Thornton (1992) study finds stronger evidence that the
SCP paradigm holds across European banking markets. Overall, it seems
clear that the structure of a market influences the way in which banks
operate in that market. With these points in mind, we can examine a
number of important factors affecting banking structure in Europe.
3.2.3 Rules and regulations affecting structure
3.2.3.1 Definition of banking business and licensing requirements
The legal and supervisory framework under which banks operate is one of
the most important factors influencing the present and developing
structure in European banking markets, although there has never been a
unifr:_m approach to banking law throughout Europe. Even though the
banking laws enacted in most Continental European countr':s after the
widespread banking crises of the 1930s were similar in nE:ure (Revell,
1987), there is currently no legal consensus as to what constitutes
'banking business' and the permissible scope of bankins activity.
Pecchioli (1987) notes that the banking laws of Austria, France and
Germanyl provide a detailed description of what constitutes banking
business, whereas those of Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and the
United Kingdom are very broadly defined. In contrast, the Banking Acts
of Switzerland do not provide any precise definition of banking
business 2 .	 This, however, does not necessarily mean that banning
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systems that have a detailed legalistic definition of 'banking business'
are more restrictive: for example, the detailed and wide-ranging German
banking laws actively promote banks to operate as universal-type
institutions. The largest banks in the United Kingdom have now
partially achieved universal bank status, despite a completely different
legal framework.
Regulatory bodies can influence the size and structure of the
banking sector through their control over access to the banking system
via licensing.	 Compulsory bank licensing systems were introduced in
Ireland (1971), the Netherlands (1979), the United Kingdom (1979) and
France (1984) 3 . In these countries authorisation procedures are usually
based on the fulfilment of specific legal requirements where the
supervisory authorities have a certain degree of administrative
discretion.
	
Licensing bodies have full discretionary authority in
countries such as Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain and Sweden (see
Pecchioli, 1987, pp.46-56 and OECD, 1984, for a detailed examination of
licensing and branching regulations in OECD countries). In addition to
the granting of licences, the regulatory authorities have the power to
control the opening of new domestic branches by authorised institutions.
In various European countries the opening of a new domestic branch
requires either notification to the relevant supervisory authorities4 or
is subject to non-statutory requirements 5 .	 On the other hand, in
Finland, Greece and Italy 6 prior authorisation by the central bank is
required. Since the 1960s, regulations have been modified significantly
in only a handful of countries: most notably in France and Italy.
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3.2.3.2 EC regulatory environment
Over the last thirty years, the European Community has introduced
banking legislation aimed at harmonising regulations and fostering
competition. In this regard, Baltensperger and Dermine (1990) identify
three distinct regulatory time periods: deregulation of entry to
domestic markets from 1957 to 1973; attempts towards harmonisation of
banking regulations from 1973 to 1983; and the recent European
integration and 'internal market' proposal of freedom of cross-border
services, single banking licence, home country control and mutual
recognition.
Under the 1957 Treaty of Rome, the internal market was viewed as
one which allowed, 'free movement of goods, persons and services' and
the objective was to transform segmented national markets into a common
single market. In July 1965 the Commission proposed a Directive on the
Abolition of Restrictions on Freedom of Establishment and Freedom to
Provide Services in Respect of Self-employed Activities of Banks and
other Financial Institutions. This was adopted by the EC Council of
Mi-sisters in 1973 and aimed to ensure the equal treatment of national
and other firms of member states relating to entry into domestic markets
and the conditions under which banks are allowed to operatr!.
Subsidiaries of non-member country banks were to be regarded as EC
undertakings in every way. From 1973 onwards very little discrimination
remained as to entry into member states, although cross-border
competition was still severely hampered by capital restrictions. In
addition, there was non co-ordination of banking supervision, so banks
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operating in different countries were subject to different prudential
requirements. This led to the second period of attempts to harmonise
regulations.
Advances in harmonisation came in 1977 with the adoption of the
First Directive on the Co-ordination of laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking up and Pursuit of
Credit institutions (hereafter known as the First Banking Co-ordination
Directive). This directive established a definition of credit
institutions and the principle of home country control, whereby
supervision of credit institutions operating in various member countries
would be now the resp)nsibility of the home country of the parent bank.
A directive on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consolidated
basis was adopted in 983, along with two other directives relating to
bank accounting formats and consumer protection in 1986. Baltensperger
and Dermine (1990) state that despite the above legislation, European
banking markets were still far from full integration. A bank wishing to
operate in another country still had to be ;sthorised by the supervisors
of the other country. It remained subject to supervision by the host
country and i-s range of activities could be constrained by host country
laws. In addition in most countries, bank branches had to be provided
with earmarked endowment capital as if they were new banks. Finally,
the supply of cross-border services was severely impaired by the
restrictions on capital flows.
The difficulty encountered by full harmonisation of national
regulations promp,:ed a new approach towards European integration. 	 In
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1983 a White Policy Paper on financial integration enunciated clearly a
renewed commitment to the Treaty of Rome and in 1985 the EC Commission
proposed its White Paper on the completion of the internal market by
1992. In relation to banking, the White Paper set guidelines for a
single banking licence, home country control and mutual recognition.
These principles were incorporated in the 1988 Second Banking Directive
which was passed by the EC Council of Ministers on 15 December 1989. It
sets out to eliminate the remaining intra-EC barriers to freedom of
establishment in the banking sector and provides for full freedom of
banking services across intra-EC boundaries. The main aim of this
legislation is to harmonise laws and rules for credit institutions so
that they can set up and operate rreely across the Community, subject to
adequate supervision. To this end the directive provides for minimum
capital requirements, the monito_-ng and vetting of bodies that have
substantial bank shareholdings, control over banks' long-term
participation in non-financial companies, and the establishment of a
single banking 'passport' to permit activity anywhere within the EC.
The principle of the single banking 'passport' is of particular
importance. Once a crp -it institution is authorised to do banking
business by its home supervisor (home country control) it will have a
'passport' to sell its products and services throughout the EC as long
as there is prior harmonisation of essential supervisory rules (mutual
recognition).	 A vital reinforcing feature of the Second Banking
Directive is the associated supervisory arrangements. The Own Funds
Directive (1988) was formally passed by the EC Council of Ministers in
April 1989, along with the Solvency Ratio Directive in December 1989.
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The former aims to harmonise the definition of the capital, whereas the
latter harmonises the solvency ratios for EC credit institutions. Other
directives harmonising regulations on: 	 larger risk exposures;
accounting for foreign branches; re-organisation and winding up
procedures; and deposit insurance have also been adopted.
Accompanying all the above legislation is the proposal for full
liberalisation of capital flows and all restrictions will be removed by
the end of 1992 apart from in Greece and Portugal where restrictions
will disappear by 1995. In addition to the above legislation, on the 21
September 1990 the EC Merger Control Regulation came into force. From
that date all proposed mergers and acquisit i ons of a 'Community
dimension' have to be notified to the EC Commission for prior approval
before becoming effective.	 Transactions betwe—, banks will have a
'Community dimension', according to Ratcliff and Garner (1991, p.232),
where:
-	 The banking/financial groups have total assets exceeding ECU 50,OOC
million
-	 The banking/financial groups concern d have a significant level of
assets attributable to the Europeaa Community. (The value of one-
tenth of the total assets of each of the institutions involved when
multiplied by the ratio of loans and advances made by them to EC
banks and customers, to the total of all loans and advances to
banks and customers, should exceed ECU 250 million)
-	 Each of the groups to which the companies involved belong must have
significant assets attributable to more than one EC Member Srate.
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A transaction is exempt from notification where more than two-
thirds of the EC assets of the parties concerned are attributable
in one and the same EC Member States.
Given that in various EC countries the banking market is highly
concentrated, the above legislation aims to monitor the build-up of EC-
wide market concentration.	 Most national legislation, in fact, has
arrangements in place which either formally limit participations in
banks - Netherlands and Norway for example - or which allow the
monitoring of any incentives for change in substantial participations in
banks including mergers and takeovers (this is the case in Belgium,
France, Germany, Greece and the United Kingdom).
	
As the OEC ­ (1989)
point out:
The authorities generally use merger (and ownership) policies in
the financial sector in a flexible manner and integrate them with
general policies towards improving the efficiency and functioning
of financial systems (p. 68)
National mergers policy during the 1980s has mair_y been used to deal
with banks that are in difficulty and to encourage consolidation in the
mutual sector. Some countries regulators have encour.ged bank mergers
(as in Spain) as a view to strengthening 	 he international
competitiveness of the domestic banking market (see Revell (1991) for ao
analysis of recent mergers in Spanish banking).
Given this brief review of the legislation, it is clear that the
main objectives of the European Commission has been threefold: 	 to
establish free entry and provisions of financial services throughout the
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EC, the establishment of a fair level playing field with a single
banking licence; and finally, consumer protection. These factors,
coupled with EC merger control regulations applicable to bank mergers
should combine to improve competition between and within EC banking
markets.
3.3 Competitive Pressures in the 1990s
The European banking system will change considerably in the next few
years in response to the creation of a single internal market and
European Economic Integration. It is generally believed that a handful
of large European multinational operators will emerge. Of the 14,000 or
so banks in Western Europe the vast majority will have to `settle for
whatever pickings are available, either in products or regional
specialisation. The minnows will be swallowed up by the bigger fry or
scatter for shelter in bigger boutiques' (Jones, 1988, pp.56).
Various large European banks already own foreign branch networks,
for example Deutsche Bank's purchase of Banca d'America a d'Iralia in
1986. Deutsche has also purchased a Portuguese merchant bank, hole- a
50 per cent stake in H. Alfred de Bory (a Dutch investment banks and
has increased its holding in Banco Comercial T~ansatlantico, a $1.7
billion Spanish bank. Recent moves by Deutsche Bank confirm its avowed
interest in the French and UK market (see Gardener and Molyneux (1990)
pp.208-213). Banks in Germany and the United Kingdom have already made
clear their wider European interests by recently forging links with
Spanish, Italian and French banks. In fact, many large European banks
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appear to be focusing their attention on the United Kingdom, Spain and
Italy. As Morgan Stanley (1990) identifies, the relatively high
margins that can be earned in Spain and the considerable growth in
consumer lending (mainly housing finance) experienced in recent years in
the United Kingdom are also of noticeable interest to the large Swiss
and German banks.	 This 'interest', of course, has been somewhat
dissipated since the collapse of the UK property market.
3.3.1. Cross-border activity
Salomon Brothers (1990) have identified that cross-border acquisitions
t, date have involved large banks acquiring much smaller banks. There
is, however, no general view as to what form of cross-border activity is
t1, most common and which will be the most successful. Molyneux (1991)
examines the type and scale of cross-border activity currently being
undertaken by the world's largest banks and draws some interesting
observations about developments in the European market place. Table 3.1
shows the cross-border (--jerations of the world's top 150 banks between
January 1989 and April 1991. It shows that the two most common forms of
cross-border activity relate to the opening of new branches or
subsidiaries and acquisitions. Co-operation agreements and alliances
are still not as popular as the traditional modes of international
expansion. This is because, although co-operation agreements and
alliances cost less than substantial acquisitions, the general
perception is that they are difficult to manage because they require the
co-operation of different organisational and managerial structures
operating on an equal footing.
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In addition, the advantages and returns accruing to each partner
may not always be clearly evident. Some say the forging of such
relationships are based on the herd instinct of senior managers who will
not last long enough to see any positive benefits. Having said this,
however, joint ventures (which account for some 14 per cent of all
operations) seem a popular method of cross-border activity. This is
Table 3.1 Cross-border activity of the world's top 150 banks
January 1989 to April 1991
Types	 Numbers	 %
Opening of new -anches or subsidiaries	 94	 21.7
Acquisition of a controlling interest
	 87	 20.1
Acquisition o.: a minority interest 	 63	 14.5
Reciprocal equity shareholdings	 12	 2.8
Joint ventures	 61	 14.1
Co-operation agreements	 42	 9.7
New foreign non-bank shareholders 	 25	 5.8
Disposals or closures of operations abroad 49
	 11.3
Total	 433	 100.0
Sources: Agence Europe 'Economic in-. ^rpenetration in Europe and the
rest of the world' 1989-90, Financial Institutions Review ,
Issues 11-16 Salomon Brothers (1990): 'Multinational money
center banking: the evolution of a single European banking
market', Istituto Bancario San Paolo di Torino: Gardener,
E.P.M. and P. Molyneux (1990), Changes in western European
Banking (London: Allan Unwir.)
because it is easier to share responsibility (and profits) if a new
joint-owned business unit is creates..
An interesting point to note is the number of new ncn-bank
shareholders that have emerged. Some of these shareholdings relate to
insurance co.apanies which have taken stakes in banks, but others relate
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specifically to links between industry and banks. The relationship
between the industrial sector and banks is strong in countries where
banks still hold large participations in the shares of industrial
companies, as in Spain, Germany, France and Japan. In some countries,
mergers in industry are inextricably linked with mergers in the
financial services sector. For example, holding companies that seem
likely to arise resulting from a merger of industrial companies will, in
many cases, include a bank or a financial se rvices company of some sort.
This was a factor in the siege laid by De Beneditti and the Compagni
Financière de Suez against Société Générale de Belgique, since that
group contained one of the largest Belgian banks, Générale Bank (see
Salomon Brothers, 1990). Ir 'is also been argued that the ownership of
a bank by an industrial group protects the group from predators by
acting as 'poison pill' to c._ _^courage or delay take--over through the
need to secure central bankers approval of the acquisitio n o f the bank.
The trend of non-bank financial institutions and industrial
companies to take cross-border shareholdings in t.nks will probably
continue, and this may encourage regulatory authorit°_es to allow banks
to undertake reciproc-- activity, especially in countries such a she
United Kingdom whe,:e equity ownership of industrial companies is
positively discouraged.
Table 3.2 provides a breakdown of the cross-border acquisitions and
new openings of the world's top 150 banks between January 1989 and April
1991 according to business area.	 Ccntrolling acquis itions and. the
opening of new operating units account for about 7 5 per cent of all
^^
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Table 3.2 Cross-border	 activity: controlling and	 minority
acquisitions and new openings
January 1989 to April 1991
Business area
Commercial Investment Fund
Number banking banking Leasing	 Insurance Management	 Others
Controlling 87 47 16 10 5	 9
acquisitions
Minority 63 26 12 3 22
acquisitions
of which	 10% 41 16 13 2 10
Openings 99 53 32 2	 5 5
Geographic	 location
Europe Outside Europe Main countries
of expansion
Number Reinforcement* New Reinf••rrement* New
entry entry
Controlling 87 52 13 14 8 France 12
acquisitions
Minority 63 29 20 10 4 Italy 14
acquisitions
of which >10% 41 22 11 7 1
Openings 99 24 44 9 22 Germany 16
E.	 bloc 15
*`reinforcement' is used to identify expansion in countries where the
bank is already represented
Source: As Table 3.1
operations. Most controlling acquis`^ions are in the area of commercial
banking, followed by investmen banking. 	 A similar pattern is
illustrated for minority acquisitions, although minority investments are
consistently channelled towards non-traditional sectors.
These strategic stakes according to Molyneux (1991, p.25) generate a
number of benefits for the banks concerned:
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they enable partners to rationalise their businesses;
they help the institutions concerned to build-up cultural links
prior to the advent of a possible merger or continuing joint
venture;
they make it cheaper for banks to acquire majority control.
Limited evidence to date suggests that moves to actual majority
control do not tend to require a higher premium to be paid than on
the original stake;
premiums are rarely paid for nominal stakes acquired to forge
alliances, apart from cases where shares are closely held by a
small number of investors. However, minority stakes large enough
to provide the purchaser with substantial influence a-.3 which block
potential counter-bids generally have to be acquired at substantial
premiums over market value;
they protect the buyer, to a certain degree, from potential
competitive offers.
Direct expansion involving new branches and subsidiaries is still a
popular form of cross-borer activity, especially in the area of
investment banking. 	 There is, however, a majo difference between
acquisitions and new operating units, part_cularly in terms of
geographical location.
In the case of controlling acquisitions, 76 per cent indicate
expansions in countries where the bank is already represented, and most
of these have taken place in Europe with France being the most popular
area of expansion. Banks appear to be choosing acquisition as a means
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of expansion in markets already known.
With minority acquisitions banks have also tended to enter markets
in which they are already represented, although there is a slightly
greater preference for entering new markets. The opening of branches
and subsidiaries appears to be the preferred method of breaking into new
markets, and Table 3.2 shows that this type of expansion has been most
common over the past couple of years in Germany and in Eastern bloc
countries. It makes sense that in markets which are difficult to enter,
a gradual approach starting with the opening of a new branch or
subsidiary is the most suitable strategy for cross-border expansion.
Alliances represent a relatively low cost way of creating
international networks without becoming involved in substantial capita
investments. It is probably the simplest method of overseas expansion.
Agreements involving exchanges of shares between companies or their
subsidiaries (such as the Crediop/San Paolo share swap and the sale of
CIC st,ck by the French Government for GAN equity) are viewed by many as
an ideal defensive agreement and an excellent way to encourage
management to develop the benefits of co-ordination.
	 Equi'y cross-
shareholdings are generally viewed as precursors to the forging of
stronger relationships and possible future rergers - they are unique to
the European market.
	 Other types of asset swaps, such as the
subsidiaries exchanges between Banco Bilbao Vizcaya and Banque Nationale
de Paris, have aimed to consolidate business operations and, in general,
lead to further collaboration between the groups concerned.
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Despite the perceived benefits accruing from cross-equity holdings,
Table 3.3 shows that these types of agreements are an uncommon form of
cross-border operation, probably because of the difficulties associated
with developing a constructive and long-lasting relationship with a
major foreign partner and shareholder. Joint ventures and co-operation
agreements appear to be the preferred route for building cross-border
alliances. Joint ventures fall into three main categories:
-	 those between large banks and smaller institutions which are set up
to enter new markets, such as the recent Car iplo/Zentralsparkasse
and Kommerzialbank venture in Hungary and the Banque Nationale de
Paris/UOB Holding SA in Switzerland;
-	 those aimed at developing new business sectors, for example, the
Cariplo/French Caisse Nationale de Providence/British Trust Company
operation aimed at selling life assurance in Italy;
-	 agreements between large banks seeking access to new markets, such
as the joint holding company to be set up by DG Bank, Crédit
Agricole and }abo Bank in Luxembourg.
Many of the joint ventures in late-1990 and early-1991 have been
concerned with establishing new operations in Eastern bloc countries.
The recent co-operative agreement and reciprocal investments between Z-
bank (Zentralsparkasse and Kommerzial bank Aktiengesellschaft, Wien) and
Cariplo are typical of such developments. These two banks have decided
to develop a common central European strategy. As part of the broad co-
operation agreement, Cariplo has taken a 5 per cent participation in Z-
bank's share capital, and the latter is expected to take a reciprocal
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Table 3.3 Cross-holdings, joint ventures and co-operation agreements
January 1989 to April 1991
Business area
Commercial
	
Investment	 Fund
Number	 banking	 banking	 Leasing	 Insurance Management Others
Cross shareholding 12	 9	 2	 1
Joint ventures	 61	 12	 18	 6	 9	 6	 10
Co-operation
	 42
Geographic location
Europe	 Outside Europe
	
Main countries
of expansion
Number	 Reinforcement*	 New	 Reinforcement*
	 New
entry	 entry
Cross 12	 8	 4 France 6
shareholding
Joint ventv r es 61	 28	 14	 10	 9 France 24
E.	 bloc 13
Co-operation 42 France 13
Italy 9
Spain 6
*`reinforcement' is used to identify expansion in countries where the
bank is already represented
Source: As Table 3.1
stake after 1992. The banks 7 _v- already established a joint venture
bank, Europa's Kereskedelmi Bank Rt (EKB) in Hungary.
Finally, Table 3.3 shows that agreements involving co-operation. in
:he broadest sense accounted for 37 per cent: cf alliances between 1989
and 1991. Their most common characteristic relates to the sharing of
national networks for product/distribution alliances or for
collaboration in specific sectors. 	 Gardener. (1991) notes that 'These
often involve a comparatively sophisticated product provider from
Northern Europe and a distribution network in the So-ith. Probably the
most explosive growth in this area has been in the ban'r; distribution of
7 9
life and pension products'. (p.14)
So in conclusion, the cross-border activity of the world's largest
banks between 1989 and 1991 illustrates the diverse nature of
international bank expansion and shows that the bulk of activity is
taking place in Europe. The acquisition of controlling or minority
interests, as well as the opening of new operating units, is the most-
favoured form of cross-border operation. Acquisitions generally appear
to take place in countries where banks already have a presence, whereas
the opening of new branches or subsidiaries is the most popular route
for entering new markets.
It should also be mentioned that despite the, `wave of bank
arrangements, which rolled all over Europe in 1988-89, no single
significant cross-border bank merger has materialised' (Abra'riam and
Lierman (1991, p.15), although important mergers between the largest or
'core' banks have occurred in a limited number of countries: Spain, the
Scandinavian systems, Netherlands and Italy. Overall, given the
authorities' desire to harmonise bank regulations and to bring about a
'level playing fie'P by the end of 1992, coupled with the above
corporate restruc-uring, this one would expect to lead to a more
competitive European banking environment.
3.4 Size and Concentration
Every banking system in Western Europe has a group of dominant or 'core
banks' which are recogi_ised by both the authorities and the general.
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public . In many European countries, especially those whose government
is based on a Federal system, there has been a trend for local and
regional based banks to form groups that could effectively compete
against the national 'core' banks. Those countries with a large number
of mutual and co-operative banks, such as Germany, France, Italy, Spain
and the Scandinavian countries, tend to have a stronger regional focus
than countries which have a small number of relatively large private
banks.
If we take the size of individual economies into consideration the
relative importance of bank assets in relation to gross national product
can be analysed.	 Table 3.4 shows tha-, deposit banks' assets as a
percentage of GNP for almost all European countries have increased
substantially between 1981 and 1989. This measure is sometimes used to
gauge the degree of financial depth in an economy. If we accept this as
an acceptable measure then it would be fair to say that the financial
systems of Ireland and Portugal hardly deepened between 1981 and 1989
whereas those of Germany and the United Kingdom certainly did.
Table 3.5 illustrates var' -)us structural characteristics of
European banking markets at the and of 1989. (See Appendix 1 for tables
for 1986 to 1988).	 It shows that the German, UK, French and Italian
banking systems are by far the largest banking sectors, out of which
Italy and France have the most concentrated systems.	 In all but
Germany, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg the five-firm concentration
ratios exceed 30 per cent and for the deposits ratio increases to over
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Table 3.4 Deposit bank assets as a percentage of GNP
1981	 1985	 1989
Austria 148.0 169.7 189.4
Belgium 137.7 172.8 172.1
Denmark 52.9 84.2 95.6
Finland 57.1 76.9 102.4
Francea 109.7 (80.5) 130.2
Germany 144.0 181.6 220.4
Greece 91.8 110.2 120.3
Ireland 110.2 94.0 115.4
Italy 113.5 115.2 134.4
Luxembourg 2520.4 2664.6 2774.1
Netherlands 193.4 214.1 283.3
Norway 115.8 132.5 152.4
Portugal 91.5 - 101.5
Spain 113.2 127.9 135.6
Sweden 135.9 136.6 152.1
Switzerland 188.1 224.9 248.4
UK 130.1 165.5 2"1.7
USA 95.2 104.0 129.3
Japan 202.3 208.5 L72.1
Source:	 Calculated from various editions of IMF, International
Financial Statistics
Notes: aFrench data are for bank assets as a percentage of GDP and
figures for 1985 and 1986 understate the situation because
they exclude claims on other banking institutions
70 per cent in Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden.	 It is
interesting to note that, of the four largest banking markets, it is
those in which regulations have, in their rer-.nt history been the most
restrictive - France through nationalisatior. and Italy through branching
restrictions and government ownership - which are the most concentrated.
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Table 3.5
	
Market concentration and size of banking sectors in
Europe 1989
Numb e r	 Size of banking	 Concentration % of
of banks	 Country	 sector	 total market
(Assets $ bn)
Assets	 Deposits
10-firm 5-firm 10-firm 5-firm
1,226 a Austria 324.2 55.3 35.8 61.9 42.0
117 Belgium 321.0 81.8 70.9 96.0 87.8
156 Denmark 169.0 64.2 47.6 65.6 50.1
502 Finland 172.0 68.7 64.5 77.8 73.8
1,897 b France 2,204.3 48.4 30.4 50.7 33.1
4,247° Germany 2,519.4 42.1 26.3 30.2 21.8
42 Greece 85.6 n.a n.a 71.2 68.9
49 Ireland 44.5 87.6 66.2 88.9 67.5
1,059 Italy 1,100.0 58.4 35.8 63.9 43.3
177 Luxembourg 317.8 43.2 26.7 43.0 26.5
180 Netherlands 463.3 72.9 67.5 83.0 77.3
267 Norway 162.4 61.1 51.8 62.2 51.1
33 Portugal 70.9 77.5 53.7 83.9 59.4
482 Spain 519.3 60.3 37.3 60.9 X7.9
655 Sweden. 215.5 88.1 76.0 71.9 73.9
625 Switzerland 1,031.5 59.5 51.5 62.5 54.9
66 Turkey 42.2 n.a n.a n.a n.a
774 UK 2,280.2 38.6 28.7 36.9 27.5
dotes:	 a. Includes 780 credit co-operatives
b. 1,009 Special Finance Intermediaries included
C. Including 3,225 credit co-operatives
d. Concentration ratios calculated from individual bank data
taken from IBCA Credit Rating Agency (.ondon) database
Sources:
	 See Appendix 2
Table 3.6 shows the change in various structura - . characteristics
between 1986 to 1989. Overall it can be seen that, for the majority of
European banking markets, the number of banks declined between 1986 and
1989 with the noticeable exceptions of Luxembourg, Portugal, Netherlands
and Spain. The increase in Luxembourg was wholly attributable to an
influx of 57 foreign banks between 1986 and 1989, the same was the case
for Portugal which increased its number of foreign_ banks by seven over
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this period. In the Netherlands, there was an increase in the number of
savings banks and commercial banks (especially foreign) and the growth
of banks in Spain can be attributed to the increase in foreign banks and
money market intermediaries. (Over this period, Spain actually
experienced a decline in the number of credit co-operatives). In
general, the reason for increased bank numbers in particular markets was
mainly the result of greater foreign bank presence.
Table 3.6 Change in structural characteristics of European banking
markets between 1986 and 1989
% change in	 Country	 % change in	 % change in concen-
number of	 size of banking	 tration of total
banks	 sector	 banking market
1986-1989	 1986-1989	 1986-1989
Assets	 Deposits
10-Firm 5-firm
	
10-firm 5-firm
-	 1.7 Austria 44.4 -8.0 -6.5 -10.2 -2.1
-	 2.5 Belgium 43.9 -1.8 -1.3 0.6 2.5
-	 1.3 Denmark 47.7 16.3 8.4 14.1 -5.8
-19.2 I-nland 115.8 -4.7 -6.4 -8.8 -8.2
-	 8.8 France 33.3 -1.6 -17.2 -5.8 ,.6
-	 8.2 Germany 37.7 8.2 6.9 9.0 X 2, .5
7.7 Greece 92.4 n.a n.a -12.5 3.7
-	 9.3 Ireland 56.1 -1.7 -8.4 -0.4 -4.11
-	 4.4 Italy 53.4 1.2 3.2 15.8 22.0
47.5 Luxembourg 60.4 -2.5 -6.3 -1.8 -4.-
16.9 Netherlands 56.3 -2.7 -4.7 0.6 -0	 .3
-18.8 Norway 81.5 -0.5 -4.6 -10.4 -15.3
26.9 Portugal 42.4 n.a 7.2 n.a 3.5
9.3 Spain 81.8 9.8 1.1 25.9 43.0
-12.1 Sweden 66.9 2.6 2.8 -7.3 15.1
2.3 Switzerland 97.5 -2.3 -3.0 -3.7 -4.2
8.2 Turkey 38.8 n.a n.a n.a n.a
0.5 UK 47.6 13.2 1.8 17.1 6.2
Note:	 n.a not available
Source:
	 See Appendix 1 and 2
84
Looking at those markets which experienced a decline in the number
of banks, the main reason for this can be attributed to the fall in
number of mutual banks such as savings banks and co-operative banks.
For example, in Finland, Norway and Sweden (the markets which
experienced the largest proportional declines in bank numbers) the
reduction was almost entirely due to rationalisation in the savings
banks sector. Austria experienced a substantial decline in the number
of rural credit co-operatives (from 940 in 1986 to 860 in 1989) as did
France, Germany and Italy.
Th• change in concentration over the period under question varies
across countries, although it is noticeable that both assets' and
deposit- concentration ratios increased in three out of the four
largest European banking markets (for a more detailed treatment of the
structural characteristics of individual European banking markets see
Gardener and Molyneux 1990, Appendix One).
Simple correlation coefficients relating change in market size,
lumber of banks and concentration ratios are shown in Table 3.7. It can
be seen from Table 3.7 that change in market size is negatively
correlated with all changes in concentration measures, whereas the
relationship between the change in number of banks and concentration is
ambiguous. This is not surprising, given that if only very small banks
enter or leave markets, the concentration ratios are hardly affected.
It is only when large banks merge, or new ones enter the market, that
conc-,ntration ratios can noticeably change.
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The concentration of European banking markets has been an important
feature of structural change. Concentration is by no means a recent
phenomenon, and many countries' banking systems have been dominated by a
handful of large banks for at least half a century or so. The way we
measure concentration is also important.	 If it is measured on a
Table 3.7 Correlation coefficients: change in bank numbers, market
size and concentration ratios in European banking, 1986
to 1989
$ change in number	 % change in
of banks	 market size
% change in market size -0.181
% change in 10-firm assets
concentration ratio -0.105 -0.411
% change in 5-firm _ssets
concentration ratio -0.079 -0.518
% change in 10-firm deposits
concentration ratio 0.123 -0.359
% change in 5-firm deposits
concentration ratio 1.056 -0.127
Source: Calculated from data in Appendix 1
'consolidar.d groups basis' then the Netherlands and France appear to be
the most concentrated systems, whereas Germany and the United Kingdom
appear co be the most dispersed (Revell, 1987, pp.27). Other results
(Baer and Mote, 1985) indicate that the French banking system has become
twice as concentrated since the 1930s, whereas the degree of
concentration in the German banking market has fallen by some 50 per
cent.
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From the information provided in this section, it is difficult
to appraise accurately either the efficacy or extent of increased
concentration within individual banking systems, that is why the
structure-performance model is used to further investigate this
relationship. It is also becoming much more difficult to measure
concentration by contemporary measures, because of the blurring of
demarcation lines between banking and other financial markets. It is
clear, however, that there appears to be a current preference for larger
size in many banks within different European countries. The desire to
obtain economies of scale and scope appear to be the main driving force
behind the trend towards larger-sized institutions, which is another
reflection of the so-called con-lomeration movement.
3.5 Performance and Ownership ^,_.aracteristics of Europe's Largest Banks
The relative performance of industrial countries' banking systems can be
gauged by the distinguishing characteristics of the major banks that
operate in these markets. It is also the case that tt: degree of change
in market size, concentration and ownership resulting from major
reforms, such as the 19' 2 proposals, will be determined primarily by the
ability of the largr_r banks to discover and exploit new profitable
opportunities within domestic and across country boundaries. An
analysis of the major structure and performance characteristics of top
banks operating in the EC (between 1985 and 1987) has been undertaken by
Molyneux (1989). The most important findings were as follows:
-	 Top French banks were on average the largest in the EC, but
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employed considerably less staff than their UK counterparts.
The major UK banks had the largest branch networks and employed
considerably more staff than their counterparts in other EC
countries. The labour-intensive nature of the UK payments system
and the different production functions of UK banks compared with EC
banks are usually cited as important causal factors in this
differentiation.
Comparing the relative performance figures for top banks in the
bigger banking markets it was found that Italian and Spanish banks
had the highest ROAs (return on assets) and the highest ROC (return
on capital) ratios. Italian banks had quite small branch networks.
The performance figures for the top 1 ' German, 33 Italian and 13
Spanish banks were less dispersed than compared with similar
figures for the top 15 UK and 20 French oanks.
The biggest banks in Germany and France had	 markedly lower
capital:assets ratios than banks in the United Kingdom, Spain and
Italy.	 The top German banks had	 quite similar capital:assets
ratios.	 Some of these points can be explained by the r( .e of
hidden reserves and attitudes to loan capital in Germany and the
role of the state in France.
The above observations were consistent over time as illustrated in
Molyneux (1989).
It has already been mentioned that an important feature
distinguishing Continental European banking systems from British-based
systems is that publicly controlled ban:.s (whether by central or local
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government) are much more important in EC countries. Table 3.8 shows
that out of the 162 EC banks listed in the 1987 Banker `Top 500', 69
were privately owned and 67 publicly owned. The mean performance
figures for the public banks were marginally worse than those for
private banks, although it could be fair to say that both sectors
exhibit remarkably similar characteristics, apart from the average
number of employees. The average public bank employed half as many
staff as the private banks. The reasons for this are not immediately
clear, but it could be the case that central management costs and
staffing levels of some public banks are hidden in government accounts.
Credit co-operatives found in the group under `udy tend to be
larger than their public and private bank counterparts, and this is
because they are central institutions representing tI. asards of sm-all
operations. The mutual institutions (savings banks) are the smallest
category and tend to be much smaller in size, even though their ROA
(return on assets) and ROC (return on capital) statistics are comparable
with those of private and public banks. It is interesting to note that,
of the top 162 banks in the EC, 93 are not run for a commercial profit
or to satisfy the requirements of privatF shareholders. These
institutions cannot be acquired through host-!e takeover. Even though
various countries, such as Denmark and the United Kingdom have
established legislation enabling mutual. societies to convert to
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Table 3.8 Statistical summary of the ownership of top banks in the EC,
1987.
Arithmetic means and standard deviations
No. of EC banks Assets
	 PTP/	 PTP/	 PTP/	 CAP/	 NINT/ Employees
in Bankers	 $m.	 Assets	 CAP	 Assets Assets
Top 500
Private	 69	 37,601	 207.2	 0.77	 16.36	 4.81	 3.01	 15,948
	
(1.15)
	
(1.61)	 (0.89)	 (0.80)	 (0.48)	 (0.59)	 (1.36)
Public	 67	 31,133	 158.9	 0.61	 14.30	 3.70	 2.14	 7,261
(Central	 (1.09)	 (1.43)	 (1.1)	 (0.66)	 (0.54)	 (0.60)	 (1.48)
& local
govt.)
Co-operative 14	 41,402
	 242.8	 0.89	 17.31	 5.16	 2.06	 12,124
	
(1.36)	 (0.95)	 (0.60)	 (0.40)
	
(0.58)	 (0.62)	 (1.69)
Mutuals	 12	 10,421	 77.5	 0.81	 14.78	 6.14	 3.99	 4,419
	
(0.50)	 (0.64)	 (0.46)	 (0.52)	 (0.39)	 (0.29)	 (0.56)
Source:	 Molyneux (1989, p.528)
Notes: a Classification after Revell (1987). Large German savings
banks are controlled by local government organisations and
therefore are classified as public rather than mutual
organisations.
b Figures in parentheses are standard deviations/means
c PTP — pre-tax profits, CAP = Capita, NINT = net interest
income.
corporate status, Molyneux (1989) envisaged that there-would not be a
great deal of merger activity between these groups until. widespread
conversion from public to private ownership took place. Many public,
co-operative and mutual banks, however operate in the same way as
private banks and their ownership status does not preclude them from
being aggressive acquirers of private banking institutions. Molyneux
(1989) concluded that of the top EC banks, 93 could not be acquired and
25-27 were too large and nationally too important to allow any foreign
predator to acquire them. This left about 42-44 large size banks that
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were potential acquisition targets; in fact, at least 25 of them were
already controlled by other institutions or groups of institutions. The
corollary of this was that, if widespread acquisitions were to take
place, it would be mainly medium-to small-sized local and regional banks
that became foreign-owned. The limited takeover opportunities available
to large banks have subsequently accelerated the move of large banks to
form joint ventures, alliances and co-operation agreements with other
financial institutions as discussed earlier in this chapter.
3.6 A Note on Performance Characteristics.
Two reports (OECD, 1987 and 1988) indicated a number of important trends
that have been occurring in European banking systems since the early
1980s.
An interesting trend identifiable from the OECD (1987) study was
that, with regard to average interest margins of commercial banks, low
interest margin countries tend to reflect the relative importance of
wholesale banking compared to retail activities. European countries
such as Luxembourg and Switzerland tended to have the lowest interest
margins, whereas banks in Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom had the
highest margins (this trend is also confirmed by interest margin
estimates for the largest European banks in 1991 given in Morgan Stanley
(1992, Table 7, p.12)).	 High interest margins tend to be translated
into high net income ratios 8 , but if one considers operating expenses to
gross income figures this provides a more satisfactory measure for
making international comparisons 9 . Table 3.9 shows that in the early
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1980s banks in Luxembourg and Switzerland appeared to be the most
profitable in Europe, whereas those in Belgium, Finland and the United
Kingdom were the least profitable. Other measures of performance from
Table 3.9	 Gross income as a multiple of operating expenses for
commercial banks (1980-85 averages).
Country	 Multiple
Luxembourg	 3.33
Switzerland	 1.78
Portugal
	
1.64
Sweden	 1.60
Netherlands	 1.56
Germany	 1.53
Italy	 1.52
Spain	 1.52
France	 1.47
United Kingdom	 1.44
Finland	 1.28
Belgium	 1.20
Source: Gardener and Molyneux (1989, p.38)
the OECD study indicated that, in the two systems which had experienced
widespread nationalisation prog ammes (France and Portugal), ROA had
fallen dramatically between 1980 and 1985, whereas the largest increase
oc urred in Germany and Switzerland. In general, ROA figures were
nigher for those countries which had experienced some form of structural
deregulation.
Table 3.10 provides a brief indication of how ROA estimates for the
main European banks have altered since the above OECD estimates. It is
clear that Spain stands out with an ROA of above 2 per cent, which is
nearly three times better than the second best ROA, which is that of the
92
German banks. The figure for Spain is mainly attributable to the high
net interest margins in this banking system (4.21%) more than double
that of net interest margin in Germany (1.80%). France and Belgium
were, in 1991, relatively unprofitable banking markets and the
Scandinavian countries (as well as the UK's) ROA's have been severely
affected by heavy loan-loss provisioning and inadequate earnings
capacity as a result of downturns in their respective economies.
Table 3.10 Return on assets
1991	 1992E	 1993E
Belgium 0.40 0.46 0.48
Denmark (0.05) 0.57 0.64
Finland (0.49) 0.10 0.24
France (0.49) 0.10 0.24
Germany 0.70 0.71 0.74
Italy 0.65 0.72 0.75
Netherlands 0.58 0.59 0.61
Norway (3.76) (1.12) 0.07
Spain 2.01 2.04 2.02
Switzerland 0.68 0.75 0.81
UK 0.43 0.70 1.00
Source: Mo- ;an Stanley (1992, p.16)
Notes:	 E stimates; figures in brackets are losses
3.7 Competitiv Environment in European Banking
3.7.1 Competition and competitors
Over the last decade or so Revell (1985, p.47) has identified three
overriding competitive trends in European banking systems: competition
has increased between commercial banks; competition has incr^•.ased
between financial institutions; and competition has increased in the
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market for financial services. This more competitive environment has
encouraged banks and financial se rvice firms of all kinds to broaden and
improve the quality of their services and hence their customer bases.
The OECD (1989, p.12) has also noted that national authorities in
OECD countries have undertaken a wide range of measures designed to
promote competition and strengthen the role of market forces. These
measures include:
-	 Widening the scope for price competition through deregulation
of interest rates and fees and commission for financial
services;
-	 Increasing the number or competitors in various sectors of the
financial service markets through providing more scope for
despecialisation and diversification and by removing obscacles
to the domestic and cress-border expansion of banking
networks;
-	 Increasing investor and borrower-choices throw ., A encouraging
the creation of a wide range of new financial asset and debt
instruments;
-	 Removing obstac7 ^as to free lending and investment decisions of
banks and other financial institutions by abolishing, or
easing, direct lending controls and mandatory investment
regulations;
-	 Improving the visibility of financial service markets through
better information; and
-	 Forestalling anti .-co,..petitive concentration mov=meets in
j4
banking and finance by merger and ownership control.
In the area of retail banking Stevenson (1986, p.2) noted that
customers were becoming relatively older, wealthier and financially more
sophisticated. As retail demands become more sophisticated, customer
loyalty decreases. Retail customers now demand more services, better
information, and most importantly value for money. As a result, banks
have to be able to identify their markets. Through market segmentation,
product differentiation and accurate packaging, banks are now able to
offer services in designated `target' markets - one-parent families,
high net worth individuals, house buyers and the like. Maintaining a
strong hold on the payments mechanism is a crit•,al factor in preserving
customer bases within the retail barking market (as identified by Vittas
et al (1988)).
The OECD (1989, pp.20-26) identifies a substantial increase in
competition in retail banking markets which has resulted in:
...a considerable widening of the range of products and instruments
amongst which the private aver can choose according to his
preferences ... (p.26)
This report notes that during thr 1980s, competition in OECD retail
banking markets has led to the expansion of distribution networks as
well as an increase in the use of consumer credit facilities,
especially, different types of housing finance.
	 Innovation and
technological advances, spurred by competition, has, it is suggested,
improved the level of service provision by the barking sector as a
whole.
S
In an early review of trends in European banking, Arthur Andersen
(1986) predicted that corporate customers would continue to demand
highly specialist products and would expect to pay competitive, cost-
based charges for them. As the demand for traditional corporate banking
services from the largest of corporations was predicted to decline with
the securitisation phenomenon, banks would increasingly focus on the
small to medium-sized corporate customer. Only the larger savings and
mortgage institutions, the study suggested, were likely to compete
aggressively with the commercial banks for a portion of this market.
The later OECD (1989, pp.27-31) study confirmed these earlier
predictions about competition in the corporate banking .-actor and
identified a substantial increase in competition for medium-term
enterprise financing:
In some countries, new competitors in the form of finance companies
specialised in industrial hire purchase finance, leasing or
factoring, have entered this market. Sometimes, the banks
themselves have set up such finance companies in order to be able
to compete more effectively for medium-term funds ...(p.29)
The aforementioned study, however, also notes that as far as term
lending to small-and medium-sized enterprises is cor-^erned, it is less
clear whether banks and their competitors have sa'isfied the financing
requirement of this part of this business sector.
Revell (1985) suggested that financial services would mainly be
supplied by various types of corporate entity:	 conglomerates,
specialists, agents and franchisers, groups and associations.
Conglomeration is probably the most important of these trends applicable
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to European banking. It refers broadly to the provision of a range of
financial services by a collection of financial service firms under
common ownership or control. The conglomeration movement is
characterised by the desire of the larger European banks to maintain a
global presence as well as to offer a universal range of bank products
and services (see Gardener (1990) for a more detailed analysis of the
conglomerate trend). At the present time only a few European countries
- Germany, Luxembourg, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom - do
not apply specific restrictions on the interests of commercial banks in
other corporate entities, and as such it seems likely that
conglomeration will be a more important phenomenon in these countries.
This view has been supported by the large number of mergers and
takeovers in the European financial services marketplace which hay.
taken place since 1986, as reported by de Jonquières (1988).
The conglomerate trend is expected to continue as long as larger
institutions wish to expand their multi-product and geographical
coverage and as long as the predators have sufficient excess capital to
swallow their victims. Partnerships and cross-shareholdings in the
financial services marketplace are now widely being used as -either
insurance policies against the threat of takeover or as a pre_ude to a
possible full merger. The main impetus towards a conglomerate trend
during the past decade has been the perceived growth in importance of
investment banking and securities markets activities.
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3.7.2 The Price Waterhouse/Cecchini findings
The first and most important empirical study investigating comparative
competitive conditions across EC banking and financial systems was
undertaken by the Cecchini study (see Commission of the European
Communities (1988a)). This set out to analyse the economic consequences
of 1992, completing the EC internal market, on various economic sectors.
The microeconomic study of the financial services sectors was undertaken
for Cecchini by Price Waterhouse Management Consultants (Dublin), whose
results were published in detail by the Commission of the European
Communities (1988b). The following three sections examine the aims and
methodology of this important study and also discuss its main findings
and limitations.
...7.2.1 Aims and Methodology of the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini Study
The main aim of the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study was to assess the
economic impact of 1992 on the financial services sectors in eight EC
countries (Belgium, :'rance, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain,
United Kingdom and West Germany) under the assumption that the law of
one price prevails.	 In other words, the main assumption being that
after 1992 EC financial marketplace prices would settle at (or at least
move towards) some uniform level for each financial product/service,
thereby bringing about economic gains from EC integration.
The Price Waterhouse study, firstly, examined in detail the
economic dimensions of the three main financial services sectors -
banking, insurance and securities business - across the eight EC
countries under study.
	 The study then focused on comparative price
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differences (obtained mainly by field survey) of sixteen financial
products or services, spread over the three main financial services
sectors. This dataset was posited by Price Waterhouse to be
representative broadly of the three financial sectors, and Table 3.11
shows the standard financial products and services they surveyed. Price
Waterhouse then estimated price falls, hypothesised from completing the
internal market, on this 'standard' set of (sixteen) financial products
and services: prices were simulated to fall to the average of the four
lowest prices for each product/service. It is these hypothesised price
falls that are the basis of the calculation of the economic gains from
integration. These economic gains are the consumer surplus (CS) gains
under these simulated pricefall scenari -:.
The calculation of economic gains, however, brought about by an
integrated European financial sector, is further complicated by the
issue of corresponding producer losses. Whilst price falls clearly
increase CS gains, they have a corresponding negative impact on producer
surpluses. The rationale for this, as noted in Gardener a-1 Teppett
(1991) is that:
.... producers may experience internal economies of scale leading
both to inefficient s-all-scale production when the market is
restricted within national boundaries, and to an oligopolistic
market structure. Within a non-integrated Europe, therefore,
average costs are unnecessarily high; the mark-up of prices over
marginal cost is also higher than necessary to cover fixed costs.
This economic perspective suggests the consequences of opening up
trade are : (1) to lower unit costs by facilitating more use of
the economies of scale, (2) and (probably) lower the mark-up of
prices over marginal costs to the extent that oligopoly is
weakened. Whilst the consumer will gain (increased consumer
surplus); there will also be reductions in excess profits (reduced
producer surplus). (p.116-117).
In their first report on the economic gains to integration, Price
Waterhouse (1987) noted that the economic gains from EC financial sector
integration can be calculated according to two main `cases'. Case 1
(pure cost differential) is concerned only with CS estimates and
producer-surplus losses are ignored. In Case 1, the CS gains brought
about by financial sector integration and reported in the Cecchini study
were calculated on the basis of the following equation:
CS —	 1	 p X(p) (1-(1- X) 1-e
1-e
where
	 CS — consumer surplus
e — elasticity of demand
1- X — the respective price differential com,ared with the lowest
cost country
X(p) — the demand curve i.e. assumed to be P-e
Case 2 (where price differentials reflects costs differences as well as
oligopoly) deducts the loss of producer surplus from the CS gains.
Price-Waterhouse used the Cournot-Nash Model of non-competitive
behaviour to provide an estimate of the pure oligopolistic profits
prevailing:
TT+ K — (H/e) px
where 'Tr— pure profits
k — fixed cost
(1)
(2)
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H — Herfindahl index
e — price elasticity of demand
p — price
x — output
From this model one can construct a measure (derived in Appendix B of
Gardener and Teppett (1991)) to compute changes (losses) in producer
surplus brought about by financial sector integration.
The estimates undertaken by Price Waterhouse and eventually
published in the Cecchini Report (Commission of the European Communities
(1988a), Table 5.1.5) concentrated on the Case 1 scenario, i gains
only. The argument for focusing on these results appeared to be that
the dynamic, longer-term benefits flowing from completing _he EC
financial services market are so considerable that they easily outweigh
any shorter-term losses in producer surplus. It has, however, been
suggested by Gardener and Teppett (1991) that one (of many) of the major
Limitations of the analysis was the omission of pre rtucer surplus losses
from the overall estimated gains.
Overall, the Price Waterhouse microeconomic e_teraise involved
making assumptions about the following:
(1) likely level of price changes
(2) value added in financial services
(3) elasticity of demand for financial services (e)
(4) estimates of the Herfindahl index (H) (in Case 2).
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These data comprise the 'base case dataset' used by Price Waterhouse and
are reproduced in Table 3.12.
The following section discusses the main findings of the study,
3.7.2.2 Results of the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study
The results of the economic analysis of completing the internal marl-et
in financial services after 1992 (published in detail in the Commission
of the European Communities (1988(b)) provides a broad indication of the
kind of competitive forces that may be released when the 1992 market is
completed.	 Table 3.13 summarises the estimated price falls,
hypothesised from completing the internal market, on the standard set of
(sixteen) financial products as reported by the EC 'Cecchini_' study.
The estimated gains from 1992 are reflected in the corre_:pundiig
differences between the prices in individual countries compared with the
level at which overall prices are estimated to fall when the ir.t -^ rr.al
market is cor ileted. Although the data are not .forecasts and ha ve becn
estimated subject to strong assumptions, they represent a heroic attc-m-c-,
to suggest possible post-1992 developments.
The theoretical, potential price reductions s:io- vm in Section 1 of
Table 3.13 indicate the different competitive conditions that exist in
the three main financial services sectors for eight countries, It Can
be seen that price falls for banking products are expected to be r_he
largest in West Germany, Spain, France, Ita1^T and the United KUngdor.
Section 2 adjusts the theoretical potential price reductions to reflect
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Table 3.13	 Estimate of potential falls in financial product prices
as a result of completing the internal market (per cent)
Belgium West	 Spain France Italy Luc- Nether ûR
Germany	 embourg lands
1. Theoretical, potential price reductions'
Banking	 15 33	 34 25 18 16 10 18
Insurance	 31 10	 32 24 51 37 1 4
Securities 52 11	 44 23 33 9 18 12
Total	 23 25	 34 24 29 17 9 13
2.	 Indicative price reductions2
All financial services
Range	 6-16 5-15	 16-26 7-17 9-19 3-13 0-9 2-12
Centre of
range	 11 _J	 21 12 14 8 4 7
Notes:	 1.	 These data show the weighted averages of the theoretical
potential falls of selected financial product prices
2. Indicative price falls are based upon a scaling down of
the theoretical potenti • _ price reductions, taking into
account roughly the extent to which perfectly competitive
and integrated conditions will not be attained, plus
other information for each financial services, sub-
sector, such as gross margins and administrative costs as
a proportion of total costs.
Source:
	 Commission of the European Communities (1988a, Table 5.1.4,
P.91)
more accurately expected price falls and shows that price falls for
financial services as a whole are expected to be the largest in Spain,
Italy, France and Belgium.
The price falls computed by Price Waterhouse in Table 3.13 are used
to	 mod-i l the impact on value-added and	 the	 gains	 in CS that are
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hypothesised to result from the law of one price assumption. Table 3.14
summarises the results and shows that the largest gains in CS, as a
proportion of GDP, will accrue to Spain (1.5 per cent), Luxembourg (1.2
per cent) and the United Kingdom (0.8 per cent). Overall, the gain in
CS to the eight EC countries under study will amount, on average, to 0.7
per cent of GDP.
Table 3.14	 Estimated gains resulting from the indicative price
reductions for financial sectors
Average Direct impact on value- Gain in consumer surplus
indicative added for financial as a result of average
price services indicative price
reduction reduction'
% Mn ECU	 % of GDP Mn ECU % of GDP
B 11 656 0,6 685 0,7
D 10 4442 0,5 4619 0,6
E 21 2925 1,4 3189 1,5
F 12 3513 0,5 3683 0,5
1 14 3780 0,7 3996 0,7
L 8 43 1,2 44 1,2
NL 4 341 0,2 347 0,2
UK 7 4917 0,8 5051 0,8
EUR - 8	 10 3617 0,7 21614 0,7
Source:	 Commission of '1e European Communities (1988a, Table 5.1.5
p.92)
Note:
	 1.	 Based c_ the assumption that the elasticity of demand for
financial services is 0,75
3.7.2.3 Limitations of the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study
Various commentators, such as Gardener and Teppett (1990) and (1991),
Neven (1990) and Vives (1991) have investigated the Cecchini findings
and the impact of European integration on the competitive conditions in
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banking and financial markets. Whilst they all agree that there are
different competitive conditions existing across EC banking systems and
that the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini exercise was a useful exercise, they
all have serious reservations about the methodology and assumptions
used.
The microeconomic gains from completing the internal market are
hypothesised to result from the elimination of barriers to trade and the
increased stimulus to competition.	 They include cost reductions,
increased efficiency in financial sectors, a higher rate of financial
innovation and, generally, increased competition.
	 These factors are
then believed to have positive influences on i__ , ortant EC macroeconomic
variables. This is an extremely positive picture of advantage for 1992.
There is major scepticism, however, relatinb to the microeconomic
methodology which is used to model these effects.
The microeconomic approach adapted to estimate the economic gains
from integration was strongly influenced by the work of Venables E 
Smith (1986) which, `had the advantage, alongside their academic
respectability, of producing comparative y high welfare gains' (Gardener
and Teppett (1991), p.159). The mar ,,inal analysis adopted to evaluate
the gains accruing to integration may be distorted, for example,
according to the relative speeds at which various countries adjust. For
example, the implicit assumption that price uniformity will be achieved
by the establishment in high-price countries of institutions from low-
price countries or by the delivery (offer) of cross-border services.
This argument sounds straightforward and ii. full accord with economic
^y
theory, yet it begs many questions when one considers it as a practical
process in the market.
Another criticism relating to the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini
methodology focused on the role of economies of scale. The Centre for
Business Strategy (1989) noted that trade liberalisation of the type
envisaged for 1992 had its primary effects on supply and not demand.
This study cautioned that the scale economy argument was far from
unambiguous, and they note:
It is puzzling that economies of scale are so widely touted as a
source of competitive advantage when there is so little evidence of
their significance.	 (p.104)
and they go on to argue;
Successful operators in an integrated financial market will be
those who correctly exploit the scale of scope economies that do
exist without sacrificing the specialisation that can also be very
important.	 (p.104)
The Centre for Business Strategy (1989) study was also critical of Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini for ignoring important factors such as
consumer/customer behaviour, cultures, habits and s • --ategic issues in
their analysis. They also noted that in the shor,:er-term other major_
environmental factors (such as different legal, regulatory and fiscal
systems) would prevent financial sector integration - especially in the
retail and lower segments of the corporate banking market.
Focusing on the specific methodology, a majc•r undesirable
characteristic of the overall analysis relates to the ..t-rong 'upward
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bias' in the interpretation of economic gains. Gardener and Teppett
(1991) note that the calculation of economic gains published in the
Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study, exclude the cases where some financial
product prices are hypothesised to rise. They argue that price rises
for specific financial products suggest possible credit rationing and/or
the existence of cross-subsidies. Under both of these scenarios, it is
likely that prices will rise under the law of one price assumption and,
`ignoring these possible price rises, therefore, may be unrealistic
unless a strong, rigorous case can be made for this approach' (p.160).
The same authors also note that the calculated economic gains are
overstated because the findings downgrade estimates of the hypothesised
losses in producer surplus. A short-term drop in profits for firms may
have more negative economic effects than were emphasised by the Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini findings. Gardener and Teppett (1991, p.170)
suggest that the results should be re-computed to include producer
surplus losses.
	 The methodology suggested to compute these producer
losses, however, does not escape criticism. We noted earlier in Section
3.7.2.1 tha' the Cournot-Nash oligopoly model was suggested by Price
Waterhouse to calculate the relevant producer-surplus losses.
	 This
approach included the use of a uniform elasticity of demand mea.^•.re
(also used in the consumer surplus only estimates) and a Herfindahl
index. Both measures have been criticised for their crudity in
accurately describing different demand and competitive market
conditions, respectively.
Despite the above limitations and the major data problems
associated with such an analyses, the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini exercise
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incorporates international trade theory with industrial organisations
theory, in a static framework, to provide us with the first step towards
attempting to evaluate all of the benefits and costs of-financial sector
integration. We have already noted, however, that the study played down
the producer surplus side of the analyses and provided no producer
surplus loss estimates; although the Cournot-Nash model of non-
competitive behaviour was stipulated by Price Waterhouse (not Cecchini)
to provide estimates of oligopolistic profits. The focus of the
remaining chapters in this thesis aims to investigate the SCP
relationship across and within European banking markets. Our analysis,
will enable us to evaluate whether oligopoly profits are prevalent
acro--.i banking systems and if they are, this may indicate that producer
surplus losses have an important negative impact on the economic gains
estimnced by Price Waterhouse/Cecchini in the event of financial sector
integration from 1992 onwards.
3.7.3 Other evidence of competitive conditions in European banking
Gardener and Teppett (1990 and 1991) replicate the Cecchini methodology
to evaluate the impact of EFTA integration in the EC and they find the
gains in CS are highly significant for all of the EFTA countries. In
fact, the results suggest generally that larger CS gains (as a
percentage of GDP) may be realised for EFTA countries under certain
scenarios than were originally hypothesised for the EC-8 (see Table
3.12) countries by Price Waterhouse/Cecchini:
PW/Cecchini suggested a gain of 0.7 per cent of GDP on average for
the EC-8. The range of results for our EFTA Integration Scenario,
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where EFTA financial sectors globalise between themselves but
independently of the EC-8, are similar. However, the other two
scenarios investigated, Bilateral Integration and EEA Integration,
support the view that some EFTA countries could potentially achieve
even higher gains.	 (Gardener and Teppett, 1991, p.155)
Furthermore, EFTA integration with the EC suggests even greater price
falls than the Cecchini study. Despite the authors strong rese rvations
about the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini methodology, they find that average
indicative price reductions in the financial services sector for the EC
countries under a European Economic Area (EC plus EFTA) scenario would
be 24 per cent. Price reductions would range between 34 per cent in
Spain to 17 per cent in the Netherlands.
A quite diff^^ent approach is undertaken by Molyneux et al (1993)
who investigate competitive conditions in five major European countries;
Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and Spain. They use the
Rosse-Panzar (see Rosse-Panzar, 1977) statistic to assess quantitatively
the competitive nature of the respective banking markets. This
statistic measures the sum of elasticit i.es of total revenue with respect
to input prices, and Rosse and Panzar show that this sum cannot be,
positive if a firm is a profit-maximising monopoly. Using a sample of
banks frog each country for the years 1986 through to 1989 their results
indicatF that monopolistic competition is prevalent in Germany, the
United Kingdom, France and Spain, 'and given relatively free access to
those banking markets, our findings are consistent with contestable
markets theory' (p.24). The results for Italy suggest that domestic
banks are earning revenue as if under monopoly conditions.
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3.8 Conclusion
The structure of European banking markets has changed-markedly over the
last decade or so. The banking sector in almost all European countries
has grown in size relative to GNP. Banking markets have also become
more concentrated in some countries with public ownership still playing
an important role in many financial systems. The level of employment in
the banking sectors has increased in all the major European countries
during the 1980s, despite the indication that this trend might have
reversed in the late 1980s. There has been an increase in the number of
foreign operators doing business within Europe, and many non-bank
financial institutions have soug.-.: to compete in markets that were once
the sole preserve of banks. Despite these factors and the moves to
harmonise structural deregulation and supervisory re-regulation, we can
still identify substantial 'country-specific' characteristics relatirg
to banking markets. For example, UK large banks tend to employ many
more staff than their German and French counterparts and Spanish banks
are noticeably more profitable than their Europea, counterparts.
Certain countries' banking systems are much more concentrated than
others, and banks perfor much better in some countries compared with
others.
The analysis of the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study illustrates
that different competitive conditions exist across European banking and
financial markets and the CS gains from financial sector integration
after 1992 appear to be substantial. Estimates of thi CS economic gains
from integration, however, may be overstated because the final estimates
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did not take into account producer surplus losses. The aforementioned
study suggested that a Cournot-Nash model of non-competitive behaviour
could be estimated to evaluate evidence of oligopoly profits, from which
producer surplus losses from integration would be calculated, although,
this was not included in the final Cecchini (published) analysis. As a
result, the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini methodology provides us with an
important justification as to why it is useful to examine the SCP
relationship across European banking markets, namely because the
prevalence of significant oligopoly profits across European banking
markets would imply substantial producer surplus losses in the event of
financial integration.
The following two chapters examine the theoretical basis of the
structure-performance relationship and show aow it is empirically
evaluated. Chapter 4 will consider the relationship from an industrial
organisations viewpoint and Chapter 5 will demonstrate how the
structure-performance model has beer_ tested for banking markets.
Notes
1. In 1978 a specific definition of `banking activity' was introduced
into Finnish legislation. It may be noted that a very detailed
description is also enshrined in Japanese banking law and banks'
allowable business powers are well documented by regulators in
Canada and the United States.
2. However, in the case of the United Kingdom and other countries the
central bank is responsible for makin g sure that a bank's business
1-4
is undertaken in such a manner that it does not jeopardise the
position of depositors.
3. Also in Luxembourg (1981) and Portugal (1983)
4. In Austria, France, Germany, Spain, Sweden
5. As in Belgium, Denmark and the Netherlands
6. As well as Luxembourg, Norway and Portugal
7. As identified by Revell (1987), for example, in the United Kingdom,
Barclays, National Westminster, Midland, Lloyds; in France, Crédit
Agricole, BNP, Crédit Lyonnais, Société Gdndrale, Paribas; in
Italy, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, Istituto Bancario San Paolo,
Monte dei Paschie die Siena; and in Germany, Deutsche Bank,
Dresdner Bank, Commerzbank.
8. Net income ratio equals pre-tax profits as a percentage of assets.
9. This is because net income measures do not take into account the
difficulties associated with bad debts, taxes, different countries'
accounting policies, hidden reserves and profit-smoothing
techniques.
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Chapter Four
The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Model and its
Applications in Industrial Organisations Literature
4.1 Introduction
We have seen from the previous chapter that the Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini methodology on 1992 experimented with an aspect of
industrial organisations' literature - a Cournot-Nash competitive model
- to investigate empirically evidence of oligopoly profits in EC
financial systems. This model is at the heart of SCP analysis. This
chapter examines the SCP model and its applications in the industrial
organisations literature. Section 4.2 describes the traditional SCP
paradigm and formally discusses the link between economic theory and the
SCP relationship. Section 4.3 considers measures of market structure,
focusing on concentration measures and inequality indices. Section 4.4
outlines the determinants of the level of concentration, and Section 4.5
briefly discusses measures of conduc.: and performance. Section 4.6 is a
li , erature review of the empirical evidence of the concentration-
pf-formance relationship and distinguishes between two hypotheses - the
traditional SCP paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis. Section 4.7
covers the policy implications of the SCP relationships, and Section 4.8
assesses the role of the SCP model in the light of the new game-
theoretic industrial economics literature. The last section is a
conclusion.
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4.2 The Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) Paradigm
4.2.1 The SCP relationship
The structure-conduct-performance (SCP) approach - based upon
neoclassical theory - has long been the predominant methodology in the
study of industrial economics. Simply stated, the conduct or'rivalry in
a market is determined by market structure conditions, especially the
number and size distribution of firms and the condition of firm entry to
the market. This rivalry leads to unique levels of profits, prices,
advertising and other aspects of market performance. Through the link
of conduct, the performance of firms in a particular market is tied to
the structure of that market. Industrial economists have sought to
identify sets of attributes or variables that influence economic
performance and to develop theories describing the links between those
attributes and end performance. The general descriptive model of these
relationships was conceived by Mason (1939, '_949) and his model of
industrial or , anisation analysis, nowadays referred to as the SCP
approach, is down diagrammatically in Figure 4.1.
The performance in various industries or markets is said to depend
upon the conduct of sellers and buyers in such areas as pricing policies
and practices, inter-firm co-operation, product line and advertising
strategies, research and development, and so on. 'Conduct', therefore,
relates to the behaviour of the firms in a market; to the decisions
these firms make and also to the way in which decisions are taken.
	
In
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general, 'conduct' focuses on how firms set prices, whether independently
or in collusion with others in the market. 'How firms decide on their
advertising and research budgets, and how much expenditure is devoted to
these activities, are also typical considerations' (Ferguson, 1988,
p. 8). The conduct of firms depends on the structure of the relevant
market including such features as the number and size distribution of
sellers and buyers, the extent of physical or subjective differentiation
existing among competing sellers products, the ease of entry into the
market, the ratio of fixed to total costs in the short-run for a typical
firm, the level of vertical integration in the industry, and the amount
of diversity or conglomeration characterising individual firm's product
lines (see Scherer 1980, p. 4).
The linkage between structure, conduct and performance then turns
to identifying structural characteristics against models of firm and
market behaviour, namely, perfect competition, monopoly, monopolistic
c o mpetition and oligopoly. Take, for example, the structures of two
different markets as shown in Table 4.1.
Table 4.1	 Structural differences between two hypothetica.L markets
Structural	 Market A	 Market B
characteristics
Number of firms
Number of buyers
Type of product
Entry barriers
Large number of firms
with a small market share
Many
Homogeneous
Low
Five firms with equal
equal market share
Few
Differentiated
High
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Market A displays characteristics analogous under perfect competition
and, therefore, in this market we can make certain deductions about firm
conduct. For example, in A, firms are likely to act
- independently in
setting price and output levels. Individual firms will be price-takers
- they will be unable to influence the price established by the market.
Economic theory tells us that, in such a market, prices will tend
towards marginal costs, and, in the long-run, all firms in the market
will earn normal profits. Production is allocatively as well as
productively efficient, thus increasing economic welfare. In Market A,
analysis of conduct is actually unnecessary because firm and industry
performance can be directly predicted from market structure conditions:
that is, the structural conditions (perfectly competitive market) yield
enough information to deduce how firms must behave.
Market B displays characteristics of an oligopolistic market which
suggests that price and other aspects of firm behaviour are likely to be
determined collusively. This would yield a higher price (price greater
than marginal cost) and a lower level of output than under perfe•t
competition. In this case, however, the structure of the market dc,Is
not guarantee collusive behaviour - oligopolists may compete for market
share and price may be close to a perfectly competitive level. As such,
in markets which are characterised by oligopolistic structure, conduct
is a critical part of the SCP methodology.
So far we have noted that the direction of causality in the
traditional SCP approach flows from market structure through conduct to
performance in a unidirectional manner. This rests on the view that
market structure is exogenously determined. In reality, however, f=.m
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performance and conduct affect market structure. For example, if market
structure permits conduct which increases prices and enhances profits,
this would attract new entry into the market, changing-the structure of
the market. Conversely, aggressive pricing strategies could force firms
to leave the market.
Concentration may influence performance, not only directly, say
through collusion, but indirectly through its impact on advertising,
research and development, and product differentiation. Non-price forms
of competition may become more intense in concentrated markets that find
it profitable to limit price competition. Performance (profitability)
may be an important determinant of advertising, research and development
and (through investment) of scale economies and costs. Figure 4.2
illustrates how the SCP relationship can be adapted to incorporate these
more complex relationships. Part a) of the figure shows the traditional
SCP relationship, and Part b) shows the various interactions that exist
between structure, conduct and -Derformance. Note, however, that despite
these more complex relationships, the main causality still runs from the
structural criteria.
4.2.2 Economic theory and the SCP paradigm
In a perfectly competitive environment, firms' prices are equal to
marginal cost, firms face perfectly elastic demand curves and they
operate in a socially optimal manner. In an environment characterised
by imperfect competition, on the other hand, firms are likely to depart
from marginal cost pricing which may lead to inefficiency and monopoly
profit... The seminal works of Robinson (1933) and (more importantly in
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the case of the SCP relationship) Chamberlin (1933) initiated formal
study of markets falling between perfect competition and monopoly. The
distinguishing feature of Robinson's work was to establish that, under
'imperfect competition' (a term first used by Robinson) firms face
downward sloping demand curves as compared with the perfectly elastic
demand curves in the perfectly competitive case. Chamberlin focussed on
what he called 'monopolistic competition' and his approach was to assume
that firms operating under monopolistic competition would wish to
achieve jointly the same price-output configurations as would a monopoly
firm. Chamberlin's approach provided a theory about how the number and
size of firms affect industrial performance. He argued that, given
perfect knowledge, and given that each seller is big enough to affect
significantly the market, 'If sellers have regard to their total
influence on price, the price will be the monopoly one' (Chamberlin
1946, p. 54). In addition, he states:
If sellers are three or more, the results are the same, so long as
each of them looks to his ultimate interest. There is no. gradual
descent to a purely competitive price with increase in m-•abers,
as in Cournot's solution. The break comes when the individual's
influence upon the price becomes so small that he neglects it.
(Chamberlin 1946, p. 48)
Chamberlin's theory can be inte_preted that, with perfect information,
markets in which only a few firms operate will be practically equivalent
to monopoly.
Chamberlin's analysis of monopolistic competition was extended by
Fellner (1949) whom, unlike his predecessor, emphasised oligopoly.
Fellner theorised that noncollusive oligopolies 'partially' achieve
joint-profit maximisation. I ­ general, maximising total profits for the
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industry appears a sensible objective: it should be possible to make
every firm better off by first getting, then dividing the largest
possible total market revenue. Fellner (1949) notes, however, that even
colluding firms may fail to maximise their joint profits because of such
things as: arguments about how to split profits; uncertainties and
mistakes; cost and product differences; inter-firm differences in risk
appraisal; difficulty in harmonising preferences of shareholders and
managers; and so on. In fact, such differences may actually result in
price competition. Noncolluding oligopolists are likely to miss the
goal of 'partial' joint-profit maximisation still further.
Nevertheless, Fellner argues that oligopolies are very similar to
cartels except in degree. Overall, Fellner's theory suggests that it is
differences among firms (and their managers) that restrict joint-profit
maximisation most. Variations among firms will rise with their numbers,
but it is not clear how much of an effect should be expected as the
number of firms in a particular market vary.
The works of Chamberlin and Fellner are 'highly indefinite about
how the number of firms affects competition' (McGee 1988, p. 86). An
important question, therefore, becomes un,er what type of market
structure firms will be able to co-ordinate their operations to produce
monopoly price-output configurations. For example, even if it is in the
interests of all firms to set the monopoly price, individual firms may
feel that they can do better by reducing their price relative to the
group. Stigler (1964) has outlined the conditions that lead to such
price cutting behaviour by providing, 'a systematic account of the
factors governing the feasibility of collusion, which like most things
in this world is not free' (Stigler 1964, p. 44), to general, assuming
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imperfect information, Stigler investigates how the incentive secretly
to reduce price changes alter with changes in the size and number of
buyers; number of sellers; and the likelihood that customers who buy
from a given seller in one period will do so in the following period in
the absence of price cutting. According to Stigler, when price exceeds
marginal cost, there is always an incentive for each cartel member to
cut its price and, according to his findings, the incentive secretly to
cut prices:
... increases roughly in proportion to the number of rivals ...
falls as the number of customers per seller increases ... [and]
rises as the probability of repeat purchases falls, but at a
decreasing rate. 	 [p. 51]
From the above, it can be seen that the larger the number of firms, the
harder it is to detect and prevent price cutting. In addition, the
difficulty of detection is affected by the number of buyers, market
growth, consumer loyalty and product differentiation. Put simply,
StiQ,ler's model suggests that prices will be higher (and performance
worse) in markets with a small number of firms, many (ustomers, low
customer turnover, substantial product differentiation.-ind in markets
with lower growth rates.
Stigler's model did not consider the impact of actual and
potential entry in oligopolistic markets, but this also limits the
ability of incumbent firms to maintain monopoly positions. An industry
generating high profits will attract new entrants, so incumbent firms
may post entry-forestalling or limit prices that make it unprofitable
for new firms to enter. On the other hand, they may continue to charge
the monopoly price, thus attracting new firms which will -ventualli push
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prices and profits down. In either case, barriers to entry into a
market influence the equilibrium price and performance.
From the above it can be clearly seen how economic theory relates
market structure to firm performance, especially price performance. The
following section will provide a formal model, widely illustrated in
industrial economic texts, to show this relationship.
4.2.3	 Competition theory and the SCP paradigm - a formal approach
This section aims to explain formally the linkages between the
attributes of competition theory and the SCP paradigm. The basic
analysis is clearly illustrated in Reekie (1989) and his approach can be
easily extended to show the relationship between industry performance,
market structure, demand elasticity and any degree of collusive
behaviour ranging from totally non-cooperative (Cournot-Nash)
equilibrium to co , plete collusion.
The relationship between competition theory and the SCP paradi•_n
can be analysed by using two cases:
1) The case where the number of competing firms alone is of crucial
importance
2) The case where numbers are not important, but where views about
the ease of collusion between alleged competitors are
We will use Reekie's (1989, pp. 39-40) example to illustrate the
former. The first case starts with the Cournot -Nash
 
theory :f
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oligopolyZ where each firm believes that others will not change their
output even if the original firm does alter its output.
Let the industry demand curve be:
P - a +bQ (1)
where	 P - industry price
Q - industry output
q - firm output
where Q - f(q)
Let the profits of firm i be:
û i
 = Pqi - Cqi
where C is constant average (ai,d hence marginal) cost
(2)
To f ind the
profit maximising situation we differentiate (using the multiplication
ru-e) to obtain:
dII i
	
Pdg i	 g i dP	 dP
dq = dq	 + dq	 - C = P + q i dq - C = 0
Similarly, differentiating equation (1) we have:
(3)
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dP =0+bdQ
(4)
dq i
	dqi
By substituting (4) and (1) into (3) we arrive at the profit-maximising
condition of:
dIIi =a+bQ+bgidQ-C=0
	 (5)
dq i	dqi
Given that the Cournot-Nash assumption that i believes others will not
alter output, if he does, then any change in output Q ( i.e. dQ) = dqi,
so dQ/dg i = 1.
Thus:
dlI i = a +bQ+bg i -C=0
	 (6)
dq i
for firm i in the profit maximising situation.
For all n firms, the industry's maximising situation can be arrived at
by multiplying equation (6) by n to obtain:
Q - n(c- a)/(n+l)b
Remembering; that in equation (1) P= a + bQ, by substitution of (7)
into (1) :
P - a + n(c-a)/(n+l)	 (8)
(a+nc)/(n+l)
In perfect competition price (P) equals marginal cost (c) then:
P = c - (a+nc) /(n+l)
=cn +c=a +nc
-c - a =P)
(7)
(9)
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While in monopoly:
P — (a+l.c)/(n+l)
— (a+c)/2
From the above two cases, one can see that as the number of firms (n)
changes from one to infinity and market structures from monopoly to
perfect competition price falls from (a+c)/2 to c where (a+c)/2 is the
monopoly price. This can also be represented by a simple diagram as
shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3	 Price under monopoly and perfect competition
Price
wy — Ica since wz—cw
wx — oc
wy+wx — xy — oc+hca
monopoly price P — xy — (oc+oa)/2
MONOPOLY PRICE P — (a+c)/2
1-4
o	 x	 MR—	 AR—
Mar€ nal	 Demand output curve—
revenue	 Average revenue curve
The above example only focuses on the case where the number of
competing firms is of importance. 	 However,	 the analysis can be extended
to include	 the degree of interfirm_ collusion and firms elasticity of
demand.
(10)
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In the second case, to illustrate the relationship between
competition theory and the SCP paradigm, we drop the Cournot-Nash
assumption (that each firm assumes all other firms maintain output
constant in relation to its own output changes) and therefore the output
of other firms will change as output of firm i changes. Using a
slightly adapted formal analysis from Hay and Morris (1991, p. 220-21)
we can show how collusion and elasticity of demand can be incorporated
into the SCP framework.
If the profits (performance) of the ith firm are given by:
II ,
 = Pq 1 - TC 1	(11)
where II = profitability of firm i
P = industry price
q i = output of firm i
TC = total costs of firm i
then profit maximisation requires:
dTr i = q i dP dQ + P - 
dTC i = 0	 (12)
dq i	dQ dqi	dqi
dQ dq i 	 dj;iq^
+	 _ ^ + A
dq i
 dq i	 dqi
where A = dj;F1 gl/dgI
A is known as the CONJECTURAL VARIATION OF FIRM i. This term measures
the competitive reaction of all firms in the -Industry (dj^: lg i ) to the
output decision of firm i, as subjectively perceived by firm i, and it
130
is the determination of this which is at the heart of oligopoly
analysis.	 The second guessing of competitors' reactions can be
expressed formally as that of specifying a value of the derivative
dj^igi
dqi
Because this derivative relates to variations in output and, 'since its
value must be guessed at or conjectured by firm i, it is known in the
literature of oligopoly theory as the conjectural variation of firm V.
(Gravelle and Rees 1981, p. 311)
Following from equation (12), assuming constant costs (marginal
cost = average cost) the profit maximising margin is given as:
	
m. = P - AC i _ _ gi
 dP dQ-	 (1
'	 P	 P dQ dq i
where m, profit maximising margin of firm i
P = industry price
AC i = average cost of firm i, which is equal to marginal cost
of firm i in a constant cost case
Multiplying by Q/Q and rearranging, we get
qi QdP dQ
m =	 (14)
i	 Q Pdq dqi
m i = (s i ) I 1 
J 
(1 + a)	 (15)
e
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where s i = market share of firm i
e = elasticity of demand
(1 + A) = one plus the conjectural variation of firm i.
Thus,
m i
 = S i (1 + 1)
	 (16)
e
which is a derivation of the Lerner index of monopoly power (see Lerner
[1934], and Kwoka and Ravenscraft [1986, p. 352 1
 under a conjectural
variation environment)3.
Equation (16) gives us the firm's profit maximising mark-up and
does so in terms of its market share, its demand elasticity and the
degree to which it can forecast competitive reactions (conjectural
variation).	 If firms behave in a totally non-collusive manner (the
Cournot-Nash case) then A = 0.	 If behaviour is perfectly collusive,
then any change in the output of the ith firm will generate a response
so as to keep market shares constant. Up-der this scenario,
j;iqj + dj;ig j	 J1gS
q  + dgi	 q 	
(17)
Cross multiplying gives
q ij;lqj + g i dj;lgj - q ij;l qj + dgij;lgj	 (18)
Therefore, the conjectural variation is:
a= 
dj^1 qj = j^1qj = j;1 q j /Q _ 1- s i	(19)
dqi	 q 	 gi/Q	 si
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Hay and Morris (1991, p. 221) show that if we let the extent of
collusion be S, where g ranges from 0 to 1, then A is generally given by
13 1 - Si
	 + (1 - S)0 = P 1 - s 
ss
1	 1
Substituting this into equation (16) for the profit maximising firm
(20)
margin m  gives:
1-M i = si 1 + S si
e s
1
(21)
The average industry mark up over marginal cost can be found by
using equation (21) for each firm, weighting it by the relevant market
share and -amming across firms. Industry average margin is:
2	 rEs	 IS 21
M = Es i m i = E si + S 1 1- 1 1	 (22)
i e	 e
where Is = 1 and Es 12 is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index H; so
	
M = H+S- 9H 	 (23)
	
e e	 e
_ 13 1 + (1 - 9) H
	
e	 e
Equation (23) is the most general expression for the relationship
between industry margin (industry performance) and market structure as
measured by the Hirschmann Herfindahl index (which will be discussed
later in this chapter). This elegant formulation allows for any market
structure, any demand elasticity, and any degree of collusive behaviour
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- from totally non-cooperative (Cournot-Nash) to complete collusion. If
there is no collusion, then g becomes zero and the expression reduces to
H/e. With complete collusion, 13 = 1, then it reduces to 1/e, which is
the value when firms act as a monopoly and, in fact, is equivalent to
the Lerner index of monopoly power.
4.3 Measurement of Market Structure
4.3.1 Desirable properties of measures of market structure
Market structure can be described by examining (either jointly or
separately) the number of firms, the extent of product differentiation,
entry conditions, and the level of integration within the market. The
most commonly used measure is market concentration. A concentration
measure shows the level to which the production of a &cod ur service is
restricted to a few large firms. If a market has a small number of
firms, or a great disparity in size between firms, the more concentrated
and so less competitive the market will be. Ferguson (1988) notes why
concentration measures are the most widely v-,ed measures of market
structure:
The attractio n, of this measure is easily understood. Differences
in the numl_ar and size distribution of firms are key factors
distinguisling the theoretical models of perfect competition,
oligopol y , monopoly and monopolistic competition. Market
concentra-:ion is easily estimated since published data on the
number and size distribution of firms are generally available.
For other structural variables, published information is rare ...
(pp. 23-24)
There are a wide range of statistical measures of concentration
and it is important to analyse these measures because if they provide us
with contradictory rarkings of industry concentration then this has
implications 'jr how we interpret findings of empirical work on
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concentration. Before we consider the various concentration measures we
should first discuss what constitutes a desirable property of a
concentration measure. Hall and Tideman (1967) identified the following
desirable properties:
(1) The measure used must yield an unambiguous ranking of
industries.
(2) The measure should be independent of the size of an industry
but be a function of the combined market share of firms.
(3) Concentration should increase if the market share of any
firm is increased at the expense of a smaller firm, that is,
the 'principle of transfers' should hold.
(4) If all firms are divided into a given number of equal parts,
the concentration measure should fall in the same
proportion. For instance, if all firms are divided into two
equal parts, the concentration measure should halve.
(5) The concentration measure should be a decreasing function of
the number of fi--ms.
(6) The limits of a concentration ratio measure should be zero
and one. (Some proposed measures do not exhibit this
property per se bu'. can be normalised to do so by expressing
them as a proportion of their maximum value.)
Subsequently Hannah and Kay (1977) have proposed several other
criteria that concentration indices should meet:
(1)	 If one concentration curs-e lies entirely above another, it
represents a hi-ter leve *- .,f concentration. An exare.pi.e of P-
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concentration curve is shown in Figure 4.4 and shows the
cumulative shares of market output attributable to the
largest firs in the market.
Figure 4.4 — Concentration curves
4	 8	 12	 Cumulative no.
of firm frurr
largest to
smallest
On the above criterion, industry A is more concentrated
since a given number of firms s counts for a higher
proportion of output in A than in dither B or C. The case
is ambiguous for industries B aid C because the four firm
concentration ratio shows industry C to be more concentrated
than industry B, whereas the twelve firm concentration ratio
suggests the opposite. If the concentration curves do not
intersect, the ranking of industries is unaffected by the
number of firms chosen to calculate the concentration ratio.
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(2) If a large firm wins a customer from a small firm,
concentration has increased. This is what is known as the
'principle of transfers'. A transfer of output from a
smaller to a larger firm, which will increase the degree of
inequality, should increase the value of the concentration
index.
(3) The entry of a new firm below some significant size reduces
concentration. The entry of a new firm increases the number
of firms in the industry and, therefore, decreases
concentration, but if the new entrant has a sufficiently
large market share, it could move the concentration curve
upwards and, therefore, increase concentration.
(4) Mergers increase concentration
(5) The contribution of a firm to the concentration measure
tends to zero with.its market share.
Given these criteria and bearing in mind that there is no general
consensus as to the relative importance of the above requirements, the
following will examine the actual measures.
4.3.2
	 Concentration ratios
A simple measure of market structure is the concentration ratio
which is defined as the percentage of total industry output (or sales,
or capacity, or employment, or value added) contributed by largest
firms, ranked in order of market share. The cumulative market share of
the largest firms are ranked in descending order of sire to giv(,:
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where CR = the X firm concentration ratio
X
S 1 = the percentage market share of the ith firm
The most commonly used concentration ratio used in American studies
(according to Scherer 1980, p. 56) of market structure is the percentage
of total industry sales made by the four largest firms - the four-firm
concentration ratio. The concentration ratio is a popular measure
because it is relatively easy to obtain information to calculate the
ratio. Data on market size and shares of the largest firms are
frequently published. The United States government also provides
concentration ratio estimates for manufacturing industry tiïougii the
Department of Commerce Census for Manufactures5.
Concentration	 measures are generally subject to two main
criticisms. Firstly, the choice of an arbitrary number of firms on
which to calculate a concentration ratio may yield ambiguous r•isults as
illustrated above in Figure 4.4. There is also no theoretical reason
for preferring a four-firm to a ten-firm or thirty-firm concentration
ratio. The second criticism is that concentration ratios do n t take
into account the number of firms in the industry. For example, two
industries may have identical ten-firm concentration ratios, but one may
have thirty smaller firms and the other 300 smaller firms in their
respective industries. If industry performance is determined by the ten
largest firms, then this may not be a problem, but if the number of
firms included in the concentration ratio does not relate to the number
that influences industry performance, then it may be. In ge- oral, th,
(24)
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concentration ratio measure meets all the Hannah and Kay (1977) criteria
so long as changes in the industry structure affect the largest firms as
measured by the concentration ratio.
4.3.3 Hirschmann-Herfindahl index
The Hirschmann-Herfindahl index (Hirschmann 1964), hereafter known as
the H-index, is a summary index of market structure which takes
account of the size distribution of firms. It was heavily promoted by
Stigler (1964) as a good structural index for oligopolistic markets.
The index is the sum of the squares of the sizes of firms in a market in
which sizes are expressed as a proportion of the total market size. It
is shown as follows:
H index = E Xi 2
i lm
where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., n
M = total market share
X = firm i's share of the markett
n = number of firms in the market
Under perfect competition the index would equal zero and under
monopoly it would equal 1. If all firms in the market were of equal
size the H-index would be 1/n. As the number of Firms in the market
increases, the H-index tends towards 0. The advantages of the H-index
are that it takes into account both the absolute n ,-mibers as well as size
inequalities of firms simultaneously. It also meets all the Hannah and
(25)
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Kay criteria as a desirable market structure measure. We have also shown
in Section 4.2.3 of this chapter that if industries are oligopolistic
and behaviour is of a Cournot-Nash nature, then the Herfindahl index is
related to industry price-cost margins. To recall briefly, the price
cost margin for a firm with constant costs is:
Mi — S_i	 (26)
e
mi — firm price-cost margin
( price - average cost )
(	 price	 )
s i — market share of firm i
e — elasticity of demand
The in:;up try profit margin is the weighted sum of firms' profit
margins where the weights are market shares so:
M = E m ;si
,
- ^ 81 JS1
e
= E 
S12 = 
H
e	 e
w}-ire M — industry price-cost margin
H — Hirshmann-Herfindahl index
This illustrates that industry profit margins should vary directly
with the H-index and inversely with the elasticity of demand. The H-
index is frequently expressed as a 'number equivalent' measure of
concentration, which is just the in verse of the H-index:
Numbexs equivalent measure of co:zcentratiorL = 1
H
(27)
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An H-index of 0.10 would give us a numbers equivalent of ten, that
is, the degree of concentration in the market is equivalent to having
ten equal-sized firms. In its favour, the H-index and its numbers
equivalent fulfils all the Hannah and Kay criteria and it is a
theoretically elegant measure. On the other hand, its major criticism
is that any value of H is not unique - different size distributions of
firms can yield the same H statistic. In addition, obtaining
information on all firms in a particular industry may be difficult,
although Adelman (1969) has pointed out that this is not necessary to
get a reasonable approximation to the H-index (see also Schmalensee
1977, P. 188).
4.3.4	 Entropy indices
Entropy Indices of market concentration involve a more complex weighting
scheme for firm size than the H-index. The basic entropy measure
developed by Theil (1967), analysed in detail by
 Jacquemin and de Jong
(1977), is:
N
E _ - ^ s i
 log s i
	(28)
where E = F itropy
S = firm size relative to market structure
i
The weight applied is minus the logarithm (usually to the base 2) of the
market share (because s,<l, log s, <0, therefore the negative sign gives
a positive entropy, E, measure). The index measures the degree of
uncertainty or disorder in the market. If all firms were of equal size,
then E - logN and when, -irms are unequal in size, E will tend towards
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zero. E is an inverse measure of concentration 6 . The advantage of this
type of measure is that it can be broken down to illustrate how various
sub-groups contribute to the overall level of concentration. It is
generally subject to the same criticisms as the Hirschmann-Herfindahl
index.
4.3.5 Rosenbluth or Hall-Tideman index
Another general class of indices are those represented by the Rosenbluth
or Hall-Tideman indices7
 and are illustrated as follows:
Rosenbluth or Hall Tideman index =
1/ (2
-E is - 1,
N	 (29)
where i is the firm ranking
s i is the market share of the ith firm measured as the output
of the ith firm divided by total output
The index will equal )ne in the case of monopoly and will equal
zero where all firms have equal market shares. A closely related index
is the dominance index develop d by Kwoka (1977):
n
Dominance Index = E ( s i - si +i)Z
	
(30)
where s is defined as above
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In the case of the dominance index, the differential market share
between firms is ranked by firm size. A monopoly situation obtains a
dominance index of unity and the index ranges from zero to one.
4.3.6 Hannah and Kay index
This index devised by Hannah and Kay (1977) is similar to the
Hirschmann-Herfindahl index and, in fact, can be regarded as a special
case of the latter. The Hannah and Kay index is:
1
Hannah and Kays number equivalent index = (Zs ia) 1-a	 (31)
Market share is raised to the power (a), which is left up to t:-.a
researcher. Hannah and Kay suggest that the range 0.6 to 2.5 gives the
best results, and one can see that if one chose a = 2 then the index
becomes the Hirschmann-Herfindahl index.
4.3.7 Gini co-efficient and variance of logs of firm size
The Gini co-efficient is a measure of rela_1ve concentration and is
really a measure of inequality rather t)an concentration. It has,
however, been widely used in the industrial economics literature to
measure market structure. The Gini co-efficient is derived from the
Lorenz curve which is shown in Figure 4.5.
The Lorenz curve shows that proportion of the market which is held
by the relevant x per cent of firms. If all firms are of equal size,
then the Lorenz curve will be equal to ' .e diagor..., otherwise known as
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the line of absolute equality. Figure 4.5 illustrates two Lorenz curves
for industries A and B. The Gini co-efficient is derived from the
Lorenz curve as follows:
Gini co-efficient — Area between Lorenz curve and diagonal
Total area under diagonal
Absolute values of the Gini co-efficient vary between zero and
one, the lower the value, the less the degree of inequality. One of the
major criticisms of this measure is that it is only a measure of
relative size and does not take into account the numbers of firms in the
Figure 4.5 The Lorenz Curve
Cumulative % of firms
Source: George and Joll (1988, p. 114)
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industry. For example, if there are 500 firms of equal size or just a
monopoly, the Lorenz curve will follow the line of absolute equality and
yield a Gini co-efficient of zero. This measure, therefore, does not
satisfy the Hall and Tideman fifth criteria that a concentration measure
should be a decreasing function of the number of firms in the industry8.
Another widely used measure of inequality (or relative
concentration) is that developed by Hart and Prais (1956) known as the
variance of the logarithms of firm size (v) where:
1 n
	 1	 n	 2
V = —, El (log si)2 
a [i
E
 l 
log s i l	 (32)
where s i is the market share of the ith firm
The measure is close to zero if firms are of a similar size,
irrespective of the number of firms in the market. It is, therefore,
subject to the same criticisms as the Gini co-efficient and can generate
ambiguous concentration measuresç.
4.3.8
	 Other indices
We have discussed above the measures of market structure most widely
used in the industrial economic's literature. There are, however, a
variety of other measures that have been used, the most important of
which (as far as we are aware) include: the Linda class of indices (see
Ferguson [1988, p. 171]); and the share stability indices simply
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illustrated by Hymer and Pashigian (1962) and developed by Grossack
(1965) and Salley (1972). The Linda class of indices are based upon the
concentration ratio, but allow for inequalities between large firms'O.
Share stability indices (sometimes known as dynamic concentration
measures) relate the market share of firms in a given base year with its
share of the market at the end of the period under study11.
4.3.9	 Practical problems associated with concentration measures
There are three main practical problems associated with measuring market
structure. Firstly, the market share of individual firms can be
measured by using a whole range of variables, for example, total assets,
output, value added, employment, etc. Diffarart variables are quita
likely to yield different concentration rankings and therefore it is up
to researchers to provide both empirical and theoretical justification
for the choice of the market share measure.
Secondly, different concentration indices may yield conflicting
measures of market structure. Jacquemin and de Jong (1977) in a study
of £.,ropean manufacturing industries estimated rank correlation
cc fficients to different concentration measures. They found a high
correlation between rankings using the four and eight-firm
concentration ratios, the H-index and the entropy coefficient, but the
correlation between these measures and the Gini coefficient was much
lower. George and Ward (1975) have also shown that change in the
measure of concentration can affect empirical results. In a study of
the change in concentration among the top European Community companies
jetween :".,2 and 1972, the Herfindahl and entropy measures showed that
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concentration had declined, whereas the variance of logs method recorded
an increase in concentration. Other studies by Bailey and Boyle et al.
(1971), Aaronovitch and Sawyer (1975) and Vanlommel (1977) have found
various concentration measures to be highly correlated with one another.
From this literature, it appears that four- and eight-firm
concentration ratios, H-index and entropy measures are all highly
correlated, and thus provide similar concentration ratings. Inequality
measi—es of concentration, such as the Gini coefficient, variance of
logs method and the Linda indices appear to be less closely correlated
and also provide conflicting rankings to the aforementioned
concentration measures.
A third major problem in calculating the relevant measure of
market structure relates to how one defines the market. Sometimes the
size of the market is difficult to define, especially if there are a
large number of firms providing close substitutes. Asch (1983, pp. 186-
9) has argued that consumer substitutability is the main criterion for
defining the market but, 'in practice, a great meal of judgment must be
used in classifying firms, and the researcher must always be alert to
the possibility that empirical results may be sensitive to the
particular industry grouping that have been used'. (George and Joll,
1988, p. 118).
4.4 Determinants of the Level of Concentration
4.4.1
	 Economies of scale
The area the- has pr(.'-,bly received the most attention from industrial
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economists as a determinant of the level of industry concentration is
economies of scale. As Scherer (1980) notes:
One condition that could lead to concentrated market structures is
the existence of substantial scale economies, permitting
relatively large producers to manufacture and market their
products at lower average cost per unit than relatively small
producers
(P. 81)
Figure 4.6 illustrates a long-run average cost curve and economies of
scale are shown on the downward sloping part of curve.
Figure 4.6 The long-run average cost _rve and economies of scale
Cost
tput
AC
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Economies of scale are present along the output range OX, where
long-run average cost is falling. OX represents the minimum optimal
size of the firm in the particular industry because it is the smallest
size of firm that can benefit from all the economies of scale and thus
minimise long-run average cost. In analysing the structure of a market,
it is important to know how large the minimum optimal size of firm is in
relation to the size of the market. For example, if OX is a third of
the market size, then the market can support only three firms of optimal
size; if it is one-hundredth, then the market is large enough to have
100 firms of optimal size, etc. In addition, the steepness of the cost
curve is also of interest because this can indicate the cost
disadvantages suffered by firms which are of suboptimal size.
There is an enormous literature on economies of scale which is
well beyond the scope of this thesis to tackle 13 . Scherer (1975) and
(1980, Chp. 4) gives a comprehensive review of the literature. The
latter cites over 230 sources relating to the subject of economies of
scale. In his 1980 study he discus es five main types of scale
economies that could impact on the level of concentration:
1. Product-specific economies - c st economies generated by the
specialisation of production relating to individual products
2. Plant-specific economies - cost economies coming from the
expansion in size of individual processing units
3. Multi-plant economies - 'the multi plant enterprise can
employ a more richly specialised array of accounting,
licence, marketing, production proce;s, research and Legal
talent than a single plant = _rm, all j_se being equal, "his
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may be reflected in lower administration costs and/or higher
productivity' (Scherer, p. 84)
4. Capital raising and other pecuniary economies - cost
economies encountered when firms raise capital through
common stock issues, borrowing and such like - based on the
view that the larger the amount raised, the lower those
costs are per dollar of capital raised
5. Economies of large-scale promotion - cost economies
generated through large scale promotion and marketing
campaigns, for example, one possible source of scale
economies is the need to attain a certain minimum level of
TV advertising before reaching maximum effectiveness (see
Scherer, p. 108)
In general, the link between economies of scale and concentration
is non-contentious. Market concentration is expected to increase as
,iconomies of scale increase. If market concentration reaches a level
dictated by available economies of scale, then it F-uld be futile for
policy makers to influence the level of market concer':ration because, in
the long-run, market concentration will move towards the level as
dictated by the cost function.
Various studies, such as Scherer, et a l . (1975) have sought to
estimate various industries minimum efficient scale (OX in Figure 4.6)
and compare this with the observed 'Levels of market concentraLion. 7n
this study for the United States, they find that the four.-firm
concentration ratios are much larger than the operation of minimum
efficient scale plants would suggest. A similar study re.,orted by
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Silberston (1972) on economies of scale across 25 UK manufacturing
industries found that the minimum efficient scale of production of
aircraft, diesel engines and certain types of machine' tools was greater
than the size of the UK market! Overall, the literature suggests that,
in the case of the United States, 'national market concentration in most
industries appears to be much higher than it needs to be for leading
firms to take advantage of all but slight residual scale economies'
(Scherer [1975, p. 54]). The case is not so clear-cut for industries in
other countries.
In relation to the SCP framework, this result is not so
surprising; one might expect that leading firms will maintain positions
of market power (through entry deterring tactics), even if market shares
are much larger than those necessary for efficient operation. Some
economists, referred to in the industrial organisations literature as
the Chicago School , in fact argue that estimates of scale economies
and minimum efficient scale are irrelevant, because the market structure
observed in the real world is efficient:
I see little reason to spend much more time estimating opr4.mum
plant or firm size except, perhaps, in a completely centra.ized
and governmentally controlled economy in which the State tries
hard to keep markets from working and consumers from exF_essing
preferences. When property and markets are at work, and consumers
are permitted to choose what and from whom to buy, it is, as far
as I am concerned, a trivial matter what the facts of technical
economies are, or what economists and engineers have to say about
them. Consumers will choose products and firms will offer what
is, to their tastes, the best deal. Consumers will make the
trade-off between prices and product qualities. The prices they
pay for the qualities they buy are signals to anyone who would do
better by them. Such economies as there are will assert
themselves, and no-one need be concerned how large or small they
are.
(McGee, 1974b, p. 84)
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4.4.2	 Barriers to entry
Bain (1951), in the first quantitative study of the relationship
between industry concentration and profitability, (discussed in more
detail later in this chapter) identified that industrial concentration
is higher than can be justified by superior performances or economies of
scale. He argued that concentration is preserved by various types of
entry barriers. The concept of entry barriers was extended in Bain
(1956) where he defined barriers to entry as any constraint which puts
potential entrants at a competitive disadvantage compared with
established firms and which enables established firms to generate
abnormal profits in the long-run. The level of entry barriers
determines the level of profits. Bain (1956) identified four main types
of entry barriers: absolute unit cost differences; product
differentiation; capital cost requirements; and economies of scale.
The first type of barrier identified by Bain (1956) relates to
absolute cost advantages of established firms: that is, for any given
level of output, incumbent firms can produce and market their product at
a lower cost per unit than newcomers. This situation may arise because
new entrants may have to pay more for scarce raw material, use inferior
production technologies, the cost of capital may be higher, or they may
not be able to have access to relevant marketing outlets.
A second type of barrier relates to product differentiation and,
in particular, differenciation supported by heavy sales promotion. Bain
(1956) concluded that product differentiation was: 'of at least the same
general order of importance ... as economies of large-scale production
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and distribution' (pp. 142-43) in providing the largest firms a price or
cost advantage over rivals and especially over new entrants. A later
study by Scherer et al. (1975) found that, Although product
differentiation was important, firms with only a single plant of
efficient scale could promote their products on equal terms by directing
their promotional campaigns at specific market segments. The reason for
the interest in advertising and product differentiation in general is
typified by the findings of Mueller and Rogers (1980) who noted that
consumer goods industries that spent especially large sums on TV and
radio advertising have also experienced high increases in concentration
over the period 1947 to 1977. Consumers goods industries that spent
heavily on newspaper advertisements or did not advertise at all and
producer goods industries experienced either falls or no increase in
their respective industry concentration levels. The role of advertising
and product differentiation as forming a barrier to market entry is
discussed in substantial detail in Bain (1968), Simon (1974, Chapter 1),
Comanor and Wilson (1974), Lambin (1976), Brown (1978), Ferguson (1988,
Chs?ter 4) and Hay and Morris (1991, Chapter 5).
A third type of entry barrier relates to capital cost
requi r.ements. Potential entrants may find the capital needed to enter
an industry may be a considerable barrier, but for existing firms in the
market, this may not be a constraint. For example, if the industry is
identified as having a large minimum efficient scale of operations, this
may necessitate a large capital cost outlay. The deterrence of this
barrier, however, depends on the nature of the potential entrant as well
as the type of industry being entered. If a major potential entrant is
al.aady a 1.-ge firm, then capital costs may not pose a serious problem.
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The final barrier to entry, as identified by Bain (1956), are
economies of scale which we have already discussed in the previous
section. To restate the main issue - if the minimum efficient scale of
firm is large in relation to the size of the whole market, and if
operating at suboptimal costs yields significant cost disadvantages,
then there will be a major barrier to the entry of new firms.
4.4.3	 Other determinants of concentration
There are a wide range of other causes that are believed to have an
impact on the type of market structure and hence the level of
concentration. These are shown below:
4.4.3.1 Size of the market
The size of the market can have an impact on the level of market
concentration because smaller markets would te n d to support a smaller
number of firmF and thus the likelihood of collusion and anti-competitive
practices me -r be more likely. In addition, many studies of
concentration have Focused on national markets, yet many industries have
strong regional narkets, the national concentration measures tend to
understate the degree of concentration. Weiss (1972), for example,
noted that the average four-firm concentration ratio for a variety of
thirteen industries (ranging from cigarette producers to cement
manufacturers) increased from 19.6 per cent when viewed in a naticiial
context to 35.7 per cent after adjustment for regional markets.
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4.4.3.2 Market growth rate
When economies of scale are tending to increase concentration, this
effect will be weakened by an increase in the size of the market. It is
likely that slow growth industries become monopolised more easily.
4.4.3.3 Government policy
Government policies such as: antitrust legislation; regulations
governing patents, licences, tariffs and quotas; procurement policies;
and other regulations specific to various industries, such as public
utility regulation and banking regulation have an impact on
concentration. With regard to antitrust legislation, governments have
created various laws to limit or prohibit excessive concentrations of
market power. On the other hand, Greer (1984, p. 120) notes that
various anticompetitive government policies such as: licences - restrict
the entry of firms into particular markets; franchises - grart monopoly
rights to bus companies, warir companies and other business; tariffs and
quotas - inhibit the free flow of imports; and patents - award x-year
monopolies over the use of new i. ►ventions and processes. In the case of
public procurement programmes governments may show a bias in favour of
large firms, mainly because of the nature of the products that they
purchase, e.g. defence equipment, transport, etc. All the above
policies could lead to increased concentration in the market place.
4.4.3.4 Business policies
Business policies such as mergers, :estrictive practices and product
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differentiation (which we have already discussed) are all deemed to have
an impact on market concentration. As George and Joll (1988) state:
The single most important cause of increases in concentration is
undoubtedly merger activity ... It need not be the case that all,
or even the majority of, mergers are the results of attempts to
monopolise industry. But whatever the precise causes of merger
there can be no doubt that they have contributed massively to
increases in concentration.	 (p. 132)
The first systematic study examining the impact of mergers on industry
concentration was undertaken by Weiss (1966) who traced the effects of
mergers on four-firm and eight-firm concentration ratios in six US
manufacturing sectors between 1930 and 1960. Changes in concentration
were categorised according to merger, internal gro-70 1 . entry and exit of
firms and a value described as displacement, which allowed for changes
in the identity of the major firms in each time pe '.c3. Weiss found
that mergers contributed the largest components to increased
concentration.
Various similar studies of mergers and concentration for the
United Kingdom undertaken by Hart, Ut =on and Walshe (1973), George
(1975) and Hannah and Kay (1977) arrived at s i milar findings.
Restrictive practices, which incltie such things as collective
rebates, predatory price discrimination, exclusive dealing, and barrier
pricing have no immediate effect on concentration although, over a long
period of time, they might help consolidate market power.
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4.4.3.5 Stochastic processes or 'luck'
The extreme alternative to the view that concentration is determined by
economies of scale, barriers to entry and so on is based on the
assertion that it is brought about by pure (statistical) chance. A
casual inspection of data on firm size across countries reveals that in
many industries the data exhibit a similar pattern, 'the size
distribution of firms is highly skewed, with a few large firms, rather
more medium-sized firms, and a large 'tail' of small firms' (Hay and
Morris [1991, p. 537]). Such distributions can be approximated by a
number of related skew distributions - of which the most widely used is
the lognormal. These distributions can be generated by a stochastic
process in which the variable (in the case above, the size of firms) can
be subjected to cumulative random shocks over time. The size
distribution of firms in an industry is, therefore, related to a series
of random growth patterns in the history of the particular market. This
process of random growth which generates a lognormal distribution was
first identified by Gibrat (1931) and his formulation is known as
Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Effect.
Various researches, such as Hart and Prais (1 x 56) and Simon and
Bonini (1958), identified that such stochastic processes could be used
to explain concentration. This is clearly illustrated using a
simulation experiment reported in Scherer (1980, p. 146). Scherer
simulated sixteen separate histories of a market under the following
assumptions:
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1.	 In the first period the market consists of fifty firms each with
$100,000 in sales and a 2 per cent market share. The four-firm
concentration ratio is then at 8 per cent.
2. The chance for growth of each firm is identical. The chances are
specified by each firm annually drawing a year's growth from an
identical probability distribution.
3. The probability distribution from which the annual growth rates
are obtained provides for an average annual growth rate of 6 per
cent, but a variance of growth rates around this average, such that
the distribution is normal with standard deviation of 16 per cent.
These assumptions also conform to Gibrat ' s Law of Proportionate Growth.
Table 4.2 reproduces Scherer ' s (1980) simulation exercise and
shows that concentration rises dramatically over the first twenty years
and more slowly thereafter. Why is this the case? Well, as Scherer
(1980) states:
The answer: in a word, is luck. Some firms will inevitab-y enjoy
a run of luck, experiencing several years of rapid growth - n close
succession. Once the most fortunate firms climb well ahead of the
pack, it is difficult for laggards to rally and rectify she
imbalance for, by definition, each firm - large or small - hF^ an
equal chance of growing by a given percentage amount.	 (p 146)
If a firm has managed to become one of the market leaders, its position
will be enhanced if it continues to be luckier than average ( as in fact
it will be in roughly half the cases).
A :.umber of studies have sought to compare the actual distribution
of firms with that predicted by similar forms of stochastic p-.:ocess.
158
Quandt (1966) and Silberman (1967) found that the distribution generated
by stochastic processes were generally a rather poor fit. More recent
studies, such as that of Davies and Lyons (1982) have sought to
integrate the traditional (deterministic) and stochastic approaches
Table 4.2	 Four-firm concentration ratios resulting from sixteen
simulation runs of a stochastic growth model
Simulation 1
Four-firm concentration ratio at
20	 40	 60	 80	 100
year:
120 140
Evan 1 8.0 19.5 29.3 36.3 40.7 44.9 38.8 41.3
Run 2 8.0 20.3 21.4 28.1 37.5 41.6 50.8 55.6
P.:i 3 8.0 18.8 28.9 44.6 43.1 47.1 56.5 45.0
Run 4 8.0 20.9 26.7 31.8 41.9 41.0 64.5 59.8
Run 8.0 23.5 33.2 43.8 60.5 60.5 71.9 63.6
Run 6 8.0 21.3 26.6 29.7 35.8 51.2 59.1 72.9
Run 7 8.0 21.1 31.4 29.0 42.8 52.8 50.3 53.1
Run 8 8.0 21.6 23.5 42.2 47.3 64.4 73.1 76.6
Run 9 8.0 18.4 29.3 38.0 45.3 42.5 43.9 52.4
Run 10 8.0 20.0 29.7 43.7 40.1 43.1 42.9 42.9
Run 11 8.0 23.9 29.1 29.5 43.2 50.1 57.1 71.7
Run 12 8.0 15.7 23.3 24.1 34.5 41.1 42.9 53.1
Run 13 8.0 ?1.8 31.3 44.8 43.5 42.8 57.3 65.2
Run 14 8.0 17.8 23.3 29.3 54.2 51.4 56.0 64.7
Run 15 8.0 21.8 18.3 23.9 31.9 33.5 43.9 65.7
Run 16 8.0 17.5 27.1 28.3 30.7 39.9 37.7 35.3
Average	 8.0	 20.4	 27.0	 33.8	 42.1	 46.7	 52.9	 57.4
Source: Scherer (1980, p. 146)
relating Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Change to minimum efficient scaâ.c.
'economies of scale).
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4.5 Measures of Conduct and Performance
Conduct relates to the way in which firms behave in a market including
the nature of decisions these firms take and the way in which they are
taken. It, therefore, focuses on such issues as firm price setting
behaviour, how firms decide on advertising and R&D activities and such
like. These factors are difficult to evaluate empirically compared with
structure and performance characteristics. Industrial organisations
literature primarily focuses on the measurement of firm performance from
which conduct is implied. The usage of the terms 'conduct measures' and
'performance measures' tend also to be used in an interchangeable
manner15 confusing the issue. For ease of exposition, we will refer to
them from now on as performance measure.
In the formal analysis of the SCP relationship undertaker. in
Section 4.2.3 of this chapter we assumed that the profit maximising
margin of firm i, mi — (Price-Mar-inal Cost)/Price, was the main
performance measure. Because of its analytical elegance and the way it
can be used to illustrate different competitive environments, it is
relatively simple to incorporate in the SCP paradigm. This measure,
known as the Lerner index, equals zero under perfect competition.
(because price equals marginal cost) and under monopoly it is positive,
the larger the margin between price and marginal cost, the greater the
firm's degree of monopoly power. The Lerner index is also equivalent to
the inverse of elasticity of demand, so as elasticity of demand tends
towards infinity (the competitive case) monopoly power tends to zero.
This measure is subject to three criticisms. Firstly, the index depends
on ae level of costs, yet high marginal cost may produce a low index
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even if monopoly power was significant. Secondly, the index takes no
account of the size of the market. Finally, the index depends on price
elasticity which is only partially determined by industry structure
because it is also influenced by the type of goods being sold.
It is, however, difficult to obtain data on firms' marginal costs
or the ratio of marginal costs to prices, so researchers have chosen
proxy measures. By assuming marginal costs could be approximated by
average variable cost, we arrive at what is sometimes referred to as the
profits-revenue ratio:
Profits-revenue ratio — 	 Profits attributable to shareholders
or return on sales	 Sales revenue
There are two main other measures of performance: return on shareholders
equity and return on capital assets employed and these are shown as:
	
Return on share-	 — Profits attributable to shareholders
	
holders' equity	 Shareholders equity (book value)
Return on capital 	 Profits attribu'.ab'_e to shareholders
assets employed	 Total assets (capital assets employed)
The latter two ratjjs are ambiguously referred to in the industrial
economics literati-re as return on capital ratios or the 'accounting rate
of return'.
All the above ratios are subject to criticisms relating to how
firms arrive at their accounting profits, for example, how costs (such
as operating costs and depreciation) are measured. In the latter two
ratios, the valuation of capital (however defined) is also important16
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4.6 Concentration and Industry Performance - An Overview of the
Empirical Findings
The SCP model suggests that market performance will be closer to
l
monopoly, the more concentrated the market, the greater the barriers to
entry, the greater the level of product differentiation and the larger
the extent of economies of scale. (This section primarily focuses on
empirical tests of the relation between concentration and industry
performance. Because of the extent of this literature 17 it is not
within the scope of this section to provide a comprehensive survey,
instead, we will focus on the seminal studies and also cite the main
findings of the survey literature.
4.6.1	 Bain (1951) and (1956)
The earliest empirical works on the relationship between market structure
and performance was undertaken by Bain (1951) and (1956) and is viewed
as the foundation of modern empirical work in the industrial
organisations literature. Bain set out to test the influence of
concentration on market power. Fc: his 1951 study he analysed a sample
of 42 US industries and used eight firm concentration ratios to divide
his sample into concentrated and unconcentrated industries. He found
that industries with eight-firm concentration ratios greater than 70 per
cent averaged return on equity (after-tax profits as a percentage of
shareholders equity) of 11.8 per cent. Those industries with
concentration ratios less than 70 per cent averaged a 7.5 per cens_
return.
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Bain's (1956) study extended his analyses to include the effects
of both concentration and entry barriers on industry performance:
This predicted influence on the condition of entry on the size of
price-cost margins and profits is clearly subject to the
concomitant influence of the degree of seller concentration within
the industry. Specifically, it is expected to be evidenced in a
verifiable simple association of the condition of entry on profits
mainly as far as seller concentration throughout is high enough
to support effective collusion in industries with both high and
medium entry barriers. 	 (p. 191)
In this study Bain chose twenty industries to analyse rates of return in
1936 to 1940 and in 1947 to 1951. He classified industries as having
very high, substantial, or moderate to low entry barriers, as well as
into concentration groups. This study yielded two main results.
Firstly, large firms operating in industries with high en`ry barriers
earn higher returns than large firms in industries w' h either
substantial, moderate or low entry barriers. Secondly, there is a
positive relationship between market concentration and profitablility.
The higher the entry barriers and the greater the concentration, then
the greater large-firm profitability.
4.6.2
	
Weiss (1974)
Weiss undertook a detailed literature review of structure-performances
studies undertaken since Bain's seminal work up to the early 1970s. He
was able to evaluate critically 46 concentration-profitability studies
(36 in the USA or Canada, 3 in the UK, and 7 in Japan) and to refer to 8
others. The majority of these studies use regression analysis on
industry level data to test to see if concentration was n statistically
163
significant determinant of profitability (however measured). The
general form of these linear regression equations is given as follows:
II i
 = f(C i , B i , Os i , X i , ei) (33)
where IT
Ci
Bi
osi
Xi
= profit index for the ith industry
= industry's concentration ratio
set of entry barrier measures (including measures of
minimum efficient scale, capital requirements, product
differentiation, advertising intensity)
= set of other structural indicators (including measures
of growth, diversification, geographical dispersion,
risk, market share, firm size, buyer concentration,
imports and exports)
non-structural	 indicators	 (including measures of
strategic groupings; R and D intensity, price fixing
agreements)
e = statistical error termi
Overall, the majority of the studies analysed by Weiss confirmed the
structure-performance relationship, that is, concentra-ion is a
statistically significant determinant of profitability. (The ncLable
exceptions being studies undertaken by Brozen [1971] and Stigler
[1963]).
As Weiss (1974) concludes:
... the theory of the dominant firm unequivocally points to high
prices and suggests high profit rates for dominant firms ... Our
massive effort to test these predictions has, by and large,
supported them for "normal" years such as the period 1953-1967,
though the concentration profits relationship is weakered or ma.-
even disappear completely in periods of accelerating i,_lation c._
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directly following such periods. By and large the relationship
holds up for Britain, Canada, and Japan, as well as in the United
States ... Altogether, there is still plenty of reason to believe
on both theoretical and empirical grounds that high concentration
facilitates tacit or explicit collusion.
(Weis 1974, pp. 231-32)
In general, the early literature, therefore, supported the view
that more concentrated industries earn monopoly profits.
4.6.3	 Demsetz's efficiency hypothesis
A major criticism of the traditional structure-performance relationship
espoused by the Chicago school is associated with the work of Demsetz,
Oro argued that the explanation for the relation between market
structure and the performance of firms related to efficiency 18 . If a
f m enjoys a higher degree of efficiency than its competitors, that is,
if it has a relatively low cost structure, it can adopt one of two
strategies: it can maximise profits by maintaining the present level of
prices and firm size; or it can maximise profits by reducing prices and
expanding firm size. 'f a firm adopts the latter strategy, the most
efficient firms will gain market share and firm efficiency will be the
driving force behind the process of market concentration. Firms will
also reap higher profits from their efficiency. In any event, given
that industry profits are a size-weighted average of individual firm
profits, concentrated industries will tend to be more profitable even if
there is no causal link between concentration and profitability as a
result of collusion.
Demsetz (1973) indirectly tested efficiency explanations of
concentrated industries by examining the pattern of 1963 earnings within
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95 US industries. He sorted firms in each industry into four different
asset-size classes and calculated accounting rates of return for each
class. In the regressions estimated, he used differences in
profitability between the largest firms and smaller classes of firms in
the same industry. The independent variable used was the four-firm
concentration ratio. Demsetz's most significant results are illustrated
by profit differences between the largest and smallest firms as
illustrated in the regression equation below:
II	 = -1.4 + 0.21 CONC	 RZ = 0.09	 (34)L -s	 (3.0)
where II4-1 = differences in profitability between the largest (4)
and smallest (1) class of firms
CONC = Four-firm concentration ratio
Figures in parentheses are the t-statistic and are significant at
the 99 per cent level.
The regression equation shows that concentration is a significant
determir.ant of differences in profitability between large and small
firms Demsetz also finds that there is a tendency for the rate of
return to rise with concentration for the largest firms but not for the
smaller firms. This obviously conflicts with the traditional view that
firm profitability in a concentrated industry will be higher for all
participants because of collusive/market power reasons. On the basis of
this evidence, Demsetz concluded that. leading firms are larger and more
profitable because they are more efficient and, as a result, policies
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designed to reduce the level of concentration in industries would
probably reduce efficiency. As Demsetz (1974) states:
A phenomenon that is likely to generate fairly persistent differences
in accounting rates of return is the fact that some products are
more efficiently produced by firms possessing a large share of the
market, while in other industries large market shares are not
necessary for efficiency. Those firms that first act on the
belief that large scale is an advantage, and that invest in the
marketing and production technique prerequisite to executing the
move to large scale, will possess a competitively secured advantage
in timing and in obtaining early consumer acceptance that will be
difficult to overcome in a short period. The market may not have
grown large enough to accommodate more than a handful of such
firms. These firms can produce at lower unit cost than smaller
firms. They are superior in this respect, and they command an
economic rent for achieving primacy. This rent will be measured
as profits by accountants.	 (pp. 176-77)
In support of Demetz's efficiency hypothesis subsequent studies by
Carter (1978), Porter (1979), Chappel and Cattle (1985) amongst othera
have also found that the profitability of market leaders in US
manufacturing is positively related to concentration whereas the
profitability of firms with small market share is not. Schmalensee
(1989, p. 983), however, notes that this may not be the case outside
the United States 19 . Other studies have sought to uiscriminate between
the collusion and efficiency hypothesis by including both concentration
and market share var-ables as independent variables in a regression
equation explaini-ig accounting rate of return. If the collusion
hypothesis is correct, then all firms in a concentrated industry will
tend to have higher profits, irrespective of whether they have large or
small market share. If the efficiency hypothesis is observed, then only
firms with larger market share will generate higher profits. US studies
undertaken by Ravenscraft (1983), Smirlock et ate. (1984), Schmalensee
(1985), Smirlock (1985) and Kessides (1987), for example, have all found
evidence of the -ficienc3 hypothesis by observing market share strongly
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correlated with profitability and a negative or insignificant
concentration relationship 20 . In fact, the majority of empirical work
that tests the two hypotheses tends to confirm-the efficiency
hypothesis, although others (such as Clarke, Davies and Waterson [1984]
and Kessides [1987]) find that profitability is not generally strongly
related to market share. Others, such as Peltzman (1977) have found
evidence that the two hypotheses are correct, that is, higher profits
can be generated out of either superior efficiency or monopoly pricing,
or both. Peltzman, however, did state that superior efficiency was
mainly responsible for the increase in profitability. In a comment on
this literature, Scherer et a1. (1987) concluded that:
... individual market share effects are ... much more powerful
than the traditionally emphasized concentration effects in
explaining profitability. With most .Pccifications, concentration
coefficients turn out to be negative [but] the positive and
significant market share relationship alone cannot discriminate
between monopoly power and efficiency or cost advantage
hypotheses.
(p. 206)
Because the empirical evidence suggests that concentra^io^ in an
industry will have some ele. • ants of market power and of efficiency,
empirical tests have increasingly focused on firm level performance.
For example, recent work by Muller (1986), Kwoka and Ravenscraft
(1986), Cotterill (1986) and Sett and Pascoe (1986) find complex firm-
specific effects (e.g. rivalry between the top firms) which are not
easily explained by either the collusion or the efficiency hypothesis
(see Scherer et al. [1987] for an ove rview of this literature). All the
above has sought to weaken belief in the traditional structure-
performance paradigm21.
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4.6.4	 Other studies
The above has mainly focussed on empirical evidence of the
concentration-profits relationship. However, studies of the structural
determinants of profitability go beyond just concentration and also
consider other market structure features such as(Dutry barriers
(advertising, economies of scale research and development), market
growth,3firm diversification,'`eographical dispersion0trategic
groupings&sk and foreign trade. In empirical studies that analyse
the concentration-profits relationship these 'other market structure'
variables enter as control variables. Many studies, however, have
directed their attentions away from the concentration-profits
relationship to focus on the impact these other variables have on
performance. For example, Comanor and Wilson (1967 and 1974) examine
the relationship between advertising and profitability, Connoly and
Hirschey (1984) identified that research intensity contributed to firm
profitability, Bradburd and Caves (1982) note that market growth is
positively related to profitability and so on. These studies are
examined in critical detail in Srhmalensee (1988) and Hay and Morris
(1991) of which the latter conclude:
... the growth characterisrics of an industry, advertising
intensity, buyer concentration and probably international trade,
are all important influences (on profitability) which must not be
omitted from empirical work.
(p. 261)
4.7 Policy Implications of the Structure-Performance Relationship
The traditional SCP paradigm suggests that in oligopolistic markets,
protected by barriers to entry, ,.'11 f=rms In an industry are able to
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price substantially above marginal cost and, therefore, earn higher
profits than in competitive markets. The implication of this is that
oligopolistic industries impose welfare losses on the economy. The
policy implications of such is that society would be better off if
dominant firms were broken up, large scale mergers prohibited and
barriers to entry reduced or abolished. McGee (1988) argues that the
main thrust of US competition policy especially in the 1970s was
influenced by the traditional paradigm, although Reekie (1989) notes
that the traditional rationale for policy rested on market structure
rather than on performance:
American anti-trust policy has tended to emphasise the structure
of industry. "Unreasonable" and "undue" concentrations of market
power are discouraged by either merger prevention or by
divestiture of assets ... The objective has been to maintain a
"substantial" nub ber of competing firms and hence to .-.i_iimize
monopolistic behaviour.
(p. 199)
Competition policy in the United Kingdom has focussed more on the
'public interest' argument and there is considerable power of discretion
with the authorities. Brozen (1982, pp. 370-76) notes that the general
industry policy in the European Community and the United Kingdom is
favourable to the growth of firm size and focuses morte on the abuse of
market power (price discrimination, joint buying and selling, etc.)
rather than on structure and performance per se.
The efficiency hypothesis states that firm efficiency dictates
market concentration and, therefore, any attempts by competition policy
to reduce industry concentration levels would be potentially damaging to
society's welfare because it would 'prevent the rise of more efficient
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firms and lower the efficiency level of market lenders' (Rose, 1987,
p. 178)
4.8 The Structure-Conduct-Performance Model and its Place in the New
Industrial Economics
From the above we have shown that the SCP paradigm lies at the heart of
the established, mainly empirically based, industrial economics
literature. This paradigm suggests that a variety of basic economic and
other conditions determine market structure factors such Aakriers
^2)to entry , Y a extent of product iff7erentiatioi	 he number of buyers
and sellers and so on. Structure in turn determines firm conduct which
includes such things as pricing behaviour, investment, research strategy
and product innovation. Finally, structure and conduct together
determine the performance of the industry under investigation - in terms
of measures such as profitability, factor employment and consumer
welfare.
Academic study of this paradigm progressed either by case study or
through large-scale cross-section econometric analysis and from this, ':-
series of insights were gained and a series of stylised farts
identified' (Norman and La Manna, 1992, p. 1). Indeed, Schmalensee
(1988) cites many of these stylised facts in his review of structure and
performance studies and he concludes that:
... inter-industry research in industrial organisation should
generally be viewed as a search for empirical regularities, not as
a set of exercises in structural estimation. And I have attempted
to show that research in this tradition has indeed uncovered many
stable, robust, empirical regularities. Interindustry research
has taught us much about how markets look, especially with--i the
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manufacturing sector in developed economies, even if it has not
shown us exactly how markets work.
(p. 1000)
The SCP approach, however, suffers from a number of serious
deficiencies. In particular, while empirical investigation of an
industry may reveal a positive correlation between industry
profitability and concentration this tells us little about the direction
of causality, and we illustrated in Section 4.2.1 of this chapter the
various interrelationships that may exist. The traditional industrial
organisation literature identified the 'problem' of causality but the
main model and area of investigation still focussed on the causal link
from structure through conduct to performance.
Over the last decade, however, the industrial organisations
literature has experienced a radical change. This change, as identified
by Sutton (1991, p. xiii) has involved the reformulation of many
traditional arguments within the subject area in terms of explicitly
game-theoretic oligopoly models. A key distinctive feature of this type
of modelling is the appreciation of the strategic dimension of firms'
decisions. This makes it possible to construct models that have the
direction of causation of the SCP relationship going in either
direction, or in both simultaneously:
What this points to is a difficulty in the traditional approach in
identifying which of the relevant economic phenomena are exogenous
and which are endogenous. Developments in the new industrial
economics suggest that most of the factors that enter into market
structure, conduct and performance are endogenous. They are
derived from the basic economic conditions that characterise the
markets under investigation and the strategic interactions of the
players in those markets. As a consequence, many of the factors
that enter into the various parts of the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm are simultaneously determined.
(Norman and La Manna, p. 2)
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In the recent game-theoretic literature, various authors have sought to
examine the issues surrounding the determination of industrial structure
(see Dasgupta and Stiglitz [1980], Shaked and Sutton [1982] and Vickers
[1986]). One characteristic basic to this game-theoretic literature,
however, is that the results of such analyses tend to depend heavily on
the precise form of the underlying game. In addition, since there are
many ways of designing strategic game-theoretic models, which appear
reasonable a priori, within any model there may be a whole range of
equilibrium outcomes.
This 'new' approach has, therefore, made it relatively easier to
provide a theoretical rationale for a wide range of observed phenomenon
in industrial economics. There is a difficulty with this approach,
however, in that the results of game-theoretic analyses are highly
sensitive to a range of factors that are impossible to identify or proxy
empirically. This has led empirical research in the 'new' industrial
economics to focus on some particular industry or range of similar
markets for which a tailor-made specific oligopoly model can be
constructed. Examples of such 'ultra-micro' work include, Hendricks and
Porter (1568) on the auctioning of offshore leases, and Slade (1987) on
gasoline price wars. The specific game-theoretic oligopoly modelling
approach has, 'led to a growing scepticism about the value of searching
for statistical regularities that hold across a broad run of different
industries' (Sutton 1991, p. 6). This, of course is counter to the
traditional approach where both individual industry and cross-industry
empirical work has been undertaken to search for empirical regularities,
as in the case of the SCP paradigm.
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Overall the empirical work in the 'new' industrial economics is
still in its infancy, compared with the traditional approach, and the
analysis is predominantly predicated on oligopoly game-theoretic
modelling. The analysis in the following chapters aims to evaluate the
SCP relationship in European banking from the traditional standpoint as
no game theoretic oligopoly model is developed. Our analysis of co-
operative and rivalrous behaviour between leading banks, however,
focuses on large bank conduct and these areas, which are empirically
investigated in Chapter 8, could clearly lend themselves to some form of
game-theoretic model. It is not, however, within the scope of this
thesis to do so.
4.9	 Conclusion
This chapter has examined both the theoretical rationale and empirical
findings of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) model from
industrial organisations literature. We have shown that theory
indicates that firms with market power can price âuove marginal cost
and, therefore, generate higher profitability than in the competitive
case. Early empirizal work by Bain supported the view that
concentration and entry barriers increased market power and therefore
generated collusive profits. This spawned a massive (mainly US)
literature testing the SCP paradigm, and the majority of studies up to
the early 1970s supported the traditional view that higher levels of
profitability in concentrated industries reflected collusive activities.
During the 1970s there arose an alternative interpretation which argued
that the concentration-profits relationship was a reflection of large
firm efficiency - not col-'-sion. As a result, more recent empirical
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work has sought to distinguish between the two hypotheses, and has
increasingly focussed on the role of firm market share and its
relationship to market power. Despite the development in the 'new'
industrial economics, the analysis in the following chapters aims to
evaluate the SCP relationship from the traditional standpoint as no game
theoretic oligopoly model is developed. The following chapter examines
the banking SCP literature which mainly concentrates on testing the
traditional hypothesis.
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Notes to Chapter Four
1. See Bain (1954 and 1962) which both discuss in detail the types of
barriers which may exist in an industry. Watersôn (1984, Chapter
4) also provides a good review of barriers to entry and limit
price formulation
2. Gravelle and Rees (1981, pp. 312-16) provide an excellent
exposition of the Cournot oligopoly model
3. Lerner (1934) identified that the divergence of price from
marginal cost under monopoly can be regarded as a measure of the
degree of monopoly power. The index is written as such;
Price - Marginal cost	 1	 1<e<^
Price	 e
where a is the elasticity of demand. Thus, as e > ^ (the
competitive case) monopoly power tends to zero
4. See Curry and George (1983) for a detailed review of the range of
concentration measures that are available
5. For example, see United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of
the Census (1977) and Census of Manufacturers (1972). For a
summary of earlier US concentration ratios sources, see Nelson
(1963, pp. 17-19)
6. Because the entropy measure E is an inverse measure of
concentration, a 'redundancy' measure R has been defined as R=log
N-E for ease of interpretation. Ferguson (1988, p. 169) also
notes that there is a relative first order entropy measure E/log N
and an associated redundancy measure 1-(E/log N). The numbers
equivalent would be defined as antilog E
7. See Waterson (1988, pp. 169-170) and Rose (1987, p. 182)
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8. In addition, it is also sensitive to data on small firms. If an
industry was comprised of ten firms, five large and five very
small, if the five very small firms left the industry, leaving the
remaining with 20 per cent market share each, the Gini coefficient
would fall dramatically to zero because inequality of size had
disappeared. Such an event, however, would probably have little
effect on market behaviour
9. See Hay and Morris (1991, p. 213) who state that if a smaller firm
gets smaller, concentration measured by the variance of logs
method increases, but if the small firm disappears altogether,
concentration decreases. It is also possible to identify cases
where a merger reduces the number of firms in an industry and
where the concentration ratio rises and yet the variance of
logarithms declines. The logarithmic transformation
significantly reduces the importance of the growth of large firms
10. The Linda index for the n largest firms (from Ferguson [1988, p.
171]) is:
n-1
1	 C n-i	 CRi
Ln =	 1 —
n(n-1) i =1 i	 CRn-CRi
It is a popular measure used in European Community studies of it Justrial
concentration
11. A simple example is the Hymer and Pashigian index:
n
HP index =	 Sit - Sit-
J
i =1
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12. See Ferguson (1988, p. 171) for a theoretical example of how
different indices can provide conflicting rankings. Chapter 4 of
Scherer (1980, pp. 81-150) provides one of the most comprehensive
analyses of the economies of scale literature
13. Robinson (1958) provides a classic reference on the logic of scale
economies. Also see Moore (1959), and Haldi and Whitcomb (1967)
for an insight into early empirical studies on plant size
economies. Scherer et al. (1975) provide an excellent
international comparison of economies of scale studies, see also
McGee (1974) for a critique of the economies of scale literature
14. See McGee (1974a) and Bork (1979) for example
t5	 Reekie (1988, p. 54) for example
16. Hay and Morris (1991, pp. 216-220) provide a comprehensive
analysis of these issues, as does Scherer (1980, pp. 269-73)
17. Weiss (1974) surveyed 54 empirical tests of structure-performance
relationships and Hay and Morris (1991, pp. 223-69) analyse a
further 55. Both of these provide excellent reviews of the
empirical literature
18. For earlier studies espousing the same views, see Brozen (1971)
and McGee (1971)
19. For example, Waterson (1984) on the United Kingdom, and Neumann,
Bobel and Haid (1979) on West Germany, find no such relationship
20. As have studies undertaken by Bothwell and Keeler (1976), Gale and
Branch (1982), Martin (1983), Harris (1984), and Mueller (1986)
21. See Brozen (1982) for a book-long account voicing support for the
efficiency hypothesis and its implications for public policymaking
in the United States
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Chapter 5
r
The SCP Relationship in Banking - a Literature Review
5.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of how the SCP relationship has been
investigated in primarily US banking markets. Section 5.2 explains the
rationale for testing this relationship in banking and section 5.3
describes how the structure-performance debate emerged in US banking at
the end of the 1950s to early 1960s. Section 5.4 examines the general
form of the structure-performance model and also describes t-_.e
variables, together with problems associated with definition and
measurement, that are used in this literature. Section 5.5 reviews tL.e
findings from over seventy US studies that have examined the
concentration-performance relationship (further details of each of these
studies is provided in Appendix Three). Section 5.6 investigates the
empirical evidence from international studies which examine
concentration and bank performance issues. Section 5.7 notes the
limitations of bank SCP modelling, and 5.8 is the conclusion.
5.2 The Rationale for Testing the SCP Relationship in Banking
As we saw in the last Chapter, the SCP model is a general statement on
the determinants of market performance. Simply stated, the conduct or
rivalry in a market is determined by market structure conditions,
especially the number and size distribution of firms and the condition
of entry. This rivalry leads to unique levels of price , advert— ing,
profits, and other aspects of market performance. Thr-agh the. _ink of
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conduct, the performance of firms in a market is tied to the general
structure of the market. The rationale for testing the SCP relationship
in banking markets, as identified by Heggestad (1979, p.450), is to
address three main issues:
1. Does market structure matter in banking markets, or is the industry
so highly regulated that market structure is not an
important/relevant factor in determining market performance?
2. Which aspects of market structure are the most important, and,
therefore, which type of regulations or regulatory reform have the
greatest impact?
3. What aspects of bank performance are most sensitive to differences
in market structure?
Analysis of the SCP relationship in banking is used to help
evaluate the main policy issue of which type of banking structure best
serves the public in terms both of the cost and the availability of
banking services. fn general two main objectives have been sought;
firstly the attainment of an 'efficient' banking system which in some
way, secondly, minimises the likelihood of bank failure.
We have seen from the previous chapter that 'efficiency' is
associated with competition. Under perfect competition firms price
equal to marginal cost, maximise their profit, and achieve levels of
output which bring about an optimum allocation of resources. The other
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extreme is monopoly which leads to a suboptimal allocation of resources.
In general, the more competitive a market, the more 'efficient' it is.
Other factors, however, make it difficult to choose between the
objectives of 'efficiency' and 'soundness' in banking markets. Under a
competitive environment 'inefficient' firms are forced to leave the
market because they cannot maintain prices high enough to cover costs.
On the other hand, under monopolistic conditions high-cost firms are to
a certain extent immune from the forces of competition which allows them
to operate in an efficient manner and yet still survive. As such, a
monopolistic industry is more compatible with the policy objective of
maintaining a failure-proof banking system, while competition is more
consistent with the goal of 'efficiency'.
The existence of substantial economies of scale makes the choice
between the two market regimes even more difficult as Edwards (1965)
notes:
Since economies of scale occur as bank size increases, there is
usually a reduction in the number of competitors. Thus, another
dimension is added to efficiency, one that cannot be equated with
competition in the narrow sense of number of competitors. As long
as economies of scale exist, a judgement has to be made about the
extent to which diminished competition is offset by the benefits of
lower costs. (p.2)
In general there are a range of views concerning the application of the
above to the problem of competition in banking markets.	 Those who
believe that failure of a bank should be avoided at all cost due to the
serious repercussions on the financial system and economy at large would
probably be willing to sacrifice 'efficiency' for 'soundness'. In other
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words, the gains from increased competition (efficiency) would be small
in relation to the costs associated with bank failure. At the polar
extreme there would be those who believe that the cost of bank failures
is small (given that deposit insurance arrangements and flexible
monetary policy arrangements could be capable of preventing panics
induced by failures) and these observers would be willing to sacrifice
'soundness' for greater competition and therefore efficiency.
Another viewpoint originally espoused by Phillips (1964) and
Holland (1964), amongst others, is that because (the US) banking markets
are inherently oligopolistic, conventional antitrust or regulatory
policy aimed at changing mo -ket structure would be unable to increase
competition or the quality of bank performance. As Phillips (1964)
states:
It would be possible and, within limits, it probably is desirable
to improve the performance of commercial banking markets. It
appears, however, that the rule of conventional antitrust policy-
the prevention of mergers and combinations in restraint of trade -
in achieving this result is an extremely lir.ited one, because of
the con inuing necessity for some public regulation and
supervision and also because of the impossibility of altering
substantia.ly the oligopolistic structure of the typical banking
market. (p. 43'
In short, if bank performance is not affected by changes in the
structure of banking markets then regulatory authorities need not be
concerned about bank mergers. If evidence from the SCP literature found
this to be the case then it would suggest that it is the organisation,
rather than market structure, of the industry which is the major
determinant of bank performance. It would then follow that the main
means of altering performance was through changing the organisation (for
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example by altering bank participation in organisations such as clearing
houses and trade associations), especially that part which emanates from
bank regulation.
There are two important rationales for testing the SCP hypothesis
in European banking markets. First, very little empirical work has been
undertaken investigating the competitive behaviour of European banking
systems and as such an empirical investigation may yield interesting
insights that could be of interest to academics, bankers and
policymakers. Secondly, the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study on
completion of an EC internal financial market drew attention to the fact
that aspects of the SCP framework could be -:sed to evaluate the evidence
of oligopoly profits in EC banking systems. If oligopoly profits are
significant in those banking systems, then ^zoducer surplus losses would
be substantial post integration. An analysis of the SCP relationship in
European banking may help us to shed light on these issues.
5.3 The Emergence of the SCP Debate in the US Banking Market
The emergence of the SCP debate i , - the United States is based on the
view that the performance of the banking system - that is, its
effectiveness in serving the deposit and credit needs of the country -
is in some way related to its structure and organisation.
Prior to 1950 there were only two studies which examined the
competitive situation in banking - Chandler (1938) and Berle (1949).
Chandler (1938) applied Chamerlin's (1933) theory of oligopoly and
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monopolistic competition to the structure and behaviour of banking
markets and noted that:
...important elements of monopoly exist in the commercial
banking system, even in the absence of collusive agreements, and
that it is the theory of monopolistic competition, rather than the
theory of pure competition, that is the more useful in explaining
the rates of interest on bank loans to customers, the rates of
interest paid to bank customers on time and savings deposits, and
the prices paid by customers for other banking services (p.l)
In particular Chandler focused on the case that banks are sellers of
differentiated products. Customers deal with one bank rather than
another for a variety of different reasons which include: age of the
bank and its record of honesty, fair dealing, and safety; location, size
and architecture of the bank building; personalities of the bank staff
and so on. Because of customer preferences arising out of the
variations in these factors, the demand for bank services will not be
perfectly elastic, 'and each bank has some degree of freedom in
determining the prices and rates which it will pay or charge' (p.3). In
general Chandler concluded that the lack of pure competition in the US
banking market helped to explain many 'ph.nomena' in the field of
commercial banking.
Berle (1949) examined the application of competition laws to
banking and he concluded that competition (or antitrust) policy was
thought to have very limited applicability to banking because of its
regulated character. This widely held view set the scene for the lack
of research into banking structure during the 1950s (with the exception
of Alhadeff (1954) as identified by Smith (1964):
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The previous indifference of economists, even those in the
industrial organisation field, to research into banking structure
stemmed principally from the view that banking was a regulated
industry and that its major problem was one of overbanking and
excessive competition rather than one of monopolistic markets and
imperfect competition. In the atmosphere of the 1930s the safety
and liquidity of the banking system became an overriding concern
and bank mergers were welcomed as a means of shoring up weak
situations in an overcrowded industry. After the sharp reduction
in a number of banking offices during the depression years, concern
with overbanking largely subsided and was replaced by emphasis on
the need to maintain vigorous competition in banking markets. (p.
489)
According to Philips (1964) the average annual number of bank mergers
and holding company formations in the 1940s was 81, during the 1950s it
was 150 and in the three years after 1960 it was around 160 a year.
Gradual public concern in the United States over decreasing competition
resulting from a `wave' of bank mergers and holding company formations
in the 1950s led to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 and the Bank
Merger Act of 1960. The aforementioned laws required policy makers to
focus their attentions on the economic issues in bank holding company
and merger cases, and the Federal bank supervisory agencies had to
consider the competitive implications as well as the 'public interest'
matters.
By the early 1960s competition in banking had emer ged as an
ostensibly relevant public policy consideration and this, ''stimulated
academic interest in the problems of banking structure' (Smith, 1966,
p.489). Further academic interest was generated by the landmark US
Supreme Court decision in the United States versus Philadelphia National
Bank case in 1963 when it was found that commercial banking was to be
treated as any other industry under the basic antitrust laws. In short,
the ruling emphasised the need to preserve and promote competition in
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banking within the boundaries established by Federal and State
regulation. As Rose (1987) notes:
The result ....... was a veritable explosion of bank market
structure and competition studies mirroring earlier industrial
studies. Overwhelmingly, these studies have concentrated on the
relationships among bank market structure, the key prices in
banking - the rate of interest on loans and the promised rate of
return on deposits, and bank profitability as barometers of how
well or how poorly the public is being serviced by American banks
(p.59).
5.4 The SCP Model Applied to the Banking Industry
Heggestad (1979 p.467) states that in general, a model of the structure-
performance relationship in banking would make the equilibrium price of
any product a function of the following:
1. The level and elasticity of market and firm demand
2. The firm's cost function
3. The prices and quantities of related financial products, and their
interaction: with the firm's demand and cost functions
4. The objective function of firms in the market
5. The interaction among firms in the market
Every firm would simultaneously or `iteratively' obtain the equilibrium
price and market structure influences this process by its effect on the
interaction among firms. As a way of modelling this process, the US
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structure-performance studies have mainly used multiple regression
analysis as a means of relating structure to performance in banking
markets.	 The general form of the structure-performance model [see
Rhoades (1977), Heggestad (1979) and Gilbert (1984)] is as follows:
P - f (CR, S, D, C, X)
where	 P - a performance measure
CR - a measure of market structure (usually a concentration
measure)
S - other market structure variables, such as proxies for
barriers to entry
D - set of variables to reflect market demand conditions
C - a set of variables to reflect differences in costs across
firms
X - a variety of control variables related to a specific
products characteristics
Multiple linear regression analysis `is a statistical technique
concerned with variations in one dependent variable when all the other
i-dependent variables vary together' (Johnston, 1972, p.176). The term
linear means that the parameters of the model are linear coefficients,
while the variables can be linear or not (quadratic, logarithmic,
exponential etc.). This technique which has been used for testing the
SCP relationship in banking markets tries to determine whether there is
a statistically significant relationship between bank performance, which
is the endogenous variable, and market structure, which is one of the
exogenous variables.
(1)
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5.4.1 Measurement of bank performance
There are various approaches to measuring the performance of a banking
firm. Traditionally there have been two main types of measures of bank
performance. The first type of measure generally relates to the price
of a particular product or service; the second type of performance
measures are profitability measures. Table 5.1 provides a
classification of performance measures used in 73 US SCP studies between
1964 and 1991, the details of which are set out in Appendix three. It
can be seen from the table that the most common type of price measures
are as follows:
-	 Average interest rate on loans, calculated as interest and fees on
loans during the yea_ divided by the volume of outstanding loans at
a given point in time.
-	 Average interest rate paid on deposits, estimated as the total
amount of interest paid over the year divided by the volume of
deposits at the end of the year.
-	 Average service charges on demand deposits, which is calculated as
the annual Service charge revenue over the volume of demand
deposits at a specified point in time.
Several commentators [see Gilbert (1984), Smirlock (1985) and Evanoff
and Fortier (1988), for example] have criticised the use of average
deposit and loan rate ratios as measure of bank performance for the
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following reasons. Firstly, average measures combine flow variables
(ie. interest on loans over one year period) with stock variables (ie.
loans outstanding at the end of the year). It is unclear as to whether
prices should be defined using average or year-end values; depending on
the criteria chosen the value of the ratios will be different.
Table 5.1 Performance measures used in the US SCP literature'
Performance measures Number of times
the respective
performance measures
have been used in
the SCP literature
Number finding
the performance
measure to be
unambiguously
significantly
related to
market structure)
Loan Interest Rates
Interest and fees on loans/Total
loans 13 7
Interest rate on business loans 6 3
Interest rate on new car loans 3 2
Interest rate on residential
mortgages 2 2
Total 30 4
Deposit Interest Rates
Interest payment on time and savings
deposits/ total time and savir;s
deposits 16 5
Interest rates on Money Markp.
Deposit Accounts 2 2
3,6,12 and 30 month CD rates 2 1
Interest rate on Super-Now accounts 1 1
Interest payment on time deposits
/Total time deposits 1 1
Interest rate on time deposits 1 0
Interest rate on passbook savings 1 0
Interest rate on $1000 CD 1 0
Total 25 10
continued ....
3._
Table 5.1 (continued)
Service Charges
Revenue from service charges on
demand deposits/ Total demand
deposits	 14	 3
Revenue from service charges on
demand deposits	 5	 2
Monthly service charge on demand
deposits	 1	 1
Charges for returned cheques	 1	 0
Service charges on a standardised
account	 1	 0
Total
	 22	 6
Profitability measures
Return on Assets	 24	 12
Return on Capital 	 14	 8
Total	 38	 20
Other measures
Lerner index 2 0
Elasticity of loan demand 2 1
Number of bank employees 1 0
Standard deviation of return on equity 2 2
Concentration measures 1 0
Market share stability indices 2 2
Portfolio selection 2 2
Senatorial votes 1 0
Service quality measures 1 1
Labour expenses 2 2
Other expenses 2 2
Total 133 62
Notes:	 1.	 These performance measures were found to be used in a
review of 73 US SCP studies
2. Many studies use a variety of performance and market
structure measures covering different time periods.
Figures included in this column relate to those studies
that find regression coefficients on measures of market
structure with t-statistics greater than 1.95 and which
unambiguously report a significant result.
Source:	 See Appendix Three.
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Secondly, some studies have used average interest paid on deposits as a
performance measure when regulation Q, which imposed ceilings on
interest payable on deposits in US banking, was in existence. Given
this restriction, average interest rate paid on deposits `is more likely
to be a function of the maturity distribution of a bank's deposits and
their denomination than a function of market structure' Gilbert (1984,
p.632). Finally, average service charges on deposit accounts do not
take into account the fact that service charges vary according to such
things as account activity, minimum balance requirements and so on.
These measurement problems can be avoided by using survey data to
obtain information on interest rates and service cost for particL=sr
categories of loans and deposits as illustrated in Table 5.1. A much
simpler and more widely adopted approach, however, has been to L-,e
profitability measures. As Gilbert (1984) observes:
The only measures of bank performance derived from the report of
income and report of condition that do not have major measurement
problems are bank profit rates. If banks in areas with higher
market concentration charge higher interest rater on loans, set
higher service charges on deposits and pay lower interest rates on
deposits, these effects will be reflected in the _,attern of bank
profit rates ..... (p.632).
Brown (1985) , Rhoades (1985c) and Evanoff and Fortier (19F,î) , to name a
few, provide support for the use of a profitability measure to account
for the performance of the firm. The two major advantages of such a
measure are its simplicity and the fact that it consolidates information
about a multi-product firm into one single figure. The major
disadvantage of profitability measures is that they combine flow
variables (ie. profits) with stock variable (ie. assets or capital).
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The most commonly used profitability measures as shown in Table 5.1 are
net income divided by total assets (return Dn assets) and net income
divided by capital (return on capital)2. Studies that have used
profitability measures have also been more successful in finding a
significant relationship between market structure and industry
performance.
5.4.2 Definition of a market and measurements of market structure
Because banking is a multiproduct industry, a simple all-inclusive
market area is difficult to delineate and no single measure of structure
precisely reflects the degree of monopoly, nor does economic theory help
choose which measure is most important (see Edwards (1965) and the
.action on measures of market structure in Chapter 4.). As we have
shown in the previous chapter, measures of market structure that are
available suffer deficiencies which may lead to erroneous conclusions.
Vernon (1971) points out that because banking markets are mainly
categorised into the `todestly' concentrated regions:
There are no monopolies and no highly competitive market forms.
This being the case, concentration ratios relating to the local
banking markets may be rather insensitive indicators of monopoly
performance ...... The connection between structure and performance
is tenous even where a wide range of structures is present' (p.
623)
In addition, without a control group of banks existing in a perfectly
competitive environment, there is not an absolute standard for comparing
the influence of alternative bank structures.
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To account for the multiproduct nature of banking markets the
majority of US research studies on bank structure and competition,
'usually choose between studying the market for one banking service or
viewing banks as offering a bundle of services within the boundaries of
a single market area', (Rose, 1987, p.52). Banking markets have been
approximated in most studies by the Standard Metropolitan Statistical
Area (SMSA) for urban banks and counties for other banks 3 . Gilbert
(1984) notes that:
There is empirical support for such market area designations.
Surveys of where bank customers obtain banking services indicate
that the relevant market area for banking services are
substantially smaller than states or nations ......These surveys
indicat that the geographic areas over which customers shop for
banking services are different for various banking services.
This definit_on of banking markets, however, may not be entirely
appropriate because as Tolley (1977, p.5) identified, bank regulatory
agencies frequently employ SMSAs and counties as 'approximations' for
banking markets, mainly because deposit data is readily obtainable for
these geographic areas.
ost US banking markets - as identified in studies undertaken by
HeFgestad and Mingo (1977), Savage (1982), Rhoades (1985a) and Rhoades
(1985b) - have historically been highly concentrated. 	 For example,
Rhoades (1985b) shows that in 1983 the 25 states that permitted
statewide branching had, on average, 5-bank deposit concentration ratios
of 72 per cent. In local (SMSA) markets, Savage (1982) reports 5-bank
deposit concentration ratios ranging from 76.7 per cent (for SMSA's in
unit banking states) to 83.7 per cent (in limited branching states). As
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Rose (1987) notes:
.......across the United States as a whole the top three banks in
each of the nation's urban centres (SMSAs) appear to control about
70 per cent of local deposits.....' (p. 177).
As typified by the above, concentration has been most widely used as a
measure of market structure in the SCP literature. Table 5.2 provides a
summary of market structure measures used in this literature.
Heggestad (1979) identifies three major problems of measuring
monopoly in banking markets, 'choosing the appropriate general index of
monopoly power, choosing the appropriate economic variable with which to
measure differences in bank size, and accounting for differences in
institutional competition (or for competition between banks and nonbank
financial institutions)' (p. 469). In virtually all the cases referred
to in Table 5.2, the measure of market structure is based on total bank
deposits. This may well be relevant when studying general bank
performance, but may be less appropriate v-'..;^n evaluating the SCP
relationship '--i say the consumer loan market where measurement of
monopoly power should ideally be related to the distribution of consumer
loans among banks. This may seem to be a serious error in many studies,
but Heggestad -aes on to suggest that because various measures of
monopoly in banking are likely to be highly correlated and because all
measures are only approximations for monopoly, using a commonly
available deposits based measure can be viewed as satisfactory.
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Table 5.2 Market structure measures used in the US SCP literature
Measures of Market Structure 	 Number of times the
respective market structure
measures have been used in
the SCP literature
Concentration ratios
5 Firm Deposits	 2
3 Firm Deposits	 37
2 Firm Deposits	 3
1 Firm Deposits	 9
Herfindahl Index (H) Deposits	 17
Numbers Equivalent (1/H) 	 2
Number of firms in the market	 16
Gini Coefficient 	 2
Entropy	 2
Hall-Tideman Index 	 2
Dummy variable for markets with
relatively high 1-firm or 3-firm
concentration ratios 	 1
Herfindahl index (H) multiplied by a
dummy variable for markets with
relatively low H
	
1
Change in H
	
1
Notes:	 1.	 These market structure measures were found to be used in
a review of r3 SCP studies, see Appendix Three for
further information
Source:	 See Appendix Three.
As we have already noted in the previous Chapter, choosing the
appropriate measure of market structure is also important. Most US
studies have used a simple concentration ratio, but this tvpe of measure
If
does not take account of the dispersion of bank size in the market and
also does not reflect the number of competing firms. The Herfindahl
index is responsive to the number and dispersion of firms in the market
and is therefore generally viewed as a superior measure. It has been
suggested, however, that these measures are actually so highly
correlated (see Rose and Fraser, 1976) that the choice of market
structure measure is 'not of critical importance for testing structure-
performance hypotheses' (Heggestad, 1979, p. 470).
5.4.3 Other Market Structure Variables
5.4.3.1 Entry barriers
Economic theory implies, ceteris paribus, that the -_itry of new firms
into a given market will necessarily increase rivalry. This is because
the entry of such firms has long been regarded as a stimulus to
competition. If the number of firms in a market increases, it will
become more competitive and less concentrated (see Bain (1956) and
Scherer (1970)). Rhoades (1980) points out;
In addition, particularly in the short run, new entry will tend to
increase uncertainty among the firm5- in a market with respect to
their views of the actions and reactions of their rivals as well as
to their views of the action of new entrants	 (p.424)
In US banking markets, many decisions that affect the number of
competitors in various markets are made by Federal and State regulatory
agencies. These authorities have the power to approve or deny
applications for new bank charters or branches, -nd therefore they can
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determine the number of competitors in banking markets. Public policy
of this nature seeks to protect the public interest by avoiding
excessive competition. This role of the authorities is based on the
view that unrestricted competition would not safegùard the public
interest: consequently, competition should be restricted as Phillips
(1964) observed, in order to, 'preserve the liquidity of the payments
mechanism, and to provide safety for depositors' (p.41).
In contrast to this view, there are other commentators who believe
that entry barriers into banking markets should be relaxed in order to
foster competition. King (1979) notes that in order to evaluate the
costs and benefits of Federal and State entry barriers (eg. br-zching
versus unit banking states, liberal bank holding company (LBHC)
legislation versus restricted BHC regulations) one must evaluate .__ether
decisions that loom so important in theory have any influence in
practice. In other words, entry conditions are included in the SCP
model in order to evaluate the impact they have on bank performance as
k.11 as to see how they relate to concentration levels.
The majority of US studies that account for entry bar-iers do so by
assuming that lower entry barriers - the ability to undertake branching-
enter the performance equation only as a shift parameter (see Rhoades
(1980, 1981, 1982a); Rhoades and Rutz (1982), Berger and Hannan (1989),
to name but a few). The findings of these studies, though not
conclusive, suggest that higher entry barriers result in greater
profits. In other words, in unit banking states it should be easier for
banks to exert market power than in areas where there is always the
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threat of potential entry: these areas are termed liberal branching
states4 . Evanoff and Fortier (1988) suggest that the use of a binary
variable to take account of entry barriers may distort.the influence of
other explanatory variables, given that determinants of market
performance may be quite different across the two types of banking
markets. As a result, they suggest that it is better to estimate
separate equations for unit banking and liberal branching states - they
do however use a binary variable to account for whether 'liberal'
holding company expansion is allowed or not.
We have discussed (see above) the regulatory barriers to entry.
There are also, of course, non-regulatory barriers to entry, such as the
relative-minimal-efficient-size-of firm, and SCP studies usually account
for this by including a variable for the size of the market, since most
studies in US banking assume the minimum efficient size of firm is the
same in all markets. In addition, production differentiation may be
achieved through a proliferation of branches (see Stolz, 1976 and White,
1976) or, high 1•vels of advertising expenditure (see Edwards, 19730.
Only a few studies, however, control for product differentiation.
5.4.3.2 Other market structure variables
Other market structure variables included in the SCP models are used to
control for other structural factors that are believed to impact on bank
performance. For example, number of bank branches; market share of
banks; binary variables to account for competition between bank and non-
bank financial intermediaries; binary variables to capture differences
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in bank behaviour attributable to holding company affiliation; binary
variables indicating banks located in Metropolitan Statistical Areas;
and so on.
5.4.4 Market demand conditions
All the SCP studies use some variables to proxy for market demand
conditions, the most popular being measures of market size and market
growth. Market size, either total bank deposits or assets in respective
markets, is used as a proxy for market potential on the basis that the
larger the market the greater the likelihood of new entry and potential
for i. :reased competition (see Evanoff and Fortier (1988) and Hannan
(1991a), for example). Growth in market deposits is also often used as
a prop.. to account for change in local demand conditions. Other
variables that are used to control for market demand conditions include:
per capita income or wage levels in the relevant markets (see Rhoades
(1981) and Berger and Hannan (1989)); coefficient of variation of per
capita income in the market co capture variation in the demand for bank
services); population density to control for demographic differences
across markets; and the rate of in-migration into specific markets to
account for changes in demand.
5.4.5 Cost differences
The most common variable used in the SCP literature to account for cost
differences across banks is a measure of individual bank size, namely
total assets. This is included in virtually every model that has been
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tested and is included to account for size-induced differences between
banks, such as scale economies. Other measures, such as local banking
wage rates (a proxy for the cost of labour: see Calem and Carlin ,
1989) and interest paid on deposits (a proxy for the cost of funds: see
Berger and Hannan, 1989) are also used to account for cost differences
across banks. Many studies also use the ratio of demand deposits to
total deposits as a crude proxy for the relative cost of funds on the
grounds that demand deposits are a relatively inexpensive , source of
funds.
5.4.6 Other control variables
SCP studies that adopt loan and deposit rates as a measure of bank
performance use a v-tiety of other variables to account for their
characteristics such as the type, size and maturity of these items, In
addition, all the studies also utilise a variety of variables to control
for different risk characteristics associated with individual banks.
For example, the loans-to-assets ratio is sometimes used as a rough
proxy of portfolio risk based on the view that loans tend to be risky
relative to ather assets typically held in a commercial bank's
portfolios 5 . Studies, particularly in the 1980s, tended also to
incorporate a capital- to -assets (or equity-to-assets) ratio to account
for differing risk levels between banks - lower ratios implying a more
risky position. Clark (1986b) introduces loan-loss reserves to total
loans as an indicator of default risk.
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5.5 Concentration and Performance - The Empirical Evidence from the
United States
Details of all the studies cited in the following section are provided
in Appendix Three. This appendix provides information on the: sample
used; measure of bank performance; R 2 or adjusted R2 (R2 ), measures of
market structure and shows whether the coefficient on the measures of
market structure are statistically significant. It covers US SCP
studies from 1960 to 1991.
5.5.1 Concentration and loan rates
In the earliest SCP study of banking markets, Schweiger and McGee (1961)
came to the conclusion that the smali-r the number of banks in a region,
the higher the level of automobile and installment loan rates. The
sample was taken from 11 large cities for 1960, but unfortunately the
study did not provide adequate statistical tests to determine whether
differences detected were other than random.
Edwards (1964) in his study of 49 SMSA's found that for data
provided by the Federal Reserve Survey on business loan rates these were
found to be significantly related to concentration levels in 1955 but
not for 1957 (these conflicting results, it was suggested, may be due to
different monetary policies pursued by the central authorities in those
years). The positive relationship between individual business loan
rates, obtained through survey data, and concentration has been
substantiated by the majority of subsequent studies (see Phillips
- J1
(1967), Jacobs (1971), Hannan (1991a), for example).
Fleschig (1965), however, used a similar dataset to Edwards (1964)
in order to undertake two tests of the SCP relationship and found that
concentration had no effect on those rates in 1957 and only a marginal
impact for 1955 data. He concluded:
Although concentration in metropolitan areas in some instances
appears to be directly associated with bank rates on these loans it
is not significantly related to loan rates when adequate account is
taken of the differences in loan characteristics and in the supply
and demand conditions in local and regional markets. (p.310)
The studies mentioned above all used individual loan rates as a measure
of performance. The data were usually obtained from Federal Reserve
Surveys of business loan rates or individual researchers' surveys.
Average loan rates, calculated by dividing interest and fees on loans by
total loans, however, have been the most widely used measure in the US
SCP literature. This is because data on average loan rates are much
easier to obtain. The difficulty arising from using this measure
that `average' loan rates make no r lowance for major differences in
risk and types of loans held by bank s . This problem, however, has not
restricted the amount of studies usi--g this specific performance
indicator as illustrated in Table 5.3.
The results from those studies have been very mixed. Ware (1972),
so as to avoid problems associated with variations in regulations across
states, restricted his study to markets within the state of Ohio (see
Fraser and Rose (1971) and 	 Kaufman (1966) for examples of other
2 0:
studies). Ware concludes that concentration has no significant affect
on any of his measures of performance, average loan rates included.
Conversely, Beighley and McCall (1975) found that concentration had an
important effect on average loan rates:
The results clearly provide a firm basis for the conclusion that
competitive market structure is statistically significant in
explaining variations in the market power of individual banks in
large and medium-sized local instalment loan markets. (p.466)
Studies by Edwards (1965), Kaufman (1966), Fraser and Rose (1971),
Whitehead (1978), Savage and Rhoades (1979), Rhoades and Rutz (1979),
Rhoades (1979), Rose and Scott (1979), Rhoades (1981) and Hanweck and
Rhoades (1984) all substantiate the case that concentration d,-Is have a
significant effect on average loan rates. However, the remaining
studies do not find any significant link between the _--vel of
concentration and average loan rates.
A study by McCall and Peterson (1980), focusing on 155 SMSA's and
counties in 14 unit banking and limited branching states, is of
particular interest because it uses the Lerner index (i.e. the spread
between average loan and deposit rates) as the main )ank performance
indicator, and tests for non-linearity in the st_ucture-performance
relationship. Using a switching regression technique, the authors find
evidence of a critical level of concentration in business loan markets.
This finding of a critical level of market concentration above which the
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Yes 1955
No 1957
Yes
Yes 1955
No 1957
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No 1966
Yes 1967
Yes
No
Table 5.3 Concentration and loan rates
Coefficient on the
Study	 Individual Loan	 Average Loan	 Measure of market
Rates Rates structure are
statistically
significante
1. Schweiger and	 Automobile loan	 -	 Higher rates with
Mcgee (1960)	 rates	 fewer banks
Instalment loan	 -
rates
2. Edwards (1964)	 Business loan rates
3. Edwards (1965) - IL - TL
4. Fleschig (1965) Business loan rates -
5. Kaufman (1966) - IL - TL
6. Phillips (1967) Rates on short-term -
business loans
7. Taylor (1968) - IL - TL
8. Aspinwall (1970) Rates on residential -
mortgages
9. Fraser an- Rose - IL - TL
Business loan rates	 -
IL - TL
-	 IL - TL No
-	 IL - TL No
-	 II. - TL No
(1971)
10. Jacobs (1971)
11. Fraser and Rose
(1972)
12. Ware (1972)
13. Yeats (1974)
14. Fraser and Alvis
(1975)
continued .....
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Table 5.3 (continued)
15. Beighley and McCall
(1975)
16. Heggestad and
Mingo (1976)
17. Whitehead (1977)
18. Whitehead (1978)
19. Graddy and Kyle
(1979)
20. Harvey (1979)
21. Savage and Rhoades
(1979)
22. Rhoades (1979)
23. Rhoades and Rutz
(1979)
24. k.—se and Scott
(1979)
25. McCall and Peterson
(1980)
26. Rhoades (1981)
27. Marlow (1982)
28. Hanweck and
Rhoades (1984)
29. Hannan (1991a)
IL - TL
IL - TL
IL - TL
IL - TL
IL - TL
IL - TL
IL - TL
IL - TL
IL - TL
1L - TL
IL - TL
Rates on residential	 -
mortgage loans
IL - TL
Commercial loan rates 	 -
Yes
Yes
No
Yes
No
AMBIGUOUS
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes (in 5 out of î
years)
Yes
Yes
Yes in only 1
out of
8 cases for 1984
Yes in 5 out of 8
cases in 1986
Interest rate on
new car loans
Notes:	 e: where t-statistics on the market structure coefficient are
greater than 1.95.
IL — interest and fees on loans
TL a total loans
Source:	 See Appendix Three
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market power of leading firms exerts a significant effect on performance
supports similar findings by Rose (1976), Rhoades (1980) and Daskin and
Wolken (1989).
Hanweck and Rhoades (1984) and Rhoades (1985a) evaluate whether
market share has an effect on bank prices, loan rates included. Hanweck
and Rhoades (1984) examine 147 SMSAs and 112 country-wide banking
markets and Rhoades (1985) analyses 6,500 banks both during the 1970s:
The underlying hypothesis of their studies is that some banks, may
be so large relative to their competitors, possessing markedly
superior resources and diversification, that they are able to
intimidate smaller banks into adopting the larger institutions
pricing schemes.	 (Rose, 1987, p.196)
This predatory pricing thesis is generally supported in both studies,
especially for loan interest rates (as well as service charges on
deposits and non-interest operating expenses).
In general we can make two mn__n conclusions about the
concentra ion/loan rate relationship. Firstly, as Gilbert (1984 p.631)
has obsei , red, average loan rates are poor measures of bank performance
and studies that use individual loan data obtained through survey avoid
measurement problems and yield satisfactory results. As we have noted,
virtually all of these suggest that the traditional structure-
performance relationship holds. Secondly, even when the relationship
between concentration and loan rates is found to be significant, there
is a quantitatively small impact. The range of estimates of effects of
a 10 per cent increase in market concentration on loan rates
(individual or average) vary between 18 basis points (Edwards, 1964) and
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0.1 basis points (Rhoades, 1981) In addition, the R 2 for the equations
in most of the market structure studies on bank loan rates vary between
0.15 and 0.60, suggesting that there are important omitted variables in
these equations. The estimated effects of concentration on loan rates
may therefore be biased if the measure of market concentration is
correlated with the omitted variables.
5.5.2 Concentration and deposit rates
Interest on time and savings deposits has also been used as a
performance indicator in the structure-performance studies. As in the
case for loan rates, the majority o studies have used average deposit
rates (mostly interest payment on rime and savings deposits divided by
time and savings deposits) as a pez.;rmance measure. This measure is
subject to the same criticisms as average loan rates because the
numerator is an annual expense flow (income flow in the case of loans),
but the denominator is a balance sheet item recorded at a point in time,
which may be different from the average deposit balance (-r loan) over
the year.
Despite these problems, it can be seen from Table 5.4 that all but
five of the 23 studies that use deposit rates as a performance measure
employ average rates. Most studies that use average deposit rates find
that there is no significant relationship between market structure and
these rates. The earliest work using individual deposit rates (Klein
and Murphy (1971) and Heggestad and Mingo (1976)) also find no
significant relationship. One s_iould note, however, that US pre-1980
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Table 5.4 Concentration and deposit rates
Coefficient on the
Study Individual
deposit
rates
Average
deposit
rates
measure of market
structure are
statistically
s ignif icante
1. Edwards (1965) - IT - TS Yes
2. Kaufmann (1966) - IT - TS Yes
3. Fraser and Rose
(1971) - IT - TS No for 1966
Yes for 1967
4. Klein and Murphy Interest rate - No
(1971) on time
deposits
5. Fraser and Rose - ITD - Tr No
(1972)
6. Ware (1972) - IT - TS No
7. Fraser and Alvis - IT - TS No
(1974)
8. Yeats (1974) - IT - TS No
9. Heggestad and Interest rate - No
Mingo (1976) on passbook savings
Interest rate on 1
year $1000 CL
10. Fraser and Rose
(1976)	 - 'l - TS No
11. Rose and Fraser	 - IT - TS No
(1976)
12. Stolz	 (1976) IT - TS No
13. Whitehead (1977)
	 - IT - TS Yes
14. Whitehead (1978)	 - IT - TS No
15. Graddy and Kyle	 - IT - TS No
(1979)
16. Harvey (1979)	 - Interest Yes
continued ..
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Table 5.4 (continued)
17. Savage and Rhoades	 -
(1979)
18. Rhoades (1979)
	 -
19. Rose and Scott (1979) -
20. Rhoades (1981)	 -
21. Hannan (1983) Passbook
savings
rate
payments on
TD - TD
IT - TS	 Yes
IT - TS	 No
IT - TS	 No
IT - TD	 Yes in 4 out of 7 cases.
Yes (from Tobit Maximum
Likelihood estimates)
22. Hanweck and Rhoades
(1984)
23. Berger and Hannan
(1989)
24. Calem and Carlino
(1989)
IT - TD
Money Market -
Deposit
Account rate
3,6,12 and 30
months CD rate
Money Market -
Deposit Account rate
3 and 6 month
CD rates
Yes
Yes in 8 out of 10
equatio ,
MMDA's Yes
6 month CD Yes
3 month CD No
Notes:	 a: where t-statistics on the market structure coefficient are
greater than 1.95
IT — interest payment on time and savings deposits
TS — time and savings deposits
ITD — interest payments or time deposits
TD — time deposits
Source:	 See Appendix Three
studies using deposit rates as a performance measure give a biased
picture of performance, because in most periods studied Regulation Q was
in force. It is, therefore, more sensible to consider briefly the
literature that uses sample data from outside this period.
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Berger and Hannan (1989) examine 470 banks in 195 local banking
markets observed quarterly over a two and a half year period between
September 1983 and December 1985. They use as performance measures,
interest paid on Money Market Deposit Accounts (MMDAs), Super-Now
(Negotiable Order of Withdrawal) Accounts, and 3,6,12 and 30 month CDs.
These price data were obtained from the Federal Reserve's Monthly Survey
of Selected Deposits and other Accounts. Their findings are strongly
consistent with the implications of the structure-performance
hypothesis:
'... banks in the most concentrated local markets in the sample are
found to pay MMDA rates that range from 25 to 100 basis points less
than those paid in the least concentrated markets, depending on the
time period examined. Similar results are found for Super-NOWs and
shorter-term CDs' (pp.298-299)
These results are also unusual because their equations have much higher
RZ than other studies - ranging between 0.33 and 0.88.
Calem P.,Ld Carlino (1989) use a sample of 466 commercial banks and
Federal savings banks insured by the Federal Deposit Ins,rance
Corporation (FDIC) in 1985 covering 145 SMSAs. Using MMDA's and _' - and
6 - month CD rates as performance measures, they find that a 10 per c nt
increase in concentration creates a fall in MMDA rates by 5.9 'asis
points and for 6 - month CDs a fall of 3-4 basis points - (the
relationship was not significant for 3 - month CDs). One should also
mention that despite individual deposit rates being a better measure of
performance, the explanatory power of these models (Rz ranging for most
between 0.01 and 0.25) is lower than those that use average rates (R`
ranging between 0.2 and 0.5 in most cases)
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To conclude, individual deposit rates are a better measure of bank
performance than average deposit rates, although the majority of studies
provide biased results because of the impact of Regulation Q in the
1960s and 1970s. The most recent studies, using individual deposit
rates, find strong evidence of the traditional structure-performance
hypothesis.
5.5.3 Profitability and concentration
Most bank concentration studies have examined the relationship between
bank market structure and profitability ratios, either using ROA
(net ln,-me divided by total assets) or ROC (net income divided by total
equity capital). Table 5.5 provides the findings of those studies that
examine ,e profitability-concentration relationship, and it illustrates
that ROA is the most popular profitability measure. Edwards (1965),
Kaufman (1966), Fraser and Rose (1976), Heggestad (1977), Rhoades
(1979), Glassman and Rhoades (1980), Rhoades (1982a), Kwast and Rose
(1982) and Rhoades and Rutz (] 82) all find a statistically significant
relationship, suggesting that ROA for banks operating in more
,)ncentrated markets is higher. Studies undertaken by Yeats (1974) and
Rhoades and Rutz (1979) however, find no such relationship. Early
studies using ROC as a measure of performance also tended to find no
such relationship, although later studies (such as Clark 1986b) provide
a little more evidence that the traditional structure-performance
relationship holds.
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Table 5.5 Concentration and profitability
Study Profitability Coefficient on the measure of
measure market structure-one
statistically
s ignif icanta
1. Edwards (1965) NI - TA Yes
2. Kaufman (1966) NI - TA Yes
3. Fraser and Rose NI - C No
(1971)
4. Vernon (1971) NI - C Yes
5. Emery (1971) Deviations from	 No
the capital
market line
6. Fraser and Rose NI - TA No
(1972)
NI - C No
7. Ware (1972) NI - C No
8. Edwards (1973) NI - C No
9. Yeats (1974) NI - TA No
10. Fraser and Alvis NI - TA No
(1975)
11. Fraser and Rose NI - TA Yes
(1976)
12. Mingo (197( NI - TA No
13. Heggestae (1977) NI - TA Yes
14. Whitehead (1977) NI - C No
15. Whitehead (1978) NI - C No
16. Harvey (1979) NI - C Yes
continued ......
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Table 5.5 (continued)
17. Savage and Rhoades NI -	 C Yes
(1979)
18. Rhoades (1979) NI - TA Yes
19. Rhoades and Rutz NI - TA No
(1979)
20. Glassman and Rhoades NI - TA Yes
(1980)
21. Rhoades (1981) NI - TA No
22. Rhoades (1982a) NI - TA Yes
23. Kwast and Rose NI - TA Yes
(1982)
24. Rhoades and Rutz NI - TA Yes
(1982)
25. Smirlock (1985) NI - E Yes when market share not
NI - C included as an explanatory
NI - TA variable. (No when
included)
26. Wall (1985) NI - TA No
NI - C No
27. Clark (1986a) NI - E No
28. Clark (1986b) NI - E Yes
29. Evanoff and Fortier NI - TA Yes (but only in 2
(1988) equations when market
share is not included
as an explanatory
variable).	 No otherwise
Notes:	 a where t-statistics on the market structure coefficient are
greater than 1.95.
NI — net income
TA — total assets
C — capital
E — equity
Source:	 See Appendix Three
J
Conventional economic theory links concentration to individual firm
profitability, but it can be seen from the above results that there is
no clear agreement on the concentration-profitability connection. Wall
(1985) in a study of independent SMSA banks finds that neither market
concentration nor bank size has a major impact on profits, and he
suggests that bank profits are dominated by asset and funds management
strategies and by management's ability in reducing non-interest
expenses, not by market structure or regulation.
Other negative results for banking concentration were reported by
Smirlock (1985) and Evanoff and Fortier (1988) who both argue that the
major linkage is between market share and profitability, which are
positively related. In testing Demsetz's (1973) efficiency hypothesis
they both find that once the market share of individual banks is
controlled for, concentration provides no additional explanatory power
in influencing variations in bank profits. A study undertaken by
Hanweck and Rhoades (1984), which examined 259 metropolitan and country-
wide banking markets, contradicts the above findings when applied to the
market share of the major banks in each market. They find that the
presence of `dominating' banks affF:ts service prices but not
profitability. Rhoades (1985c), in a st-.dy of 3777 commercial banks in
372 markets across the United States for 1976 to 1980, finds that
profits tend to be higher where there wer , relatively few fringe banks
(those ranked 4,5 and 6 in market share).	 As Rose (1987) has
identified:
This finding clashes with the conventional argument that mergers
among fringe banks should be encouraged in order to create new
market lenders to challenge the dominant banks. (p.198).
Finally, although Gilbert (1984, p.632) }-is state ," `hat bank profit rate
is an appropriate measure of bank perfc mance, 	 is these studies that
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have the lowest explanatory power with R2 or adjusted R2 (R2 ) typically
ranging between 0.01 and 0.15.
5.5.4 Service charges and concentration
Demand deposit service charges have also been used as a performance
indicator for assessing the effects of concentration. Heggestad and
Mingo (1976) find that these charges increase with concentration in a
nonlinear fashion. Stolz (1976), in a study noted for its good survey
data, analysed the effect concentration had on demand deposit service
charges in 333 banking offices in 75 rural countries. Using a novel
'area of convenience' approximation to banking markets, Stolz found that
these service changes were not influenced by concentration.
Weiss (1969), in his study of 25 SMSAs, noted that higher
concentration is related to the absence of 'free checking'. Not only
does the study identify this finding, but it also mentions the need to
observe mutual interdependence on the part of major competitors in the
m,_ket:
When this condition exists, a decision-make: in the market
explicitly considers the reactions of his competitors t- any market
action he may take ... If this situation goes undisturbed,
unilateral price reduction is not likely to occur. (p. 105)
Average service charges have been the most commonly used measures of
performance. Table 5.6 illustrates this point. The problems associated
with this choice of performance indicator are similar to those
associated with the average loan and deposit rate indicators, as
mentioned earlier. In general, however, studies that use individual
service charge measures tend to be no more conclusive in . their findings
than those that use average measures.
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Service charge on standardised	 No
account charge for returned
	 No
cheque
SC - DD	 No
SC - DD	 Yes
Table 5.6 Service charges and concentration
Coefficient on the measure
Study	 Service Charge	 of market structure one
Measure	 statistically significanta
1. Bell and Murphy
(1969)
2. Weiss (1969)
3. Fraser and Rose
(1971)
4. Klein and Murphy
(1971)
5. Fraser and Rose
(1972)
6. Ware (1972)
7. Fraser and Alvis
(1975)
8. Heggestad and Mingo
(1976)
9. Fraser and Ros:
(1976)
10. Rose and Fraser
(1976)
Estimated service charge
on demand deposits
Offering of no service
charge on demand
deposit accounts
SC - DD
Service charge revenue
divided by:
1. No. of DD accounts
2. No. of debits to DD
accounts
SC - DD
SC - DD
SC - DD
Yes
Concentration related tc
the absence of free
chequing a/c
No
No
No
No
No
No
continued ...
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Table 5.6 (continued)
11. Stolz (1976)	 SC - DD No
12. Heggestad and Mingo	 Monthly service charge on demand Yes
(1977)	 deposits (based on a survey)
13. Graddy and Kyle	 SC - DD No
(1979)
14. Savage and Rhoades	 SC - DD Yes
(1979)
15. Rhoades (1979)	 SC - DD Yes
16. Rhoades and Rutz	 SC - DD Yes
(1979)
17. Osborne and Wendel 	 SC - DD Yes
,(1981)	 SC - Number of DD accounts No
Explicit	 SC	 for 20 cheques Yes (Opposite si
to the SCP
paradigm)
Price per number of
cheques written (6, 20, 42 No in all 4 case
or 84)
16. Rhoades (1981)	 SC - DD Yes (in 5 out of
7 years tested)
17. Hanweck and Rhoades 	 SC - DD Yes
(1984)
Notes:	 a where t-statistics on the market structure coefficient are
greater than 1.95
SC — revenue from service charges on demand deposits
DD — demand deposits
Soi- ce:	 See Appendix Three
j.5.5 Extra-market structure and communication
Extra-market factors are those `structural considerations outside the
market that influence behaviour in the market' (Heggestad, 1979, p.483).
Only a handful of studies have been centred on these peripheral effects.
Rose (1976), using 90 senatorial votes as his sample and the vote on the
Helm's Amendment to the Financial Institutions Act of 1975 as the
perfor• ance measure, attempted to see whether large banking
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organisations could influence the passing of legislation.	 The study
concluded that concentration had no effect on the legislation passed by
government.
As mentioned previously, other effects of an inter-institutional
kind have been identified in various studies. Heggestad and Rhoades
(1978) attempted to evaluate empirically the performance of 'links
between the dominant banks' in markets throughout a State. They
concluded that collusion between banks was apparent, and that multi-
market meetings between dominant banks do adversely affect the degree of
rivalry within markets.
Edwards (1965) also identified this interaction and noted that, if
firms have close contac, with each other in many markets, they may
develop interdependence, thus forming a type of oligopoly within the
banking system (see Stolz 1976).
5.5.6 Non-price competition and concentration
Edwards (1973) <<udied the effects of concentration on advertising
intensity, usirg 36 of the largest American banks in 23 SMSAs as his
sample. He found that concentration had no effect on his performance
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measure.
From previous, major reviews of the SCP literature (see Heggestad,
1979 and Gilbert, 1984), it is generally accepted that the strongest
non-price competition results are obtained by Stolz (1976), White (1976)
and Heggestad and Mingo (1977). White (1976) assesses the linkage
between concentration and service quality; he measures quality of
service by the number of branch offices in each of 40 SMSA's in
statewide branching states based on the view that more branches imply
greater convenience to customers. The expected negative relationship
between concentration and number of branches is found to be
statistically significant and quanti-atively important - a 0.1 decrease
in the Herfindahl index is associaced with a 14.4 per cent average rise
in the number of bank offices in each SMSA.
5.5.7 Behavioural models of banking structure
5.5.7.1 Expense-preference behaviour
Behavioural models of bankir, structure aim to observe the managerial
objectives of banks. Edwa •:ds (1977) in his study on expense preference
behaviour in banking suggests `that managers of regulated firms may be
utility maximisers rather than profit maximisers'. His findings, using
a sample of banks based in 44SMSAs for 1962, 1964 and 1966, indicate
that expense - preference behaviour better explains the performance of
regulated firms than does a profit-maximising framework. Edward's model
found that wage and salary expenditures in banking increase with
_19
monopoly power.
Hannan's (1979a) study, using 367 banks based in 49 local banking
markets in the State of Pennsylvania, finds that banks' wage and salary
expenditures and the number of bank employees are significantly related
to the market-structure measure, leading him to support strongly
evidence of expense-preference behaviour in local banking markets. In a
similar study, Hannan and Mavinga (1980) studying banks operating in
Pennsylvania in 1970 also find strong evidence of expense preference
behaviour:
Consistent with the implications of expense reference behaviour
(and inconsistent with those of profit maximisation), manager-
controlled banks operating in non-competitive markets are found to
spend more on inputs likely to be preferred ry managers than do
owner-controlled banks in the same situation (p.680).
Of all the studies that test the structure-performance relationship
those studies which find evidence of expense-preference behaviour have
(by far) the highest explanatory power. Other studies, however, reject
the expense-preference hypothesis: for example, Rhoades (1980) finds
bank expenses to be lower in more concentrated than in less concentrated
markets. Smirlock and Marshall (1983) argue'that if the market share of
individual banks is included in the type of equations used by Edwards
(1977) and Hannan and Mavinga (1980) to control for bank size, there is
no evidence of a relation between market concentration and expense
preference behaviour by managers.
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5.5.7.2 Market power and risk reduction - the quiet life hypothesis
A few studies during the 1970s and 1980 have tested the
relationship between market power and risk reduction, otherwise known as
the Quiet Life Hypothesis. This hypothesis was developed by Hicks
(1935) who suggested that, ' the best of all monopoly profits is a quiet
life' (p.8). This hypothesis suggests that a bank with greater market
power will be more risk-averse, and thus will be able to achieve some
combination of both higher return and lower risk than firms possessing
lesser power in the market.
Edwards and Heggestad ( 1973), in their study of 'u= rtainty
avoidance' within the banking system found evidence thL^ profit
maximisation may not necessarily be the objective of some bank., The
study indicated that 'uncertainty avoidance' increased with high
concentration, implying that banks become more risk-averse the fewer
competitors they have.
	
Edwards and Heggestad measure risk as the
.oefficient of variation in bank profit rates.	 Using this as the
dependent variable, the significant independent variables are market
concentration (negative sign) and bank size (negative sign). Their
equations explain about 12 to 17 per cent of the vari_bility of profit
rates. Heggestad (1977), using a similar measure of risk, also found
that banks ( from a sample of 238 in SMSAs between 1960 and 1970) became
risk - averse the higher the level of concentration.
Rhoades and Rutz ( 1982) use a sample of 6,500 unit banks operating
between 1969 and 1978 to test the Hicksian Quiet Life Hypothesis. They
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use four performance measures to account for risk: coefficient of
variation of ROA (overall risk measure), equity to assets ratio (balance
sheet risk measure), loans to assets ratio, and the net-loan-losses to
total loans ratio. The measures are regressed against the three bank
concentration ratio along with variables to control for bank size,
market size, growth and deposit volatility. For all performance
measures (apart from net-loan-losses to total loans) they find a
statistically significant relationship with the concentration variable,
which suggests that risk is associated with higher levels of
concentration. These findings, however have to be qualified as the R2
for all five equations range between 0.003 and 0.06, and as such one
could alternatively state that no meaningful relationship between
concentration and risk-aversion was found in this study.
Clark (1986a and 1986b) uses two approaches to test for the
concentration-risk relationship in banking markets. Both studies use
the same dataset, 1857 banks located in 152 SMSAs in unit or limited
branching -cates operating between 1973 and 1982. Clark (1986a) uses
ordinary least squares regression procedures and the standard deviation
of return on equity as the risk measure and finds that, even -then
controlling for bank size,there is no statistically signiA cant
relationship between concentration and risk. The explanatory power of
this model is also weak with an R2 of 0,05. In his second paper (Clark
1986b) shows how simultaneous estimation using a two-stage least squares
(2SLS) procedure generates more satisfactory results. He finds evidence
supporting the traditional structure-performance hypothesis on
profitability and risk, and also rejects the efficiency hypothesis.
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Gilbert (1984, p.633) notes that influences other than risk affect
the variance of bank profits: such as capital gains and losses on
securities and the incidence of loan-losses. He suggests that more
`direct' indicators of risks undertaken by banks can be obtained by
examining the composition of assets held by banks. Mingo (1976) tests
the hypothesis that banks in areas with higher concentration hold less
risky assets. He finds no significant relation between market
concentration and the percentage of bank assets invested in US
government securities, but does find that banks in areas with relatively
high market concentration hold relatively high percentages of their
assets in commercial loans.
These results obviously contradict the hypothesis that banks hold
les- risky assets in more concentrated markets.
5.5.8 Other studies
Various studies focus on inter-institutional competition in banking
markets, and there is evidence to suggest that this factor may be
important in explaining performance. Heggestad and Mingo (1977) find
that service charges on demand deposits are cheaper ($1.52 per month) in
markets where Savings and Loan (S&Ls) institutions are allowed to offer
NOW (Notice of Withdrawal) accounts. White (1976) shows that the
presence of S&Ls increases the number of commercial bank branches within
SMSAs. Curry and Rose (1984) test for the relationship between bank
holding company presence and banking market performance: the results
-suggest that outside banking holding company presence leads to increased
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bank lending, particularly in the real estate and consumer loan market.
Berger and Hannan (1989) note that the presence of S&Ls has no
significant affect on deposit rates charged in concentrated commercial
banking markets.
5.6 Concentration and Performance - Empirical Evidence from
Individual European Countries
As far as we are aware there have only been two SCP studies on
individual European banking markets; Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux and
Thornton (1993) on Spain and Mooslechner and Schnitzer (1992) for
Austria. The :.ason for the scarcity of European SCP studies relates to
the lack of publicly available regional banking market data. As a
result it is m, n more difficult to define banking markets in Europe.
The US studies, on the other hand, are able to obtain data on a large
number of banks which operate in statistically identified local and
regional markets according to Metropolitan Statistical Areas and non-
Metropolitan Statistical Area county ooundaries. Concentration ratios
anti market share values are calculated on the basis of these local
markets This is the standard approach adopted in the US studies. This
poses problems for the researcher who wishes to study the SCP paradigm
for individual European countries, because it is very difficult to
define and obtain data on local banking markets: publicly available data
generally only allow the researcher to calculate national concentration
ratios.
VariouL- studies (which will be discussed later in Section 5.7.3)
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such as those undertaken by Short (1979) and Bourke (1989), have
examined the relationship between bank profitability and concentration
across different countries which has enabled them to avoid this problem.
These studies, however, tell us little about the SCP relationship in
individual countries. To counter this problem, Lloyd-Williams, Molyneux
and Thornton (1993) pool their data over the period 1986 to 1988 so that
they can include both concentration ratios and market share variables to
test two competing hypotheses - the SCP paradigm and the efficiency
hypothesis. Their results for the Spanish banking market tend to
support the traditional SCP hypothesis whilst rejecting the competing
efficiency hypothesis.
A more detailed study undertaken by Mooslechner and Schnitzer
(1992) on the Austrian banki. 1, system examines the SCP and efficiency
hypothesis over the years 1988 and 1989. As Mooslechner and Schnitzer
(1992, p.14) note:
One of the major problems of the structure-pey•formance literature
is how to *:asure market structure. Market structure is usually
approximated by market-share and concentration. But it is
extremely c'fficult to define a meaningful (relevant) market area
and a reasonable measure of concentration under universal banking
and nationwide banking conditions because banks are operating in
many different product and geographical markets.
To deal with this problem Mooslechner and Schnitzer (1992) categorise
the Austrian banking market into various districts, each bank has a
relevant market of its own, ranging from at least one district for a
local bank to nationwide banks ;which serve many districts. They
classify the number of districts relevant to an individual bank
according to the geographical distribution of each banks' branch
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network. They point out that: 'Because there are in general no balance
sheet data for bank branches, market structure is measured empirically
within the relevant market of each bank separately,' including the
balance sheet totals of all banks headquartered in one of the districts
of the relevant markets' (p. 15)
Using cross-sectional estimates on a sample of 956 banks for 1988
and 1989 they find almost no significant influence of market share and
market concentration variables on indicators of profitability. On the
other hand, pooled time-series calculations for 13 large banks produce
significant impacts for both variables. These findings lead them to
conclude that:
those results point to the fact that it is rather difficult to
apply the standard US-approach of structuY_ performance to European
universal and nationwide banking conditions. Very poor data
availability and severe problems in geographical market delineation
limit the empirical possibilities. (p.24)
5.7 Concentration and Performance - Empirical Evidence from
International Studies
5.7.1 Concentration in international b .eking
In general there are two types of study that compare concentration in
international banking. Firstly, there are those that focus on changes
in concentration levels between the world's largest banks, such as
Aliber (1975), Tschoegl (1982), Rhoades (1983) and Thornton (1991a).
Secondly, other studies have examined the relationship between the
relative size of banks and industrial firm.; across countries (Rhoades
6
(1982b) and Thornton (1991b).
Aliber ( 1975) found that concentration in international banking had
altered little between 1964 and 1974. The measure of concentration used
was the percentage of total deposits of the world's largest 100 banks
accounted for by the largest ( top 10,20 etc.) banks. Tschoegl (1982)
presents evidence that concentration in international banking decreased
over the period 1969 to 1979 and suggested that it would continue to
decrease. The study used both static and dynamic measures 6 applied to
asset data for the world's 100 largest banks and the top 20 medium-term
Euroloan syndicators (1977 to 1979). Both the static and dynamic
measures of concentration indicate that for the 100 l^^gest banks
concentration fell between 1969 and 1973 but remained rel—Avely stable
up to 1979. Results for the top 20 syndicators of Eurolt.—is suggest,
'dramatic' falls in the level of concentration between 1977 and 1979.
In contrast to previous findings, Rhoades (1983) found that
concentration in international banking markets had increased steadily
since 1956. The study used deposit data for uhe world's 100 largest
banks between 1956 and 1980 and found:
The five largest banks in the world have steadily lost their share
of the deposits controlled by the top 100. It declined from 22.6
per cent to 13.3 per cent between 1956 and 1979. It is worth
noting that since 1975, the decline in share of the five largest
was much smaller than in the previous period - while the banks
ranked 1-5 lost share, banks ranked 6-10 and 26 - 50 held there own.
The greatest gains within the 100 largest banks were made by banks
ranked 26 - 50 as their share of the top 100 deposits rose from 20
per cent in 1956 to 25 . 9 per cent in 1979. (p. 431)
This study also revealed that the importance of US banks within the
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world's largest banks had declined dramatically since 1956. It was
argued that this trend was the result of re-adjustment to, 'The
distortions of World War II, the rise of the commercial paper market in
the United States, and the large number of US banks compared to other
countries'. (p.427).
Thornton (1991a), using asset data on the world's 100 largest
banks obtained from The Banker, replicated Rhoades' (1983) study for the
period 1979 to 1989. He found that the percentage of banking assets
accounted for by the world's 100 largest banks had generally declined
since 1979, but the five largest banks experienced a marked increase in
their share of world bank assets. Thornton also noted that banks within-
the top 100 have become less equal in size, a finding which conflict-z
with those of Rhoades (1983) who reported an increase in the share of
world assets controlled by the top 100 banks and a tendency for the
banks to become more equal in size. The results also reveal that
Japanese banks have become more dominant within the world's largest
banks, me •_nly at the expense of US and German banks. Thornton suggests
that the preeminence of Japanese banks in the top 100 banks, 'could not
be accounted for by greater bank asset concentration in Japan r' an in
other countries, since Japan has a large number of relatively large
banks' (p.271). He suggests that advantages due to the lower cost of
capital in Japan may be the reason for the noticeable growth of Japanese
banks during the 1980s.
Rhoades (1982b) examines the relative size of banks and industrial
firms in the United States and other major industrialised countries fir
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1978. Using deposits as a measure of bank size and total sales as a
measure of the size of large corporations, he shows that US large banks
are small in relation to large industrial corporations in comparison
with other countries. For example, the deposits to sales ratio for the
five largest banks to five largest corporations is estimated to be 1.09
for US organisations in 1978 which compares with 5.15 in France, 4.27 in
Germany and 4.58 in Japan. A study using similar methodology (Thornton
1991b) examines the size relationship between large banks and
corporations in Japan, United States, France, Germany, United Kingdom
and Italy for 1989. The results indicate that, with the exception of
the five largest French banks, banks in Japan are much larger in
-lation to industrial corporations than in other countries. The
difference is especially notable with respect to the United States which
t. -; by far the lowest assets-to-sales ratios, for example; the five
largest banks assets to five largest corporations sales ratio is 1.40,
compared with 8.49 in Japan, 8.62 in France, 4.29 in Germany; 4.85 in
Italy and 4.15 in the United Kingdom. Even when one considers the '20
largest bank to 20 largest corporate ratio' the Japanese figure of 9.44
compares extremely with the 1.75 for the United States. Thornton
suggests that the largest Japanese banks have such a significant size
advantage over their major competitors, that US and EC banks may find it
difficult to compete against them in the international market place.
5.7.2 Bank concentration across countries
There have been a variety of studies which examine concentration across
- different banking markets, IBRO (1976), Honohan and Kinsella (1982),
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Smith and Quinn (1983) and Baer and Mote (1985), but by for the most
detailed and authoritative has that been undertaken by Revell (1987).
Revell undertakes an extensive country-by-country study examining
concentration levels (3,5 and 10 firm deposits and assets) on an
unconsolidated and consolidated groups basis in 14 countries for 1983.
A summary of his findings is shown in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7 illustrates some of the difficulties in calculating
concentration ratios for banking systems. In the table it can be seen
that ratios are reported for three groups. The ones based on
unconsolidated figures are for individual banks registered in the
country, incl -ling in the case of Spain and France business of their
branches situated outside the country, it is the nearest that we
can get to a . .asure of concentration within a domestic banking system,
although much international business is conducted from domestic offices',
(p.26). At the other extreme, the consolidated group figures cover the
worldwide business of the institutions. The table clearly illustrates
the different concentration ratio teat can be arrived at depending on
whether one uses consolidated or unconsolidated data, this of course can
also t strongly influenced by data availability.
Revell (1987) also identifies various statistical problems in
interpreting concentration measures across countries:
1.	 When considering concentration within a population of commercial
banks there is the problem of the different definition of a
commercial bank in each country.
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Table 5.7 Summary of 1983 concentration ratios
Percentages of total assets of category
Country	 Coverage	 Commercial	 All banking
banks	 institutions
3	 5	 10	 3	 5	 10
Unconsolidated
Germany A 43.0 60.7 69.4 16.6 24.0 38.2
Italy A 28.0 40.8 61.3 17.5 25.5 40.4
Spain A+B 28.3 42.6 57.9 17.6 26.3 35.7
Japan A 22.6 36.3 58.1 22.9 29.6 41.5
Australia A 66.9 92.3 99.1 30.4 46.4 65.5
France A+B 48.5 57.4 .. 33.1 47.3 60.9
Belgium A 51.6 75.0 97.5 35.8 52.1 67.7
Ireland A 48.0 .. .. 40.0 .. ..
Switzerland A 70.6 74.7 79.8 44.8 51.5 59.3
Sweden A 76.4 88.8 97.4 52.0 60.4 67.5
Partly consolidated or combined
UK A+C	 _8.9	 25.2	 .. 16.3 21.7 ..
Australia A+C	 65.1	 87.2	 98.2 46.3 62.0 69.8
Ireland A+B+C	 76.0	 ..	 .. 66.9 .. ..
Consolidated groups
Germany E/H	 44.5	 60.3	 68.8 15.0 22.0 35.0
UK H	 24.4	 34.0	 38.8 21.3 29.7 37.1
Spain H	 38.4	 59.7	 77.9 23.8 37.2 58.2
Italy E	 ..	 ..	 45.4 .. .. 41.3
France H	 51.8	 68.7
	 .. 35.1 53.6 70.5
Netherlands H	 69.3	 83.9	 89.0 58.7 72.9 81.5
Source: Revel'_
	 (1987,	 p.27) Table 2.2
Notes: (1) Belgium 1982; Spain 1985
(2) Commercial	 banks	 include	 foreign banks (branches	 and
subsidiaries).
TERMS: A - parent bank offices in home country
B m branches in other countries
C = bank subsidiaries in home country
D - bank subsidiaries in other countries
E - Consolidated banking group
F - non-bank subsidiaries in home country
G e non-ban-: subsidiaries in other countries
H m consolidated group
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2. Problems arise when one includes public and mutual banks within the
population because they may not compete in 'strictly' the same
market.
3. Definition of all banking institutions (ie. the market) depends
ultimately on subjective judgements.
4. The paucity of ratios on fully consolidated accounts is unfortunate
because there are considerable differences between countries and
between individual banks in the proportion of the activity of the
banking group conducted through subsidiaries, both at home and
abroad. 'For all these reasons like is rarely being compared
exactly with like'. (p.26)
Revell (1987) identifies that ever; banking system appears to have a
group of dominant or 'core banks' recognised by both the authorities and
by the general public:
The main significance of the core group (or the group of a few
large banks if there is a divergence in membership between the two
groups) is that they are highly visible. We have alrF_3y seen that
they attract special attention from the central bank, bw_ they also
act as the focus of attention to the general public. In all
countries there is a latent populist feeling arising out of a
largely unconscious "_ear of finance and banks. This feeling has
been behind anti-Semitism in some countries, behind persecution of
Asians in African coun tries, and behind the dislike of the
financial power of the T.astern states of the United States felt by
those further to the W.st. In its less lucid moments the general
public finds it difficult to distinguish between bankers and
moneylenders. In most countries the populist feeling takes the
form of an expressed fear of banking monopoly, which means that an
alleged monopoly of banks is pursued with far more vigour than the
alleged monopoly of industrial empires. (p.256).
There are two consequences for banks as soon as it is recognised
that a group of 'core' banks has emerged. Firstly, when large banks in
^ ,^
the group wish to become even larger by merging among themselves, they
need to provide public plausible reasons for doing so. Secondly,
mergers between core banks becomes a public policy issue, and the
approval of the authorities is nearly always required.
Mention should also be given to the Honohan and Kinsella (1982)
study which provides a critique of cross-country comparisons of
traditional measures of concentration (although this study will also be
discussed in the following section). This study notes that when one
compares concentration across countries one must take into account the
effects of market size on the, 'minimum practicable degree of
concentration having regard to the desirability of-in efficient scale of
production'. (p.262). They develop, with the help of a theoretical
model, a measure which takes account of market size - essentially
Herfindahl indices scaled-up by an amount proportionate to the level, or
the square root of GDP. Their study, using data obtained from Short
(1979) for 1973, shows that if their measures are used, Japan which had
the least concentrated market as measured by the Herfindahl index would
have almost the highest degree of concentration of any country if either
of their measures were chosen. Belgium an . - Sweden which appeared among
the most concentrated according to the herfindahl index would seem to
have the 'minimum feasible level' of concentration across countries if
the Herfindahl multiplied by GDP measure was used.
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5.7.3 International evidence of the SCP relationship
A handful of studies have appeared in recent years testing the
relationship between concentration and bank performance across
individual countries. The earliest was a paper by Short (1979) that
links profit rates of 60 banks in Canada, Western Europe, and Japan to
concentration in their national banking systems over a three-year period
(1972 to 1974). Bank profitability is measured by the ratio of after-
tax profits to shareholders equity. Because of the lack of information
on system-wide profitability or capital scarcity measures, Short chooses
the central bank discount rate and the yield on long-term government
securities to represent these features of each national 3conomy.
Individual bank profitability is regressed against variables measuring
bank leverage (assets to equity ratio), bank size, asset growth., whether
each bank is privately or state owned, and concentration measured by the
Herfindahl index, numbers equivalent and 1,2 and 3 bank concentration
ratios.	 Short finds that state ownership, market concentration and
capital scarcity dominate the regression equations. Concentration,
however, is the least important of these variables and its effect is
quantitatively small: for example, one equation indica---s that nearly a
30 per cent reduction in the 3 bank concentration ra.;io is necessary to
reduce individual bank profit rates by about one per cent. Short (1979)
concludes:
'Nevertheless, even very small reductions in banks' lending rates
or increases in their borrowing rates may in aggregate result in
substantial redistribution of income to bank customers'. (p.214)
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A recent study by Bourke (1989) on the determinants of international
bank profitability replicated and extended the earlier work undertaken
by Short (1979) and found support for the view that concentration was
positively and moderately related to profitability. The data used in
Bourke's study were based on the financial statements of 116 banks each
year from 1972 to 1981 in 15 countries or territories (Australia, New
Zealand, California, Massachusetts, New York, Canada, Ireland, Scotland,
England and Wales, France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Spain).
The banks included in the sample were every bank in these countries
which fell within the Top-500 banks in the world in June 1980, ranked by
total assets. Bourke used a pooled time-series approach to estimate a
linear equation, regressing performance measures (ROA, ROC - before and
after tax) against a variety of internal (staff expenses, capital
ratios, liquidity ratios) and external (concentration ratios (3 bank),
government ownership, interest rates, market growth and inflation)
determinants of bank profitability. His results find support for the
view that concentration was positively and moderately related to
profitabili t y. The results also provide some evidence for the Edwards -
Heggestad - Mingo hypothesis (Edwards and Heggestad (1973) and Heggestad
and Mingo (1976)) of risk avoidance by banks with a high degree - of
market power.
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) replicate Bourke's methodology in
order to evaluate the determinants of European bank profitability. A
sample of European banks; 671 for 1986, 1,063 for 1987, 1,371 for 1988
and 1,108 for 1989 are taken across eighteen countries. Standardised
accounting data for the banks were obtained from International Bank
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Credit Analysis Ltd. (IBCA), a London-based bank credit-rating agency
and the variables used were as follows:
Dependent variables
(NPBT - Net profit before tax; NPAT - Net profit after tax)
BTCR NPBT as % of capital and reserves
ATCR NPAT as % of capital and reserves
BTCRTB NPBT as % of capital and reserves and total borrowings
BTTA NPBT as % of total assets
BTSETA NPBT + staff expenses as % of total assets
BISE-LTA NPAT + staff expenses + provision for loan losses as % of
total assets
Independent variables
GOVT
	
A binary variable representing government ownership, one
- when a tink is owned by a government, national or
provincial, zero otherwise
CONC	 Ten bank asset concentration ratio
INT
	 The long-term bond rate for each country for each year
(IMF)
MON
	 Growth in money supply for each country for each year
(IMF)
CRTA
	 Capital and reserves as % of total assets
CBINVTA
	 Cash and bank deposits + investment securities as % of
total assets
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CPI	 Percentage increase in consumer price index for each
country for each year (IMF)
SE	 Staff expenses as % of total assets
As with previous studies, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) estimate a simple
linear equation using a pooled sample of European banks between 1986 and
1989 7 . Results are shown in Tables 5.8 and 5.9
Table 5.8 estimates the relations between return on capital and
various independent variables and these are more or less similar to the
equations estimated by Short (1979). As with Bourke, Molyneux and
Thornton (1992) f: d an, 'almost total lack of correspondence' (p. 75)
between their ROC results and those of Shorts. For European banks they
find a statistically significant positive relationship between ROC and
concentration and a positive relationship for nominal interest rates
(which is used as a capital scarcity proxy variable). Unlike Short and
Bourke, however, who both find a statistically significant inverse
relationship between ROC and government c.fnership, Molyneux and Thornton
find a statistically significant positive relationship, suggesting that
state-ownrI banks generate higher ROC than their private sector
competitors. In one way this result is surprising because it conflicts
with earlier findings, but it is not unexpected because state-owned
banks generally maintain lower capital ratios (because the government
implicitly underwrites their operations) than their private sector
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Table 5.8 Estimates of the relation between return on capital and selected
independent variables for 1986-1989
Intercept	 GOVT	 CONC	 INT	 MON	 R2	 F
1. BTCR 90.0629 0.0007 0.0007a 0.0019 a -0.0007a 27.6 246.25
(-0.74) (0.02) (3.44) (24.42) (-3.93) - -
2. BTCR -0.2830 a 0.0070 0.0092a - - 1.1 18.59
(-3.10) (0.14) (5.99) - - - -
3. BTCR -0.1630 -0.0297 0.0071a - 0.0025a 10.8 105.29
(-1.76) (-0.64) (4.80) - (16.53) - -
4. ATCR -0.3090 a 0.0905a 0.0075a O.00lOa - 10.9 125.60
(-4.49) (2.38) (6.47) (17.56) - - -
5. BTCRTB -0.8150 a 0.4050a 0.0168a - 0.0003 2.2 20.32
(-5.41) (5.34) (7.01) - (1.19) - -
6. BTCRTB -0.6620a 0.2990a 0.0156a 0.0003 a - 2.4 26.45
(-5.47) (4.54) (7.77) (2.61) - - -
a significant at the 5 per cent level
t - statistics in parentheses
Source; Molyneux and Thornton (1992, p.1175)
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counterparts. A simple explanation for their findings could be that,
because their sample comprises a much larger proportion of state-owned
banks (for example, over 200 in 1988), these results are more
representative than the two aforementioned authors who only included the
largest government-owned banks in their much smaller samples (eg. Bourke
(1989) used 200 banks over ten years, of which there were only thirty or
so government-owned institutions).
The results shown in Table 5.9 use asset-based returns and, in
general, show that capital ratios and nominal interest rates are
positively related to profitability. These findings are to be expected
and are confirmed in the Bourke (1989) study. Government-)wnership also
appears to have a positive impact on bank profitability. In the case of
liquidity ratios, Molyneux and Thornton find a weak invers_ relationship
with profitability which is also to be expected as liquidity holdings
(particularly those imposed by the authorities) represent a cost to the
bank. Molyneux and Thornton find that concentration shows a positive,
statistically significant correlation with pre-tax ROA, which is
consistent with the SCP paradigm. When the value-added measure used to
test for the expense preference theory, one would -;xpect the sign on the
CONC variable to be positive and strengthen. This is because the
measure of value added largely removes the possibility of either
managerially-induced expenditure or labour union-negotiated wage demands
appropriating excessive proportions of net income. Their results appear
to find evidence of expense preference behaviour in European banking.
Another value added measure (BTSEPLTA) is used to test for the Edwards-:
Heggestad-Mingo risk aversion effect: 	 using this as a dependent
240
variable one would expect the sign on the CONC variable to be negative
and the relationship strengthen, which illustrates that higher levels of
concentration are associated with lower loan costs: Molyneux and
Thornton (1992) find no evidence of the risk aversion effect.
In general, Molyneux and Thornton's analysis of the determinants of
European bank profitability conflict with the earlier findings of Short
(1979), yet the main results on asset-based returns confirm Bourke's
(1989) findings, apart from the relationship between government
ownership and profitability. The results are in agreement with the
traditional concentration and bank profitability (SCP) studies for the
US market, and they find no support for the Edwards-Heggestad-Ming•
hypothesis. Support, however is found for the expense preference
expenditure theories in European banking.
Finally, Ruthenberg (1991) employs a transcendental logarithmic
function (translog) to estimate the structure-performance relationship
using - 984 to 1988 data on the EC and several non-EC banking markets
(Israel, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Australia, Canada, Switzerland, Japan
and the United States). The dataset employed was obt p '_ned by
questionnaires responded to by the central bankers in the countries
listed above. The data, therefore, relate to aggregate commercial
banking markets. In order to test the relationship between structure
and performance, Ruthenberg uses the general form of the performance
equation:
TÎij —	 (Hij , PCij , NNIij , Rij , Vij )
	
(2)
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where
	
TPij — performance measures, Lerner index [the differences
between price (interest rate on loans) and marginal cost (rate
paid on deposits) divided by price] and Net interest margin.
Hij — Herfindahl index
PCij — proxy for potential competition. The two measures used
are (1) population per number of branches and (2) population
per number of banks
NNIij — non-interest income (overhead expenses less fees and
commissions).
Rij — risk measures which include; (1) loans to assets ratio,
(2) equity to total loans ratio (3) loan-loss reserves to
total loans (4) standard deviation of the return on equity.
Vij — vf.-, tor of control variables to account for banking
market and/or economy specific characteristics.
Two types of binary variable were also included to (a) account for the
time trend effect between 1984 and 1988 and (b) to account for
intercountry differences in size (zero if GNP per capita is less than
$10,000 and one otherwise). The performance function estimated was as
follows:
242
ln tc = ao + a 1 1nH + a21 n NNI + ix 1nPC +a41nR
+ a5 1nV + 1 [R1 (ln H) 2 + S2 (1nNNI) 2 + p3 (1nPC) 2	 (3)
2
+ js4 (1nR) 2 + p5 (1nV) 2 ) + T1 ln H lnNNI + ......
.. + T41nH1nV + ..,.T101nR1nV.
ao; ai i=1, ... 5,
	 13i i=1, ... 5; T i	 i=1, ........ 10 are the
parameters to be estimated.
Despite reservations about the nature of the data obtained, aggregate
data for teach country that yields only 54 observations for SCP estimates
for EC countries between 1984 to 1988, the study has some interesting
findings.
Ruthenberg finds that (at the sample means) there is a
statistically significant relationship between the concentration measure
-Lhe Herfindahl index) and one of the performance measures (Lerner
index) when the European Community is considered, but not when the
larger sample of countries is used. When they deviate from the sample
means of the Herfindahl index, empirical results suggest the existence
of a `critical level' of concentration (consistent with earlier US
findings by McCall and Peterson (1980)). In the EC, the banking markets
which consistently fall above the `critical level' of the Herfindahl
index are Ireland, Greece, Netherlands and Portugal.
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Ruthenberg (1991) concludes:
In sum, it appears that only relatively small (probably with the
exception of Canada), concentrated banking markets: with an H
greater than 0.13, that are characterised with relatively few
competitors, and high entry barriers can offer banking
organisations that expand their activities across borders a
potential for decreased profits. We arrive at this conclusion
because in that group of countries the positive effect of structure
on performance is most profound. (p. 21-22).
It should be noted that in a study of this nature it might have been
better to use a weighted Herfindahl index as suggested by Honohon and
Kinsella (1982), so as to control for the effects of relatively small
concentrated banking markets.
5.8 Limitations of Bank SCP Modelling
A positive relationship between concentration and rarfornance has teen
found in some, but far from all, of the empirical studies investigating
bank market structure and performance. The lack of consistent results
have lead some researchers (noticeably G = _bert (1984)) to argue that the
literat-re contains too many inconsistencies and contradictions to
establi • h a satisfactory SCP relationship in banking. In addition,
despite thrre being numerous empirical studies, these have not been
based on n explicit model of the banking firm (see Hannan, 1991b).
The defects of trying to quantify empirically the relationship
between commercial bank performance and market structure are numerous
and (some might say) obvious. We have already mentioned that because
banking is a multiproduct industry, a simple all-inclusive market area
is difficult to delineate and no single measure of structure precisely
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reflects the degree of monopoly, nor does economic theory help choose
which measure is most important.
Adequate standards of performance measurement have also not been
developed, as can be seen from the variations noted previously. In many
past studies it is difficult to argue that output was a homogeneous
measure, i.e, all banks do not offer the same services (see Bell and
Murphy (1969)), and while banks are multiproduct firms, the majority of
studies have been limited to analysing the prices of a single product,
thus underestimating the total impact of monopoly power on performance.
To illustrate this argumen• Klein and Murphy (1971) developed a
model to test whether an individual bank faces different markets for
different activities. They stat-: 'the possibility that local market
structure may have a differential impact on bank performance in
different activities, seems to have escaped systematic investigations'
(p.747).	 This study points to the limitations of other 'non-
differentiated' investigations. In addition fe- studies have
empirically considered the possibility that banking competition is best
reflected in non-price di • ensions. These factors could be of paramount
importance in determini-.ig performance.
The functional form of the structure-performance model will now be
briefly reiterated. It is quite possible that the relationship will be
non-linear, so that changes in concentration would have different
impacts on performance at different levels of concentration. Heggestad
and Mingo (1976) point out:
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`Specifically, a given increase in concentration will have a
greater impact on prices (services), the less concentrated is the
market initially'	 (p.108)
Studies undertaken by McCall and Peterson (1980) and Daskin and Wolken
(1989) using switching regression and maximum likelihood estimation
procedures have been used to examine this issue. In addition, the one-
way causality assumption of the SCP relationship has been clearly
identified by many authors (see Britton, Clark and Ball 1992, for
example) but has rarely been empirically addressed (see Clark, 1986b).
The statistical results obtained from a large number of the SCP
studies cannot confirm the hypotheses of central relationships which
they aim to show. Taylor (1968) notes that: `No regression ever
produces definitive answers about cause or effect', and that `This study
reinforces the scholar's conclusion that, no matter how sophisticated
the techniques that are applied to poor data, the results are likely to
be poor'. (p.803)
Another important factor (_ee Phillips (1967)) is the weighting
problem involved in aggregatin g, within and among banks. Previous
studies on banking have also been -:riticised for assuming that banks
behave as profit maximisers under condition of complete certainty. As
Edward and Heggestad (1973) noted:
Implicit in this argument is the assumption that the managements of
large firms are insulated from the kind of stockholder pressure
that would prevent them from pursuing objectives other than the
maximisation of the value of the firm. 	 (p.148)
They argue that if managerial objectives vary systematically with firm
size and market power, the findings of past studies may be biased and
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therefore fail to disclose the true structure-performance relationship.
Furthermore, these studies, by isolating one sector from the rest
of the economy, fail to examine interactions between sectors (any
distortion away from a perfectly competitive order may be necessary to
maintain a 'second-best' position).
Rhoades (1982a) claims that many of the equations are mispecified,
thus biasing the estimated coefficients on the concentration measure.
For example, if one does not take account for bank management risk-
return preferences operating in different concentrated markets then one
is ignoring the possibility of trading off potential prof-=s for lower
risk. Thus it is important to account for differences in risk-taking
across the observations. Clark (1986b) goes further and saggests that
risk and profitability should be determined simultaneously.
Others suggest that many of the studies have ignored the existence
of potential competitors to the relevant markets. This ommission was
justified on the grounds of technological conditions, and the existence
of strict regulation either on the type and variet, of services offered
and/or the ability to expand geographically. Therefore, even if
concentration is high in a particular market, the threat of competition
(potential entry) can lead to lower profits than otherwise. Evanoff and
Fortier (1988) have shown that accounting for differences in entry
barriers across markets adds significantly to the impact of structure on
profits.
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Demsetz (1973) Brozen (1982) and others have argued that an
industry's structure may exist as a result of a superior efficiency in
production by some firms which enables them to increase market share
thus increasing market concentration. This efficiency hypothesis
suggests that it is not collusion which leads to higher than normal
profits but rather economies of scale and scope. Smirlock (1985) and
Evanoff and Fortier (1988) find that once firm-specific efficiency is
accounted for in banking markets, market concentration adds nothing in
explaining performance. Conversely, Clark (1986a) and (1986b) and
Berger and Hannan (1989) find no evidence to support the efficiency
hypothesis.
Gilbert (1984) notes that one of the major criticisms of this type
of methodology for investigating banking markets is that it neglects the
role of regulation. There may be strong interactive effects between
regulation and other variables which have a significant impact on market
concentration and performance. Heggestad (1984), however, notes that
the importar.e of this problem is overstated and he argues that,
'Regulation does still permit market forces to work but may change the
intensity of their effect. For example, liability rate ceilings r--.y
make collusion less difficult, as may high entry barriers.
Consequently, markets with low concentration may exhibit collusive
behaviour. On the other hand, competition may be enhanced by regulatory
oversight', (p. 648). In general, rates of return are not directly
regulated and firms treat regulation as an operational constraint. They
maximise some objective function within the environment in which they do
business.
	
Different regulatory regimes may lead to different
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relationships between structure and performance but as Heggestad (1984)
states,'... it is highly likely that structure will have an impact on
performance' (p.648). The empirical biases resulting from regulation
may also be overstated because most bank SCP studies are cross-sectional
and in general they control for important cross-sectional changes in
regulation.8
Overall, despite the generally low explanatory power of many of the
SCP studies, frequently 20 per cent or less of the performance
variability from bank to bank and market to market is explained by
concentration or other market structure variables, Gilbert (1984) points
out that,
... the pattern that emerges from this analysis is that the
better studies report a significant influence of market
concentration on the performance measures, with signs implied by
the structure-performance hypothesis, more consistently than the
other studies. (Gilbert, 1984, p.636).
5.9 Conclusions
This chapter has examined the empirical literature on SCP modelling in
b zking markets. The bulk of these studies investigate the structure-
performance relationship in US banking markets, although there have been
recent attempts to investigate the relationship across countries. In
general one can conclude that statistical studies of structure and
performance reveal the existence of important relationships, whose
presence stands out more sharply the better is the quality of the data
and methodology employed.
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In addition, there are public policy reasons for undertaking more
research in the bank concentration area, especially in European banking.
With the advent of the single European banking market after 1992, it is
of interest to know how strongly or weakly the SCP relationship holds in
established markets so one can evaluate how things will change in the
new, broader markets and in markets linked by common competitors after
1992. The following chapters will attempt to evaluate these features.
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Notes to Chapter Five
1. The development of models of imperfect competition led various
researchers, notably Alhadeff (1954), Hodgman (1961) and Shull
(1963), to apply these models to the commercial bank as a
multiproduct, price-discriminating firm and to banking markets
where there were elements of monopolistic behaviour. Alhadef£
(1954) analysed economies of scale by relating total operating
costs per thousand dollars of loans and securities to different
deposit-size banks. The data were obtained from operating ratio
statistics published by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
for the period 1938 to 1950. Hot- CD (1961) examined the deposit
relationship of commercial bank investment behaviour in the United
States and found that competition _or deposits may take the form of
lower rates on loans to depositors. Shull (1963) provided a
theoretical exposition of how commercial banks could be analysed as
multiple-product price discriminating firms.
2. Smirlock, Gilligan and Marshall (1984) suggest on al'ernative to
profitability measures of bank performance; namely Tobin's Q ratio,
which is defined as the ratio of the current market value of the
firm divided by the cur'_ent market value of its productive assets.
This, they argue, provides a precise bound on the monopoly and
firm-specific rents of the firm. If the Q ratio is higher than 1,
it implies that the firm is earning monopolistic rents.
3. The main exceptions being Stolz (1976) and Hannan (1979b)
4. In a review of 38 studies that examine differences in state
branching restrictions, Gilbert (1984) notes that results are
`inconsistent across studies' (p.629) although Evanoff and Fortier
(1988, p.279) do find some support for the expected relationship.
5. See Edwards and Heggestad (1973) for an early analysis of the
relationship between bank risk-taking and market structure, as well
as Rhoades and Rutz (1982)
6. The static measures were: Herfindahl index, Theils entropy measure
and a dominance index. The dynamic measures used were the Hymer
and Pashigian index of market share instability and two stochastic
growth measures.
7. Cross-sectional equations for individual years were estimated and
yielded similar results, so these were not reported in the paper.
8. Fry (1988, p.255) has also noted that there has _--en virtually no
discussion of what he terms, `the second-best dilemma' that arises
when controls in some areas are dismantled (suca as structural
deregulation) but controls in other areas (supervisory re-
regulation say) are strengthened.
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Chapter 6
The SCP Relationship in European Banking - the Methodology
6.1 Introduction
This Chapter examines the methodology that is to be used to evaluate the
SCP relationship across European banking markets. The chapter can be
divided into two main sections. The first section outlines the variable
choice, model specification and estimation procedures which will be used
to test two competing hypotheses - the SCP paradigm and the efficiency
hypothesis. The second section explains a methodology which evaluates
rivalrous and cooperative behaviour between market leaders in an
industry. This methodology will be adopted to illustrate the influence
of market leaders on industry performance in European banking, thus
providing a greater insight into the concentration-profits relationship.
6.2 Testing the Traditional SCP and Efficiency Hypotheses in European
Banking
The methodological approach adopted in this thesis is similar to
previous studies undertaken by Short (1979), Bourke (1989) and Molyneux
and Thornton (1992), but it differs in one main respect. The
aforementioned studies primarily focused on explaining the determinants
of bank profitability using a measure of market structure as one of the
explanatory variables in their equations. The studies placed greater
emphasis on explaining bank profitability rather than on the SCP
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relationship. The concern of this thesis is to place greater emphasis
on the structure -performance interactions and to extend analysis of this
relationship for banking markets. This will be undertaken in two ways.
First, a methodology for testing both the traditional SCP and efficiency
hypotheses across European banking markets will be discussed; as far as
we are aware there is no other study that provides international
evidence of this relationship. Second, a methodology will be analysed
for testing for rivalrous and cooperative interactions between the
largest banks across European markets from the approach outlined in
industrial economics by Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986).
^
.^
6.2.1 The general model
The general form of the structure -performance model used in the US
literature estimated using multiple regression analysis, and discussed
in the previous chapter is as follows:
P — f (CR, S, D, C, X)
where	 P —	 a performance measure
CR —	 a market structure measure (usually a concentration
measure)
S —	 other market structure variables, such as proxie-
for barriers to entry
D —	 a set of variables to reflect market dema#d
conditions
C —	 a set of variables to reflect differences in costs
across firms
X —	 a variety of control variables related to a specific
product's characteristics
A variation of this type of model specification has been used by Short
(1979), Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) to test the SCP
relationship in an international context.
(1)
It has already been noted that the later US studies focus on
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specific products and market characteristics relating to those specific
products - such as different deposit services, loans and such like. The
international studies, however, do not use such micro data because of
availability problems. As a result, the (X) control variable in the
international studies relates to other firm specific characteristics
rather than different product characteristics.
The international studies examine the SCP model by estimating the
relationship between market structure and bank performance in an
aggregate fashion, using total banking sector assets or total banking
sector deposits as the size measure for the market, and calculating
concentration ratios on this basis. This approach is subject to
criticism because banks as multi-product firms may not operate in all
markets, and concentration ratios based on this crude definition of
market size may be misleading. Concentration ratios for different
product-line markets may be significantly different than those estimated
on the basis of total banking sector assets and/or deposits. The reason
why relatively crude market structure measures are used in the
international studies is because specific product market data - for
example on standard loan or deposit products across cot itries - are
difficult to obtain. Bearing this in mind, the fc--lowing will
illustrate how the aforementioned general model will be user' in this
thesis to estimate the SCP relationship across European bank i ng markets.
6.2.2 Variable choice
The model used to estimate the SCP relationship in European banking is
strongly influenced by the data availability across countries. A sample
of balance sheet and income statement data of European banks - 759 data
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items for 1986, 1201 for 1987, 1541 for 1988 and 1268 for 1989 - was
taken across nineteen European countries. Standardised year-end
accounting data for the banks were obtained from International Bank
Credit Analysis Ltd (IBCA), a London-based bank credit-rating agency,
and the variables chosen were classified into groups according to the
specification of the general model discussed above (see Chapter 7 for a
detailed discussion of the data).
6.2.2.1 (Performance Measures
The two main performance measures used for our analysis are before-tax
return on assets (ROA) and before-tax return on equity (ROE). These
accounting measures are used in favour of market-value measures for two
main reasons. First, many of the banks in our sample do not have
publicly quoted equity on which market-based estimates could be made.
Secondly, ROA and ROE are generally regarded as the most appropriate
overall bank performance measures (see Sinkey 1992, p.269-289 for
further details).( In the previous chapter we noted that) Gilbert (1984,
p.632) identified that the only measures of bank performance obtained
from bank financial accounts that do not have m-jor measurement problems
are bank profit rates. Others, such as Rhoade s (1981) and (1985a) and
Evanoff and Fortier (1988), provide support for the use of profitability
measures to account for the performance of banks Fo r example, Evanoff
and Fortier (1988) suggest a number of reasons why the ROA measure is
preferable to other profit measures. Firstly, although some studies
have used bank product prices as the dependent variable, banking is a
multiproduct business and individual prices may be misleading. Prices
can only be used if costs directly associated with these prices are
explicitly accounted for as an explanatory variables, `Even then, given
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the regulatory constraints on the industry, the expected structure-price
relationship may not be realised for a particular service because of
differing pricing strategies among banks' (Evanoff and Fortier, 1988,
p.281). Secondly, the potential for significant cross-subsidisation
between products obviously exist and pricing strategy would differ
across markets.	 As a result, the use of profit measures should
eliminate many of these potential problems.
We also use ROE as a second performance measure although ROA is
generally regarded as a more satisfactory measure because of the
significant discretion that individual banks in different countries have
in dividing capital between debt and equity. Equity values may not be
comparable across countries between banks, therefore bank assets is a
more `common' denominator. Short (1979) uses ROC as his performance
measure, whereas Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) use both
ROA and ROC, the latter two studies yielding significantly different
results according to the performance measure used. Smirlock (1985), on
the other hand, found somewhat similar results employing either of these
profit measures - ie. return on assets, equity and capital.
Of course, neither of the at •)ve measures are ideal. For example,
if banks with monopoly power have higher capital-to-asset ratios,
because they are more conservati--e or they have generated larger
absolute profits over time and have retained these funds, their ratios
of profits to capital may be low, even though their net return on assets
is high.
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I6.2.2.2 Measures of market structure
.r^
This study uses two main types of market structure measure -
ti
concentration ratios and firm-specific market shares. The concentration
ratios include: the five-firm deposits and assets concentration ratio;
the ten-firm deposits and assets concentration ratio; and the Herfindahl
index measured using both firm-assets and firm-deposits. We use these
six measures in order to evaluate whether results differ according to
the choice of concentration measure used. Theory indicates a
relationship between the level of output controlled by a few of the
largest firms and performance, although it offers no information about
the absolute number or size distribution of firms necessary to exercise
market power.
In previous SCP studies, the majority of authors appear to have
chosen arbitrarily a three-firm concentration ratio. This implies equal
impact by the three leading firms, although nothing in theory suggests
that the behaviour of the largest three firms is all-important to market
performance or that their relative impact is uniform Kwoka (1979), in
a study of nationwi ie US manufacturing data, found that the four-firm
concentration ratio, widely used in studies of these industries,
included superfluous firms. Using a range of concentration measures may
help us to identify tie number of large firms that do have a significant
impact on market performance. The Herf indahl- index takes into account
all firms in the sample, but tells us little about the counterveiling
power of the largest firms (a methodology for investigating cooperative
and rivalrous behaviour between the largest banks in Europe will be
discussed in the second part of this Chapter).
258
As well as the concentration measures, firm - specific market share,
defined as bank assets divided by total market assets, is used to
capture firm efficiency so as to enable us to test for both the
traditional SCP and efficiency hypotheses.
6.2.2.3 Other market structure variables
This study utilises a binary or ` dummy' variable to account for the
prevalence of state-owned banks in European markets. As mentioned in
the previous Chapter, Short (1979), Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and
Thornton ( 1992) all examine the relationship between government
ownership and profitability; the first two studies finding a significant
inverse relationship and the latter a positive relationship. Given the
importance of state-owned banks in France, Italy, Greece and Portugal
and their existence in many other European countries, it was felt that
state ownership may have a significant impact on bank performance so
this was included as an explanatory variable in the model. This
variable was also introduced in order to confirm or reject the
findings of the Molyneux and Thornt^a (1992) study which found that
statt ownership and bank profitability were positive and statistically
sign'_ficantly related in European banking markets.
6.2.2. 4 Demand conditions
As noted in the previous chapter, all the SCP studies use some variables
to proxy for market demand conditions of which the most common are
measures of market size and market growth. Total banking sector size is
used as a proxy for market potential on the grounds that the larger the
market, the greater the likelihood of new entry and potential for
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increased competition. Growth in market size is also often used as a
proxy to account for change in local demand conditions.
So as to take account of changing demand conditions a change in
money supply variable is used. We use the narrow money definition from
the International Monetary Funds International Financial Statistics
publication (Vol. XLIV, No. 5, May 1991) taken from line 34. As they
state, '...the data in line 34 are frequently referred to as Ml', (p.12)
and consists of currency outside banks and demand deposits other than
those of the central government. Bourke (1989) also uses change in the
money supply to account for market demand conditions as do Molyneux and
Thornton (1992). Prior to estimation, the impact of the market growth
variable is difficult to predict. If market growth can be exploited
without fear of rival entry, profitable opportunities should occur for
incumbent banks. If growth encourages entry, profitability may be
depressed.
6.2.2.5 Cost differences
The explanatory variable most commonly used to account for cost
differences across banks is a measure of bank size, namely total assets.
This is included to take account of size-induced differences between
banks, such as scale economies. 	 Other studies also suggest other
explanatory variables which proxy for the cost of funds and labour. As
such, we chose the three following variables to account for cost
differences between banking institutions:
(i) Total assets of individual banks
(ii) Interest paid/total funds (proxy for the cost of funds).
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(iii)
	
Staff expenses/total assets (proxy for the cost of labour)
The effect of the total assets variable prior to estimation is
indeterminant, because any positive influence on profits generated from
economies of scale may be offset by larger banks being able to diversify
their portfolios resulting in lower risk and a lower required return.
One would expect the proxy for the cost of funds variable to have a
negative effect on bank profitability as increased funding cost would
reduce profitability. Finally, the explanatory variable that accounts
for the cost of labour, staff expenses divided by total assets, is
expected to have a negative impact on profitability. Bourke (1989) and
Molyneux and Thornton (1992), however, find a strong positive relation
with ROA. Given that these two studies find that the traditional SCP
paradigm holds, this result implies that banks 'in concentrated
industries may have a larger proportion of their expenses appropriated
in the form of higher payroll expenditures, and this suggests evidence
of expense preference behaviour across banking markets.
6.2.2.6 Other control variables
Since the performance measures, ROA and ROE, used in the analyses are
not risk-adjusted, we employ three variables to account for fir-a-
specific risk. The loans-to-assets ratio provides a measure of risk
since loans are riskier and generally have a greater expected return
than other bank earning assets, like government securities. Thus, one
would expect a positive relationship between this variable and the
performance measures. It could be the case, however, that banks that
are rapidly increasing their loan books have to pay a higher cost for
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their funding requirements and this could reduce the positive impact on
profitability.
The equity- to -assets ratios is also included to account for
different risk levels between firms. As lower ratios suggest a
relatively risky position one would expect a negative coefficient on
this variable although it could be the case that high levels of equity
suggest that the cost of capital is relatively cheap and therefore this
variable may have a positive impact on profitability. We treat the
equity-to-assets ratio as indeterminant prior to estimation.
Finally we use loan-loss reserves divided by total loans as a
default-risk measure - the implication being the higher the ratio the
more risky (poorer quality) the banks loan-portfolio. Conversely, it
could be the case that more conservative banks make excessive provisions
against poor loans and therefore it is not unambiguously clear as to the
effect on bank performance (see Clark 1986a and b).
6.3 Model Specification
Following Weiss (1974) and Smirlock (1985), the traditic , ial SCP paradigm
and efficient structure hypotheses can be tested by es timating the
profit equation shown below:
nij = a o + a 1 CR + a2MS + E Xi
ai
where -I(ij is a profit measure, CR is a measure of market structure
(usually a concentration measure), MS is a measure of individual-firm
market share, and X is a vector of control variables which are included
to take account of firm-specific and market-specific characteristics.
(2)
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The traditional SCP hypothesis can be verified by finding a, >0 and a2
—0; and the efficiency hypothesis by finding that a, —0 and a2>0. (Or
the two hypotheses may be complementary as found by Evanoff and Fortier
(1988) where a I >0 and a2>0).
So, given the general model and the variables specification from
above we can show the linear multiple regression model we estimate as
follows:
ROAi3 — ao + al (CRi ) + a2 (MS ij ) + a3 (NARMONj )	 (3)
or
ROEij 	+a4 (ASSETS ij ) + a5 (IPAY/FUND ij ) + a6 (LOANS/ASSETSij )
+a7 (EQUITY/ASSETS ij ) + a8 (STAFF/ASSETSij )
+a9 (LLR/LOANS ij ) + a10 (GOVT )j
where:
ROAij —	 banks is profits measured as before tax return on
assets in market
ROEij —	 bank is profits measured as before tax return on
equity in market
CR• concentration ratio in market • 	 (5 and 10 firm assets
and	 deposits	 concentration	 ratios and Herfindahl
indexes)
MS ij —	 individual banks asset narket share in market
NARMON^ —	 narrow money supply gr-wth in market
ASSETS ij —	 bank is asset size in mar'.-et J
IPAY/FUND ij — interest paid divided by total funds for bank is in
market
LOANS/ASSETS ij —	 loans-to-assets ratios for bank is in market
EQUITY/ASSETS ij —	 equity-to-assets ratios for bank is in market J
STAFF/ASSETS ij —	 Staff expenses divided by total bank assets for bank
is in market
LLR/LOANS ij — loan-loss reserves divided by total loans for bank
is in market
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GOVT	 — binary variable equal to one if government owned or
zero otherwise
The SCP literature has provided the framework from which the above model
has been derived but inspection of the above specification and data
availability problems create certain difficulties. First, the test of
market share may be nullified by the inclusion of bank assets (ie
absolute bank size) as well as market share in the regressions.
Therefore the model needs to be estimated by dropping assets from the
regressions. Secondly, data for the LLR/Loans variable is not available
for various countries (namely Austria, Belgium, Switzerland and
Liechtenstein), and there is also a substantial number of missing
observations for other countries in the sample. Estimating a model
which includes LLR/LOANS would only evaluate the SCP relationship across
a subset of European countries. 	 As a cc , sequence, we estimated the
model with and without the LLR/LOANS variable to see if the explanatory
power of the equations altered.	 There ai,: also substantial missing
values for the IPAY/FUND and STAFF/ASSETS variable.
6.3.1 Estimation Procedure
6.3.1.1 Multiple Regression Analysis
As mentioned in Section 5.4 of this thesis multiple regression has been
the method most widely used to evaluate the SCP relationship in banking
markets. A multiple regression equation describes the extent of linear
relationships between the dependent variable and a number of other
independent variables for example:
Yt ' Je  + R 2X2t + . . . + Rj Xj t + . . . + ekXkt + Ut ; t=1 . . . .n	 (4)
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The assumptions are that the variables on the right-hand side of
equations are nonrandom, and that the disturbances have zero mean,
constant variance, either zero covariance or independence between
distinct disturbances Us , Ut and, for inferences in small samples, that
Ut has a normal distribution. In short we have:
(a) 'fixed X': 
Xjt nonrandom; j=1, ...d; t=1, ...^
(b) 'zero mean': E(Ut ) = 0; t=1, .. . -0
(c) 'constant variance': var(at) = O'2 ; t=1	 (Homoscedasticity)
(d) 'zero covariance': cov (Ut , U$ ) = 0; S * t; S, t=1, ... . 71	 or
'independence': Ut , US independent; S * t; S, t=1, ...^
(e) 'normality': U t1LN (	 ); t=1, ... . 71
The error term follows the normal distribution with mean zero and
homoskedastic variance.
To ensure that the normality assumption is correctly stated, one
combines assumptions (b), (c), the independence version of (d) and (e)
by writing Ut --'^— NID (0, o' 2 ). This indicates that the Ut are normal
and independently distributed, with E(U t ) — 0 and var (Ut)
	 2
Equation (4) above is a single equation model with fixed
(nonrandom) values for the X variables. The model expresses Y as a
linear function of the X va_iables, but a random disturbance is added to
this function (Ut), so observations on Y have a random component. This
type of model is described as a multiple regression model in order to
distinguish from the two variable model of elementary statistics.
In equation (4),
	 13 2 , S;	 13 k etc. are designated as partial
regression coefficients and represent the slope of the regression line
for each independent variable, controlling for the other. Thus, 132
reflects the amount of change -i Yt associated with a given change in
X2t , holding all of---r indr^_adent variables constant, and the same
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interpretation can be given for the other g coefficients apart from 13,
which is the constant. The coefficients of the multiple linear
regression equation are estimated so as to minimise the average square
error in prediction. This is achieved by using the least squares
criterion to obtain the best fit to the data (see Frankfort-Nachmias and
Nachmias (1992, p.414) for a more detailed exploration).
We have noted above that the standardised regression coefficients -
the betas - allow us to assess the independent effect of each variable
in the regression equation on the dependent variable. To examine the
combined effect of the independent variables, we compute a measure of
the coefficient of determination, denoted R2 . This measure designates
the percentage of i=he variation explained by all the independent
variables in the multiple regression equation.
The R2 is calculated by dividing the sum of squares of the
regression by the total sum of squares corrected for by the mean. A
more useful measure used to account for goodness of fit is the adjusted
R2 or R2 (adj.). This is simply the R2 adjusted for degrees of freedom.
If a variable is added to an equation, R 2 will get larger even if the
added variab*_a is of no real value. R 2 (adjusted) is an approximately
unbiased e.timate of the population R2 and is calculated by the formula:
R2 (adj) — 1 - SS Error/( 77 -v)
SS Total/(7)-l)
	
where SS error —	 residual sum of squares
	
SS total a	total sum of squares corrected for the mean
7)	 a	 number of observations
P	 —	 number of parameters
We utilise the AINITAB statistical package to undertake multiple
regress i on anal. - Ls on our data sample for European banks.	 This
provic. s; an 7" 	 which is a measure of the overall significance of
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the estimated regression line, a table of coefficients; the estimated
standard deviation about the regression line; R-sq and R-sq (adjusted)
measures; analysis of variance ( including the regression sum of squares;
residual sum of squares; mean squared residual and the total sum of
squares corrected for the mean); table of predicted Y value, (4) and the
relevant residuals.
6.3.1.2 Test for heteroscedasticity
The assumption of homoscedastic residual variance is often violated by
the use of cross-section data. To investigate whether there is evidence
of heteroscedasticity in the residual variance we use the Lagrange
Multipli r (LM) test. The LM test is described in detail in Griliches
and intrilgator (1984) and its application to matters of
heterosc^lasticity is relatively uncomplicated. The test is performed
by regressing the residuals onto the predicted values from which they
were obtained. Calculating n R2 , where `n' is the sample size and the
R2 obtained from this regression gives the test statistic. Its
distribution will be chi-squareji with s degrees of freedom, where 's' is
the number of restrictions in the model. The critical chi-square values
:e 3.84146 (at the 5 per cent level) and 6.63490 (at the 10 per cent
level). Values below this would reject the null hypothesis of
heteroscedastic residual variance. Note that heteroscedasticity does
not destroy the unbiasedness property of ordinary least square
estimators, but these estimators would no longer be efficient. In other
words, ordinary least squares estimators would no longer be best linear
unbiased estimators (BLUE) (see Gujarati (1992) for a more detailed
explaaation) .
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6.3.1.3 Test for multicollinearity
An important problem in the application of multiple regression analysis
involves the possible multicollinearity of the independent variables.
This is when explanatory variables are highly correlated with each
other. In such situations collinear variables do not provide new
information and it becomes difficult to separate the affect of such
variables on the dependent variable.
One method of measuring collinearity (and provided by the MINITAB
package) uses the variance inflationary factor (VIF) for each
explanatory variable. The VIF is defined as :
VIF. — 1
L R2.
1
where 
R2J 
represents the coefficient of multiple determination of
explanatory variable X
I
 with all other X variables. In the case when
there are only two explanatory variables, then 
R2  
is the coefficient of
determination between Xl and X2 .	 If, for example, there were three
explanatory variables, then R21 would be the coefficient of multiple
determination of X1 with X2 and X3 . If the explanatory variables are
uncorrelated, then VIF
i
 will equal to 1. Marquardt (1980) has suggestea
that if VIFi is greater than 10 there is too much correlation between
variable Xi and the other explanatory variables .
6.3.1.4 Test for normality
Another important problem in the use of multiple regression analysis
involves the assumption of normally distributed error terms ,or
(6)
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residuals).	 Non-normality of the residuals would cast doubt on the
validity of the linear model. To test for normality we use a procedure
provided in MINITAB which is essentially the same as the Shapiro-Wilk
(1978) test.
We calculate normal scores for the residuals (which are mainly used
to produce normal probability plots) and then correlate these with the
residual values. A very powerful test of normality can be based on this
correlation. A very high correlation is consistent with normality. The
hypothesis of normality is rejected if the correlation falls below the
appropriate values in Table 6.1.
6.3.1.5 Cross-section and pooled time-series estimates
The size of our data sample allows us to estimate variations of the
model in equation (3) using both cross-section and pooled time-series
data. The estimation sequence followed in this thesis is as follows:
1. Cr.)ss-section estimates of the model are undertaken for each year,
1986 to 1989, across countries. These estimates are used to adopt
the most appropriate form of the model.
2. Pooled time-series cross section estimates are undertaken using
time series dummy variables. F-tests on the pooled data are used
to evaluate evidence of seasonality in the results.
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Table 6.1 Critical values for the Shapiro-Wilk equivalent test
N 0.10 0.05 0.01
4 0.8951 0.8734 0.8318
5 0.9033 0.8804 0.8320
10 0.9347 0.9180 0.8804
15 0.9506 0.9383 0.9110
20 0.9600 0.9503 0.9290
25 0.9662 0.9582 0.9408
30 0.9662 0.9582 0.9490
40 0.9767 0.9715 0.9597
50 0.9807 0.9764 0.9664
60 0.9835 0.9799 0.9710
75 0.9865 0.9835 0.9757
Source: MINITAB Manual, p.46
3. Pooled time-series cross section estimates of the model are made
for each individual country's banks, ie., an equation is estimated
for each country. (One has to pool data for individual countries
because only one market structure measure is available in any one
year, pooling the data provides variance in the concentration
measure despite there only being four different values).
6.4 Testing for Rivalry and Cooperation in Euro- :an Banking
The concentration measures which have been used in the above analysis
and previous studies have no apparent theoreti:al superiority over
alternative measures. As such, the appropriateness of such measures
should be empirically verified. Employing a five-firm concentration
ratio, for example, also implicitly assumes equal influence by each of
the top five firms in the market. This may be a tenable assumption, but
it also should be empirically verified. In Section 4.2.3 of this thesis
we showed how the firm Lerner index of monopoly power can be derived as:
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S^	 (1+ a )	 ( 7)
m. - —i
e
where Mi
 - Lerner index
S i
 - market share of firm i
e - elasticity of demand
r	 dEgj
l^ =
	
J- conjectural variation of firm i, l	 vx1 J
dqi
Subsequently the Lerner index for the industry can be written as:
S
MiJ = _
i ^ (1+^iJ)
e
J
If firm behaviour is totally non-collusive (the Cournot-Nash case) then
A J
 = 0. If behaviour is perfectly collusive then
_ 1-S
^iJ	
---1j 	 (9)
S
iJ
Hay and Morris (1991, p.221) show that if we L _ the extent of collusion
be 9, where g ranges from zero to one, then X is generally given by:
_	 1-S
Ai J - ^J	 iJ	 (10)
S
iJ
The variance ^ j represents the degree of industry wide co-operation.
It is natural to represent 0 J
 as an increasing function of the level of
concentration in the market, therefore the higher level of concept--ti.on
the greater the degree of indust.y-wide co-operation. All firms gain
from the higher prices that result from co-operation, therefore,
profitability is assumed to be some ositive function of industry-wide
concentration. Using summary inderes of market structure - like five-
firm concentration ratios for example - imposes a variety of
restrictions on the role of individual firm market shares and, by
implication, on inter-firm behaviour. For example, the 71 firm
concentration ratio sums the top 71 market shares with equal weight and
ignores all other firms
	 The Herfindahl index weights each firm by
itself, and then sums those terms.
	 This measure precludes the
possibility of a negative rivalry effect f--m any firm.
(8)
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The industrial economics literature has sought to investigate firm
behaviour between the largest firms by examining the relationship
between market share of the largest firms and price-cost margins.
Studies undertaken by Kwoka (1979), Lamm (1981) and Kwoka and
Ravenscroft (1986) investigate the relationships between firstly, the
four-firm concentration and price-cost margins, and secondly, the market
shares of the top four firms and price-cost margins.
Kwoka (1979) and Lamm (1981) find that there is a positive
relationship between price-cost margins for the top two or three firms'
market shares followed by a negatively signed share. The latter finding
is interpreted as possibly reflecting pro-competitive rivalry by third
or fourth-rated firms, since i`-en such firms are large then industry
margins decline.	 Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) examine price-cost
margins line of business in-US manufacturing industry. Their
traditional SCP estimates suggest that the four-firm concentration ratio
is negatively related to price-cost margins (a finding counter to the
SCP paradigm). When they examine the relationship between the market
shares of the leading four firms and price-cost marg4as, however, they
observe that larger leading firms generally lower margins. In addition
they find:
The market shares of non-leading firms do not, in general seem to
affect the price-cost margins of firms in the industry, while the
leading firms acts as a strong rival to the smaller firms. Thus,
it is the negative effect of S1 (market share of the largest firm
in the line of business) that underlies and explains the negative
impact of CR4 (four-firm concentration ratio) ....
(Kwoka and Ravenscroft 1986, p.357)
This study also finds that a larger leading firm lowers follower margins
in high-scale industries, bvt has little effect where scale economies
are not important. They al find that larger second-ranked firms can
significantly low-: leader ' margins. One can see from above that the
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aforementioned studies investigate cooperative and rivalrous behaviour
between the largest firms in the market to gain a better insight to the
concentration-price-cost margin relationship.
As far as we are aware, only Evanoff and Fortier (1988) have
investigated the relationship between the market shares of the largest
firms and industry performance in the banking literature. Using a
sample of 6,300 unit banks located in 30 US states, which permit either
unit banking only or statewide branching, they estimate the following
equation:
ROA, j — ao + a i MSI i + aZMS2 j + a3MS3 i + a4CAPAST ij 	 (11)
+ aSMKTDEP + a^ o
 MGROW^ + a7
 POPD^ + aB ASSET_ij
+a9HCLAWi + alo DDTODEP jj + a,, LTOAST,,
where
ROAD	s return on assets
MSIP MS2,, MS3 i a first,	 second and third largest banks 	 deposit-
market share
CAPAST,,
	 — capital-to-asset ratio
MKTDEP.	 a
1
market deposits
MGROW^
	 — market growt'-
	 rate	 (growth rate
	 in market
deposits)
T )PD.	
— population density
aSSEf i j
	— bank assets
CLAW	 — binary variable
	 equal
	 to	 one	 if	 liberal
holding company expansion is allowed, zero otherwise
DDROT)EP i j 	— ratio of demand deposits to total deposits
LTOAST 1j
	 loan-to-asset ratio
They estimate the above equation for both unit banking and liberal
branching markets. `Results are presented in a stepwise manner to show
that the marginal impact of additional market shares is the same whether
entered in the stepwise fashion or in one equation ...' (p.282). The
results for banks in unit markets imply that the share of the leading
bank is 'apparently' the main influence on profits. For the second and
thirr largest f irms the impact is small and insignificant suggesting no
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systematic role in determining bank profits. In these unit banking
markets with relatively high entry barriers there appears to be
potential for a single dominant firm. Evanoff and Fortier (1988) find
for liberal branching markets that the market share controlled by the
largest firm has a significant positive influence on market profit
rates, the second firm has no influence whereas the third firms share
enters positive and significant. They state:
While the reasons for this are not obvious, it may result as the
leading firms find it advantageous to cooperate if all three are
relatively equal-sized competitors. Whereas a leading firm may
dominate if it has superior market share compared to all but one
other rival, a more equal distribution of shares may lead market
leaders to decide that cooperation is most profitable. In any
case, whereas it is relatively clear that CR1 is the most
appropriate measure of market structure for banks in markets with
-ntry barriers, it is not as clear in the subsample with few entry
barriers. (p.283)
Surprisingly, Evanoff and Fortier (1988) do not make reference to
Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) who provide an elegant theoretical and
empirical exposition of cooperation and rivalry between the largest
firms in the market (although they do refer to Kwoka's earlier (1979)
study). The major differ,-ice between the above two empirical approaches
is that Evanoff and Fortier use market shares of the three largest firms
to estimate their model whereas the latter use an interactive market-
share term to account for the differences in size between the largest
four firms and all other firms in the market.
6.4.1 Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) methodology
In this thesis we intend to follow the approach taken by Kwoka and
Ravenscroft (1986) to investigate the profits-concentration relationship
estimated in the series of equations discussed in the first part of this
crRpter.
	 This will provide greater insight into the concentration-
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profits relationship and should illustrate the conduct of market leaders
and their influence on European banking industry performance.
Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) relax the assumption of a uniform
degree of industry-wide co-operation by letting 13 j be a simple, linear
function of the ordered sequence of market shares in that industry, so:
k
R = E a S
^	 m=1 m m j
where k is an empirically determined variable, 1 S k S N, represents
the number of firms where shares 'matter', in the sense of having a
significant impact on margins. 
Sm1 
is the Mth firm market share in the
industry, ranked from the largest to the smallest; thus, S1
j represents
the share of the largest firm in the market; S2  the second largest and
so on.
	 If co-operation characterises the relationship between the
leading firms, then am>0. If the second or third firms, say, are strong
rivals, co-operation breaks down and all firms' margins are reduced. In
the presence (if .uch rivalrous firms, 13 j is smaller as the consequence
of some am<0.	 If firms other than the leader do not matter, -nen
margins are determined independently of them and their a m in equation
(10) equals zero.
Clarke and Davies (1982) have noted that there is no reason to
believe in identical p, for all firms in an industry. They state that,
'smaller firms may feel more able to get away with output changes
undetected than would larger firms' (p.280).
	 Kwoka and Ravenscroft
(1986) also .tote that different oligopoly theories (dominant firm, price
leadership, limit pricing, 'strategic groupings') would also sugt,.sst
important differences between leading and non-leading firms.
(12)
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In addition, the role played by market leaders may be expected to
differ depending on various factors influencing the firms' environments.
Leading firms may benefit from substantial economies of scale resulting
in lower price setting. This may reduce the price-cost margins for non-
leaders' which may suffer from distinct cost disadvantages. In low
scale industries larger leaders are less likely to have an adverse
impact on non-leaders' margins. Kwoka and Ravenscroft test for this and
find it to be the case for US manufacturing although it is beyond the
scope of our study to examine the economies of scale issue.
To test for evidence of co-operative and rivalrous behaviour
between the largest firms, Kwoka and Ravenscroft start with the simplest
case where industry-wide co-operation ( S j ) depends on K market shares
according to equation (10) above. They assume K=2, so only the largest
firm (S1) and the second largest firm (S2) are important to co-operation
and rivalry. They provide the following equation:
L ij = ( 1/-n j ) (MS 11 + ai 
si  ( 1 -MS 1 j) + a2 S2  ( 1 -MS ij )} + ŒX + Ei ( 13)j
where L ij = Lerner index
71 1 = industry's elasticity of demand
MS ij = market share of individual firms
S1, S2 = market share of the largest and second "Largest firms in the
industry
X = vector of control variables
E ij = random disturbance term
MS,, is included to evaluate whether the market share of individual
firms is related to industry margins - i.e. a test of the efficiency
hypothesis. The interactive term S1 j (1-MS,,) is used to account for
differences in the market share of the largest firm in the industry
relative to the market shares of all other firms in the indus .ry. The
same interactive term is used for the second largest f Jrm, S2  .'i.-MSij).
As mentioned previously, the co-operation hypothesi implies - -at a1>0;
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rivalry, that a 1<O; and `independent' behaviour; that a 1 — 0.
From the above Kwoka and Ravenscroft estimate the following model:
OPINC/SALES ji — ao + a 1
 S1DMS , i
 + a2
 S2 DMS, i + a3
 S3 DMS ji
	(14)
+ a`S4DMS ii + a5MS gi + a6MES i + a7GROWi
+a8DS i + a9IMP i
 + a10ADV i + a11RDi
+a12 CAP i + a13 CUi i
where OPINC/SALES^ i —	 Line
	 of business
	 operating
	 income	 divided by
sales
SnDMS^ i =	 Variables
	 denoting
	 interaction
	 of	 Sl i ,	 S2 17
S3.,	 S4.
MS Ii firm market share
MESJ.-
GROW
industry minimum efficient scale measure
=	 industry growth
DS 1
IMY•
=	 industry distance shipped measure
ADV^
=	 industry import penetration measure
=	 industry advertising intensity measure
RD.l
CAY.
—	 research and development intensity measure
industry capital intensity measure
CU i j —	 line-of business capital utilisation measure
The estimation procedure involves first the evaluation of the effect of
the S1DMS, i
 variable by itself.
	 Then,
	 S2DMS ii
 is added to the equation
with S1DMS , i ; then S3DMS 1i
 is added and so on,
	 Two-tail (F) tests were
performed on an ordered sequence of the SnDMS coefficients,
	 testing to
see whether the second,
	 third or fourth firms had a significant impact
on industry margins.	 For	 their
	 data	 source	 comprising 3186
	 line-of-
business observations for US manufacturing in 1975 Kwoka and Ravenscroft
(1986)	 find:
The coefficient on S1DMS. i
 is negative and significant, implying
that larger firms generally lower LB (line-of-business) margins.
The estimated coefficients on S2DMS_ i
 and S3DMS_ i
 are neither
stable in sign nor anywhere near conventional levels of statistical
significance. S4DMS ,i
 is positive but also insignificant. The F-
statistic on S2DMS. i
 and S3DMS.. taken together is 0.09, far below
the 5 per cent F-value of 3.0d. The addition of S4DMS.to
 thisi
group raises the F statistic slightly to 0.27, but still below the
critical F-value of 2.60. The market shares of non-leading fj.rms
do not, in general, seem to affect the price-cost margins of firms
in the industry, while the leading firm acts as a strong rival to
the smaller firms. Thus, it -. the nE--tive effect of S1 that
underlies and explains the r-gative 'P,3act of CR4 (four-firm
concentration ratio) ... (pp.3'j„-357)
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6.4.2
	 Estimating cooperative and rivalrous behaviour in European
banking - the model
Following the methodology outlined above we estimate a model including
the SnDMS,, variables for our sample of European banks. We examine the
relationships between the five leading banks in each individual market.
The equation to be estimated is as follows:
ROAjj — ao
 + a, MSASS j j + a2NARMON i + a3 IPAY/FUND i j 	(15)
+a4
 
LOANS/ASSETS ii + a5
 
EQUITY/ASSETS ii + a6
 
STAFF/ASSETS ^^
+a7
 
GOVT 
j 
+ a8S1DMS i + a9 S2DMS i + a10 S3DMS i + a11 S4DMS i
+a 1 2S5DMS j
where: ROAD
	=	 bank :'s profit measured as return on
assets in market.
1
MS ij	bank is asset market share in market
NARMON^	 =	 narrow money supply growth in market,
IPAY/FUND, j
	interest paid divided by total funds for
bank is in market.
i
LOANS/ASSETS ,j
	loans-to-assets ratios for bank is in
market.i
EQUITY/ASSETS i j —	 equity- to -assets ratios for bank i's in
market.
STAFF/ASSETS ,j —	 staff expenses divided by total bank
assets for bank is in market.
i
GOVT
	 =	 binary variable equal to one if government
owned or zero otherwise
SnDMS^ = Variables denoting interaction of Sl,,
S2., S3., S4. and S5. with the difference
between unity and own share
Cross-sectional estimates of the above equation are undertaken for each
year from 1986 through to 1989 and pooled time-series estimates are also
undertaken. As in the Kwoka and Ravenscroft study, two-tail F-tests are
performed on an orderr sequence of the SnDMS coefficient testing to see
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whether the relative market share of the second, third, fourth or fifth
largest firms have a significant impact on industry margins. These
results can then be compared with the results obtained from the
equations outlined in section 6.2.3 which use the . five - firm assets
concentration ratio.
Overall this analysis will provide greater insight in^o the
concentration -profits relationship and should illustrate the influence
of market leaders on industry performance in European banking markets.
6.5 Limitations of the Methodology
The main limitations ^f the SCP modelling approach have been discussed
in Section 5.7 of ,:his thesis and these in general apply to the
methodology outlined in this Chapter. In particular, a major
econometric difficulty lies in specifying the functional form of the
estimating equation. Our methodology adopts a linear functional form
that assumes a given change in market structure will have the same
absolute effect on performance. Studies uiJertaken by Heggestad and
Mingo ( 19/6) and Heggestad and Mingo (1977) show that, at least for some
bank products the concentration-price relationship is non-linear.
Linear equations, therefore, may be a misspecification and result in
biased esti,iates.
The specification of the models outlined in Sections 6.2 and 6.3 of
this thesis evolve from both the banking and industrial economics SCP
literature.	 Typically the explanatory power of these models are
relatively low. T .e coefficient of determination (RZ ) in most of the
studies i ^ less tf -i 20 per cent. This poor explanatory power may be
the rest z of th- . factors. First, there may be omitted variables that
r-
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are important in explaining the variation in prices of performance
across markets. Second, as mentioned above, the linear model may be
inappropriate - the functional form may be misspecified. Third, the
majority of SCP studies are undertaken on cross-sectional data, low R2
may reflect the random nature of such data.
Another limitation relating to the econometric specification in
equations (3) and (14) is that unidentified country-specific
characteristics may create estimation bias. The country-specific
variables:	 concentration ratios (CRS ), narrow money supply growth
(NARMONJ ) and the government ownership binary variable (GOVT) may not
take account of all country-specific characteristics. If we find that
the country- pecific variables have strong effects on performance, while
the firm-specific variables turn out to be insignificant, this implies
that country .,pecific effects are important as determinants of profits
of European banks. To the extent that the unidentified country-specific
characteristics are correlated with say, CR S , NARMONJ and GOVT , the
estimated coefficients for these country-specific variables may be
biased due to the omitted variables. In addition, country specific
factors may also create the difference in the average level of profits
betwran the banks originating from one country and the banks from
another country. Thus, the average level of profits may vary from one
country to another due to the country-specific factors. Those factors
should be borne in mind when interpreting the results.
Other limitations relate to the definition of market size in
calculating the market structure variables. Regional data are very
difficult (if not impossible) in some cases to obtain across European
banking	 rkets, so for simplicity sake we assume `the market' in each
county; .. 5 either total banking sector assets or deposits. Banks, as
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multiproduct firms, have different market shares in various product
markets and some commentators (such as Gilbert 1984) suggest that it may
be better to undertake a methodology that incorporates this factor - so
like the later US SCP studies we could examine the price/performance-
concentration relationship for a particular product across European
markets. This, however, presents us with substantial data availability
problems. Examining the price-performance relationship for a particular
product or service also has its drawbacks because of the problem of
cross-subsidisation.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter examines the methodology that is to be used to evaluate the
SCP relationship across European banking markets. The first part of the
_hapter shows how we derive our model specification from the SGP
framework and explains the estimation procedure. This enables us to
test the two competing hypotheses - the traditional SCP paradigm and the
efficiency hypothesis. The second part of this Chapter provides a
methodology which anables us to investigate the performance-
concentration relationship further. Using the approach outlined by
Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) we can investigate the cooperative and
rivalrous behaviour of leading banks in each market which will yield
further insight into the performance-concentration relationship in
European banking.
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Chapter 7
European Data Sample - An Analysis
7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the variables used in our methodology to
investigate the SCP relationship across European banking markets between
1986 and 1989. It is essentially an exploratory data analysis (variable
by variable analysis) of our data set. Section 7.2 describes the source
and the format of data used, and section 7.3 investigates the sample
size as a proportion of the total population, in terms of both the
number of banks and banking sector as-ats. The remainder of the chapter
focuses on the variables outlined in the previous chapter which are used
in the detailed empirical analysis reported in Chapter 8. Section 7.4.1
analyses the two banking industry performance measures; before-tax ROA
and before-tax ROE. Section 7.4.2 investigates the market structure
variables; concentration measures and firm-specific market share.
Section 7.4.3 describes the government ownership binary variable which
is used to account for the presence of state-owned banks. Section 7.4.4
examines the market demar.3 conditions variable, section 7.4.5 the cost
variables and section 7.5.6 other control variables. Section 7.5 is the
conclusion.
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7.2 Source and Format of the European Bank Data
The balance sheet and income statement data used for . our sample of
European banks were obtained from the IBCA Ltd Database'. This database
provides information in four types of format:	 summary data, full
spreadsheet data, reduced spreadsheet data and raw data. Examples of
the data formats are shown in Appendix 4. Accounting information on
European banks (759 banks in 1986; 1201 banks in 1987; 1541 in 1988; and
1268 in 1989), across nineteen countries, were obtained from the full
spreadsheet and raw data files. This information was read into MINITAB
compatible files. Where possible the researcher used non-consolidated
bank accounting data so as to make the information as country-specific
as possible. The raw bank accounting data on the IBCA database are
obtained from the annual accounts of the banks in question.
Spreadsheets are prepared by IBCA analysts who define accounting values
into comparable categories and definitions of the spreadsheet data are
provided in database instruction manuals 2.
The data sample for all the European banks was read into MINITAB
compatible files and then coded according to the year and the country.
This enables us to undertake analysis of yearly and country differences
in the data sample. Finally, it should be noted that in tine data
sample, accounts for foreign bank subsidiaries were also included. We
did not omit these data on foreign bank subsidiaries for the following
reasons. Firstly, we noted in Section 5.4.2 of this thesis that one of
the major problems with SCP analysis is defining the extent of the
market.	 As there is no sub-market data officially available for
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different European countries, we chose the simplest and broadest market
definition - total banking sector assets in each particular country. As
we aim to evaluate banking industry performance across different
European markets, and as our market definition includes the assets of
both domestic and foreign banks, it seems justifiable to include
information on these two types of banks in our analysis. If we ignore
the presence of foreign banks we would be neglecting the competitive
influence they have in the banking marketplace, as OECD (1989) notes:
With the presence of large foreign banks in many national financial
systems the concentration of financial power in the hands of a few
large banks which previously may have existed has been considerably
diluted even if this is not easily measurable (p.68)
The majority of individual bank data for Luxembourg, Switzerland and the
United Kingdom is on foreign bank subsidiaries. In the case of the
United Kingdom it should be noted that the IBCA Ltd database does not
provide staff expense ratios nor funding cost ratios for foreign banks,
and because these are used in our model, these data are excluded from
our SCP analysis in Chapter 8.
7.3 Sample Size as a Proportion of the Total Population
Table 7.1 illustrates the number of banks in the various European
countries which are used in our data sample. It can be seen that the
largest banking markets (Germany, United Kingdom, France, Italy,
Switzerland) provide us with the most observations, and that the data
for 1988 contains the largest number of banks. This, however, tells us
little about the relative importance of these banks in their respective
banking markets.
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Tables 7.2 and 7.3 provide a better indication of the
representative nature of this sample of European banks. Table 7.2 shows
the sample size as a proportion of the total number of banks in each
country's banking systems. It can be seen from this table that despite
there being data available for 162 banks in Germany in 1988, this only
accounts for 3.7 per cent of the total number of banks operating in that
country's banking system. Similarly for France, the sample of 179 banks
for 1988 only accounts for 9.0 per cent of the total number of banks in
Table 7.1 Country breakdown of banks in European data sample
Country	 Number of banks	 Total
1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Austria 27 41 47 48 163
Belgium 26 37 38 33 134
Denmark 22 25 27 26 100
Finland 9 10 12 12 43
France 96 142 179 138 555
Germany 115 149 162 149 575
Greece 9 9 10 3 31
Ireland 9 16 17 17 59
Italy 65 170 318 169 722
Liechtenstein 3 3 3 3 12
Luxembourg 61 84 87 71. 306
Netherlands 23 30 36 2A 118
Norway 26 28 29 2i- 110
Portugal 6 17 18 18 59
Spain 37 105 165 156 463
Sweden 19 22 24 23 88
Switzerland 88 138 170 160 556
Turkey 9 18 21 12 60
UK 109 157 178 171 615
Total 759 1201 1541 1268 4769
Source: IBCA Ltd
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TABLE 7.2
SAMPLE SIZE AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL POPULATION
NUMBER OF BANKS [%]
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989
Austria 2.2 3.3 3.8 3.9
Belgium 21.7 29.1 31.7 28.2
Denmark 13.9 15.4 16.4 16.7
Finland 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.4
France 4.6 6.9 9.0 7.3
Germany 2.5 3.3 3.7 3.5
Greece 23.1 22.5 24.4 7.1
Ireland 16.7 30.2 36.2 34.7
Italy 5.9 15.2 28.9 16.0
Luxembourg 50.8 63.6 60.8 41.8
Netherlands 14.9 19.1 21.3 16.1
Norway 7.9 9.5 10.1 10.1
Portugal 23.1 65.4 66.7 54.5
Spain 8.4 22.2 33.6 32.4
Sweden 2.6 3.1 3.5 3.5
Switzerland 14.4 22.5 27.0 25.63
United Kingdom 14.0 20.1 22.7 22.1
Liechtenstein n•a• n.a. n.a. n.a.
Tlirk2y 14.8 29.0 32.8 18.2
NOTES
Sources of information for banking sector size obtained from individual countries banking asociations
and central banks.
ConL entration ratios calculated using data taken from the IBCA Credit Rating Agency [London]
database.
	 J
Sci. rce: Autb ,.4- own estimates
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TABLE 7.3
SAMPLE SIZE AS A PROPORTION OF TOTAL POPULATION
BANKING SECTOR ASSETS [%]
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989
Austria 69.7 71.8 74.2 74.6
Belgium 93.6 93.9 96.7 96.5
Denmark 60.8 67.8 71.8 66.2
Finland 72.1 69.9 68.3 75.7
France 60.3 67.1 70.8 60.0
Germany 71.2 74.8 78.7 78.5
Greece 77.2 71.5 76.2 46.7
Ireland 80.0 91.6 92.8 93.5.
Italy 64.0 75.4 84.0 70.3
Luxembourg 86.4 93.0 93.3 88.0
Netherlands 86.9 84.0 83.3 87.0
Norway 70.3 71.2 65.7 69.1
Portugal 45.2 86.0 89.1 89.2
Spain 50.0 89.4 923 87.4
Sweden 72.8 75.9 78.5 78.2
Switzerland 80.0 84.9 87.2 86.2
United Kingdom 483 59.0 64.6 65.5
Liechtenstein n•a• n.a. n.a n.a.
Thrkey
n'
58.9 80.6 91.6 62.7
ovurce. Authors own estimates
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the system. The figures for 1988 for the other large banking systems -
United Kingdom (22.7 per cent), Italy (28.9 per cent), Switzerland (27.0
per cent) and Spain (33.6 per cent) - also indicate that in terms of the
number of banks operating in respective countries banking systems, the
data sample appears to be relatively small. The most representative
data sample appears to be for Luxembourg and Portugal where, in at least
three years, the number of banks in our sample accounts for over 50 per
cent of the total number operating in the respective systems.
Table 7.3, however, provides a clearer indication of the relative
importance of the IBCA data sample for European banks. This table shows
the proportion of total banking sector assets for each individual
country accounted for by our sample. It is clear that for virtually
every country across the four years the banks in the sample account for
more than 70 per cent of total banking sector assets. For the largest
banking systems, the only noticeable exception is the United Kingdom
where our sample ranges between 48.3 per cent of total banking sector
assets in 1986 to 65.5 per cent in 1989. Returning to the example of
Germany, we can see that despite our sample only accounting for 3.7 per
cent of the number of banks operating in that country in 1988, the banks
actually accounted for 78.7 per cent of total banking sector assets.
This indicates that the data set for German banks predominantly includes
the country's largest banks and this, in fact, can be generally said for
our data sample as a whole (apart from the possible exceptions of
Luxembourg and Portugal).
288
7.4 Variable Description
7.4.1 Performance variables
7.4.1.1 Before -tax return-on-assets
Figure 7.1 illustrates the before-tax ROA variable for all banks in the
data sample across 19 European countries (summary descriptive statistics
are provided in Appendix 5). Viewing the figure for the largest
European banking market, one can see that over the period studied the
largest losses were experienced by banks operating in the UK market. In
addition, returns to banks in the German market appear to be relatively
stable and this is in fact confirmed if we consider the dispersion of
before-tax ROA statistics as reported in the descriptive statistics in
Appendix 5. The variability of before-tax ROA for our UK bank sample is
also substantial for 1987 and 1989 and out of the largest European
banking markets the standard deviation divided by the mean, or
dispersion statistic, for the United Kingdom (2.82 for 1987 and 3.21 for
1989) is the greatest. Although it is difficult to draw precise
conclusions from these observations, one may tentatively suggest that
the marked difference in the variability of performance of UK banks
compared with banks operating in the other large European systems may be
brought about by one or more of the following factors: markedly
different operating conditions in the United Kingdom vis-à-vis other
large banking markets and perhaps a more competitive environment;
accounting and other regulations may provide less opportunity for profit
smoothing than in other countries; the large number of foreign banks may
add to the variability of returns3.
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Viewing the figures for the other European banking markets one can
see that for the medium-sized systems the before-tax ROA for most banks
ranged between zero and two per cent, the mean figures in most cases
being around 0.5 per cent. In the case of the small European banking
systems, the poor performance of Scandinavian banks in recent years is
highlighted by the substantial number of banks which report losses
across the period under study.
7.4.1.2 Before-tax return-on equity
The second measure of banking industry performance used in our analysis
is before-tax ROE. Table 7.4 reports the descriptive statistics for
this variable for 1986 and 1989 (descriptive statistics for 1987 and
1988 are reported in Appendix 6). If we consider the largest banking
markets, it can be shown that for 1986 and 1989 Italian banks, on
average, had the highest before-tax ROE. This is a general reflection
of reasonable profitability yet low equity ratios of banks operating in
this market. (The state-owned commercial banks have lower capital
ratios than their private sector competitors). One would also expect
the same relationship to be borne out on the data for French banks but
the statistics do not confirm this view. ROE figures, however, do appear
to be higher in other systems where state-owned banks are important,
such as in Greece, Portugal and Turkey.
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TABLE 7.4 BEFORE TAX RETURN ON EQUITY 1986 AND 1989 [%]
N•	Dispesion
Number of
	 Missing	 standard
Banks in	 Observa_	 Standard	 Deviation /Country	 year
	 Sample
	 lions	 Afean	 Median	 Deviation mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1986 27 0 18.23 13.28 20.19 1.11 4.04 109.14
1989 48 1 9.64 8.61 8.75 0.91
-18.26 42.39
2. Belgium 1986 26 0 18.04 15.47 10.89 0.60 0.24 40.11
1989 33 0 10.79 13.10 11.40 1.06 -30.43 29.41
3. Denmark 1986 22 0 -4.72 -0 .45 12.44 -2.64 -33.64 8.691989 26 0 3.04 3.74 8.44 2.78
-25.93 1 6 .36
4. Finland 1986 9 0 10.72 10.53 6.93 0.65 1.12 24.691989 12 0 2.20 7.00 9.26 4.21
-31.01 25.25
5. France 1986 96 2 19.47 19.04 12.64 0.65 -23.94 57.661989 138 6 13.00 13.50 15.16 1.17
-17.11 78.84
6. Germany 1986 115 7 16.48 17.33 8.52 0.52 0.79 39.11
1989 149 14 11.57 10.26 12.15 1.05
-10.56 11.89
7. Greece 1986 9 0 25.49 22.46 21.67 0.85 0.26 65.781989 3 0 27.50 20.00 31.70 1.15 0.10 62.30
1986 9 7 16.01 16.01 8.47 0.53 10.02 22.00
R. Ireland 1989 17 9 20.88 20.27 934 0.45 9.24 39.66
9. Italy 1986 55 0 22.44 24.05 8.73 0.39 10.76 30.881989 169 0 36.02 25.23 42.38 1.18
1
7.03 223.72
1986 61 1 12.76 10.88 11.08 0.87
-2.21 57.5fi
111. Luxembourg 1989 74 0 10.26 9.36 13.28 1.29
-72.87 48.b3
1 1 . Netherlands 1986 23 0 17.20 14.96 12.97 0.75 1.05 53.01
1989 29 0 10.01 9.98 5.91 0.59 0.92 19.59
1986 26 2 7.83 7.68 4.12 0.53 0.6 -' 17.'_51 3. Norway 1989 27 1 -1 62 7.29 34.14 -21.07
-117.11 32.00
1986 6 0 1 •+.04 13.20 12.98 0.68 0.23 75.3714. Poruigal 1989 18 0 19.90 15.18 10.90 0.55 0.75 129.79
t
1986 37 3 16.66 14.85 12.01 0.72
-12.30 44.83
1 5. Spain 1989 156 8 21.32 21.28 10.42 0.49 -12.33 48.32
1986 19 0 13.72 16.99 14.63 1.07 -47.92 89.41
16. Sweden 1989 23 2 4.20 10.50 52.00 12.38
-215.50 53.60
1986 88 1 10.97 9.09 6.46 0.59 0.88 3;..16l7. Switnrland 1989 160 1 10.69 8.92 8.46 0.79 -5.54 55'6
1A. United 1986 109 13 14.91 15.76 10.43 0.70 -34.40 35.33
Kindgum 1989 171 19 21.20 16.00 18.10 0.85 -44.14 54.12
1986 3 0 8.30 7.98 1.32 0.16 7.16 9.74
1 8. Uechtentein 1989 3 0 6.86 6.53 0.67 0.10 6.41 7.62
1986 9 0 35.61 32.83 14.48 0.41 10.24 52.09
l9.'ILrkey 1989 12 0 22.75 28.46 12.58 0.55 -0.87 37.87
Source: Authors own estimates
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The lowest mean values for ROE, in general, appear to be for the
Scandinavian banking markets, indicative of the poor performance as
mentioned in the previous section. Variability of the ROE figures as
measured by the dispersion statistic also suggest marked differences of
banks' ROE in these particular countries. Overall, however, the level
of dispersion of ROE for individual banks across European banking
markets appears less marked than for the ROA variable. This may be a
reflection of the more uniform international standards that regulators
have demanded on equity requirements in the run-up to the acceptance of
the Basle (1988) capital adequacy proposals.
7.4.2 Market structure variables
7.4.2.1 Concentration variables
In order to calculate concentration measures for individual European
banking markets, we first obtained data on the size of individual
banking sectors from the respective countries banking associations and
official publications. This information was predominantly obtained by
telefax and the sources are listed in Appendix 2. The market structure
variables used in our analysis consist of five-and ten-firm assets and
deposits concentration ratios as well as the respective Herfindahl
indices. In Section 3.4, in Chapter 3 of this thesis, we have already
examined the market size and concentration aspects of European
banking markets for 1989: Table 3.6 illustrated that in 1989 in all but
Germany, the United Kingdom and Luxembourg, the five-firm concentration
ratios exceeded 30 per cent, and the deposits measure increased to over
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70 per cent in Belgium, Finland, Netherlands and Sweden. It was also
noted that out of the four largest banking markets, concentration tended
to be higher in France and Italy, markets which have traditionally been
more restricted compared with Germany or the United Kingdom. Figure 7.2
compares the five-firm asset concentration ratios across European
countries for the period 1986 to 1989.
From Figure 7.2 it can be seen that out of the largest European
banking markets, the five-firm assets concentration has slightly risen
over the period in Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom. The
largest fall in concentration appears to have taken place in the French
banking system where concentration fell from 36.7 per cent in 1986 to
30.4 per cent in 1989. Out of these banking sectors, the Swiss market
stands out as the most concentrated ma 4 aly because the three largest
banks (Union Bank of Switzerland, Swiss Banking Corporation and Credit
Suisse) are noticeably larger than their near rivals. Credit Suisse,
the country's third largest bank, is more than three times as big as the
fourth-sized bank in the market - Swiss Volksbank: see Gardner and
Molyneux (1990, p.279)4
Five-firm concentration ratios in the smaller banking systems
commonly exceed 60 per cent with Belgium and Sweden being the most
concentrated with 1989 ratios of 70.9 per cent and 76.0 per cent,
respectively. The only smaller banking systems with concentration
ratios under 40 per cent are Austria and Luxembourg. Both 5-firm and
10-firm asset and deposit concentration ratios, as well as market size
figures, are provided for the years 1986 to 1989 in Appendix 1. The
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ten-firm concentration ratios (whether assets or deposits measures)
confirm the same degree of concentration rankings across European
countries as the five-firm ratios. It is noticeable that the combined
market shares of the fifth to the tenth largest banks in the bigger
European banking systems in most cases are greater than for the smaller
markets. In France, for example, the concentration ratio increases from
30.4 per cent to 48.4 per cent in 1989 when we move from a five-firm
assets to a ten-firm assets measure. The figures for Germany (26.3 per
cent to 42.1 per cent), Italy (35.8 per cent to 58.4 per cent) and Spain
(37.3 per cent to 60.3 per cent) also support the view that the 'second
tier' banks are on average of significant size. This phenomenon,
however, appears to be less marked in the United Kingdom where the ten-
firm asset concentration ratio is only ten per cent greater than the
five-firm measure. This feature also appears to be apparent in the
Austrian, Danish, Irish and Portuguese banking systems.
If one compares the assets and deposits concentration measures
across the years one can see that in all European banking systems, apart
from (noticeably) in Germany and to a lesser extent in the United
Kingdom, deposit concentration measures are greater than asset measures.
This merely reflects the greater share of deposits for the largest banks
than their assets size would suggest. Deposit concentration would also
generally be expected to be higher than the assets measures because
various banks rely less heavily on deposits as a source of funds.
The reason why the deposits concentration measures are relatively
low in Germany and the United Kingdom can be explained by different
296
factors. In Germany, deposit-taking is more evenly spread across the
banking system, especially given the large number of savings and
cooperative banks (see Gardener and Molyneux, 1990, p.285). 	 This
dilutes the level of concentration in the deposit market. For the
United Kingdom, it is the presence of a large number of foreign banks
who significantly engage in wholesale foreign currency deposits business
which reduces the deposits concentration ratio. It should also be noted
that in the estimates of market size for the United Kingdom we excluded
the building society sector. As the IBCA Ltd. database provided
information on a large number of foreign banks, yet only a handful of
building societies, we deemed it best to focus entirely on banks and the
official banking sector.
Finally, Appendix 7 provides estimates of the Herfindahl indices
using both assets and deposits measures, from our data sample provided
by IBCA Ltd.	 The concentration rankings across countries closely
conform with the five-firm and ten-firm concentration ratios. In fact
the asset's Herfindahl measure suggests that concen tration in the
Italian and French banking systems is at least twice as large compared
with the German and United Kingdom markets. The deposit's Herfindahl
measure, however, suggest that the Italian system is markedly more
concentrated than the other three largest European banking systems.
Otherwise, concentration ranking appear in accordance with earlier
findings.
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7.4.2.2 Firm-specific market share
The firm-specific market share variable used in our analysis is simply
the proportion of total banking sectors attributable to individual banks
in the data sample. Table 7.5 provides an illustration of the asset's
market shares of banks across European countries for 1986 and 1989
(descriptive statistics for 1987 and 1988 are included in Appendix 8).
Firstly, it can be seen that for the largest European banking systems
the mean market shares of banks in the respective samples are very
similar, ranging between 0.4 per cent and 0.5 per cent. Viewing the
asset's market shares of the largest banks in these countries for 1989
it can also be seen that they are also alike, the largest bank in
Germany (Deutsche Bank) accounts for 7.9 per cent of total banking
sector assets, compared with 8.1 per cent for the UK's largest bank
(Barclays) 8.2 per cent for the largest bank in France (Credit Agricole)
and 7.7 percent for the biggest bank in Italy (Istituto Bancario Sao
Paolo). The only marked difference appears to be in Switzerland where
the asset's markets share of the largest bank (Union Bank of
Switzerland) accounts for nearly 17 per cent of total ban k ing sector
assets. In Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and
Turkey the asset's market shares of the largest banks exceed 20 per
cent.
Table 7.5 does not report the summary statistics describing the
variability of these market shares because these are reported later in
Table 7.7, which examines the asset's size of banks in the sample. The
level of variability in our data samples for individual countries
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TABLE 7.5 MARKET SHARE OF BANKS ASSETS MEASURE [%] 1986 and 1989
N'
Number of
	 Missing
Banks in	 Observa-Country	 Year
	 Sample	 lions	 Mean	 Minimum	 Maximum
1. Austria 1986 27 0 2.581 0.015 12.416
1989 48 0 1.554 0.083 11.064
2. Belgium 1986 26 0 3.590 0.100 26.451
1989 33 0 2.924 0.044 19.835
3. Denmark 1986 22 0 2.763 0.078 23.3081989 26 0 2.546 0.060 27.850
4. Finland 1986 9 (1 8.010 0.220 22.6401989 12 0 6.310 0.070 18.90
S. France 1986 96 0 0.628 0.002 7.2421989 138 0 0.435 0.001 8.247
G. Germany 1986 115 0 0.619 (1.011 7.078 
1989 149 0 0.527 0.003 7.869
7. Greece 1986 9 0 8.578 0.470 35.140
1989 3 0 15.580 0.800 40.211
1986 9 0 8.892 0.527 30.5448. Ireland 1989 17 0 5.496 0.219 37.66'_
9.1taty 1986 65 0 1.280 0.002 8.0311989 169 0 0.446 0.002 7.710
1986 61 0 1.416 0.015 8.822lll. Luxembourg 1989 74 0 1.189 0.039 7.418
11. Nelherl:mdt 1986 23 0 3.780 0.110 22.570
1989 29 U 3.002 0.090 20.250
1986 26 0 2.704 0.020 19.10313. Norway 1989 27 0 2.561 0.009 18.563
1986 6 Il 7.529 0.415 26.235
14. Portugal 1989 18 0 4.956 0.790 22.970
1986 37 0 1.352 0.226 6.91215. Slain 1989 156 0 0.560 0.010 9.927
1986 19 0 3.830 0.050 '0.9111lh. SweJrn 1989 23 0 3.399 0.080 27.870
l7. SwitzerlanJ 1986 88 0 0.9()9 0.006 17.8601989 160 0 0.539 0.003 16.868
18. United 1986 109 0 0.443 0.002 7.952
Kindgom 1989 171 0 0.383 0.002 8.101
1986 3 U n.a n.a n.a
18. Liechtentein 1989 3 0 n.a n.a na
1986 9 0 6.540 0.990 23.750
19.lbrkey 1989 12 0 5.223 0.523 27.117
Source: Authors )wn estim-..,,,
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appears to be related positively to the number of banks in each country.
Thus the dispersion statistic, in general, is larger for banking markets
such as Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy and Switzerland where we
have a greater number of observations.
7.4.3 Other market structure variables
In Section 2.4.2 of this thesis we noted that in certain European
banking markets state-controlled banks (whether central or local
government owned) have a significant share of total banking sector
assets. As such, our analysis aims to account for this by including a
binary variable to distinguish between state-owned and other banks in
our data sample. This could help us evaluate whether state-owned banks
performed statistically significantly differently from their private
sector counterparts.
Table 7.6 provides a breakdown of the number of publicly-owned
banks in our sample. From the table it can be seen that the bulk of
publicly owned banks in our sample occur in France, Germany,- Italy and
Switzerland. For France, the publicly-owned banks comprise Banque
Nationale de Paris and Credit Lyonnais, the two largest commercial banks
in the French system, a variety of smaller commercial banks, and several
official banks like Credit National which provide medium and long-term
finance to industry. In Germany we classified state banks according to
the definition provided in Revell (1987, p.171) which includes the
Landesbanks, Bausparkassen and the savings banks. For Italy the state
owned banks comprise the country's largest commercial banks (public law
300
TABLE 7.6
NUMBER OF GOVERNMENT — OWNED BANKS
IN THE DATA SAMPLE
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989
Austria 10 15 17 17
Belgium 1 1 1 1
Denmark 0 0 0 0
Finland 1 1 1 1
France 30 52 62 53
Germany [11 29 38 49 40
Greece 6 6 7 3
Ireland 0 0 0 0
Italy 121 14 32 79 31
Liechtenstein 0 0 0 0
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0
Netherlands 1 1 1 1
Norway 1 1 1 2
Portugal 5 9 8 9
Spain 1 1 1 1
Sweden 1 1 1 1
Switzerland 10 17 19 19
Tiukey 5 12 14 7
United Kingdom 0 0 0 0
NOTES:—	 [1]	 For Germany the state owned banks comprise the Landesbanks, Bausparkassen and
the savings banks
[2]	 For Italy the State owned banks comprise: public law banks, national interest banks
and th., . avings banks. Classification according to Revell [1937 p.171]
Source: Auth ,)Ps own esti: • , _;es
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banks and national interest banks) as well as the savings banks sector.
In Switzerland, the publicly-owned banks, are the cantonal banks which
occupy a similar position to the savings banks in the German system.
Finally, in the case of Austria, Greece, Portugal and Turkey our data
sample is dominated by state-owned banks. In most of the other European
banking systems, publicly-owned banks appear rarely in our data sample.
Where there is only one entry for a particularly country, the bank
tends to be either the post-office bank or another specialist public
credit institution, such as in Spain where the one bank identified is
the foreign trade-financing bank, Banco Exterior. Other examples are:
Belgium (Crédit Communal); Finland (Postipankki); Netherlands (Postba.nk)
and Norway (Industri and Skipsbank). The entry for Sweden is for PK
Banken. No publicly-owned banks were available in our data sample frr
Denmark, Ireland, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom.
7.4.4 Demand conditions variable
As a proxy for changing banking market demand conditions we use a growth
in narrow money supply measure. This measure, as defined by the IMF's
International Financial Statistics, is equal to the sum of currency
outside banks and demand deposits other than those of the central
government. Figure 7.3 illustrates the growth in narrow money for the
European countries that are under study.
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The substantial variations in narrow money supply growth, as
illustrated in Figure 7.3, make it difficult to suggest generalisations
across countries. The high levels of growth of Turkey are indicative of
the substantial level of inflation experienced in this country between
1986 and 1989. Large variations in the growth levels for Norway are
'possibly' indicators of extreme changes in monetary policy positions
over the period. Switzerland, on average, seems to experience the
lowest level of narrow money supply growth over the period. Overall,
changes in demand conditions appear to be similar across other large
banking systems for the period 1986 to 1988, and Spain seems to have
experienced relatively higher levels of money supply growth over the
period compared with the other larger European banking systems (see
Appendix 9 for the data and source of information).
7.4.5 Cost variables
7.4.5.1 Asset size
The asset size of banks is included in the SCP analysis so as to take
account of differences brought about by size, such as scale economies.
Table 7.7 shows descriptive statistics for bank's assets size for our
sample across European countries for 1986 and 1989 (see Appendix 10 for
the figures for 1987 and 1988). It can be seen that in all countries
(apart from Liechtenstein), the median bank size is substantially
smaller than the mean values, which suggests that in virtually all
European banking markets the presence of large'banks substantially skews
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TABLE 7.7 BANKS ASSETS SIZE [$ MILLION] 1986 AND 1989
N'	 Dispesion
Numberof	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in
	 Observn-
	
Standard
	 DeviatioqCount ry
	Year	 Sample	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean
	 Minimum xi..-;
1. Austria 1986 27 0 5793 1864 6980 1.20 34 27874
1989 48 0 5039 1999 7638 1.52 269 35874
2. Belgium 1986 26 0 8023 1509 13011 1.62 220 58986
1989 1	 33 0 9338 1288 16516 1.77 142 63679
3. Denmark 1986 22 0 3161 1130 4288 1.36 90 26664
1989 26 0 4288 1840 12475 2.91 108 47067
4. Finland 1986 9
0 6380 4064 7239 1.13 175 18043
1989 12 0 10890 2137 12354 1.13 119 32649
S.Cr;mce
1986 96 0 10395 4400 13130 1.26 30 119790
1989 138 0 9582 2870 27322 2.85 22 181809
6. Germany 1986 115 0 11296 32 9 20965 1.86 193 129508
1989 149 0 7893 3108 28195 3.57 83 198254
7. Greece 1986 9 0
3811 2058 5576 1.46 209 15637
1989 3 0 13333 1441 14400 1.08 680 34421
1986 9 0 2533 834 4460 1.76 150 87011R. Ireland 1989 17 0 2435 930 5854 2.40 97 16760
9.It:,ly 1986 65
0 9180 5021 14442 1.57 24 57595
1989 169 0 4556 1375 15464 3.39 16 94810
1986 61 0 2807 1753 3225 1.15 30 1748010. Luxembourg 1989 74 0 3769 1803 4656 1.24 21^4 23519
11. Netherlands 1986 23 0 11209 4530 21701 1.94 314 66908
1989 29 0 13990 2053 30600 2.19 421 93824
1986 26 0 2420 795 4221 1.74 18 1709
13. Norway 1989 27 0 4160 1185 7094 1.71 138 301-1S
1986 6 0 3750 1792 1119 0.30 207 1310414. Portugal 1989 18 0 3506 3146 3674 1.05 559 16279
1986 37 U 3865 3359 6315 1.63 647 19740
15. Spain 1989 156 0 2896 1259 7987 276 51 81609
1986 19 0 4947 1920 8841 1.78 63 26355
lh. Sweden 1989 23 0 7326 2828 18871 2.58 86 60061
1986 88 0 4748 740 14814 3.12 33 93273l7. Switzerland 1989 160 0 5554 648 13685 2.46 23 163 1493
IR. United 1986 109 0 6804 1485 19211 2.82 43 122862
Kindgom 1989 171 0 8724 1634 24991 2.86 35 184874
1986 3 0 2134 2498 760 0.36 1261 2644
18. Liechtenlein 1989 3 0 3466 3868 1061 0.31 2264 4268
1986 9 11 1990 811 2494 1.25 119 7223
19.11trkey 1989 12 0 2217	 1 940 986 0.44 721 1143
Source: Authors own estimates
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the mean size distribution. Given the broad distribution of bank sizes
in our data sample, however, this is hardly surprising.
Considering the figures for 1986 and 1989, it can be seen that the
largest banks in Germany, France and the United Kingdom are of a similar
size, although it is noticeable how small the largest Italian bank is in
comparison. Our data show that Istituto Bancario San Paolo had assets
of $94.8 billion in 1989 compared with $198.3 billion for Deutsche Bank;
$184.9 billion for Barclays Bank and $181.8 billion Credit Agricole.
The data also suggests that the assets size of the largest banks in
Belgium and the Netherlands are relatively high compared with the
largest banks in other similar-sized banking system. This, of course,
is reflected in the high levels of market concentration in these systems
as reported earlier.
The variability of bank size in individual countries has already
been discussed in Section 7.4.2.2 of this Chapter, where we considered
the dispersion of the firm-specific market share variable.
7.4.5.2 Interest paid/total funds
The intexest paid divided by total funds variable is a proxy for funding
cost used in our SCP analysis. Figure 7.4 reports the median values of
the funding cost ratios for our data sample of European banks.
(Appendix 11 provides the descriptive statistics on this variable for
1986 to 1989.)
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First, it should be noted that no data were available from the IBCA
Ltd database for Dutch banks, and, secondly, a large number of
observations were missing for UK banks (especially foreign
subsidiaries). The funding cost figures for the UK banks primarily
indicate the ratio for domestic institutions. Median values reported in
Figure 7.4 give a clearer indication of average industry funding,
because the mean values are exaggerated by some extreme values. In
general, the median values are about 1 per cent lower than their mean
counterparts.
Figure 7.4 illustrates that in most countries the median industry
funding costs ranged between 5 and 10 per cent, with the noticeable
exceptions of Portugal and Turkey. The median funding costs for
Portuguese banks in our sample amounted to over 35 per cer:. in 1989, and
for the Turkish banks over 25 per cent. In all countries, apart from
Ireland and Italy, median funding costs increased between 1986 and 1989.
This is probably indicative of higher domestic interest rate levels as
well as the increasing cost of raising funds on capital markets for
banks. Figure 7.4 also illustrates that median funding costs appeared
to be the lowest in France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland over the
period under study.
7.4.5.3 Staff expense ratio
Staff expense ratios calculated as staff expenses as a proportion of
bank assets are described for our sample of banks for 1986 and 1989 in
Table 7.8. (Appendix 12 contains the relevant data for 1987 and 1988.)
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TABLE 7.8 STAFF EXPENSES TO TOTAL ASSETS RATIO 1986 AND 1989 [%]
N'	 Dispesion
Number of	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in
	 Observa-	 Standard	 DeviationCountry	 Year
	 Sample
	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum AtnYiminn
1. Austria 1986 27 1 0.83 0.79 0.48 0.58 0.13 1.73
1989 48 1 0.93 0.78 0.49 0.53 0.16 2.12
2. Belgium 1986 26 4 0.59 0.31 0.59 1.00 0.01 1.59
1989 33 4 0.44 0.35 0.43 0.98 0.01 1.40
3. Denmark 1986 22 2 1.59 1.55 0.34 0.21 1.13 2.17
1989 26 0 1.68 1.58 0.58 0.35 0.14 2.73
4. Finland 1986 9
0 1.23 0.99 0.74 0.60 0.07 2.33
1989 12 0 0.92 0.86 0.61 0.66 0.07 2.02
5. France 1986 96
2 1.33 1.14 0.97 0.73 0.04 4.14
1989 138 4 1.49 1.19
1
1.97 1.32 0.02 20.73
6. Germany 1986 115 7 0.96 1.09 0.64 0.67 0.11 2.73
1989 149 12 0.92 0.93 0.65 0.71 0.08 3.66
7. Greece 1986 9 U 1.39 1.62 0.69 0.50 0.45 2.59
1989 3 0 1.99 1.41 1.03 0.52 1.40 3.18
1986 9 9 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.aR. Ireland J989 17 14 1.57 1.88 0.77 0.49 0.69 2.14
9. Italy 1986 55 1 1.41 1.27 0.46 0.33 0.07 3.04
1989 169 2 1.85 1.39 1.08 0.58 0.01 7.21
1986 61 0 0.26 0.13 0.30 1.15 0.03 1.71111. Luxemhourg 1989 74 1 0.29 0.22 0.24 0.83 0.04 1.14
11. Netherlands 1986 23 0 0.93 1.03 0.40 0.43 0.09 1.62
1989 29 0 0.78 0.86 0.46 0.59 0.05 1.70
1986 26 1 1.40 1.42 0.32 0.23 0.31 1.94l3. Norway 1989 27 U 1.30 1.39 0.34 0.26 0.36 1.96
1986 6 0 3.47 2.55 2.72 0.78 1.84 8.9.;
14. Portugal 1989 18 0 2.87 2.57 1.47 0.51 1.45 6.97
1986 37 0 1.83 1.87 0.62 0.34 0.27 3.09IS. Spait' 1989 156 3 1.76 1.81 0.66 0.38 U.10 4.62
1986 19 0 1.07 0.99 0.54 0.50 0.17 2.0516. Sweden 1989 23 0 0.77 0.75 0.44 0.57 0.16 1.79
17. Switzerland 1986 88 1 1.49 1.07 1.32 0.89 0.24 6.76
1989 160 1 1.99 1.11 2.11 1.06 0.25 18.26
IR. United 1986 109 81 0.98 0.56 0.73 0.74 0.27 2.76
Kindgom 1989 171 124 1.03 0.62 0.90 0.87 0.30 5.02
1986 3 0 0.58 0.66 0.19 0.33 0.36 0.72
IR. Liechlenlein 1989 3 0 0.55 0.60 0.17 0.31 0.36 0.68
1986 9 9 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
19.1Urkey 1989 12 12 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Sour_' Authors Own estimates
309
No data are available for this variable for Turkish banks, and a large
number of observations are missing for Irish and UK banks. In the case
of the United Kingdom, data on staff costs are unavailable for foreign
bank subsidiaries, so the figures represent ratios for domestic banks
only. Staff expense ratios are by far the lowest in Luxembourg, an
indication of its status as an offshore banking centre and lack of many
retail banks. One would also expect to find relatively low staff
expense ratios for the sample of Liechtenstein and Swiss banks, but this
is not borne out by the latter. In fact, the mean values are amongst
the highest for any individual country in our sample. Further
investigation of this surprising finding indicated that the cantonal
banks had relatively high cost ratios. Some of the small private banks
in the sample also illustrated very high ratios, possibly indicating the
labour-intensive nature of private or/and investment management banking
business in the country. As is the case of other variables that we have
studied, the Greek and Portuguese banking systems exhibited extreme
values: for example, in 1986 the mean value of staff expense ratios in
our Portugal sample was nearly twice as large (3.47 per cent) as the
country sample which had the second largest mean ratio, Spain (1.83 per
cent).
Out of the four largest European banking markets, the sample of
banks for Germany and the United Kingdom exhibited lower cost ratios
than for banks in France and Italy. Mean staff expense ratios also
systematically increased in our sample of UK, French and Italian banks
between 1986 and 1989. For the German banks, the ratio increased from
0.96 per cent in 1986 to 1.01 per cent in 1988, but fell to 0.92 per
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cent in 1989. In various other European countries, there appeared to be
an unambiguous decrease in staff expense ratios between 1986 and 1989,
both the mean and median values fell for our sample banks in Belgium,
Finland, Netherlands, Norway, Spain and Sweden. The trend is more
difficult to interpret for other countries where the sample mean ratio
may have increased when the median value fell and vice versa. Finally,
the dispersion of staff expense ratios across our. sample of banks in
individual countries appears to be the greatest in Belgium, France and
Switzerland.
7.4.6 Other control variables
7.4.6.1 Loans-to-assets ratio
The loans-to-assets ratio is included in our SCP analysis as a proxy for
balance sheet risk as described in Section 6.2.2.6 of this thesis.
Figure 7.5 illustrates the median values of this ratio for our data
sample across the European countries under study (see Appendix 13 for
the descriptive statistics). In general, for most cases the ratio
ranges between 50 and 60 per cent, and out of the four largest banking
markets, only the Italian bank sample has noticeably lower median (and
mean) values around 40 per cent. This implies that, on average, Italian
banks have a greater proportion of their assets tied up in investments
and liquid assets. What is also interesting to note is that in
countries in which universal banking is undertaken (such as in Austria,
Germany and Switzerland), the loans-to-assets ratios do not appear to be
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markedly different from in other countries (although this cannot be said
about our sample of Belgian banks where the ratios appear quite low).
Figure 7.5 also illustrates that in some countries where the public
sector controls a large proportion of the banking system - such as in
Italy, Greece and Portugal - the loans-to-assets ratios, on average,
appear low. This may well be a reflection of the fact that in these
countries, especially the less-developed systems, the State relies
heavily on the banking system to provide its funding needs through
purchase of its government debt.
	 The greater level of portfolio
restrictions in these countries (which in fact also existed in Spain up
until 1991) also may be a factor in explaining why the mean loan-to-
assets ratios in these countries appear relatively low on a European-
wide basis.	 Finally, the loans -to -assets ratios for our sample of
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein banks are noticeably lower than in other
countries, reflecting the particular nature of investment off-shore
banking business undertaken in these centres.
7.4.6.2 Equity-to-assets ratio
The equity- to -assets ratio is included in our SCP analysis to account
for different risk levels between banks. Figure 7.6 shows the median
values for our data sample across European countries (descriptive
statistics are listed in Appendix 14).
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Figure 7.6 illustrates that in the majority of cases the median
values for bank equity-to-assets ratios across countries range between 3
and 4 per cent. The ratios are noticeably higher for the sample of UK
banks than for the German, French and Italian banks. Banks in the
latter two countries also appear to have lower ratios than for the
German banks. This is a widely accepted feature of the larger European
banking systems which have a high proportion of publicly owned
commercial banks. As IBCA (1991) notes, `In France, .... profitability
remains meagre but capital ratios, although stronger, are still well
below those set by international competition' (p.3). Median equity-to-
assets ratios also appear to be relatively low in Sweden and Luxembourg.
The median values for Denmark, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom
overall appear to be high on a European wide comparison, as do the
ratios for banks operating in the smallest banking markets. In the
majority of countries the industry average equity-to-asset ratio
increased between 1986 and 1989.
7.4.6.3 Loan-loss reserves to total loans ratio
The higher the loan-loss reserve ratio for an individual bank, the
greater the apparent riskiness of the banks' loan book. Table 7.9
illustrates the descriptive statistics for this variable for our sample
of European banks in 1986 and 1989 (Appendix 15 provides the
descriptive statistics for 1987 and 1988). Firstly, it should be noted
that there are a large number of missing values for this variable, no
data are provided for banks in Austria, Belgium, Netherlands,
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TABLE 7.9 LOAN-LOSS RESERVES / LOANS [%] 1986 AND 1989
N•	Dispesion
Number of	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in
	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation
Country	 Year	 Sample	 tions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1986 27 27 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1989 48 48 na na na na n.a n.a
2. Belgium 1986 26 26 n.a n.a n.a n.a na n.a
1989 33 33 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
3. Denmark 1986 22 22 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1989 26 23 2.814 3.112 2.173 0.77 0.510 4.820
1986 9 0 2.712 2.880 1.622 0.60 0.400 5.6804. Finland 1989 12 1 2.562 2.380 1.303 0.51 0.150 5.160
1986 96 67 3.912 3.700 2.270 0.58 0.270 8.0305. France 1989 138 101 5.087 3.820 4.665 0.92 0.150 22.370
6. Germany 1986 115 64 0.723 0.464 0.636 0.88 0.039 3.322
1989 149 147 0.558 0.558 0.424 0.76 0.258 0.858
7. Greece 1 986 9 0 2.357 2.050 0.902 0.38 1.370 3.910
1989 3 0 2.660 2.120 0.940 0.35 1.040 4.810
1986 9 9 n.a n.a na n.a na n.a
8. Ireland 1989 17 15 2.100 2.1Q0 0.495 0.24 1.750 2.450
1986 65 0 5.171 5.305 2.130 0.41 1.630 14.9509.ltaly 1989 169 0 3.514 3.956 2.220 - 0.63 0.941 10.855
1986 61 3 9.180 6.000 8.260 0.90 1.080 39.860
10. Luxembourg 1989 74 4 9.370 4.860 10.010 1.07 0.790 44.520
11. Ncthcrlands 1986 23 23 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1989 29 29 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1986 26 1 3.001 2.902 0.862 0.29 0.645 4.917
13. Norway 1989 27 1 2.062 1.905 0.981 0.48 0.346 4.501
1986 6 0 3.451 2.793 4.982 1.44 1.570 5.229
14. Portugal 1989 18 0 2.482 2.109 4.380 1.76 0.400 5.699
1986 37 0 3.384 3.160 1.804 0.53 1.430 8.960
15. Spain 1989 156 6 3.322 2.535 10.111 2.34 1.120 10.000
1986 19 0 0.895 0.909 0.534 0.59 0.009 1.593
16. Sweden 1989 23 0 0.624 0.620 0.522 0.84 0.011 1.640
17. Switzerland 1986 88
88
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n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1989 160 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1 8. United 1986 109 78 2.125 1.280 3.505 1.65 0.053 16.670
Kindgum 1989 171 121 3.290 2.579 8.610 2.62 0.074 19.650
1986 3 3 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
18. Liechlenlein 1989 3 3 na n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1986 9 0 2.412 1.650 2.580 1.07 0.901 6.780
19.'lùrkey 1989 12 0 2.436 1.325 2.955 1.21 0.031 8.990
Source: Authors own estimates
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Liechtenstein and Switzerland. Data are also unavailable for Ireland
and Denmark in 1986. The number of observations for France, Germany and
the United Kingdom is also limited.
For most countries the mean values for the loan-loss reserve ratios
range between two and three per cent, although provisioning amongst
French, Italian, Spanish and, most noticeably, Luxembourg banks appears
to be higher. Conversely, loan-loss provisioning for German banks
appears to be low if we consider the mean values for 1986 and 1987 where
there is a reasonable number of observations. In these years the
provisioning ratio was around 0.7 per cent. (The mean values for 1988
and 1989 are only based on six and two banks respectively).
The dispersion of loan-loss provisioning across banks in individual
countries appears to be greater in the United Kingdom for 1986 and 1989
and also in Spain for 1987 through to 1989, which suggests larger
differences in loan performance across banks in these countries,
compared with banks operating in other systems. If one views the
maximum figures for provisioning, the data in Table 7.9 and Appendix 17
illustrate that the largest provisions made by any banks in Germany in
our sample over the four years amounted to 3.9 per cent, compared with
22.4 per cent in France, 26 per cent in Italy and 29 per cent in -the
United Kingdom. Swedish banks yielded the lowest maximum provisioning
level at 1.6 per cent in 1989. Bearing in mind the number of missing
observations. The variability in the data confirms the marked
difference in loan-loss provisioning practice within countries and
throughout European banking systems.
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7.5 Conclusion
This chapter examined the variables outlined in the methodology to
investigate the SCP relationship across European banking markets. The
IBCA data represent a relatively small percentage of the number of banks
operating in different European systems, yet for most countries the
banks in each sample account for more than 70 per cent of total banking
sector assets. Out of the four largest European banking markets
concentration is higher in Italy and France, and in general it is also
greater in the smaller European systems. The asset's market share of
the largest bank in, Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom are
all around 8 per cent, whereas in Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands,
Portugal, Sweden and Turkey the asset market share of the largest bank
exceeds 20 per cent. In our data sample, the majority of publicly-owned
banks appear in France, Germany, Italy and Switzerland.
Average funding cost ratios range between 5 and 10 per cent across
European countries, and there appears to have been an increase in
average industry funding costs across the majority of systems between
1986 and 1989.
	 Staff expense ratios are by far the lowest for
Luxembourg-based banks. The IBCA dataset also reveals that average
loan-to-assets ratios typically range between 50 and 60 per cent, and
there appears to be no major difference between universal banking and
other types of systems apart from banks operating in Belgium where the
average ratio across four years is below 40 per cent. The descriptive
statistics also indicate that banks, operating in systems where there is
a high level of government ownership, such as in Italy, Greece and
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Portugal, hold a smaller proportion of their assets in loans. This may
be indicative of the portfolio restrictions imposed on banks in these
countries as a means of the banking system funding government deficits.
Equity-to-assets ratios appear to be around 3 to 4 per cent across
European banking systems. The highest mean ratios in our data sample
are for banks operating in Denmark, Spain, Switzerland and the United
Kingdom. Average banking industry equity-to-asset ratios are higher for
UK and German banks than for Italian and French banks. In the majority
of countries, the industry average equity-to-assets ratios increased
between 1986 and 1989. Finally, the data set revealed a very mixed
range of loan-loss reserve ratios for banks across countries, although
loan-loss reserve levels appear to be very low for German banks.
Overall, our analysis reveals the heterogenous nature of European
banking markets and identifies some major differences across various
systems between 1986 and 1989. Chapter 8 will utilise these data to
further investigate the SCP relationship across these markets.
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Notes
1. IBCA Ltd, Eldon House, Eldon Street, London EC2M 7LS
2. According to IBCA Ltd, the raw data for the European banks will be
broadly comparable with their annual accounts, although spreadsheet
data is standardised so more useful comparisons can be made. IBCA
provide instruction manuals to illustrate how spreadsheet items are
defined, but no documentation exists as to the rationale behind
these definitions.
3	 E.P. Davies, Adviser on Financial Structure and Regulation at the
Bank of England, suggested in a personal conversation whilst on a
seminar visit to UCNW, Bangor, on 25 November 1992, that it was
probably the varied influence of foreign banks and an indication of
the competitive environmen- that brought about this variability.
4.	 Swiss Banking Corporation agreed to merge with Swiss Volksbank in
January 1993 to form Switzerland's largest banks.
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Chapter 8
The Structure-Conduct-Performance Relationship in European Banking - The
Results
8.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the empirical evidence of the SCP relationship in
European banking between 1986 and 1989. It tests the models outlined in
Chapter Six, using the data explored in Chapter Seven, of this ^.hesis.
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first part of the
chapter tests two competing hypotheses with regard to market stzacture
and performance - the traditional SCP paradigm and the efficiency
hypothesis. Cross-sectional results are reported for the years 1986 to
1989 as well as pooled-time series estimates, so as to confirm seasonal
(yearly) effects, over the whole period. Tests for evidence of the two
competing hypotheses in individual European banking markets are also
conducted. The second part of this chapter investigates *ne performance
- concentration relationship further by examining evidence of rivalrous
and cooperative behaviour between leading banks across European banking
markets.
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8.2 The SCP Paradigm and Efficiency Hypothesis in European Banking
8.2.1 Cross - sectional estimates
8.2.1.1 Equation specification
The purpose of this section is to determine the precise specification of
the model that is to be estimated. It addresses two main problems
relating to variable selection which have already been mentioned in
Section 6.3 of this thesis. It is important to note that reference will
be made to results estimated for 1989 and other year€ but it is not the
purpose of this section to analyse these in detail - this will be
covered in the remainder of the Chapter. Rather, the sstimates provided
in this section will specifically address the variable selection problem
and it will provide the model specification that is to be estimated.
In Section 6.3 of this thesis we stated that the model to be estimated
would be as follows:
(1)
ROA j j = a90 + a, (CR^) + a2 (MS il ) + a3 (NARMON , ) + a4 (ASSETS ij )
or
ROE
Ij
	+ a5
 (IPAY/FUND ij ) + a6
 
(LOANS/AS SETS i j ) + a7 (EQUITY/ASSETS ij )
+ a8 (STAFF/ASSETS, i ) + a9 (LLR/LOANS jj ) + a10 (GOVT )
where:	 ROAj j bank is profits measured as before tax
return on assets in market j
ROE j j bank is profits measured as before tax
return on equity in market j
CRj concentration ratio in market j	 (5 and 10
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firm assets and deposits concentration
ratios and Herfindahl indexes)
MS U	 = individual bank i's asset market share in
market j
NARMONj narrow money supply growth in market j
ASSETS . bank is asset size in market j
IPAY/FÜkD, j	= interest paid divided by total bank funds
for bank is in market j
LOANS/ASSETS, j loans-to-assets ratios bank is in market
j
EQUITY/ASSETS =	 equity-to-assets
	 ratios	 for bank
	 is	 in
market j
STAFF/ASSETS, j staff expenses divided by total assets for
bank is in marketj
LLR/LOANS, j
	= loan-loss reserves divided by total loans
for bank is in market j
GOVT] binary variable equal to one if government
owned, zero otherwise
We also noted that the above specification and data availability
problems relating to the (LLR/LOANS ij ) variable created certain
problems. First, as the test for market share (MS, j ) may be nullified
by the inclusion of bank assets (ASSETS,-,), we estimated the equation
(1) over the four years (using the ten-firm asset's concentration
measure) and then replicated the exercise by omitting the (ASSETSSid
variable. Both before tax return-on-assets (ROA, j ) and return-on-equity
(ROE ij ) were used as the dependent variables.
	 The ten-fins assets
concentration measure was arbitrarily chosen for expository purposes.
Second, data on the loan-loss reserves variable (LLR/LOANS, j ) were
unavailable for banks operating in Austria, Belgium, Netherlands,
Switzerland and Liechtenstein across all the years under study. Only a
handful of observations were available for Denmark and Ireland, and
there were also substantial missing values for the other countries in
the sample. As such, equations that include the (LLR/LOANS ij ) variable
would only be estimating the SCP relationship over ten European
countries (Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Norway, Portugal,
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Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom). The theoretical justification
for including this variable deterred us from rejecting it at the onset
of the estimation. So as to evaluate the impact of the (LLR/LOANS, , )
variable, we estimated equation ( 1) over the four years (the same as in
the ASSETS i j case above) and then dropped this variable.
Finally, our data sample provided no information on the interest
paid to total funds ratio (IPAY/FUND ii ) for the Netherlands and
similarly no staff expense ratios (STAFF/AS SETS ^ j ) for Turkish banks.
In addition, we could not obtain information on the size of the
Liechtenstein banking market so banks' market share (MS i j ) and the
concentration ratios could not be estimated. As a result, the equations
that exclude the (LLR/LOAN i j ) variables are estimated on a data sample
across 16 countries.
The estimates for 1989 using both before tax return-on-assets
(ROAi j ) and return-on-equity (ROE,,) as the dependent variables are
shown in Tables 8.1 and 8.2, respectively (esti ,,iates using the same
equation specifications for 1986, 1987 and 1988 are reported in
Appendix 16). Table 8.1 shows the results for estimating the ROA
concentration relationship using the ten-firm asset's concentration
ratio for 1989. Equation (1) in Table 8.1 is the model estimated with
all the variables included, and equation (2) illustrates the impact of
omitting the (ASSETS, , ) variable. It can be seen that the inclusion of
the (ASSETS il ) variable adds no explanatory power to the model with the
adjusted coefficient of determination (RZ ) actually increasing from 37.1
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TABLE 8.1
Sour(,-. Authors wn estimates
Relationship between ROA and independent va riables 1989
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF
I
VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.01433 0.0131a 0.0083a 0.0085a
[2.69] [2.66] [2.95] [3.14]
CRIO ASS -0.0001 1.2 -0.00009 1.1 -0.000005 1.3 -0.00008 1.2
[-1.24] [-0.11] [-0.18]
[-1.101
MSASS 0.0076 1.7 0.0001 1.1 0.0195 1.6 -0.0086 1.1[0.37] [-0.59] 1-0.54]
[0.01]
NARMON 0.00003 1.1 0000004 1.1 -0.00004 1.1 -0.00003 1.1
[0.84] [0.89] [-0.77] [-0.79]
ASSETS -0.00000 1.7 _ _ -0.00000 1.5 - _
[-0.601 [-0.26]
IPAY / FUND 0.0010a 1.2 0.0010a 1.2 0.0004 1.0 0.0004 1.0
[2.43] [2.41] 10.981 [0.99]
LOANS/ASS
-0.0108a 1.6 -0.0108a 1.6 -0.0058a 1.7 -0.0058a 1.7
[-10.00] [-10.06] [-7.73] [-7.73]
EQUITY/ASS 0.0884a 1.4 0.08869a 1.4 0.0051a 1.4 0.0565a 1.4
[12.99] [13.06] [11.13] [11.15]
STAFF /.1SS 0.1644a 1.6 0.1639a 1.6 0.0197a 1.8 0.0727a 1.8[4.62] [4.61] [3.69] [3.69]
-0.0004a 1.3 -0.0004a 1.3 - - -LLR / LOAN [-4.36] [-4.36]
0.0014 1.6 0.0021 1.6 0.0012a 1.4 -0.0039 a 1.4
GOVT [0.67] [0.69] [-3.25] [-3.25]
Observations 1268 1268 1268 1268
N` 716 716 229 229
R2 37.1 37.2 18.1 18.2
F 31.0 34.5 25.6 28.8
LM 1.60 1.40 0.50 0.40
SW 0.194 0.913 0.981 0.983
^
0
lk^
MR
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TABLE 8.2
Relationship between ROE and independent variables 1989
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE
VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.8235a 0.7401a 0.3917a 0.3806a
[2.09] [2.03] [1.98] [2.00]
CRIO ASS -0.0113 1.2 -0.0100 1.1 -0.0031 1.3 -0.0029 1.2
[-1.72] [-1.63] [-0.92] [-0.90]
MSASS 0.0750 1.7 0.5550 1.1 0.0300 1.6 -0.1260 1.1[0.70] [0,45] [0.02] [-0.22]
NARMON -0.0007 1.1 -0.0005 1.1 0.00003 1.1 0.0004 1.1
[-0.22] [-0.17] [0.10] [0.12]
ASSETS -0.000002 1.7 _ _ -0.00000 1S _ -
[-056] [-0.20]
IPAY / FUND 0.0330 1.2 0.0322 1.2 0.05823 1.0 0.0580a 1.0
[1.03] [1.01] [2.10] [2.09]
LOANS/ASS
-0.1391 1.6
-0.1416 1.6 -0.0971 1.7 -0.0974 1.7
[-1.74] [-1.77] [-1.84] [-1.85]
EQUITY/ASS 0.1702 1.4 0.1887 1.4 -0.1842 1.4 -0.1788 1.4
[034] [0.37] [-0.51] [-0.50]
STAFF / ASS 1.8530 1.6 1.8150 1.6 2.2690 1.8 2.2680 1.8[0.70] [0.69] [1.64] [1.64]
0.0169 a 1.3 0.0169a 1.3 - - -
-
? LR / LOAN [2.48] [2.48]
-0.1805 1.6 -0.1782 1.6 -0.1075 1.4 -0.1079 1.4
GOVT [-1.16] [-1.15] [-1.27] [-1.28]
Observations 1268 1268 1268 1268
N' 716 716 229 229
R2 1.9 2.0 0.2 0.3
F 1.99 2.18 1.18 1.32
LM 1.50 1.30 0.70 0.60
SW 0.889 0.889 0.822 0.812
Sou, ,e; Authors own estimates
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to 37.2 when it is omitted. In addition, the coefficients of the
variables in equation (2) in Tables 8.1 are virtually the same as in
equation (1), as are the t-statistics reported in parentheses.
If we compare equation (3) which includes all the variables as
specified in our original model but omits (LLR/LOAN, , ) and equation (4)
which omits (LLR/LOAN i j ) and (ASSETS^ d we find again that the
(ASSETS,,) variable has virtually no impact on the estimated results.
This finding is also confirmed if we examine the same equations in Table
8.2 and those reported in Appendix 16 for other years. Given these
results we assume that the inclusion of the bank asset's size variable
(ASSETS il ) adds no explanatory value to our originally specified model,
and therefore later estimates of the SCP relationship will exclude this
variable.
The second difficulty to be addressed relates to the (LLR/LOANii)
variable. Equation (2) in Table 8.1 estimates the original model
excluding the (ASSETS i d variable but including the (LLR/LOAN,
,
)
variable. Compare this with equation (4) which estimates the same
equation with the (LLR/LOAN i j ) variable omitted. There are four major
differences. Firstly, the equation that uses the (LLR/LOAN ii ) variable
is estimated using only 552 banks (across ten countries), whereas
equation (4) which excludes the (LLR/LOAN,,) variable is estimated on a
sample of 1039 banks (over 16 countries). Secondly, the explanatory
power of the equation that includes the (LLR/LOAN i j ) variable is double
that of the equation that excludes it, with adjusted RZ being 37.2 and
18.2, respectively. 	 Thirdly, loan-loss reserves do seem to have a
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significant impact on ROA as illustrated by the t-statistic of -4.36 on
the (LLR/LOAN ij ) variable in equation (2). Fourthly, the significance
and signs of various coefficients alter when the (LLR/LOAN,,) variable
is included: see for example (MSASS ij ), (NARMON i ), (IPAY/FUND,,), and
(GOVT j ). These differences are also confirmed if we examine the ROE
estimates in Table 8.2 and those reported for other years in Appendix
16, although the difference in the coefficients of determination for
1986 and 1987 are not as great as in 1988 and 1989. From the above it
is clear that the loan-loss reserves ratio improves the explanatory
power of our equations, but due to the collapse in sample size brought
about by its use we chose to estimate and report equations which
excluded it as an explanatory variable.
In the following sections of this Chapter, tests of the S:.P
paradigm and the Efficiency Hypothesis will be undertaken on the
following model:
ROAi j — ao + a, (CRi ) + a  (MS jj ) + a3 (NARMON,) + a4 (IPAY/FUND,,) (2)
or
ROE i 1	 + a5 (LOANS/ASSETS ,,) +6 (EQUITY/ASSETS , j ) + a7 (STAFF/ASSETS ,,)
+ a$ (GOVT )
We will, however, report analgous results of the two competing
hypotheses for equations that include the loan-loss reserves variable in
Appendix 17.
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8.2.1.2 ROA and concentration
This section reports the estimated results for the before-tax ROA -
concentration relationship for each year, 1986 through to 1989, using
six different concentration measures. The six measures used -five-firm
assets and deposits concentration ratios; ten-firm assets and deposits
concentration ratios and the deposits and assets Herfindahl indices -
are used to see if the nature of the relationship alters according to
the concentration measure chosen. Estimated equations for each year are
shown in Tables 8.3 to 8.6.
First, it can be seen that for all equations (apar — from equation
(1) in Table 8.4) the hypotheses of non-normality of residuals can be
rejected by the derivative Shapiro-Wilk test (SW) . Secoi..A, all values
of the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test fall below the critical 5 per cent
level of the chi-square value of 3.84146, thus rejecting the assumption
of heteroskedasticity in the residual variance. Finally, across all
equations multicollinearity appears not to be evident as the variance
inflationary factor (VIF) is well below the Marquardt (1980) critical
value of 10. In fact, for virtually all the equat-ons estimated in this
section there appears to be little evidence of heteroskedasticity in
residual variance or multicollinearity between independent variables.
The results for 1989 shows that the choice of concentration measure
can alter the significance of this variable. In Table 8.3 the sign on
all the concentration measures is negative, implying an inverse
relationship between market concentration and banks' before-tax ROA.
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Table 8.3
ROA and Concentration 1989
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables
VIF
I  I VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 00136a 0.0085a 0.0099a 0.0086a 0.0096a 0.0093a[6.20] [3.14] [5.62] [4.10] [7.85] [9,00]
-0.0001a 1.4
CR5 ASS [-2.82]
-0.00000 1.2
CR10ASS [-0.18]
CR5DEP
-0•0000 1.2
f-1.281
CRIODEP 0-00001 1.3
HERFASS -0.0213a 1.5[-2.02]
HERFDEP -0.0129a 13
-2.80
WASS 0.0022 1.1
1[-0.54]
-0.0086 1.1 -0.0069 1 .0 -0.0081 1.1 0.0017
l'2
0.0055 1.1[0.14] [-0.44] [-0.51] [0.11] [0.33]
-0.00006 1.1 -0.0003 1.1 -0.0000 1 . 1 -0.0000 1.1 -0.00005 11 -0.00006 1.1
NARMON [-134] [-0.79] [-1.03] [-0.81] [-1.17] [-1.27]
0.0004 10 0.0004 1.0 0•0004 1.0 0.0004 10 0.0004 10 0.0004 1.0
IPAY/FUND [1.06] [0.99] [1.02] [0.99] [0.99] [0.96]
-0.0055a 1.7 -0.0058a 1.7 -O.M57 1.7 -0.0058 1.7 -0.0059a 17 -0.0058a 1.7LOAN/ASS [-7.35] [-7.73] -7.65 [-7.72] [-7.90] [7.77]
EQUITY/ 0.0574a 1.4 0.0565a 1.4 0.05G5a 1.4 0.0565a 1.4 0.0564a
1 '4
0.0569a
1'4ASS [11.35] [11.15] [11.16] [11.15] [11.16] [11.27]
0.0788a 1.8 0.0727a 1.8 0.0756a 1.8 0.0730a 1.8 0.0712a 18 0.0699a 1.8STAFF/ASS 4.04 [3.69 3.86 [3.72] [3.67] 3.611
GOVT -0.0055a 1.7 -0.0039a 1.4 -0.0044 1.5 -0.0039 1.5 -0.0048x
1	 1.5
-0.0049a 1.4[-4.28] f-3.25]
-3.58 [-3.20] [-3.87] [-4.06]
Observation
1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268
N• 229 229 229 229 229 229
RZ 18.9 18.3 18.3 18.2 18.5 18.9
F 30.02 28.81 29.05 28.82 29.43 30.01
LM 0.42 0.40 0.46 0.39 0.41 0.41
SW 0.992 0.993 0.989 0.990 0.986 0.985
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.4
ROA and Concentration 1988
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] ' [6]Independent
Variables
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONS -0.0148x -0.0197a -0.0155a -0.0188 --0.0034 -0.0004[-3.67] [-4.87] [-4.47] [-5.76] [-1.45] [-0.20]
0.0003a 1.7
CR5 ASS [4.21]
0.0003a 13
CR10ASS [5.56]
CR5DEP 0.0003a 1.6
r5.391
CR10DEP 0.0003a 1.2[7.10]
HBRFASS - 0.0381a 1.5[2.65]
HERFDEP 0.0050 1.3E 0.74
MSASS 0.0557a 1.1 0.0502a 1.1 0.0507a 1.1 0.0462a 1.1 0.0649a 1
0.0805a 1.1[2.42] [2.21] [2.221 [2.07] [2.77] [3.44]
0.0007a 1 .5 0.0006a 12 0.0007a 1.5 0.0006a 1.2 0.0005 12
0.0005a 1._2
NARMON [5.01] [4.40] [5.52] [4.95] [3.97] [3.54]
-0.00001 10 -0.00000 1.0 -0.000004 1.0 0.000005 1.0 -0.00001 1.0 -0.00001 1.0
IPAY/FUND [-0.09] [-0.06] [-0.03] [0.04] [-0.11] [-0.10]
800 ] 
a 1.6 8003 9a 1.6 _ 8000 9a 1.6 8 1.6 -	 8a8028
1.6 -0.0082a 1.6
LO?u^1 ASS [ ] [-8.431 [-	 ] [-8.65]
EQUITY/ 0.851a 1.3 0.0839a 1.3 0.0849a 1.3 0.826a 1.3 0.0868a 1.3
0.0863a
1.JASS [14.58] [14.44] [14.64] [14.31] [14.82] [14.70]
0.0131 17 0.0074 1.7 0.0108 1.7 0.0032 17 0.0218 17 0.0209 17
STAFF ASS 0.61 [0.35 0.51 [0.15] [1.02] [0.97]
GOVT 0.0109a	 17 0_0100a	1.4 0.0108a	1.5 0.0103a	 1.3 0.0087a	 1.5 0.0073a 1.4[6.17] [6.32] [6 .56] [6.66] [5.29] [4.58]
Observation
1541 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541
N'
272 272 272 272 272 272
RZ 22.1 23.0 22.8 24.2 21.4 20.9
F 42.19 44.28 43.99 47.37 40.48 39.45
LM 0.040 0.028 0.030 0.051 0.056 0.067
Sw 0.973 0.978 0.981 0.990 0.986 0.986
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.5
ROA and Concentration 1987
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] 151. [6]Independent
Variables
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.0047' -0.0589a -0.0163 -0.0323 0.0063a 0.0071a
[-1.10] [-8.51] [-3.87] [-6.08] [3.26] [3.49]
0.0003a 1.6
CR5 ASS [3.43]
0.0011' 2.1
CR10ASS [10.08]
CRSDEP 0.0005a 1.9
r6.521 I
CR10DEP 0.00063 2.2
HERFASS 0.0423a 1.3[2.89]
HERFDEP 0.0229 13
-0.0288 12
-0.0192 1.2 -0.0345 12 -0.0071 13
1.71
0.0064 12MSASS 0.0041a 1.2[0.17] [-1.25] [-0.80] [-1.44] [-0.28] [0.26]
0.000005a 1.1 0.000004a 11 0.000005 1 . 1 0.000005 11 0.000005 11 0.000OO5a 1.1
NARMON [8.53] [7.84] [8.67] [9.69] [8.56] [8,84]
0.0005 1.0 0.0004 10 0.0003 10 0.0003 1.0 0.0005 1 '0
0.0004 1.0 
IPAY/FUND [0.64] [0.59] [0.47] [0.38] [0.65] [0.57]
-0.01203 1.4 -0.0112a 1.2 -0.0097 12 -0.0092 12 -0.0109a 1.3 -0.0109a 1.3
LOAN/ASS [-7.07] [-7.90] -6.63 [-6.34] [-7.28] [-7.091
EQUITY/ 0.0907 12 0.0768a 1.2 0.0888 a 1 .2 0.0825' 1.2 0.09753 1 ' 1
0.09753
_1.2
ASS [9.50] [8.52] [9.69] [9.02] [10.55] [10.45]
0.0188a 1.0 0.0168a 1.1 0.0183a 1.0 0.0191a 1.0 0.01863 1.1 0.0193'1[15.391 1.0STAFF ASS 15.091 14.10 15.03 [16.14] [14.65]
GOVT 0.0077a 1.8 0.0222a 2.
 2
0.01443 2.0 0.0198a 13 0.0028
l '-1
0.0033 1.3[2.68] [7.37] [4.81] [6.27] [1.16] [1.35]
Observation
N• 238 238 238 238 238 238
RZ 37.4 43.6 39.7 41.3 37.1 36.7
F 61.15 78.98 67.25 72.03 60.47 59.39
LM 1.192 1.187 1.197 1.186 1.171 1.174
SW 0.986 0.987 0.987 0.985 0.976 0.978
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.6
ROA and Concentration 1 QM
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [51 [6]Independent
Variables
VIF VIF VIF VIF I VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.0025 0.01261 0.0031 -0.0126 0.0122a 0.0111a
[-0.71] [5.29] [0.99] [7.05] [7.09] [5.34]
0.0002a 1.8
CR5 ASS [3.13]
-0.0005 2.0
CRIOASS [-1.62]
CR5DEP 0.00007 1.9
1.	 i
CR10DEP 0_00005a 1.8
riagi
Frt,RFASS -0.0480a 1.5[-5.31]
HERFDEP -0.0274a
-2.45 1.8
MSASS -0.0259 1.1 -0.0189a 1,1 -0.0237 1.1 -0.0168 1.1 0.01431 1.2 -3.958a 12[-1.90] [-2.59] [-1.69] [-2.26] [0.99] [-3.80]
0.0013a 1.4 0.0002a 1.8 0.0012a 1.3 0.00002a 1.5 0.0012a 17 -0.0024a 1.2
NARMON [13.22] [2.64] [12.77] [2.95] [13.49] [-0.16]
0.0009 1.1 -0.00006 11 0.0008 1,1 -0.0000 11 0.0006 1'0
0.0011a 1.0
IPAY/FUND [1.82] [-0.23] [1.60] [-0.33] [1.29] [12.40]
-0.0035a 2.3 -0.0017a 13 -0.0035 2.3 -0.0016 2.4 -0.0031a 2 3 0.0006 2.4
LOAN/ASS [-3.40] [-3.14] -3.40 [-3.02] [-3.09] - [1.19]
EQUITY/ 0.0257a 1.2 0.0116a 1 2 0.0257a 1.2 0.0117a 1.2 0.02551 12 -0.0037a 12ASS [6.70] [5.54] [6.67] [5.61] [6.67] [-3.58]
0.1160a 2.0 0.0434a ').1 0.1127a 7 . 0 0.0445a 2.1 0.1224a
-'1
0.0251a 2.0
STAFF ASS [5.12] [3.55 4.95 [3.64] [5.47] [6.51]
GOVT 0.01341 1.6 -0.00571 1.4 -0.0116 1.6 -0.0062 15 -0.0196a 1 '4
0.1091a 1.5
-7.36 6.09 -7.82 [-6.31] [-11.51] 4.79
Observations 759 759 759 759 759 758
N' 158 164 158 164 158 158
RZ 34.7 13.2 33.9 13.5 36.6 34.3
F 40.90 12.28 39.5 12.65 44.41 40.17
LM 1.692 1.612 1.618 1.632 1.727 1.734
0.930 0.921 0,923 0.924 0.954 0.960SW
Source: Authors own estimates
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The coefficients, however, are only significant at the 5 per cent level
for equation (1), which uses the 5-firm assets concentration ratio, and
equation (5) and (6) which use the Herfindahl assets and deposits
measures respectively. The sign on the banks' market share variable
(MSASS) varies, but is never significant. These results imply that for
1989 neither the traditional SCP paradigm nor the efficiency hypothesis
holds.
The variable that proxies for changes in market demand conditions
(NARMON) is negative and insignificant across all equations, thereby
suggesting that changes in market demand has no effect on the return on
assets. Similarly the variable that acts as a proxy for the cost of
funds (IPAY/FUND) is positive yet insignificant across all equations,
thereby also suggesting no impact on ROA. What is surprising is that we
find a statistically significant inverse relationship between the loans-
to-asset ratio and banking ROA. Thus, the smaller the proportion of
loans to assets, the greater the ROA for banks. This can simply be
explained by the case that earning assets, other than loans, performed
much better than loans during 1989, or that banks that had relatively
high loans-to-asset ratios also had higher funding costs, therPDy
reducing the impact on profitability. It may also be the case that banks
with low loans-to-assets ratios have relatively more profitable off-
balance sheet activities than those banks with larger loans-to-assets
ratios.
The equity- to -assets ratio (EQUITY/ASSETS) shows a positive,
statistically significant relationship across all the equations,
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implying that the greater the equity-to-assets ratio the higher the ROA.
This is counter to the expected relationship where lower ratios suggest
a relatively risky position, which one would expect be compensated for
by higher returns. On the other hand, it may be the case that higher
levels of equity suggest that the cost of capital is relatively cheap
and therefore this variable would then be expected to have a positive
impact on profitability. After all, recent evidence suggests (see IBCA
(1991) for example) that higher capitalised banks are generally more
profitable than those with lower capital bases.
The variable that proxies for the cost of labour (STAFF/ASS) is
also positive and statistically significant across all equations. .Thus,
higher staff expenses - to- total assets ratios are positively related to
banks' ROA. This counter-intuitive finding suggests that rela,-Ively
more profitable banks direct a greater proportion of their expenses to
staff costs than do less profitable banks. This may be interpreted as a
reward to staff who have helped maintain certain banks high
profitability.	 If this is the case for banks operating in the more
concentrated markets it is evidence of expense-preference behaviour.
Finally, the sign on the binary variable tha_ accounts for
government ownership (GOVT) is negative and significant in all cases
suggesting that for 1989 state-owned banks were relatively less
profitable than their private sector counterparts. As in previous SCP
studies of this nature, the explanatory power of all the equations
listed in Table 8.3 is relatively low with adjusted coefficients of
determination (RZ ) ranging between 18.2 and 18.9. It should, however,
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be pointed out that for all the equations in Table 8.3 (and those in
Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6) there does not appear to be strong estimation
bias caused by unidentified country-specific characteristics. We find
that country-specific characteristics as well as firm-specific variables
have statistically significant effects on bank performance (see section
6.5 of this thesis).
The results for 1988 shown in Table 8.4 illustrate how unstable the
estimates are from year-to-year. We find, for example, that all but one
of the equations shows a positive coefficient on the concentration
measure, suggesting that the traditional SCP paradigm holds. In
addition, the coefficients on the banks market share (MSASS) variable is
always positive and significant indicating that the efficiency
hypothesis also holds. The proxy for change in mark— demand conditions
variable (NARMON) is positive and significant in all cases implying that
changes in market demand has a positive impact on banks' ROA.
As in the case for 1989, the proxy for the cost of funds variable
(IPAY/FUND) is always insignificanr although the signs on the
coefficients change. We do find, however, that the relationships
between performance and both the loans - t-,-assets and equity-to-assets
variables are the same in 1988 as in 1985. Conversely, the coefficients
on the proxy for the cost of labour variable (STAFF/ASS) are positive
but insignificant in all cases and the (GOVT) variable suggests that
state-owned banks are relatively more profitable than their private
sector counterparts. The explanatory power of the equations for 1988 is
still relatively low with adjusted R Z ranging bet•.aeen 20.9 and 24.2.
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Instability across parameter estimates is further supported if we
examine the equations estimated for 1987 and 1986 as shown in Tables 8.5
and 8.6 respectively. For brevity we will just discuss the main
findings for these two years. The estimates for 1987 suggest that the
traditional SCP paradigm holds with five of the equations reporting a
positive and significant statistical relationship between the
concentration measures and ROA. The efficiency hypothesis does not
appear to be confirmed as the banks' market share variable is
insignificant in every case. Change in market demand conditions, the
equity-to-assets ratio, the staff costs ratio and government ownership
all appear to exert a statistically significant positive effect on bank
performance.	 As is the case for 1989 .nd 1988, the loans-to-assets
ratio has a negative statistically significant impact on banks' ROA.
Finally, the explanatory power of the equations estimated for 1987
is much better than for the other years with adjusted R Z ranging between
36.7 and 43.6. The results for 1986 imply that neither the traditional
SCP paradigm nor the efficiency hypothesis is evident in Luropean
banking. Change in market demand conditions, the equity-to-assets ratio
and the staff expenses ratio all '.ave a positive and significant impact
on banks ROA. Bank performance appears to be inversely related to the
loans-to-assets ratio and government ownership in 1986. The explanatory
power of the equations estimated for 1986 is also mixed ranging between
13.2 and 36.6.
From the above it seems that the cross-sectional estimates of the
ROA-concentration relationship are unstable - however, some of the
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variables do appear to have a similar impact over three or four years.
Table 8.7 provides a summary of the cross-sectional results, listing the
number and sign of significant variables across all equations. In the
case of the concentration measures one can see that for 1987 five of the
concentration measures had positive significant coefficients, whereas
one was negative and significant. In contrast, the estimates for 1989
yielded (from six equations) three negatively significant coefficients
on the concentration measures. Viewing the concentration measures as a
whole it does appear that the positive relationship between ROA and
concentration dominates for the 1987 and 1988 estimates although the
relationship is less certain for 1986 and 1989. There is only evidence
that the efficiency hypc hesis holds for 1988 (complementing the
traditional SCP paradigm which also holds). No positive significant
relationship between bank's iarket share and ROA is found for any other
year. Change in market demand conditions as proxied by the (NARMON)
variable is seen to have a strong positive impact on ROA for 1986, 1987
and 1988, whereas the cost of funds variable (IPAY/FUND) only has a
significant impact in one equation for 1988. The. loans-to-assets ratio
has a significant negative impact on ROA for 1987, 1988 and 1989, and in
1986 the signs o., the coefficients are also all negative yet
insignificant.
Equity-to-assets ratios exert a positive statistically significant
impact on bank performance across all years - the only variable in the
model specification to have the same significant impact across every
equation, a result confirmed also by the Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and
Thornton (1992) studies.	 There also may be evidence of expense
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Table 8.7	 ROA and concentration: summary of cross-sectional results.
Number of significant variables  1986 to 1989
Variables	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Concentration	 1	 3	 5	 1	 5	 -	 -	 3
Measures
MSASS-	 2	 -	 -	 6	 -	 -	 -
Narmon	 6	 -	 6	 -	 6	 -	 -	 -b
IPAY/Fund	 -	 -	 -	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -
Loans/Assets	 -	 -c	 -	 6	 -	 6	 -	 6
Equity/Assets	 6	 -	 6	 -	 6	 -	 6	 -
Staff/Assets	 6	 -	 6	 -	 -d	 -	 6	 -
Govt.	 -	 6	 4	 -	 6	 -	 -	 6
Note:	 a t-statistics significant at the 5 per cent level
b all coefficients negative and insignificant
c all coefficients negative but insignificant
d all coefficients positive but insignificant
Analysis of results taken from the six equations estimated for
each year.
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preference behaviour in European banking with the (STAFF/ASSETS)
variable being positive and statistically significant in three years.
Finally, the relationship between government ownership and ROA is
ambiguous with evidence of a strong positive relationship in 1987 and
1988 and the opposite in the other two years. The above general
findings are also confirmed if we examine the results for the equations
that are estimated including the Loan-loss Reserves ratio, as reported
in Appendix 17.
8.2.1.3 ROE and concentration
TP.is section replicates the estimation procedure outlined in Section
8.2.1.2, but uses instead before-tax ROE as the dependent variable.
Results of the estimations are shown in Tables 8.8 to 8.11. For all the
equations listed in the aforementioned tables, the hypotheses of non-
normality of residuals cannot be rejected by the derivative Shapiro-Wilk
(SW) test, so these results have to be treated with caution. The
assumption of heterosnedasticity in the residual variance can be
rejected because all the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) tests fall below the
critical chi-squared value, and multicollinearity does not appear to be
a problem as all the variance inflationary factor tests (VIF) are below
the critical value of 10. 1 In addition, the explanatory power of the
equations is much lower than in the ROA equations, apart from in 1987.
Adjusted coefficients of determination (k Z ) range between 0.2 and 0.3
for 1989; 7.2 and 7.4 for 1988; 49.1 and 49.7 for 1987; and 1.4 and 4.8
for 1986.
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TABLE 8.8
ROE and Concentration 1989
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables
VIF VIF VIF VIF I VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.1606 0.3806a 0.1456a 0.1659 0.22771 0.2286a
[1.03] [2.00] [1.17] [1.12] [2.62] [3.12]
-0.0014 1.4
MASS [0.42]
-0.0029 1.2
CR10ASS [-0.90]
CR5DEP 0.0016
70
CR10DEP 0.0009 1.3
HERFASS -0.1051 1.5[-0.14]
HERFDEP -0.0882 lâJ.= 0.271
MSASS -0.4780 1.1 -0.1260 1.1 -0.4470 1.1 -0.4620 1.1 -0.3030 1
-0.2570 1.1 [-0.42] [-0.11] [-0.40] [-0.41] [-0.26] [-0 221
0.0009 1.1 0.0004 1.1 0.0012 1.1 0.0009 1.1 0.0006 1 1 10.0005 1.1
NARMON [0.31] [0.12] [0.37] [0.28] [0.19] [0.17]
0.0569a 1.0 0.0580a 1.0 0.0565a 1.0 0.0568a 1.0 0.05721 10
0.05711 1.0 
IPAY/FUND [21:,] [2.09] [2.04] [2.05] [2.06] [2 06]
-0.1031 1.7 -0.0974 1.7
-0.1028 1.7 -0.1016 1.7 -0.1007 17 -0-3, 30 1.7
LOAN/ASS [-1.94] [-1.85] -1.95 [-1.93] [-1.91] [-1.,J]
EQUITY/ -0.2047 1.4 -0.1788 1.4 -0.1961 1 . 4 -0.2028 1.4 -0.1955 14 -0.1922 1.4
ASS [-0.57] [-0.60] [-0.55] [-0.57] [-0.55] [-0.54]
1.9950 18 2.2680 1.8 1.9330 1.8 1.9810 18 2.0610 18 2.0500 1.8STAFF/ASS [1.45] [1.64 1..10 [1.43] [1.51] [1.50]
GOVT -0.0678 1.7 -0.1080 1. 4 -0.0617 1.7 -0.0718 1.5 -0.0903 15 -0.0928 1.4[-0.74] [-1.28]
-0.70 [-0.82] [-1.03] [-1.09]
Observation
1_68 1_68 1_68 12 68 1268 12 68
N• 229 229 229 229 229 229
RZ 0.2 0.3 02 0.2 0.2 0.2
F 1.24 1.32 1.28 1.24 1.22 122
LM 0.62 0.60 0.71 0.80 0.73 0.75
SW 0.810 0.812 0.824 0.817 0.803 0.800
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.9
ROE and Concentration 1988
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] - [6]Independent
Variables
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.1266a 0.0897a -0.084 0.0526a 0.1199a 0.1175a
[3.92] [2.75] [3.03] [1.99] [6.44] [7.07]
-0.0004a 1.7
CR5 ASS [-0.66]
0.0003 13
CRIOASS [0.63]
CRSDEP 0.0004 1.6
10.991 1
CRIODEP 0.0009a 1.2
If2.541
HERFASS -0.1288 1.5
HERFDEP -0.0773 1.3
-1.421
MSASS 0.3551 1.1 0.2841 1.1 0.2644 1.1 0.2005 1.1 0.3890a 1.2 0.4049a
r
1.1 (1.92] [1.55] [1.44] [1.11] [2.08] [2.17]
0.0018 1.5 0.0022a 12 0.0026a 1.5 0.0027a 12 0.0018 l'2
0.0018
1 2NARMON [1.53] [2.12] [2.27] [2.53] [1.75] [1.75)
0.0013 1.0 0.0013 1.0 0.0013 1.0 0.0013 10 0.0013
1'0
0.0013 1.0
I;AY/FUND [1.25] [126] [127] [1.31] [1.26] (1.25]
-0.0531a 1.6 -0.0528a 1.6 -0.0527 1.6 -0.0519 1.6 -0.0542a 1.6 -0.05.î6a 1.6 
LOAN/ASS [-7.07] [-7.02] f-7.001 [-6.91] [-7.15] [-7.12]
EQUITY/ 0.0235 1.3 0.0198 1 .3 0.0199 1 .3 0.0112 1.3 0.02î4 1-1 0.0222 1.3
ASS [0.50] [0.42) (0..}3] [0.24] [0.44] [0.47]
1.0122a 1.7 0.9914a 1.7 0.9891a 1.7 0.9534a 1,7 0.9981a 1.7 0.9949a 1.7
STAFF/ASS 5.88 5.75 5.75 [5.54] [5.82]
0.0631a
[5.80]
GOVT 0.0641a 1.7 0.0719a 1.4 0.0749a 1.5 0.0789a 1.3 15 0.0632a 1.4[4.52] [5.64] [5.63] [6.31] [4.82] [4.99]
Observations 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541
N` 272 272 272 272 272 272
RZ 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.7 7.3 7.4
F 12.35 12.34 12.42 13.16 12.46 12.56
LM 0.090 0.094 0.089 0.094 0.092 0.095
SW 0.823 0.829 0.827 0.830 0.825 0.824
. ,.+_ i
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.10
ROE and Concentration 1987
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]- [6]Independent
Variables
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.2801 -1.1476a -02713 -0.1202 0.1308 0.1770'
[-1.55] [-3.77] [-1.50] [-0.52] [1.62] [2.09]
0.0140a 1.6
CR5 ASS [3.74]
0.0246a ^.1
CR10ASS [5.03]
CR5DEP 0.0122a 1.9
13.701
CR10DEP 0.0071' 2.2
HERFASS 3.6i° 
-a
1.3[3.97]
HERFDEP 2.1752a
r3.891
-3.958a
1.3
12MSASS -3.504a 1.2 -3.8990a 12 -3.776 1 .2 -3.4590 1.2 -5.014'
1 '3[-3.44] [-3.83] [-3.65] [-3.30] [-4.76] [-3.80]
0.0005a 1.1 0.0005a 2 0.0005' 1.1 0.0005a 1.1 0.0005a
1' 1
0.0005a 1.1
NARMON [23.85] [23.62] [24.16] 1 [24.46] [23.84] [24.18]
10-0174 10 0.0139 1.0 0.0123 1 .0 0.0120 10 0.0219
1'0
0.0175 1.0
IPAY/FUND [0.58] [0.47] [0.41] [0.40] [0.74] (0.58]
-0.1242 14 -0.0638 12 -0.0299 1.2 -0.0319 1.2 -0.1042 1 '3
-0.1044 1.3
LOAN/ASS [- 1.881 [-1.02] r- 0.481 -0.501 [-1.66] [-1.62]
EQUITY/ -0.7478 12 -0.8441' 1.2 -0.6028 1 .2 -0.5354 12 -0.5128
1 ' 1
-0.53S1 1.7
ASS [1.86] [-2.13] [-1.53] [1.34] [-1.34] (1.38]
0.5418 1.0 0.5182a 1.1 0.5474a 1.0 0.574'•3 1.0 0.4942'
1'1
0.5425a 21.0
STAFF ASS 10.33 9.87 10.49 [11.(,9]
2.3
[9.37]
-0.0366
1 '3
[10.37]
0.0178 1.3GOVT 0.1679 1.8 0.3627a 2.2 0.2188 2.0 0.1213
1.40 2.73 1.70 [0.88] [-0.37] 0.17
Observation
1_01 1..01 1_01 1201 1201 1201
N•
238 238 238 238 238 238
R2 49.7 50.4 49.7 49.1 51.0 49.7
F 100.45 103.24 100.38 98.07 105.78 100.72
LM 0.856 0.857 0.858 0.857 0.862 0.863
SW 0.584 0.588 0.579
	
0.581
	 10.564 0.562
r
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.11
RnF. nnri C nnrrPntrntinn 1 QS2F
Dependent
Variables
(1] (2] [3] [4] [5] - [6]Independent
Variables
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.14371 0.1369a 0.1329a 0.1192a 0.1046a 0.115a[4.81] [3.75] (5,12] [4.34] [7.21] [6.45]
-0.0004 1.8
CR5 ASS [-0.78]
-0.00002 2.0
CR10ASS [-0.38]
CR5DEP 0.0002 1.9
r-0.461
CR10DEP 0.00006 18
HERFASS 0.1886a 1.5[2.48]
HERFDEP 0.0874
[0.941 1.8
MSASS 0.0368 1.1 0.0334 1.1 0.0337 1.1 0.0181 11 -0.1050
1
-0,0285 1?
[0.32] [0.30] [0.291 [0.16] [-0.86] [- 0.23]
0.0026a 1.4 0.0013 1.8 0.0028a 1.3 0.0016 15 0.0028a 12 0.0030a 12
NARMON [3.27] [1.35] [3.54] [1.78] [3.87] [4.05]
0.0103a 1.1 0.0093a 1.1 0.0105a 1.1 0.0096a 1.1 0.0109a
i'0
0.0111a 1.0
IPAY/FUND [2.39] [2.21] [2.4.;] [2.27] [2.60] "-.60]
2.4-0.0026 23 0.0009 -0.0025 2,3 0.0010 2.4 -0.0039
^ 3
- 0.0019
LOAMASS [-0.30] [0.11] -0.30 [0.12] [-0.46] ' [-0.22]
EQUITY/ -0.0149 12 -0.0289 1.2 0.0151a 1.2 -0.0284 12 -0.00139
1 
2
-0.0129 1.2
ASS [-0.47] [-0.89] [-0.'7) [-0.88] [-0.44] [-0.40]
0.5739a 2.0 0.4300a 1 0 ',808a ^_. 0 0.4316a 2.1 0.5422a 1 0.59203 2.0
STAFF/ASS 3.041 2.29] ' ,.08
-0.0308
[2.30] [2.88] [3.13]
GOVT -0.0329a 1.6 -0.0131 1.4 1 . 6 -0.0103 1.5 -0.0135
1 '4
-0.0211 1.5
-2.17 -.90 -2.00 [-0.68] [-0.94] -1.43
Observations 759 759 759 759 759 758
N'
158 164 158 164 158 158
RZ 3.9 1.4 3.8 1.4 4.8 3.9
F 4.02 2.09 3.97 2.08 4.75 4.06
LM 0.031 0.023 0.026 0.024 0.037	 • 0.039
SW 0.959 0.958 0.955 0.958 0.968 0.965
Source: Authors own estimates
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If one considers the'concentration-ROE relationship, it can be seen
that only the results for 1987 strongly confirm evidence of the
traditional SCP paradigm. The results for 1987 have the greatest
explanatory power and all the coefficients on the concentration measures
are positive and significant. Conversely, the results for 1987 reject
evidence of the efficiency hypothesis as all the banks' asset size
(MSASS) coefficients are negative and significant - suggesting an
inverse relationship between ROE and bank size.
	 Only in two other
equations, (4) for 1988 and (5) 1986, is the traditional SCP hypothesis
seen to hold. There is even less evidence that the efficiency
hypothesis is valid - only two equations (in 1988) find a positive
relationship between banks' market share and ROE.
Overall, the number of significant coefficients on the ROE
estimates is lower than in the ROA case and the relative importance of
some of the variables also differs markedly. For example, in the ROA
estimates we found a significant positive relationship with the loans-
to-assets variable in all equations from 1987, 7.988 and 1989, yet the
same relationsh' ►
 was only found to hold in one year, 1988, for the ROE
estimates. Sin._larly, the strong positive relationship found between
the equity-to-asset., ratio and ROA disappeared when ROE was used as the
dependent variablc. The results for the ROE estimates, however, do seem
to give further possible support to evidence of expense-preference
behaviour in European banking as illustrated by the positive significant
relationship between the staff expenses ratio and performance in 1986,
1987 and 1989. The relationship between government ownership of banks
and ROE is ambiguous. Table 8.12 provides a summary of the cross-
sectional results from the ROE equations and highlights the above
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Table 8.12 ROE and concentration: summary of cross-sectional results.
Number of significant variables a
 1986 to 1989
Variables	 1986	 1987	 1988	 1989
Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Concentration	 1	 -	 6	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -
Measures
MSASS-	 -	 -	 6	 2	 -	 -	 -
Narmon	 4	 -	 6	 -	 3	 -	 -	 -
IPAY/Fund	 6	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6	 -
Loans/Assets	 -	 -	 -	 -	 -	 6	 -	 -b
Equity/Assets	 -	 -	 -	 1	 -	 -	 -	 -
Staff/Assets	 6	 -	 6	 -	 6	 -	 -	 -
Govt.	 -	 2	 1	 -	 6	 -	 -	 -
Notes:	 a t-statistics significant at the 5 per cent level
b Coefficients would all be significant at the 10 per cent level
Analysis of results taken from the six equations estimated for
each year.
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differences.
To conclude, it can be seen that the cross-sectional equations that
estimate the relationship between before-tax ROE and concentration
perform less well than the previous ROA estimates. This was a finding
confirmed in an earlier study by Bourke (1989). Despite the fact that
the equations do not fulfil the normality of residuals criterion (and
therefore are biased estimations), it does appear that they at least
provide some evidence that the traditional SCP hypothesis holds as
opposed to the efficiency hypothesis. The positive impact of changes in
market demand conditions (NARMON) and staff expense ratios
(STAFF/AE'ETS) on performance also supports the earlier findings. As
with the previous ROA estimates, however, it should be noted that there
appears to be strong seasonality in the results.
8.2.2 Pooled time-series estimates
The cross-sectional estimates o' the SCP relationship described in the
previous two sections suggest evidence that the traditional paradigm
hr,lds - that in markets with higher levels of concentration, the cost of
collusion is lower, and this results in larger profits for all market
participants. There seems to be less evidence of the competing
efficiency hypothesis where firm's market share is seen as the dominant
variable in explaining industry performance. So as to provide an
overall view, we pool our data and estimate the ROA and ROE equations
over the period 1986 to 1989; including four time dummy (binary)
variab.Les (YR86), (YR87), (YR88) and (YR89). We then use an F-test to
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test the null-hypothesis that there is no-seasonality in the data - that
is the estimates over the four years are not statistically significantly
different. The results of our pooled estimates for ROA are shown in
Table 8.13 and for ROE in Table 8.14.
The pooled estimates reported in Table 8.13 appear to confirm the
findings from our cross-sectional results. In five out of the six
equations the concentration measure is seen to have a significant
positive effect on banks' ROA, thus confirming the traditional SCP
hypothesis. Only in equation (6), which uses the deposits Herfindahl
measure of market structure, is the efficiency hypothesis seen to hold.
Changes in market demand conditions, equity-to-assets ratios and staff
expense ratios all appear to have a strong positive impact on banks'
performance. In addition, the loans-to-assets ratio is significantly
negatively related to performance, implying that the greater the
proportion of non-loan earning assets on a bank's balance sheet the
greater the ROA (or that relatively large loan books incur greater
funding cost , thus depressing profitability). The sign on the
coefficients for the cost of funds (IPAY/FUND) proxy variable is always
positive yet insignificant as are the coefficients on the governmer_
ownership variable.
Overall, the explanatory power of the equations are quite good with
adjusted R2 ranging from 37.8 to 38.8, and the diagnostic tests reject
the hypotheses of non-normality of residual variance, heteroskedasticity
and multicollinearity. Finally, the t-statistics on the yearly dummy
variables (YR86 to YR89) suggest evidence of seasonality in the data
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TABLE 8.13
Pooled Estimates of the SCP relationship - ROA and Concen tration
Dependent
Variables [1]
ROA
[2]
ROA
[3]
ROA
[4]
ROA
[5]
ROA
[6]
ROAIndependent
Variables
CR5ASS 0.00006a
[2.05]
CR10ASS 0.0002a
[7.06]
CRIDEP 0.0001a
4.48
CRIODEP 0.0001a[6.99]
HERFASS 0.00722[1.98]
HERFDEP -0.0031
[-0.080]
MASS 0.0179 0.0046 0.0127 0.0033 0.0181 0.0252a
[1.72] [0.46] rl.221 [0.33] [1.66] [J 361
NARMON 0.000005a 0.000004a 0.000004a 0.000005a 0.0000052 0.000005a
r12.081 R2.211 f11031 r12.69 (12.081 12.20
IPAY/FUND 0.00006 0.00007 0.00007 0.00008 0.00005 0.0 W5
rO.521 0.65 rO.701 r0.45 0.40
LOAN/ASS -0.0069a -0.0064a -0.0068a -0.0063a -0.0069a -0.00702
[-14.87] [-14.10]
-14.471 [-13.95] [-14.72] [-14.88]
EQUITY/ASS 0.0696a 0.06362 0.0692a 0.0633a 0.0701a 0.0702a
7 .09
r STAFF/ASS 0.0194a 0.01886a 0.01922 0.0193a 0.0194a 0.0197a
21.32 [21.481 r21.18 [22.14] [21.20] r2l.641
GOUV 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0007
LQ.961 ro. 651 rn	 5 rO.661 ro.981
YR86 0.0041a -0.0052a 0.0023 -0.0019 0.00ega 0.0065a
[2.71] [-2.83] [1.60] [-1.30] [5.191 [5.861
YR87 0.0075a -0.0012 0.0059a 0.0026 ^ .0094a 0.01022
[4.80] [-0.63] [4.40] [1.76] [8.68] [9.79]
YR88 0.0062a -0.0024 0.0044a 0.0010 0.0081a 0.0086a
4.45
-1.35 r3.461 [0.71] [8.73] r9.501
YR89 0.0039x -0.0049a 0.0022 -0.0012 0.0059a 0.0064a
2.76 r-2.641 r1.7 r-0.881 r6.12 6.80
Observations 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769
N' 7 897 900 897 897
RZ 37.8 38.8 38.1 38.7 37.8 37.8
F 180.53 187.67 182.66 187.53 180.15 180.05
LM 3.223 2.064 3.080 3.261 3.291 3.390
SW 0.980 0.983 0.981 0.979	 0.997	 0.995
VIF range 1 0.8-2.7 1	 1.0-2.5 1.1-2.6
_ 
-f1	 0.9-2.1	 ,	 0.7-î 1	 -	 0.6-2.4
Source: Authors own estimates
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(Table 8.13 continued)
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
N* = missing values.
1. Equations were also estimated without the yearly binary variables and F—tests were
undertaken to evaluate the evidence of seasonality in the results.
Equation 1 F — test 2.37	 Equation 2 F — test 2.65
Equation 2 F — test 2.82	 Equation 4 F — test 1.26
Equation 5 F — test 2.60	 Equation 6 F — test 2.80
The 5% critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom is 2.37
so in all equations apart from equation (4) we reject the null hypothesis of no seasonal
affects.
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TABLE 8.14
Pooled Estimates of the SCP relationship - ROE and Concen tration
Dependent
Variables (1]
ROE
[2]
ROE
[3]
ROE
[4]
ROE
[5]
ROE
[6]
ROEIndependent
Variables
MASS 0.0029a
[2.72]
CR10ASS 0.0031a
[2.66]
CR5DEP 0.0025'
3.06
CRIODEP 0.0019a[230]
HERFASS 1.1226a[4.91]
HERFDEP 0.2856a
[1.99]
MSASS -1.1476x -1.1491a -1.172,Aa -1.1356' -1.6222x -1.1557a[-2.94] [-2.94]
-3.01 [-2.89] [-3.99] [-2.89]
NARMON 0.0005a 0.0005a 0.00005a 0.0005a 0.0005a 0.0005a
[37.54] [37.48] 37.78 [37.711. [37.38] (37.71]
IPAY/FUND 0.0049 0.0048 0.0049
M^
0.0048 0.0049 0.0046
[1.12] [1.09] [1.13 [1.09] [1.12] [1.05]
LOAN/ASS -0.0474' -0.0438x -0.0429x -0.0435a -0.0401' -0.0443a[-2.71] [-2.49] -2.45 [-2.47] [-2.28] [-2.51]
EQUITY/ASS -0.0937 -0.0989 -0.0907 -0.0995 -0.0744 -0.0684
[-0.82] [-0.86] f -0.80 [-0.86] [-0.66] [-0.60]
0.5861aSTAFF/ASS 0.5814' 0.5807' 0.5814a 0.5870a 0.5651a
17.0 17.021 r17.101 [17.29] [17.33] [17.25]
GOVT -0.0238 -0.0243 -0.0237 -0.0241 -0.0235 -0.0235[-0.84] [-0.086] [-0.84] [-0.85] [-0.84] [-0.83]
YR86 0.0870 0.0386 0.0918 0.1001 0.1341a 0.1823a
(1.52] [0.54] [1,73] [1.73] [3.52] [4.40]
YR87 0.1428a 0.0969 0.1615a 0.1669a 0.1827a 0.2400a[2.45] [1.32] [3?2] [2.93] [4.51] [6.14]
YR88 0.0789 0.0247 0.0849 0.0899 0.1341a 0.1716a
ri.511 r0.35 1.80 (1.65] (3.88] r5.061
YR89 0.0834 0.0289 0.0932a 0.0964 0.1402a 0.1769a
[1.56] [0.40] 1.96 [1.75] [3.93] [5.02]
Observa tions 4768 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769
N' 897 897 897 900 897 897
R2 36.4 36.4 36.4 36.3 36.7 36.3
F 169.64 169.28 169.90 169.04 171.82 169.19
LM 2.773	 1 2.823 2.734 2.824 1573 2.822
SW 0.463	 1 0.456 0.46., 0.462 0.472 0.459
VIF range 0.9-1.1	 1 1.0-1 , 1	 ,.1	 1 1.0-1.2 1.0-12 1.0-1.2
Source: Authors own estimates
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(Table 8.14 continued)
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
N* = missing values.
1. Equations were also estimated without the yearly binary variables and F—tests were
undertaken to evaluate the evidence of seasonality in the results.
Equation 1 F — test 2.78	 Equation 2 F — test 1.01
Equation 2 F — test 2.93	 Equation 4 F — test 2.84
Equation 5 F — test 2.47	 Equation 6 F — test 2.87
The 5% critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom is 2.37
so in all equations apart from equation (2) we reject the null hypothesis of no seasonal
affects.
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apart from in equation (4). F-tests, reported at the bottom of the
table, were undertaken to confirm the evidence of seasonality in the
results. In all equations (apart from equation 4) we cannot reject the
null hypothesis of no seasonal effects. In other words, the parameter
estimates are sensitive to the data period chosen and exhibit
considerable instability.
Results shown in Table 8.14 give further support for the
traditional SCP paradigm as all market concentration measures are
positive and statistically significantly related to banks' ROE. The
efficiency hypothesis is strongly rejected given that the coefficients
on the (MSASS) variables are all negative and significant. The major
difference between the ROA and ROE estimates is that the latter finds
the equity-to-^^sets ratio to be negative but insignificantly related to
banks performance as measured by ROE. As with the cross-sectional
estimates, however, we cannot reject the assumption of non-normality of
residual variance because the Shapiro-Wilk tests are well below their
critical values. The F-tests again t.onfirm evidence of strong seasonal
effects on the parameter estimates.
8.2.: Pooled country estimates
We have seen from the above that the traditional SCP paradigm appears to
be the dominant hypothesis in explaining the market behaviour of
European banks.	 This section goes further and investigates the SCP
versus efficiency hypothesis for individual European countries.
	 The
equations ;hat are estimated use the asset's Herfindahl measure of
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market structure. Given the poor explanatory power of the estimates
that include ROE as the dependent variable, we chose to estimate only
the ROA specification of the model. Data for individual countries are
pooled across the four-year period. Estimates of the two competing
hypotheses cannot be made for individual years because only one
concentration measure is available for any one country in any one year.
Pooling the data provides variability in the concentration measure (as
it also does for the other country specific variable, NARMON). The
results for individual countries are reported in Table 8.15. In the
case of the Netherlands and Turkey, equations are estimated without the
IPAY/FUND and STAFF/ASSETS variables, respectively. There are also
•'nsufficient observations available for estimating an equation for Irish
banks.
Table 8.15 illustrates the marked instability in parameter
estimates across countries and the substantial differences in the
explanatory power of country equations. There is evidence that the SCP
paradigm unambiguously seems to hold in the following countries' banking
systems: Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. This in
fact, confirms the findings of the Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study which
identified the same countries, apart from the Netherlands, as the
systems which would experience the largest fall in financial service
prices after 1992 integration. The efficiency hypothesis only appears
to hold unambiguously in Norway. In the Danish banking system there is
evidence that the two hypotheses complement one another. Out of the
largest European banking markets, the only explanatory variable that has
consistently the same sign and level of significance is the equity-to-
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TABLE 8.15
Pooled Country Estimates of the SCP relationship, ROA as the dependant variable
Dependant
ariables
Variables
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France GermanyIndependant
Variables
1CONSTANT
0.0080
-0.0171
-0.1460 -0.0134 0.0018 0.0039
[1.13] [-054] [-1.29) [-0.77] [1.07] [0.74]
-0.15073 0.16363 0.04863 0.0723 0.0071a -0.3535a
HERFASS [-2.89] [4.56] [3.73] [0.50] [2.31] [-253]
-0.0255 0.0043 0.0629a -0.0002 0.0192 0.0344
MASS [-1.87] [0.26] [2.40] [-0.02] [0.89] [1.18]
0.0003a 0.0004 0.0003 -0.00003 0.000002 0.00009
NARMON
[3.35] [0.72] [1.40] [-0.13] [0.01] [0.70]
0.0021
-0.0567a
-0.1706 -0.0290a 0.0019a 0.00003
IPAY/FUND [1.25]
-3.06
-1.76 r-3.411 f3.65 0.68
-0.0022 0.0004 0.0234 0.0194a -0.0017a 0.0027
LOANS/ASS [ -151] [0.11] [1.89] [5.31] [-5.45] [1.71]
0.0272 0.1322a 0.1307a 0.16593 0,0154a 0.1092a
[1.02] [5.00] [2.54] [2.90] [9.12] [6.95]
0.1416a 0.0228
-0.4107 -0.3306a 0.0417a 0.2587a
[2.07] [0.14] [-1.76] [-2.30] [6.50] [5.43]
STAFRASS
0.0001 0.0004 n.a. 0.00005 0.0004a -0.0010
GOVT [0.23] [-0.36] [0.03] [2.48] [-1.67]
Observations 163 134 100 43 555	 57-
22	 57N• 9 17 5 1 1
RZ 11.5 23.4 18.6 53.0 20.9 17.4
F 3.64 6.08 3.77 6.92 19.22 15.98
LM 2.431 3.467 1.119 1.879 5.623 1.046
SW 0.983 0.781 0.562 0.910 0.989 0.942
VIF range 1.0-8.2 2.1-4.7 1.3-3.6 1.1-2.1 1.7-6.3 1.2-2.4
Source: Authors own estimaies
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TABLE 8.15 [continued]
Pooled Country Estimates of the SCP relationship
Dependant
Variables
Greece Italy Netherlands Nôrway Luxembour gIndependent
Variable
CONSTANT
O'0706a
-0.0213 -0.0304 -0.0167 0.0164a
[2.80] [-029] [-1.37] [-1.42] [3.86]
-0.0604 4.84903 0.1028a 0.0533 0.1014
HERFASS [-1.82] [2.74] [2.14] [0.48] [1.62]
-0.0267a
-0.6600 -0.0080 0.0663a 0.0749
MASS [-3.40] [-0.62] [-0.90] [2.76] [1.01]
-0.0125 0.0055 0.00007 0.0006
NARMON
removed hi [-0.72] [138] [1.78] [1.14]
correlation
-0.0407a 0.00002 n.a. 0.0009 0.00003
IPAY/FUND [-2.13] ro.051 0.73
-0.0142-0.0191 -0.0322a 0.0077a -0.0163
LOANS/ASS [-0.72] [-3.59] [2.37] [-1.19] f-1.781
0.0516 0.09123 0.2093a 0.4384a 0.3914a
EQUI/ASS [1.04] [9.07] [835] [8.72] [3.56]
-0.5655a
-0.5730a 0.2089 0.2737 0.4143a
[-2.341 [-4.06) [1.55] [0.93] [2.14]
STAFF/ASS
-0.0021 0.0019 -0.0009 -0.0004 n.a
GOVT [-0.80] [0.74] [-0.86] [-0.19]
Observations 31 722 118 110 306
N• 16 11 8 5 7
RZ 40.7 47.5 46.3 46.1 38.2
F 3.94 20.37 15.41 12.44 11.11
LM 1.862 2.483 4.602 3.111 2.161
SW 0.876 0,982 0.917 0.934 0.917
VIF range 12-23,6 2,2-16.2. 1.3-43.2 2.3-, 5 1.6-4.2
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.15 [continued]
Pooled Country Estimates of the SCP relationship
Portgual Spain Sweden Switzerland U.K Turkey
CONSTANT 0.4345a 0.0163a 0.5134a -0.0067 0.0385 0.0042[2.42] [2.47] [5.97] [-0.03] [1.68] [1.74]
0.0510 0.07088 removed 0.1430 -2.0463a 0.1320
HERFASS [0.03] [1.98] virtually a [0.53] [-2.37] [0.69]
constant
-0.4921a
-0.0293 0.0924 -0.0104 0.0309 0.0127
MSASS [-359] [-0.93] [0.32] [-0.531 [0.41] [0.63]
-0.003
-0.00063 0.0000005 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0009
NARMON
[-0.07] [-1.99] [0.17] [-1.86] [-1.67] [-1.59]
-0.1039x
-0.0020a
-0.9385 -0.0798a 0.0485a 0.0621a
IPAY/FUND [-6.54]
-3.37
-1.86 r2.051 4
-0.3680
-0.0082
-0.5625x -0.0079a 0.0135x
-0.0222a
LOANS/ASS [-651] 1-1.95 [-5.18] [-3.69] [4.19] -3.74
removed
high 0.1352a
-1.1640 0.03278 0.1524a 0.6286a
RQUVARq correlation [14.01] [-0.63] [5.13] [10.25] [3.01]
-0.1985 0.3187a 0.0130a 0.4209a 0.0463 n.a.
[-0.64] [3.88] [1.99] [13.71] [0.28]
STAFF/ASS
removed
0.0123 virtually a
-0.0155 0.0003 n.a.
-0.026
GOVT [0.98] constant [-0.56] [0.35] -1.14
Observations 59 463 88 556 615 60
N• 0 25 14 7 460 2
R2 64.0 33.5 56.5 54.4 20.3 33.7
F 11.4 30.15 4.89 83.78 1559 32.61
LM 1.219 2.392 2.444 1.181 2.003 2.341
SW 0.431 0.997 0.920 0.781 0.996 0.784
VIF range 1.4-4.4 1.2-3.9 1.0-1.7	 1 13-7.8 2.2-3.0	 1 1.1-12.6
Source- Authors o.,qn estimates
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assets ratio, suggesting, as in the previous findings, that banks with
greater levels of equity are relatively more profitable. Differences
between individual country estimates are too numerous to investigate,
but it is clear that significant country variations exist when the model
specification is estimated. This, however, is not surprising given the
different regulatory regimes that exist in various countries. In the US
SCP studies, researchers investigate the relationship across hundreds of
markets (which have different branch banking and regulatory regimes) yet
they only tend to report equations for the whole sample combined:
estimates are rarely provided on individual markets. These US studies
evaluate whether the SCP relationship holds across all markets, and
therefore they do expect the:­
 to be variation of estimates for
individual markets. While diiferent regulatory regimes may lead to
different relationships between structure and performance, it remains
likely that market structure will impact on performance.
8.2.4 Conclusion on the SCP paradigm and efficiency hypothesis results
The first part of this chapter has investigated evidence of the
traditional SCP paradiga and the efficiency hypothesis in European
banking markets. Them: seems to be reasonable support for the former
and little for the latter.	 The choice of before-tax ROA as a bank
performance measure yields more robust estimates than the before-tax ROE
measure. In general, the change in market demand conditions variable
(NARMON), equity-to-assets ratio (EQUITY/ASSETS) and staff expenses
ratio (STAFF/ASSETS) all appear to be related positively to banks'
performance.	 In the majority of cases the loans-to-assets ratio
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(LOANS/ASSET) exerts a negative influence on banks' performance. The
positive relationship between the performance measures and the staff
expenses ratio suggest that more profitable banks direct a larger
proportion of their expenses towards staff costs. One can tentatively
state, that given that we find the traditional SCP paradigm to hold,
this may suggest evidence of expense-preference behaviour in European
banking markets. The pooled country estimates also indicate that the
traditional SCP paradigm unambiguously holds for the Belgium, French,
Italian, Dutch and Spanish banking systems and all these countries,
apart from the Dutch system, have been identified by the Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini study as the systems which would experience the most
significant financi 1 service price falls post 1992. The results also
finds evidence of strong seasonal differences between parameter
estimates across )Lars and also instability of parameters across
individual country estimates.
8.3 Cooperation and Rivalry in European Markets
The approach adopted in the first part of this chapter assumes that the
higher the r avel of concentration in a market, the greater the degree of
industry-wide cooperation. All firms in the industry benefit from
higher prices that result from cooperation, therefore, profitability is
assumed to be some positive function of industry-wide cooperation.
Cooperation may, of course, be explicit or implicit. If the largest
firms in the industry set the market price and all other firms are
price-takers, then this is a form of implicit cooperation. The use of
concentration ratios to analyse these relationships also assumes that
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there is a uniform level of industry-wide cooperation and this imposes a
range of restrictions on the role of individual firm market shares and
on inter-firm behaviour. In Section 6.4.2 of this thesis a model is
developed from the Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) approach which enables
us to test for inter-firm behaviour between leading banks across
European banking markets. The evidence to be presented reveals a
complex range of cooperative and rivalrous effects involving leading
firms' markets shares in industry performance determination.
8.3.1 Cross-sectional estimates
Tables 1.16 to 8.19 reports estimates of equation (14) from Chapter 6
for each of the four years. These equations are similar to the ones
estimated earlier in this chapter, the difference being that they
include the interactive variables; S1DMS jj , S2DMS ij ; S3DMS,,; S4DMS,,
and S5DMS W S1DMS,, is a variable interacting the market share of the
largest bank in the market (S1 j ) with one minus the market share of all
other firms (1-MS ij ), S2DMS is equal to S2  (1-MS il ), and so on. Note
that the estimation procedure involves first evaluating the effect of
adding S1DMS jj to the equation. Then S2DMS jj is added to the equation
with S1DMS ii ; then S3DMS jj ; is added, and so on. We test to see if
these interactive terms have a significant impact on banking industry
performance, as measured by the before tax return-on-assets (ROA), by
undertaking sequential F-tests. These test to see if the equation which
includes S1DMS,, is significantly different from the equation that has
no interactive term; the equation that includes S1DMS,, and S2DMS,, is
significantly different from the one that includes only S1DMS, i ; and so
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Table 8.16
Cooperation and Rivarly, Individual Shares Components of Concentration Ratios, 1989
Dependant
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Ind
Variables
nt
ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
CONSTANT 0.0103a 0.0099a 0.0102a 0.0099a 0.0097a 0.0066a[7.53] [7.03] [6.80] [6.61] [5.65] [6.57]
0.0074 0.0079 0.0077 0.0117 0.0121 -0.0045
MSASS [0.47] [0.50] [0.49] [0.74] [0.76] [-0.29]
NARMON
-0.00003 0.00004 0.000006 0.00007 0.00007 -0.0000005
-0.47 ro.081 F0.10 rl.351 f1.37 -0.11
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 0.00002
IPAY/FUND [0.29] [0.32] [0.34] [0.46] [0.45] [0.48]
-0.0060x
-0.0061a -0.0061a -0.0052x
-0.0053x -0.0065a
LOAN/ASS
-8.271
-8.32 -8.30 -6.83
-6.70
0.0604a 0.0595a 0.0594a 0.0600a 0.0598a 0.0574a
EQUI/ASS [11.38] [11.45] [11.40] [11.60] [11.44] [11.28]
0.0658 a 0.0642a 0.0656a 0.0699a 0.0687a 0.0635a
STAFF/ASS [3.42] [3.32] [3.36] [3.60] [3.44] [3.27]
GOVT
0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
0.61 0.60 ro.591 f0.64
-0.0319a
-0.0624 -0.0675a -0.0518
-0.0528
SIDMS [-3.93] [-1.91] [-1.98] [-1.52] [-1.54]
0.0383 0.0489 0.0205 0.0215
S2DMS [0.97] [1.10]
-0.0100
[-0.46]
0.0615a
[0.48]
0.0629aS3DMS f-0.521 r2.25 2.25
-0.0885 x
-0.0930a
S4DMS [-3.67] [-3.11]
0.0078 
S SDMS [0.25]
Observations 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268
N" 229 229 229 229 229 229
R2 18.6 18.6 185 19.5 19.5 17.4
F 29.51 26.33 23.71 23.05 21.11 31.07
VIF range 1.0-1.8 1.0-20.6 1.0-26.0 1.0-26.8 1	 1.0-27.0 1	 1.0-1.8
Source: Aut hors own estimates
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Table 8.16 [continued]
i.`^I^i x^
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
No = missing values.
1.	 7Wo—tail tests were performed on an ordered sequence of the Sn DMS coefficients.
The F—	 statisitcs are as fo
ll
ows:—
Equation 1 F — test 4.60
Equation 2 F — test 1.1
Equation 3 F — test 2.14
Equation 4 F — test 3.10
Equation 5 F — test 2.90
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom are as follows:—
Equation 1,	 = 3.84
Equation 2,	 = 3.00
Equation 3,	 = 2.67
Equation 4,	 = 2.37
Equation 5,	 = 2.10
Sourcer Authors own estimates
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Table 8.17
Cooperation and Rivalry, Individual Share Components of Concentration Ratios, 1988
Dependant
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variablesriab
V ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
CONSTANT -0.0003 0.0011la 0.0138a 0.2096a 0.0199a 0.0022[-0.10] [4.63] [5.39] [8.57] [8.46] [1.11]
0.0717a 0.0364 0.0343 0.0087 0.00008 0.0788a
MSASS [3.14] [1.83] [1.70] [0.47] [0.00] [355]
NARMON 0.0004x -0.0003x -0.0004a -0.0001 -0.0003a 0.0004a3.21
-2.29 -2.95 -1.19
-2.59
0.00003
-0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00005
-0.00002 0.00002
IPAY/F JND [0.22] [-0.28] [-0.31] [-0.50] [-0.17] [0.18]
-0.0074x
-0.0069x -0.0066a -0.0015
-0.0014x
-0.0074a
LOAN/ASS
-7.941
-853 -8.10 -1.81
-1.72
0.0868a 0.0663a 0.0665a 0.0743a 0.0688a 0.0877a
EQUI/ASS [14.60] [1255] [12.63] [15.07] [14.36] [14.83]
0.0342 0.0176 0.0255 0.0736a 0.1010a 0.0343
STAFF/ASS [1.59] [0.94] [1.35] [4.11] [5.76] [1.59]
0.0010 0.0010 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 0.0010GOVT [0.74] [0.87] [0.90] [1.02] [1.05] 0.76
0.0163a 0.6357a 0.6484a 0.8632a 0.8924a
SIDMS [11.35] [18.84] [19.12] [24.40] [26.06]
-0.7483 x -0.7319x -0.9956x
-1.0452a
SIDMS [-19.31] [-18.75] [-24.12] [-26.04]
S3DMS -0.0689 1,.0497 0.0339
-1.91 '.101 r 1.48
-0.3894 0.4641
S4DMS [-1.43; [1.90]
-0.8539
SSDMS [-143]
Obse rvations 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541
N. 272 272 272 272 274 272
R2 19.6 39.2 39.6 40.7 41.4 19.6
F 36.44 84.25 77.17 97.45 103.15 41.35
VIF range 1.0-1.7 1.0-6.9 1.0-6.9 1	 1.0-10.6 1.0-30.0 1	 1.0-1.7
Sot:rc-: Authors own estimates
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Table 8.17 [coninuted]
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values signifient at the 5% level
N' = missing values.
1.	 IWO—tail tests were performed on an ordered sequence of the Sn DMS coefficients.
The F—	 statisitcs are as follows:—
Equation 1 F — test 9.33
Equation 2 F — test 107.46
Equation 3 F — test 108
Equation 4 F — test 1.26
Equation 5 F — test 0.99
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom are as follows:—
Equation 1,	 = 3.84
Equation 2,	 = 3.00
Equation 3,	 = 2.67
Equation 4,
	 = 2.37
Equation 5,
	 = 2.10
Source: Authors own estimates
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Table 8.18
Cooperation and Rivalry, Individual Share Components of Concentration Ratios, 1987
Dependant
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
aria ble
e
s
Varia
V ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
CONSTANT -0.0049 -0.00006 -0.0003 0.0006 0.0072a 0.0099a[-1.75] [-0.03] [0.12] [0.25] [2.47] [5.01]
0.0119 0.0178 0.0171 0.0190 0.0138 0.0174
MSASS [0.51] [0.94] [0.89] [0.99] [0.72] [0.72]
NARMON
0.000004a 0.0000003 0.0000003 0.0000003 0.0000002 0.000005a
6.8 FO.671 r0.70 ro.671 r0.34
0.0009 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0005
IPAY/FUND [1.34] [0.41] [0.39] [0.40] [0.33] [0.68]
-0.0103a
-0.00328 -0.0029a -0.0027a -0.0001
-0.0098aLOAN/ASS
-7.461
-2.66 -2.43 r-2.191 -0.09 -
0.0939a 0.0961a 0.0966a 0.0967a 0.1042a 0.1013a
EQUI/ASS [10.59] [13.23] [13.20]
0.0060a
[13.22]
0.0060a
[13.88]
0.0056"
[11.13]
0.0196a0.0158a 0.0059a
STAFF/ASS [12.19] [5.11] [5.12] [5.14] [4.85] [15.95]
-0.0012
-0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0012 -0.0013GOVT [-0,57] [-0.65] [-0.65] [-0.66] [=0.71] [-0.62]
0.1156a 0.6459a 0.6467a 0.6484a 0.6433a
SIDMS [7.30] [21.78] [21.76] [21.79] [21.79]
-0.7100a -0.7019a -0.7010a -0.7260'
S2DMS [-19.88] [-18.13] [-18.11 18.66[-	 ]
SIDMS -0.0168a -0.0137a 0.0276
-0.54 r-0.441
-0.0155a
r0.85
0.0047
SIDMS [-1.22] [0.35]
-0.1977a
SIDMS [-1.89]
Observations 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201
N' 238 238 238 238 238 238
R2 48.4 60.1 60.01 60.1 60.8 36.5
F 69.28 135.91 122.24 111.33 105.13 67.15
VIF range 1.0-1.3 1.0-6.9 1.0-6.9 1.0-6.9	 1 1.0-7.0	 1 1.0-1.1
Source: Authors wn estimL:__,;
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UTable 8.18 [coninuted]
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a values significant at the 5% level
N• = missing values.
1.	 Wo—tail tests were performed on an ordered sequence of the Sn DMS coefficients.
The F— statisitcs are as fo
ll
ows:—
Equation 1 F — test 14.62
Equation 2 F — test 38.96
Equation 3 F — test 1.94
Equation 4 F — test 1.98
Equation 5 F — test 2.01
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relvant degrees of freedom are as follows:—
Equation 1,
	 = 3.84
Equation 2, 3.00
Equation 3,
	 - 2.67
Equation 4,
	 = 2.37
Equation 5,	 = 2.10
!t )urce: F ^..rors own estimates
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Table 8.19
Cooperation and Rivalry, Individual Share Componenets of Concentration Ratios, 1986
Dependant
Variables
111 [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]lndependant
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
CONSTANT -0.0089a -0.0095x -0.0115x -0.0072a -0.0041a -0.00021[-3.23] [-3.40] [-3.86] [-2.53] [-0.85] [-1.39]
-0.0056 0.0068 -0.0049 -0.0063 -0.0058
-0.0022
MSASS [-0.39] [-0.47] [-0.35] [-0.46] [-0.43] [-0.15]
NARMON
0
.0010a 0
.0010a O.0011a 0.0014a 0.0013a 0.009a
rg.59i f9.68 f9.871 r12.32 r6.561 f9.541
0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0009 0.0009 0.0005
IPAY/FUND [1.31] [1.27] [1.37] [1.66] [1.68] [0.87]
-0.0058a
-0.0057' -0.0058a -0.0031a -0.00319a
-0.0059aLOAN/ASS
-5.441
-5.36 -5.47 -2.88 -2.941 r-5.4
0.0308a 0.03109a 0.0304a 0.03374a 0.0337a 0.0315a
EQUI/ASS [7.49] [7.56] [7.37] [8.62] [8.60] [7.62]
0.1214a 0.1237a 0.1174a 0.1775a 0.1786a 0.1189a
STAFF/ASS [4.96] [5.05] [4.76] [7.28] [7.31] [4.83]
0.0022 0.0022 0.0022 0.0023 0.0023 0.0024GOVT fl.671 rl.681 r1.69 1.85
0.0403a 0.0936a 0.0889a 0.2968a 0.2703a
SIDMS [2.94] [2.19] [2.08] [6.28] [4.61]
- 0.06055 a -0.0736a -0.3079a
-0.2856a
S2DMS -2321 [-1.99] [-5.94] [-4.80]
S3DMS 0.0421 0.0937 0.08641.65 [1.401 r1.70
-0.2718
-0.1601
S4DMS [-1.46] [-1.07]
-0.1437S5DMS [-0.77]
Observations 759 759 759 759 759 759
N. 158 158 158 158 158 158
RZ 23.9 34.0 34.4 34.6 34.7 22.9
F 24.60 22.08 20.35 27.21 24.97 26.53
VIF range 1.0-2.2	 1 1.0-9.6 1.0-13.7 1.0-19.1 1.0-48.0 1	 1.0-2.2
Source: Authors own estimates
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TABLE 8.19 [continued]
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
N' = missing values.
1.	 Wo—tail tests were performed on an ordered sequence of the Sn DMS coefficients,
The F—statisics are as fo llows:—
Equation 1 F — test 8.06
Equation 2 F — test 10.34
Equation 3 F — test 1.46
Equation 4 F — test 1.53
Equation 5 F — test 1.62
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relvant degrees of freedom are as follows:—
Equation 1,	 = 3.84
Equation 2,	 = 3.00
Equation 3,	 = 2.67
Equation 4,	 = 2.37
Equation 5,	 = 2.10
Source: Authors own estimates
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on. We use only five interactive terms so we can directly compare our
findings with the results obtained earlier from the equations which use
the five-firm assets concentration ratios (equation (1) in Tables 8.3 to
8.6). In particular, we are investigating the inter-firm behaviour of
the top five firms so as to provide further insight into the
concentration-performance relationship.
Table 8.16 reports the results for 1989. Note that a positive
coefficient on the interactive term implies cooperation whereas a
negative term implies rivalry. The coefficient on the S1DMS variable is
negative and, in four of the five equations, insignificant. This
confirms the proposition that leaders are lowering their own
profitability through their rivalrous behaviour. The coefficients on
S2DMS are positive but nowhere near normal levels of statistical
significance. The coefficients on S3DMS, however, are positive (in two
out of three cases) implying that a large third bank appears on average
to induce cooperation with leaders rather than rivalry. On the other
hand, the coefficients on the S4DMS variable has a large significantly
negative impact, suggesting that a large fourth bank on average induces
rivalry with leaders. The coefficient on the S5DMS is positive yet
insignificant. The F-statistics on S2DMS and S3DMS taken together is
2.14, below the critical value of 2.67 thus suggesting that the market
shares of the second and third largest banks do not, on average, affect
banking industry profitability. On the other hand, the F-statistics do
suggest that the largest bank as well as the fourth and fifth banks have
a significant impact on industry profitability. So for 1989 it appears
that complex cooperative and rivalrous behaviour is taking place between
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the largest banks in the industry. If we compare this with the result
from equation (1) of Table 8.3, which finds a negative relationship
between the five-firm assets concentration ratio and banking industry
performance (ROA), it implies that rivalry is the dominant form of
behaviour between the leading firms, thus driving down industry
profitability. These findings for 1989, which are quite different
compared with other years, could be the result of estimation bias
brought about by multicollinearity in the explanatory variables as
indicated by the size of the variance inflationary statistic in
equations (2) to (5).
Tables 8.17 to 8.19 report the results for 1- 188, 1987 and 1986.
Here the Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) methodology suggests that inter-
firm behaviour is similar across the years and also t-asier to interpret.
For each three years the coefficients on the S1DMS variable is positive
and strongly significant implying a large leading bank, appears on
average to encourage cooperation with leaders and increase banking
industry profitability. The coefficient on the S2DMS variable, however,
has a large significantly negative impact, so a large second bank seems
to induce rivalry with leaders rather than cooperation. The F-statistic
confirms that the addition of S2DMS to the equation does have a
significant impact on industry profitability.
Estimated coefficients on the interactive terms for the more
distant rivals (S3DMS, S4DMS and S5DMS) have different signs and are
statistically insignificant. The F-statistics for the equations that
include these variables suggest that they ure not significantly
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different from the equations that include only S1DMS and S2DMS. This
means that the market shares of the third, fourth and fifth largest
banks do not affect banking industry profitability as measured by
before-tax ROA. Despite the strong rivalry brought about by a large
second bank, however, we do find for all three years that there is a
positive relationship between the five-firm assets concentration ratio
and ROA, as reported in equation (1) of Tables 8.4, 8.5 and 8.6. This
suggests that although rivalry is evident, some form of cooperation
between market leaders maintains banking industry profitability levels
higher than would be the case if no cooperation took place. Or to put
it another way, a large second bank acts as a strong rival to leaders,
average banking industry profit levels are l ower than would be the case
if all banks cooperated fully ie. if all the signs on the interactive
market share terms were positive. A furthe_ inspection of the results,
for 1986 to 1988, however, leads us to be much more cautious with our
final interpretation. In Tables 8.17 to 8.19 the coefficients on the
two interactive variables that significantly affect banking industry
profitability, S1DMS and S2DMS, are of a similar magnitude and sum to
close to zero. The t-statistics on these coefficients also have similar
magnitudes. Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) find no such relationships and
whilst it is unclear why the coefficients should sum to zero, it draws
attention to the nature of the .3nDMS variables, and S1DMS and S2DMS in
particular. Simple correlation coefficients calculated for the SnDMS
variables show that the degree of correlation between S1DMS and S2DMS is
high - 0.932 over the four years under study, and exceeding 0.91 in each
individual year. Correlation coefficients between the other interactive
market share terms are lower rangii_g between 0.252 and 0.75 as
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illustrated in Appendix 18. It appears that the partial correlation
tests for multicollinearity in the regression equations, the VIF test,
are misleading as they do not suggest evidence of a strong relationship
between the S1DMS and S2DMS variables, yet simple correlation
coefficients do.
In addition, we also find that the nature in which the interactive
market share variables are constructed implies a collinearity bias when
the market shares of the largest firms are of a similar size. For
example, the S1DMS variable is calculated by, S1 j (1-MS il ) and the S2DMS
by S2  (1-MS i d .	 In industries where the market share of the two
largest firms are identical, the S1DMS and S2DMS variables will be
identical and hence, perfectly correlated. Presumably, as Kwoka and
Ravenscroft (1986) examine 3186 lines of business they do not expect the
market shares of the top, two, three or four firms in each line of
business to be of similar size. If they are, then this could present
serious collinearity problems, which indeed are not addressed in the
Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) study. It is also the case that if the
market share of firms (MS^ j ) are in most cases very small, then the
interactive term becomes virtually the same as the market share of the
interacting leading firm. That is to say, for S1 (1-MS,,), if MS il are
small then the S1 (I-MS,,) variable becomes approximately the same as S1
(the market share of the leading firm). (In fact we find this to be the
case in our sample of European banks so that there is little difference
between S1 and Sl ( 1-MS,
,
), S2 and S2 ( 1-M id and so on).
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Overall, the results presented above, therefore, suggest that
because the market share of the two largest banks across European
markets are similar in size, then this leads the S1DMS and S2DMS
variables to be highly correlated which creates bias in our estimates
(although, it does not appear to reduce the significance of the
coefficient across equations as one would expect).
8.3.2 Pooled time-series estimates
The results for the pooled sample of European banks between 1986 and
1989 are reported in Table 8.20.	 These clearly confirm the
relationships discusser in the previous section of the thesis. The
coefficient on the S1DMS variable is positive and statistically
significant across all jquations, suggesting that larger leading firms
generally increase, on average, banking industry profitability through
cooperation. The introduction of a second large firm, however, appears
to induce rivalry with leaders rather than cooperation. Our attention
is again drawn to the coefficients on the j1DMS and S2DMS variables
which have very similar magnitudes but different signs. The level of
statistical si g nificance on these terms is also remarkably alike. As
discussed above, the explanation for this appears to relate to
collinearity problems, between S1DMS and S2DMS. Bearing in mind the
estimation bias caused by collinearity, an initial interpretation would
suggest that from the F-statistics the addition of S2DMS to the equation
has a statistically significant impact on industry ROA. The F-test on
S1DMS and S2DMS taken together is 657.7, well above the critical value
of 3.00.	 Larger second-ranked banks appear to lower significantly
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TABLE 8.20
Cooperation and Rivalry, Individual Share Components of Concentration Ratios - Pooled estimates
Dependant
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
CONSTANT 0.005la 0.0063a 0.0060a 0.007la 0.0115a 0.0078a[5.08] [6.84] [6.24] [7.33] [10.98] [11.36]
0.0186 0.0089 0.0095 0.0121 0.0051 0.0231aMSASS [1.82] [0.95] [1.01] [1.29] [0.55] [2.27]
NARMON 0.000004a 0.000002a 0.000002a 0.000002a 0.000001a 0.000005a11.84 r5.291 F5.23 r5.071 r3.85 44
0.00007
-0.00007 -0.000005 -0.000005
-0.000008 0.00006
IPAY/FUND [0.62] [-0.06] [-0.05] [-0.04] [-0.01] [0.47]
-0.007la
-0.0052x -0.0053x -0.0045x
-0.0022a
-0.0070LOAN/ASS	 1 [- 15.20]
-11.83 -11.81 -9.70
-4.42
0.0690a 0.0706a 0.0703a 0.0712a 0.0763a 0.0704
EQUI/ASS [22.60] [25.14] [24.94] [25.35] [27.14] [23.15]
0.019la 0.011la 0.011 la 0.0110a 0.0097a 0.0198
STAFF/ASS [2059] [12.30] [12.20] [12.20] [10.84] [21.95]
0.0007
GOVT 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.000710 -961 r1.18 ri.181 r1.18
0.0229a 0.4261a 0.426la 0.4408a 0.4699a
SIDMS [3.72] [25.50] [2551] [26.23] [27.97]
-0.4962x -0.5034x -0.5223x
-0.569la
S2DMS [-25.64] [- 24.751 [-25.49]
0.0352
[-27.51]
0.0613S3DMS 0.0142fl.151 r1.76 0.79
-0.0537
-0.0007
S•.DMS [-1.95] [-0.07]
-0.1989SSDMS [-0.39]
Observations 4769 4769 476 4769 4769 4769
N• 897 897 897 897 897 897
R2 25 .7 37.4 214.30 38.0 39.8 25.6
F 156.63 237.95 3.216 199.92 197.76 176.39
LM 2.291 2.394 0.990 2.961 2.893 1.921
Sw 0.983 0.986 1	 1.1-10.3 0.897 0.906 0.986
VIF rang e- 1.0-1.2 1.0-9.8 1.0-10.6 1.0-11.1 1.0-1.1
Sourc:..:-.uthors own estimates
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TABLE 8.20 [CONTINUED]
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
N' = missing values.
Wo—tail tests were performed on an ordered sequence of the Sn DMS coefficients, testing to see whether additional SnDMs variables
contained additional explanatory power. The F—statistic is a test of linear restriction imposed in equation [1] to [5]. The F—tests are
as follows:—
Equation 1
	
F — test 13.48	 Equation 2F — test 657.70
Equation 3	 F — test 133	 Equation 4F — test 1.337
Equation 5	 F — test 1.064
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom are as follows:—
Equation 1,
	 = 3.84
Equation 2,	 = 3.00
Equation 3,	 = 2.60
Equation 4,	 = 237
Equation 5,	 = 2.21
Source: Authors own estimates
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leaders' profit margins. More distant leading firms (S3DMS, S4DMS and
S5DMS) seem to have, on average, no impact on banking industry
profitability. These results yet again, have to be treated with caution
given the collinearity problems and methodological biases identified in
the previous section of this thesis.
One way of possibly dealing with this problem is by examining
equations which do not include the S1DMS and S2DMS variables together as
shown in Table 8.21 and 8.22. It can be seen that the variance
inflationary factor (VIF) ranges are lower than in the previous
estimates and that in table 8.21 the S1DMS variable exerts a strong
positive influence on industry profitability, whereas in Table 8.22, the.
S2DMS variable is seen to exert a statistically significant negative
influence on average industry profitability. The F-test statistics, yet'
again, confirm the significant influence of these two variables on
industry profitability, whereas the relative size of the third, fourth
and fifth banks have no impact on industry profitability. Further
evidencz of the rivalrous impact of the second largest bank can be found
if we examine the relationship between the difference in size between
the two largest banks across European banking markets as illustrated in
Table 8.23. Here we include a variable S1 j -S2 j (market share of the
largest bank in market minus the market share of the second largest
bank in market ) which gets rid of the correlation problem. It can be
seen that there is a strong positive a statistically significant
relationship between the difference in market share of the two top banks
and average industry profitability. This implies that the larger is the
difference in size between the two top banks the greater average
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TABLE 8.21
Cooperation and Rivalry, Individual Sbare Components of Concentration Ratios - Pooled estimates. Excluding S1DMS variable
Dependent
Variables [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]Independent
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
CONSTANT 0.0058a 0.0069a 0.0073a 0.0092 0.00078a[5.08] [6.68] [6.92] [7.99] [11.36]
0.0186 0.0146 0.0155 0.0126 0.0231a
MSASS [1.82] [1.43] [1.52] [1.24] [2.27]
0.00005a 0.000004a 0.000004a 0.000004a 0.000005aNARMON [11.84] ril.641 [11.671 r11.43 2.44
0.00007 0.00006 -0.00006 -0.00006 0.00006
IPAY/FUND [0.62] [0.51] [0.52] [0.56] [0.47]
-0.0071a
-0.0063a -0.0061x -0.0052x
-0.0070a
LOAN/ASS [-15.20]
-13.23 -12.2 -9.59
-14.92
0.0690a 0.0708 0.0711a 0.0732a 0.0704a
EQUI/ASS [22.60] [23.19] [23.27] [23.68] [23.15]
0.0190a 0.0188a 0.01889a 0.0186a 0.0198a
STAFF/ASS [20.59] [20.39] [20.46] [20.20] [21.95]
0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007GOVT [0.961 r0.95 0.95 0.95
0.0229a 0.0553a 0.6556a 0.0533a
SIDMS [3.72] [6.91] [6.94] [6.66]
SIDMS
S3DMS -0.0697 -0.0734a - J.0669
-1.29 -1.66 -1.09
S4DMS -0.0180 0.001=8
[-1.81] [0.52]
-0.0844
SIDMS [-1.10]
Observations 4769 4769 476 4769 4769
N' 897 897 897 897 897
RZ 25.7 26.0 26.2 26.4 25.6
F 156.63 145.12 131.04 121.19 176.39
LM 2.489 2.794 2.719 2 '24 .921
J.986SW 0.986 0.990 0.959 '*.931
VIF range 1.0-1.1 1.0-2.0 1.0-2-1 1.G-2.3 1.0-1.1
Source: Authors own estimates
TABLE 8.2.1 [CONTTNLTED]
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5 17o level
--N` = missing values.
Tivo —
 tail tests were performed on an ordered sequence of the Sn DMS coefficients, testing to see whether additional SnDMs variables
contained additional explanatory power. The F—statistic is a test of linear restriction imposed in equation [1] to [5]. The F— tests are
as follows:—
Equation 1
	
F — test 12.24	 Equation 2F — test 1.77
Equation 3	 F — test 1.09	 Equation 4F — test.0.964
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom are as follows:—
Equation 1,
Equation 2,	 = 3.00
Equation 3,	 = 2.60
Equation 4,	 = 237
Source: Authors own estimatés
TABLE 8.22
Cooperation and Rivalry, Individual Share Components of Concentration Ratios - Pooled estimates. Excluding SiMAS variat
Dependent
Variables [1] [2] [3] (4] [5]Independent
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
CONSTANT 0.0109a 0.0106a 0.0111la 0.0137a 0.00078a[11.15] [10.42] [10.59] [11.86] [11.36]
0.0275a 0.0280a 0.0292a 0.0259a 0.0231a
MSASS [2.70] [2.75) [2.85] [2.54] [2.27]
NARMON
0.00005a 0.000005a 0.000005a 0.000005a 0.000005a[12.60) f 12.54 [12.581 r12.21 2.44
0.00003 0.00003 -0.00003 0.00004 0.00006
IPAY/FUND [0.25] [0.26] [0.271 (0.30] [0.47]
-0.0067x
-0.0068x -0.0066x -0.0054x
-0.0070a
LOAN/ASS [-14.21]
-14.10 -13.08 -9.83
-14.92
0.0719a 0.0717a 0.0721a 0.0749a 0.0704a
EQUI/ASS (23.58) [23.40] [23.48] [24.13] [23.15]
0.0202a 0.0201 I	 0.0202a 0.0199a 0.0198a
STAFF/ASS [22.32] [22.20] [22.28) [21.88] [21.95]
0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007GOVT 1,02 [1.021 r1.02 1.031 10. 981
SIDMS
-0.0319x
-0.0382a -0.0392°" -0.0475a
S2DMS [-4.48) [-3.90]
0.0127
[-4.00] [-4.80]
S3DMS 0.02004 0.03390.95' 1.44 1.44
S4DMS -0.0189 0.0115
[-1.04] [1.02]
-0.1098
SSDMS [-0.97]
Observations 4769 4769 476 4769 4769
N* 897 897 897 897 897
R2 26.0 26.0 26.0 26.1 25.6
F 157.67 140.12 126.70 11857 176.39
LM 2.041 2.311	 1
,	 0.984
2.778 2.819 1.921
Sw 0.976 0.971 0.960 0.986
VIF range 1.0-1.2 1.0-2.2 1.0-2.3 1.0-2.4 1.0-1.1
Source: Authors own estimates
TABLE 8.22 [CONTINUED]
NOTES:
t n statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
N' = missing values.
TWo— tail tests were performed on an ordered sequence of the Sn DMS coefficients, testing to see whether additional SnDMsvariables
contained additional explanatory power. The F—statistic is a test of linear restriction imposed in equation [1] to [5]. The F—tests are
as follows:—
Equation 1
	 F — test 24.14	 Equation 2F — test 1..61
Equation 3	 F — test 2.29	 Equation 4F — test 0.93
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom are as follows:—
Equation 1,	 =	 3.84
Equation 2,
	 =	 3.00
Equation 3,	 =	 2.60
Equation 4,
	 =	 237
Source: Authors owr ;stimates
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TABLE 8.23
Difference in the top Two Banks' Market Shares and Industry Profitability
[1]Independent
Variables ROA
CONSTANT 0.0003
[039]
WASS —0.0154[-1.60]
NARMON 0.000002a
[3.99]
0.00005
IPAY/FUND [0.45]
Notes:	 Si j = Market share of largest bank in country j
LOAN/ASS —	 9a S2 j = market share of second largest bank in country j[-113.43
3.43] t	 = Statistic in paretheses
0.06691a
a	 s Values significant at the 5 %O level
EQUI/ASS [23.63] N• = missing values
STAFF/ASS 0.01130a
[12.	 a]
GOVT 0.0008
1.05
0.38411a
S1 j— S2 j [23.58]
Observations 4769
N` 1197
R2 35.6
F 247.86
LM 0.4419
SW 0.992
VIF 1.0-1.4
Source: Authors own estimates
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industry profitability and hence collusive (or monopoly) profits. The
closer the market shares of the two top banks the lower average industry
profitability, although the positive coefficient implies the rivalrous
impact of a large second sized-bank will never compete away all the
cooperative profit (hence the positive coefficients on the concentration
ratio estimates found earlier).
Whilst the results indicate duopoly behaviour in European banking
markets they also lead us to question the validity of using the market
shares of the largest firms to identify cooperative and rivalrous
behaviour within individual industries if the largest firms are of a
similar size. It seems that differencing market shares of the top firms
may be a partial solution to this problem. As the Kwoka and Ravenscroft
(1986) approach, which is in the spirit of Demsetz (1973) and the
Chicago School, suffers from deficiencies when the leading firms are of
a similar size, one may have to turn to alternative methodologies to
deal with this problem. It may, in fact, be more relevant to
investigate simple or,: or two-firm concentration-profits relationships.
8.3.3 Pooled country-estimates - a note
In Section 8.2.3 we reported results which tested for evidence of the
traditional SCP paradigm and efficiency hypothesis in individual
European banking market. We attempted to estimate the cooperation
versus rivalry form of equations for individual years, but the results
were subject to severe multicollinearity problems. In particular, for
every country estimate at least one of the interactive terms (S1DMS,
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S2DMS etc.) was rejected by the statistical package because they were
too highly correlated. Even when these variables were dropped the
variance inflationary factor (VIF) ranged across equations between 9.6
and 248.4 suggesting significant estimation bias. As a result, these
equations are not reported in this thesis.
8.4 Conclusion
Two competing hypotheses with regard to market structure and performance
are the traditional SCP paradigm and the efficiency hypothesis. In the
first part of this Chapter, results are presented for tests of both
hypotheses with respect to the European banking industry using poole-
and annual data for the period 1986 to 1989. The cross-sectional and
pooled results generally support the traditional SCP paradigm as al,
explanation for the market behaviour of European banks, with little
evidence to suggest that the efficiency hypothesis holds. We also find
that changes in market demand conditions, the equity-to-assets ratio and
the st,ff expenses ratio appear to be significant and positively related
to banking industry performance (the latter possibly suggesting evidence
of expense-preference behaviour in European banking). In the -aajority
of cases, the loans-to-assets ratio exerts a negative in_luence on
banks' profitability. The pooled country estimates indicate that the
traditional SCP paradigm holds for the Belgium, French, Italian, Dutch
and Spanish banking systems. It is in these countries, where the
competitive effects of EC financial sector integration envisaged by the
Price Waterhouse/Cecchini study, are likely to have the most noticeable
effects on producer surplus losses following the completion of th, EC
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internal market. or to put another way - there will be a greater
opportunity to compete away oligopoly banking industry profits in these
particular EC countries. The results also find, however, strong
differences between parameter estimates across years and also
instability of parameters across individual country estimates.
The second part of this Chapter adopts a methodology which allows
us to test for inter-firm behaviour between leading banks across
European banking markets. From a first interpretation, the results
indicate that a large leading bank appears on average to promote
cooperation with other leaders and this, on average, increases banking
industry profitability. A large second bank, however, seem- on average,
to induce rivalry with leaders rather than cooperation. The impact of
more distant rivals does not seem to affect the profitabil_ ':y of banks
in the industry. Larger second banks appear to induce rivalrous
conjectures which reduce, on average, industry profitability, but this
reduction is not large enough to bring about a negative relationship
between industry profitability and the market concentration variable.
Further analysis of our results, however, reveal that because the market
shares of the two largest banks in individual F-.ropean markets are
similar in size, this leads the interactive market share variables,S1DMS
and S2DMS, to be highly correlated causing estimation bias.
Subsequently, this casts doubts on the methodology and interpretation of
cooperative and rivalrous behaviour in European banking. We also find
that the nature in which the interactive market share variables are
constructed implies a collinearity bias when the market shares of the
largest firms are of a similar size. This problem is i.ot addressed in
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the Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) study. To counter the collinearity
problem, we suggest dropping either the S1DMS or S2DMS variables from
our models, so the two variables are not included in the same equation,
and examine their influence on industry profitability. Alternatively,
one can examine differences in market share between S1 and S2 and the
relationship with industry profitability. By adopting these approaches,
on our pooled cross-sectional data, we still observe evidence of duopoly
behaviour, the second largest bank appears to act as a strong rival to
the market leader.
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Chapter 9
Conclusion and Limitations
9.1 Conclusion
SCP modelling forms a substantial part of industrial organisations
literature and has been widely tested on the US banking system, although
little empirical work to date has been undertaken on European banking
markets. This thesis aims to rectify the imbalance in the literature by
providing a detailed, in-depth and original analysis of structure-
performance relationships in European banking markets.
The general findings of our research are as follows. Firstly, when
we test for evidence of the two competing hypotheses - the traditional
SCP paradigm and efficiency hypothesis - across European banking
markets, we find strong evidence that the former holds. In other words,
the degree of concentration in European banking markets lowers the cost
of collusion between firms and increases average industry profitability.
This confirms the earlier findings of Molyneux and Thornton (1992).
Confronted with this evidence, regulators might feel compelled to
prohibit large bank mergers so as to reduce, or at least restrict, the
build-up of monopoly power across European banking systems. Our later
empirical work aims to investigate this relationship further and an
initial interpretation of these results suggests the following. A large
leading bank does appear, on average, to promote cooperation with other
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market leaders and this seems to increase banking industry
profitability. However, the appearance of a large second bank, seems,
on average, to induce rivalry with leaders rather than cooperation. The
impact of more distant rivals does not seem to affect the profitability
of banks in the industry. As we mentioned in the last chapter, it
appears that larger second banks induce rivalrous conjectures which
reduce, on average, industry profitability, but this reduction is not
large enough to bring about a negative relationship between industry
profitability and the market concentration variable.
Further analysis of our results, however, reveal that because the
market shares of the two largest banks in individual European markets
are similar in size, this leads the interactive market share variables,
S1DMS uLLd S2DMS, to be highly correlated causing estimation bias.
Subsequently, this casts doubts on the methodology and interpretation of
cooperative and rivalrous behaviour in European banking. We also find
that the nature in which the interactive market share variables are
constructed implies a collinc.arity bias when the market shares of the
largest firms are of a similar size. This problem is not addressed in
the Kwoka and Ravenscroft (1986) study. To counter the collinearity
problems we suggest dropping either the S1DMS or S2DMS variables from
our models, so the two variables are not included in the same equation,
and examine their influence on industry profitability. Alternatively,
one can examine differences in market share between S1 and S2 and the
relationship with industry profitability. By adopting these approaches,
on our pooled cross-sectional data, we still observe evidence of duopoly
behaviour, the second largest bank appears to act as a strong rival to
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the market leader.
In the interests of competition it may well be justified to
encourage mergers between large banks so they can act as strong rivals
to the leading institution. Our evidence also finds that the third,
fourth and fifth sized banks do not seem to affect average industry
profitability, suggesting that they neither cooperate nor compete with
the largest bank, thus operating independently. From these results one
may tentatively suggest that mergers between these banks may be
justified on competitive grounds if the combined market shares of the
merged bank is similar to the largest bank. If a merger creates an
institution which is substantially larger than the present largest bank,
then this may well result in explicit or implicit collusion. As
national authorities generally use merger policies in the financial
sector in a flexible manner so as to improve the efficiency of the
banking system (see Section 3.2.3.3) it may well be in their interests
to consider this policy prescription.
If we examine the individual country estimates, bearing in mind the
problems associated with this analysis, we find evidence that the SCP
paradigm unambiguously seems to hold in Belgium, France, Italy, the
Netherlands and Spain. Our findings are in line with the Price
Waterhouse/Cecchini study which identified the same countries, apart
from the Netherlands, as the markets which would experience the largest
financial service price falls post 1992. As such these banking markets
appear to offer the greatest incentive for new entrants to benefit from
(and compete away) high average industry margins. We noted earlier in
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this thesis that the gains from EC financial sector integration computed
by Price Waterhouse/Cecchini may be overstated because the final
estimates did not take into account producer surplus losses. Our
individual country estimates suggest that oligopoly profits accrue in
Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. It is in these EC
banking markets where the potential for producer surplus losses would be
the greatest in the event of financial integration.
9.2 Limitations of the Study
Overall, the above analysis provides an informative and new
insight, employing a hitherto infrequently used and substantial dataset
to the SCP relationship across European banking markets, from which
certain tentative policy prescriptions can be drawn. The analysis,
however, is not without its limitations as identified in Sections 5.7,
6.5 and 8.3.1 of this thesis. In a study of this nature a major problem
relates to accounting for country-specific differences and definition of
the banking markets. The country-specific variables used in the
analysis may not take account of all country-specific: characteristics
thus, average industry profitability levels may vary from one country to
another for reasons not accounted for in the model. One of the ways to
avoid this problem is to examine the structure-performance relationship
in a particular country, thereby avoiding cross-country differences.
This, however, creates further difficulties because detailed regional
data are not widely available (as far as we are aware) for many European
banking markets. Data on specific products or services are also mainly
unavailable. Given this data problem, it is very difficult to obtain
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anything but market structure variables on a national and yearly basis.
Our empirical analysis uses total banking sector assets (and total
banking sector deposits) as the definition of the market. We recognise
that this definition is adequate but not ideal. Further research should
focus on defining regional or sub-market structural variables, within
individual banking systems, so that more representative, cross-sectional
estimates of the SCP relationship can be evaluated. Detailed regional
and sub-market breakdowns for various products and services could also
facilitate further research testing for cooperative and rivalrous
behaviour in individual banking markets. This should be of particular
interest to national authorities banking regulators c-_id merger
policymakers.
Problems relating to estimation bias brought about by the way in
which the interactive market share variables are calculated have already
been discussed in this Chapter. Other limitations relate to the nature
of the data used in the empirical study. The various risk and cost of
funds measures used in the analysis 'are very broad and only crudely
proxy for the features they purport to measure. The SCP methodology
also models the risk-return trade-offs in a linear multiple regression
model, when there is no strong reason to believe why such a relationship
is non-linear.
Finally, as the methodology relies heavily on the traditional SCP
paradigm, advocates of the `new' industrial economics would argue that
it would be more appropriate to focus on game-theoretic oligopoly models
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to analyse the strategic behaviour of banks. This could well be a
fruitful avenue for future research. However, no doctoral thesis can
hope to cover all of the related ground on even a fairly specialised
area of research. This thesis started with specific aims, which have
been broadly achieved, but with an awareness of their inherent
limitations and constraints.
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APPENDIX 1
MARKET CONCENTRATION AND SIZE OF BANKING
SECTORS IN EUROPE 1986
Number of
Bad
Country Size of Banking
Sector
[Assets $billion]
Concentration % of Total
Market
Assets	 Deposits
10-Firm 5-Firm	 10-Firm 5-Firm
1247 Austria 224.5 60.1 38.3	 68.9 45.7
120 Belgium 223.0 83.3 71.8	 95.4 85.7
158 Denmark 114.4 55.2 43.9	 57.5 53.2
621 Finland 79.7 72.1 68.9	 85.3 80.4
2080 France 1654.1 49.2 36.7	 53.8 32.9
4C'14 Germany 1829.7 38.9 24.6	 27.7 19.2
39 Greece 44.5 73.6 77.7	 81.4 76.3
54 Ireland 28.5 89.1 72.3	 89.3 70.4
1108 Italy 717.2 57.7 34.7	 55.2 35.5
120 Luxembourg 198.1 44.3 28.5	 43.8 27.8
154 Netherlands 296.5 74.9 70.8	 82.5 77.9
329 Norway 89.5 61.4 54.3	 69.4 6 0. 3,
26 Portugal 49.8 n.a. 50.1	 n.a. 37.4
441 Spain 285.7 54.9 36.9	 46.9 25.6
745 Sweden 129.1 85.9 73.9	 77.6 64.2
611 Switzerland 522.2 60.9 53.1	 64.9 57.3
61 Turkey 30.4 58.9 54.1	 71.1 65.0
778 United Kindgom 1545.0 34.1 28.2	 31.5 25.9
3 `
Source: Authors own estimates
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NOTES
Sources of information for banking sector size obtained from individual countries banking asocia-
tions and central banks.
Concentration ratios calculated using data taken from the IBCA Credit Rating Agency [London]
database.
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APPENDIX 1
MARKET CONCENTRATION AND SIZE OF BANKING
SECTORS IN EUROPE 1987 .
Number of
Banks
Country Size of Banking
Sector
[Assets $billion]
Concentration % of Total
Market
Assets
	 Deposits
10-Firm	 5-Firm
	
10-Firm 5-Firm
1242 Austria 303.9 55.9	 35.8	 67.2 44.8
127 Belgium 289.5 82.9	 71.5	 97.1 84.1
162 Denmark 145.9 60.7	 45.2	 61.6 47.6
607 Finland 124.3 65.9	 62.8	 84.8 81.6
2067 France 1816.3 50.4	 31.2	 49.6 29.0
4497 Germany 2370.4 39.2	 24.6	 27.f 19.2
40 Greece 50.7 82.6	 76.2	 76.9 71.9
53 Ireland 36.9 88.5	 66.3	 68.3 67.3
1116 Italy 1050.2 49.8	 30.2	 62.2 42..1
132 Luxembourg 262.0 42.6	 26.1	 42.4 25.7
157 Netherlands 377.2 77.0	 i 72.1	 80.6 77.5
294 Norway 124.6 61.3	 53.8	 70.5 60.9
26 Portugal 64.4 75.0	 51.8	 83.7 58.0
472 Spain 405.4 52.3	 14.5	 52.2 34.7
717 Sweden 152.6 86.4	 75.3	 73.2 77.2
614 Switzerland 706.0 60.8	 52.8	 64.8 56.8
62 lürkey 37.4 63.4	 58,6	 64.8 56.7
781 United Kindgom 2017.6 36.7	 34.7	 35.7
I
25.9
Source: Authors own estimates
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NOTES
a] Includes 764 credit Cooperatives
b] Includes 1050 Special Finance Societies
C]	 Includes 3361 Credit C000peratives
Sources of information for banking sector size obtained from individual countries banking asocia-
tions and central banks.
Concentration ratios calculated using data taken from the IBCA Credit Rating Agency [London]
database.
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APPENDIX 1
MARKET CONCENTRATION AND SIZE OF BANKING
SECTORS IN EUROPE IN 1988
Number of
Banks
Country Size of Banking
Sector
[Assets $billion]
Concentration % of Total
Market
Assets	 Deposits
10-Firm 5-Firm	 10-Firm 5-Firm
1231$ Austria 287.9 55.6 35.9	 64.6 43.6
120 Belgium 285.2 82.9 72.2	 96.3 88.6
165 Denmark 146.2 62.3 48.2	 63.6 49.2
597 Finland 146.3 65.1 64.2	 79.2 75.2
1999b France 2119.3 49.8 30.6	 50.7 31.4
4390° Germany 2237.9 40.4 25.7	 28.5 20.0
41 Greece 70.8 84.3 76.8	 75.3 70.0
47 Ireland 37.0 89.3 67.2	 87.4 68.3
1100 Italy 983.6 50.8 303	 62.7 40.6
143 Luxembourg 266.1 43.2 27.0	 43.6 27.1
169 Netherlands 373.4 81.2 75.3	 86.6 80.4
286 Norway 125.7 54.6 46.2	 53.3 43.8
27 Portugal 66.1 75.4 52.8	 87.3 60.8
491 Spain 436.9 60.6 37.4	 61.6 38.3
690 Sweden 180.4 85.8 72.5	 76.0 75.1
630 Switzerland 643.3 59.8 51.6	 61.3 53.6
64 Ziurkey 33.8 61.9 50.9	 67.5 53.6
784 United Kindgom 2182.8 38.3 28.4	 36.2 26.8
Source: Authors own esth"ates
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NOTES
a] Includes 780 credit Cooperatives
b] Includes 1,009 Special Finance Societies
C]	 Includes 3225 Credit C000peratives
The largest banks in 1hrkey had not reported in time for inclusion in the estimates.
Sources of information for banking sector size obtained from individual countries banking asocia-
tions and central banks.
Concentration ratios calculated using data taken from the IBCA Credit Rating Agency [London]
database.
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APPENDIX 1
MARKET CONCENTRATION AND SIZE OF BANKING SECTORS IN EUROPE 1989
Number of
Banks
Country Size of Banking
Sector
[Assets $billion]
Concentration % of Total
Market
Assets	 Deposits
10-Firm 5-Firm	 10-Firm 5-Firm
1226a Austria 324.2 55.3 35.8	 61.9 42.0
117 Belgium 321.0 81.8 70.9	 96.0 87.8
156 Denmark 169.0 64.2 47.6	 65.6 50.1
502 Finland 172.0 68.7 64.5	 77.8 73.8
1897 France 2204.3 48.4 30.4	 50.7 33.1
4247 Germany 2519.4 42.1 263 `	 30.2 21.8
42 Greece 85.6 n.a. n.a.	 71.2 68.9
49 Ireland 44.5 87.6 66.2	 88.9 67.5
1059 Italy 1100.0 58.4 35.8	 63.9 43.3
177 Luxembourg 317.8 - 43.2 26.7	 43.0 26.5
180 Netherlands 463.3 72.9 67.5	 83.0 77.3
267 Norway 162.4 61.1 51.8	 62.2 51.1
33 Portugal 70,.9 77.5 53.7	 83.9 59.4
482 Spain 519.3 60.3 37.3	 60.9 37.9
655 Sweden 215.5 88.1 76.0	 81.9 73.9
625 Switzerland 1031.5 59.5 51.5	 62.5 54.9
66 Zùrkey 42.2 n.a. n.a.	 n.a. n.a.
774 United Kindgom 2280.2 38.6 28.7	 36.9 27.5
Soui ,o: Authors own estimates
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Appendix 2
Source of Banking Sector and Market Size Information
1. Austria a) Verband bsterreichischer Banken und Bankiers,
A1013 Wien, BSrsegasse 11, Postfach 132, Fax
535 17 71
b) Austrian Nationalbank, Annual Reports 1986-
1990, Table Monatsausureise der Osterreichen
Banken pp.18-29
2. Belgium	 a)	 Association Belge des B:3iques, Rue Ravenstein
36-Bte 5 1000 Bruxelles, Fax 507 69 29
b) Les Banques am Seim du Sectur Financier en
1988. Aspects et Documents 93
3. Denmark	 a)	 Denmark Nationalbank, Report and Accounts, 1989
and 1988. Tables 24, 25 and 27
b)	 Den Danske Bankforening, Bankfernes Hus,
Amaliegade 7, 1256 Copenhagen K, Fax 33 93 0260
4. Finland a) Finnish Bankers Association, PO Box 1009,
Kansakoulukatu 1A, 00101 Helsinki, Fax 0094
7844
5. France	 a)	 Association Francaise des Banques, 18 rue la
Fayette, 75009 Paris, Fax 4246 7640
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b) Banque de France; Statistiques Monétaires et
Financieres Annuelles, 1986 to 1989, Section
2.4, Les Banques
6. Germany
	 a) Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank
(1990) Vol 42, No. 11, Table 13.111; Vol. 41,
No. 11, Table 13 . 111; Vol. 40, No. 11, Table
13.111, Vol. 39, No. 11, Table 13.111
7. Greece	 a)	 Hellenic Bankers Association, 1 Massalias
Street, 10680 Athens, Fax: 364 6124
b)	 Bank of Greece,-Monthly Statistical Bulletin,
June 1989, Table 19 , p.37
8. Ireland	 a)	 The Irish Bankers Federation, Nassau House,
Nassau Street, Dublin 2, Fax 6796680
b)	 Central Bank of Ireland, Annual Reports 1988,
Statistical Appendix, Tables c9-cl5, c %0, c21,
p.42-68
9. Italy	 a)	 Associazone Bancaria Italiana, Piazza del Gesu
49, 1-00186 Roma. Fax 6767457
10. Luxembourg	 a)	 Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois, Siege 83,
avenue de la Liberté, L-2983 Luxembourg, Fax
492180
40^
b) Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeis, Quarterly
Bulletin, 1989 and 1988. No. is
11. Liechtenstein a)
	 Unable to obtain data on market structure for
this country.
12. Netherlands
	 a) Netherlands Bankers' Association, Keizersgracht
706 PO Box 19870; 1017 BW Amsterdam, Fax 239748
b)	 De Nederlandsche Bank Quarterly Bulletin, 1988,
no. 4 Table 1.2. pp.4-7
	 _
13. Norway	 a)	 Den Norske Bankforening, PO Box 489, Vika, 0116
Oslo Fax 83 07 51
b)	 Norges Bank Economic Bulletin (1989) Vol. 1
Tables 5 to 9, 12 and 13, pp.62-66
14. Portugal
	 a)	 Associacao Portuguesa de Bancos, Avenida La
Republica, no. 35-50; 1000 Lisboa, Fax 579533
15. Spain
	 a)	 Banco de Espana, Boletin Estadistico, February,
1990 to 1987, Tables II; III and IV
b) Associacion Espanola de Banca Privada;
Velâzquez, 64-66. 28001 Madrid. Fax 448 2885
401
16. Sweden	 a)	 Svenska Bankf6reningen, Box 7603, S-103 94
Stockholm, Fax 87969395
b) Sveriges Riksbank Quarterly Reviw vol. 1
(1989), p.54
C)	 Bankerna (1988) Tables 1.3, 2.4, 3.4 pp.18, 46-
47, 72-73
17. Switzerland	 a)	 Swiss Bankers Association, Aeschenplatz 7, 4052
Basle, Fax 061 235382
b) Banque National Suisse, Les banques Suisses
(1988) no. 75, Tables 1.0, 2.0, 2.1, pp.52-57
18. Turkey a) Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey,
Quarterly Bulletin, 1990, no. 1, January-March,
Table 3a/1, p.198-99
b)	 Bankers Association of Turkey, Mithatpara
Cadderi 12, Yenisehir, Ankara, Fax 131 6679
19. United Kingdom a) Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, May 1990,
Tables 3.2, 3.4-3.8 (some tables for May 1989,
May 1988 and May 1987)
402
b)	 Committee of London and Scottish 'Clearing
Bankers, Abstract of Banking Statistics, May
1990 through to May 1988, vol. 7 to vol. 4.
Table 5.61.
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DATAIUMAlT 31/ 12 /90
31/12/88
In
31/12/88
Va n r 3 1n
lletaAAtsK One Year Average of Not Olff 2 Change
Tear 2 as
TotalX of
eaTr 3
Sterling US Dollars
Sum Of
3	 %
Year 2 as
)AACLATS (C.) of Data Two Years of 2 Y ea rs Between Two GDP min USD win
Tears	 of Average
GNP minGNP min GNP min GS► min Years Assets Net Income
Assets,,tat 134,887.0 131,251.5 7,271.0 5.70
100.00 104,645.0 189,334.2 367,148.0 18,630.07
6,580.0 6,626.5 -93.0 .1.39 5.23 5,827.0 10,542.8 19,080.0 974.16Iqulty
tier I Capital 6,185.0 5,958.0
454.0 7.92 4.49 11 . 41. n.a. 11,916.0 836.64
total Esrning Assets 120,620.0 117,402.5 6,435.0 5.64
89.48 95,036.0 171,948.6 329,841.0 16,669.34
81,267.0 78,918.0 4,698.0 6.14 60.00 65,585.0 118,662.9 223,421.0 11,177.96Loans
)eposits 110,164.0 106,561.5 7,205.0 7.00
80.68 86,136.0 155,845.8 299,259.0 15,030.51
Interest Revenue 3,489.0 3,454.5 69.0 2.02
2.68 2,966.0 5,366.4 9,875.0 499.27
let
profit 760.0 726.0 68.0 9.83
O.Si 1,391.0 2,516.7 2,843.0 101.02
,,..tax
428.0 452.5 -49.0 -10.27 0.37 893.0 1,615.7 1,798.0 69.64let Income
let Income/Assets (ay.) 0.33 0.37 -0.07 -17.50
0.00 0.95 0.95 1.68 0.06
Are•tss Profit/Assets 	 (ay .) 0.59 0.59 0.01 1.72
0.00 1.47 1.47 2.64 0.08
let income/Equity (ov.) 6.23 6.84 -1.22 -16.38 0.01 17.71 17.71 31.39
1.09
let interest Rev./Assets 	 (a y .) 2.69 2.79 -0.20 -6.92 0.00 3.14 3.14
8.72 0.42
(gv^ty/Assets 4.88 5.06 -0.35 -6.69 0.00 5.57 5.57 15.68 0.76
fier I Cepltal	 Ratio 5.80 5.75 0.10 1.75
0.00 6.00 6.00 17.50 0.83
Liquid Assets/Total Deposits 32.14 32.39 -0.49 -1.50 0.03 32.49 32.49
97.26 4.76
Lotus/t o t a l Deposits 73.77 74.07 -0.60 -0.81
0.06 76.14 76.14 224.26 10.86
Templating Example using Su mmary Data.
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IICA SPREAD SWEET
AIck:AARBNK
71/12/90
YEAR END
31/12/90
YEAR ENO AS X OF
31112/89 31/12/88 JT/12187
BARCLAYS	 (C.) USD min GNP min ASSETS
AVERAGE
GNP min
YEAR END
GB►
 MAn
AS X OF
ASSETS
YEAR END AS % OF YEAR END AS X OF
GB►
 min ASSETS GOP min ASSETS
A. LOANS
1. Domes tic Customer
2. International	 Customer
113,233.4
38,396.1
58,731.0
19,915.0
63.54
14.76
56,951.5 55,172.0 43.23 48,278.0 46.14 36,377.0 41.11
3. Customer loans (1	 a 2) 151,629.5 78,646.0 56.31
19,714.0
76,665.5
19,513.0
74,685.0
15.29 14,950.0 14.29 13,482.0 15.35
4. Consumer loans n.a, n.a. n.a. n.s.
58.52 63,228.0 60.42 49,059.0 56.75
S. Lease Receivables
6. (Unearned Income)
9,SSS.2 4,956.0 3.67 4,669.5
n.a.
4,383.0
n.a.
3.43
n.a.
4,012.0
n.a.
3.83
n.s.
3,236.0
n.s.
3.68
1. (loan Loss Reserves)
n.8.
4,501.9
n.s.
2,335.0
n.a.
1.73
n.a.
2,417.0
n.a.
2,499.0
n. A.
1.96
n.a.
1,655.0 1.58 1,785.0 2.03
TOTAL A 156,682.8 81,267.0 60.25 81,208.0 76,569.0 60.00 65,5aS.o 62.67 51,310.0 58.40
1. *1111 FARNINO ASSETS
1. Bank Depsel is and ► lacings 49,065.7 25,449.0 18.87 25, 5 21.S 25,594.0 20.06 20,707.0 19.79 21,368.0 24.342. Short-term Investments
3. U.K. Listed Gov,	 Securities
11,462.0
1,540.5
5,945.0
799.0
4.41
0.59
S,L30.5 0,916.0 3.85 4,169.0 3.98 2,096.0 2.39
4. Other Investments 7,789.1 4,040.0 3.00
686.0
7,786.5
$73.0
3,533.0
0.45
2.77
766.0
2,002.0
0.75
1.91
1,104.0 1.26
S. Securities - long Positions 5,084.1 2,637.0 1.95 2,527.5 2,418.0 1.89 1,337.0 1.26
1,2520
883..0
1 .43
6. Equity Investments 931.2 487.0 0.36 532.5 582.0 0.46 450.0 0.43 308.0
1.01
0.35
TOTAL 1 75,872.6 39,353.0 29.17 38,î84 .5 37,616.0 29.48 29,451.0 28.14 27,033.0 30.77
C. TOTAL EARNING ASSETS (A a B) 232,555.4 120,620.0 89.42 117,402.5 114,185.0 89.48 95,036.0 90.82 78,343.0 89.17
P. FIXED ASSETS 4,833.5 2,507.0 1.86 2,314.5 2,262.0 1.77 1,793.0 1.71 1,731.0 1.97
I. NON-EARNIMO ASSETS
I. Cash and Out from Bank s
2. Other
8,483.2
14,190.1
4,400.0
7,360.0
3.26
5.46
3,962.0 3,524.0 2.76 2,951.0 2.03 3,103.0 3.537,502.5 7,645.0 5.99 4,858.0 4. 64 4,678.0 5.32
T. TOTAL RAN[?$ 260,062.2 134,s87.0 100.00 129,729.0 127,616.0 100.00 104,645.0 100.00 87,855.0 100.00
4. CUSTOMER AND SHORT-TERN FUNDING
I. Demand Deposits
1. Savin gs Deposits
28,156.5
40,164.1
14,604.0
20,832.0
10.83
15.44
14,365.5 14,127.0 11.07 11,697.0 11.18 10,944.0 12.46
!. î7m8 Oepoal is 144,075.6 74,728.0 SS. GO
19,661.0
72,735.0
11,090.0
70,742.0
i<.I1
55.43
1G, 694.0
59,715.0
14.04
57.09
11,209.0 12.76
6 Other n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
50,931.0
n.a.
57.91
TOTAL G 212,396.3 110.164.0 81.67 106,561.5 102,939,0 80.68 86,136.0 82.31 73,091.0
n.s.
83.20
I. OTHER FUNDING
1. Securities business
2. long Term Debt
5,647.1
1,203.1
2,929.0
624.0
2.17
0.46
3,365.5
735.5
3,802.0 2.98 1,789.0 1.71 770.0 0.88
3. Subordinated Debt 3,185.1 1,652.0 1.22 1,726.5
847.0
1,101.0
0.66
1.41
198.0
1,756.0
0.86
1.61
770.0
1,159.0
0.88
2.124. Nybrld Capital 1,827.7 948.0 0.70 1,007.0 1.066.0 0. 8 4 747.0 0.71 715.0 0.81
I. QTHER (Non-f ri t.	 bearing)
1. Securities
	 -	 Short	 Positions 5,086.1 2,638.0 1.96 2,095.5 1,553.0 1.22 656.0 0.63 434.0 0 . 4 92. other 18,030.7 9,352.0 6.93 9,133.5 8,915.0 6.99 6,836.0 6.53 5,918.0 6.74
I. LOAN LOSS RESERVES (Sao A above)
(,OTHER RESERVES n.s. n.s. n.a. n.a, n.a. n.a, n.a, n.s. n.s. n.s.
1. EQUITY 12,686.2 6,580.0 4.81 6,867.0 6,673.0 5.23 5,827.0 5.57 4,298.0 4.89
A. TOTAL LIABILITIES	 E EQUITY 260,062.2 134,887.0 100.00 129,729.0 127,616.0 100.00 104,645.0 100.00 87,155.0 100.00
Itchanle Rate (U3 0 1	 a GNP) 0.51167 0.62216 1.55270 0.53430
t7^
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Enb
LT1
^
Cr1
1-3
Pd
a
G-3
[T1
r
ICA SPREAD SWEET
dt1;lAABMK
IRCLAYS (C.)
I, Interest Received
L Inter es t Paid
1. NET INTEREST REVENUE
I. Other Operating Income
1. Other
 Income
I. Provisions for Loan Lo n t$
(s) Exceptional for Sur. Risks
(b) Other Loan losses
1. Personnel Expenses
1. Other Non-interest Expenses
L Exceptional Income
0. Exceptional Expenses
I. PRE-TAX PROFIT
2. Taxes
3. NET INCOME
mi Extraordinary Items (net)
INTERNAL CAPITAL GENERATION
,PROFITABILITY LEVEL
1.Pretax Proflt/Assets (ay.)
2.Net Income/Equity ( nv.)
3.Net Income/Assets (ay.)
4. Total Non-Int. Exp./Nat Int. Rev.
e Other Operating Income
S. Net Inte re st Rev./Asse ts (ay.)
II.CAPITAL ADEQUACY (year end)
I. Equity/Total Ass et s
2. Free Capital/Banking Assets
J.Equity/Loans
11, LIQUIDITY (year end)
1. Liquid Assets/customer It
Short-term funding
2. loam
t•
/Customer 6
Short erw Funding
1, LOAN LOSS COVERAGE
I. Net Charge-offs/' . no Cev.)
2. Equity lay.1/Net ..ergo-offs
3. Net Income before Loan loss Pros
6 Taxes/Net Charge-offs
4. Loan Loss Reserves/L.nns
31/12/90 31/12/89 31/12/88 31/12/87
INCOME, Al X OF INCOME, AS X OF INCOME, AS % OF INCOME, AS X OF
EXPENSES TOTAL AV EXPENSES TOTAL AV EXPENSES TOTAL AV EXPENSES TOTAL AVGBP min EARM'0 ASSTS GBP elm EARN'G ASSTS GBP min EARN'G ASSTS
GET
	 In EARN'G ASSTS
15,265.0 13.00 13,668.0 12.87 9,147.0 10.55 7,633.0 10.2911,776.0 10.03 10,048.0 9.61 6,181.0 7.13 4,962.0 6.69
3,689.0 2.97 3,620.0 3.27 2,966.0 3.42 2,671.0
H
3.60	 Lz72,194.0 1.87 2,102.0 2.01 1,747.0 2.02 1,531.0 2.06	 C771.0 0.06 117.0 0.11 134.0 0.15 87.0 0.12
	 9
0.0 0.00 983.0 0.94 0.0 0.00 713.0 0.96
	
Cn
1,233.0 1.05 414.0 0.40 311.0 0.35 J59.0 0.48	 b2,132.0 1.82 2,064.0 1.97 1,BB2.0 2.17 1,676.0 2.261,629.0 1.39 1,486.0 1.42 1,273.0 1.47 1,172.0 1.580.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 -	 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.000.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00
760.0 0.65 692.0 0.66 1,391.0 1.60 369.0 0.50	 x332.0 0.28 215.0 0.21 498.0 0.57 159.0 0.21428.0 0.36 477.0 0.46 893.0 1.03 210.0 0.28	 LT1y
198.0 0.17 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00 0.0 0.00	
I'lla
4.24 2.64 12.63 0.98 lTl
0.59 0.58 1.47 0.47
N
6.23 7.45 17.71 5.270.33 0.40 0.95 0.27
66.18 64.29 66.94 67.78
2.69 2.89 3.14 3.39
4.88 5.23 5.57 4.89
5.80 6.S7 7.62 7.488.10 8.72 8.88 8.38
72.14 32.63 32.49 37.04
73.77 74.37 76.14 70.20
0.74 0.42 0.58 0.7311.04 20.19 14.09 10.71
3.20 6.59 4.73 3.872.79 3.16 2.46 3.36
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APPENDIX 5 BEFORE TAX RETURN ON ASSETS 1986 AND 1989 [%]
N•	 Dispesion
Number of	 Nlissing
	
Standard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation
Country	 Year	 Sample	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1986 27 0 0.42 0.40 0.26 0.62 0.11 1.15
1989 48 1 0.38 0.35 0.44 1.16 -1.77 1.73
I Belgium, 1986 26 0 0.61 0.35 0.66 1.08 0.01 2.91
1989	 1 33 0 0.50 0.49 0.66 1.32 -1.85 1.99
1986 22 0 -0.41 -0.04 1.10 -2.68 -3.14 0.913. Denmark
1989 26 0 0.26 0.35 0.73 2.81 -2.28 1.65
1986 9 0 0.33 0.42 0.18 0.55 0.06 0.57
4. Finland 1989 12 0 0.01 0.26 1.31 131.00 -3.99 1.41
1986 96 2 0.72 0.53 0.69 0.96 -0.41 3.32
5. France 1989 138 6 0.73 0.54 1.42 1.95 -3.85 11.67
1986 115 7 0.65 0.58 0.44 0.68 0.03 2.286. Germany
1989 149 14 0.52 0.34 0.53 1.02 -0.32 9.33
1986 9 0 0.69 0.63 0.18 0.26 0.03 1.737. GIeCIY
1989 3 0 1.64 1.36 1.80 1.10 0.04 3.56
1986 9 7 0.70 0.70 0.05 0.07 0.67 0.73
R. Ireland 1989 17 9 1.18 1.10 0.57 0.48 0.42 2.32
1986 55 0 1.65 1.68 0.71 0.43 0.14 3.05
9. Italy
1989 169 0 1.95 1.73 2.46 1.26 0.12 30.00
1986 61 1 0.32 0.24 0.35 1.09 -1.01 1.88
W. Luxembourg 1989 74 0 0.36 0.27 0.63 1.75 -1.73 4.89
11. Netherlands 1986 23 0 0.93 0.54 1.19 1.28 0.02 5.61
1989 29 0 0.53 0.54 0.36 0.68 0.02 1.41
1986 26 2 0.35 0.33 0.20 0.57 0.02 0.77
13. Norway 1989 27 1 0.09 0.29 0.94 10.44 -2.83 1.55
1986 6 0 1.64 1.81 0.54 0.33 0.72 2.21
14. Porlugnl 1989 18 0 1.93 2.02 0.77 0.40 0.40 3.35
1986 37 3 0.98 0.90 U-15 0.77 -0.70 2.87
15. Slurin 1939 156 8 1.67 1.37 1.66 0.99 -2.94 11.4'-
1986 19 U 0.35 0.59 0.82 2.34 -2.05 1.50
16. Sweden 1989 23 2 0.16 0.18 0.79 4.94 -2.74 2.04
1986 88 1 1.20 0.77 1.18 0.98 0.08 6.94
17. Switzerland 1989 160 1 1.41 0.68 1.85 1.31 -0.89 13.33
18. United 1986 109 13 1.07 1.01 0.81 0.76 -0.94 4.69
KinJgom 1989 171 19 0.84 1.14 2.70 3.21 -17.76 7.00
1986 3 0 0.70 0.83 0.36 0.51 0.28 0.97
IR. Liechtenlein 1989 3 0 0.59 0.69 0.22 0.37 0.35 0.75
1986 9 0 2.72 3.24	 1.67 0.61 0.29 5.14
19.71irkey 1989 12 0 2.39 1.94	 2.07 " 117 -0.09 7.03
Sr.lrce: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 5 BEFORE TAX RETURN - ON - ASSETS 1987 AND 1988 [%]
N•	 Dispesion
Number of
	 Missing	
Standard	 Deviationrd /Banks in
	 Observa-
Count ry 	Year	 Sample	 tions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum hlaximum
1. Austria 1987 41 1 0.60 0.45 0.44 0.73 0.14 2.00
1988 47 1 0.63 0.55 0.40 0.63 0.07 2.18
2. Belgium 1987 37 1 0.62 0.42 0.82 1.32 -1.13 4.56
1988 38 1 0.50 0.46 0.95 1.90 -3.10 2.94
1987 25 0 0.28 0.54 0.81 2.89 -1.88 1.403. Demmn rk
1988 27 0 0.74 0.93 1.13 1.53 -3.19 2.34
1987 10 1 0.18 0.27 0.41 2.28 -0.87 0.45
4. Finland
1988 12 0 0.38 0.35 0.35 0.92 -0.17 1.18
1987 142 8 0.56 0.43 0.73 1.30 -2.22 3.895, France 1988 179 3 0.71 0.47 1.25 1.76 -4.08 12.31
1987 149 14 0.65 0.51 0.60 0.92 -0.10 5.486. Germany
1988 162 15 0.65 0.53 0.94 1.45 -0.09 9.96
1987 9 1 0.90 0.74 0.71 0.79 0.14 2.137. Grrecr
1988 10 1 1.09 0.95 1.04 0.95 0.10 3.2-
1987 16 10 0.79 0.83 0.36 0.46 0.19 1.19
8. Ireland 1988 17 9 1.04 1.12 0.64 0.62 0.24 2.00
1987 170 0 1.83 1.79 3.42 1.87 -3,29 19.139, Italy 1988 318 0 2.05 1.87 3.61 1.76 0.15 16.3
1987 84 3 0.46 0.29 0.86 1.87 0.03 7.18
10. Luxembourg 1988 87 2 0.55 0.32 0.90 1.64 0.03 6.65
H. Neilierlands 1987 30 1 0.75 0.55 0.95 1.27 0.008 5.04
1988 36 0 0.59 0.54 0.63 1.07 -0.59 3.37
1987 28 0 0.17 0.28 0.38 1.36 -0.76 0.64
13. Norway 1988 29 0 -0.54 0.04 2.22 -4.11 -11.01 0.70
1987 17 0 1.68 1.75 0.62 0.37 0.47 2.75
14.l'oriugnl 1988 18 0 1.72 1.59 0.71 0.41 0.35 2.82
1987 105 1 1	 - :) 1.38 0.46 0.46 0.01 2.8o
I S. Sliain 1988 165 13 1 19 1.00 1.14 1.14 -5.18 8.1` 1
1987 22 0 1.50 1.14 0.95 0.63 0.39 4.27
Ifs. Sweden 1988 24 1 0.32 0.33 0.25 0.78 -0.14 O.bs
1987 138 1 1.23 0.78 1.41 1.15 -5.35 8.00
17. Switzerland
1988 170 1 1.25 0.69 1.37 1.10 -0.83 7.97
1 9 , united 1987 157 25 0.77 1.08 2.17 2.82 -11.07 8.60
Kindgom 1988 178 18 1.20 1.13 1.08 0.90 -2.05 7.49
1987 3 0 0.68 0.77 0.33 0.49 0.31 0.95
18. Lirchteniein 1988 3 0 0.65 0.76 0.26 0.40 035 0.83
1987 18 0 2.88 2.22 2.51 0.87 0.09 10.12
19. Turkey 1988 21 0 2.54 2.V 2.86 1.13 -4.72 6.88
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 6 BEFORE TAX RETURN - ON - EQUITY 1987 AND 1988 [%]
N •	Dispesion
Number of	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in
	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation /
Country	 Year
	 Sample	 lions
	
Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum Alaxiroum
1. Austria 1987 41 1 15.88 12.10 9.80 0.62 5.54 48.12
1988 47 1 15.77 14.38 8.94 0.57 1.03 45.17
2. Belgium 1987 37 1 14.97 15.52 8.59 0.57 -12.44 36.07
1988 38 1 10.66 13.33 16.50 1.55 -48.87	 1 37.34
1987 25 0 2.71 5.72 11.54 4.26 -33.11 16.203. Denmark 1988 27 0 8.88 12.58 11.92 1.34 -27.24 25.35
1987 10 1 7.44 9.49 12.67 1.70 -22.50 25.87
4. Finland 1988 12 0 9.29 7.99 8.76 0.94 -2.48 30.64
1987 142 8 12.49 13.88 15.10 1.21 -67.15 51.14
5. France 1988 179 3 14.80 12.98 32.49 2.20 -21.04 30.74
1987 149 14 15.28 14.68 11.81 0.77 -1.43 116.896. Germany
1988 162 15 14.38 14.43 9.44 0.66 -2.13 66.75
1987 9 1 32.69 19.24 27.41 0.84 9.78 79.267. Greece 1988 10 1 21.60 17.99 17.95 0.83 4.48 61.88
1987 16 10 12.68 10.97 4.40 0.35 8.66 19.05
A. Ireland 1988 17 9 18.07 18.81 10.21 0.57 4.75 36.97
1987 170 0 33.10 23.53 29.44 0.89 -5.26 13125
9. Italy 1988 318 0 30.91 25.68 26.07 0.84 4.65 171.43
1987 84 3 12.46 9.66 10.78 0.87 1.10 53.81
III. Luxemhuurg 1988 87 2 14.70 11.46 12.16 0.83 1.00 51.î5
11. Netherlands 1987 30 1 13.62 13.06 9.22 0.68 0.33 40.67
1988 36 0 10.79 12.80 9.93 0.92 -23.63 35.96
1987 28 0 2.46 6.47 12.38 5.03 -30.94 20.70
13. Norway 1988 29 0 9.04 2.39 40.07 4.43 -33.87 15.83
1987 17 0 21.88 .15.44 11.26 0.51 1.02 71.88
14.11ur"'gal 1988 1.4 0 27.54 15.45 16.40 0.60 5.88 101.18
1987 105 1 23.66 23.99 11.26 0.48 0?3 ()1.()9,
15. Spain 1988 165 13 16.59 16.98 12.55 0.76 -55.93 62.26
1987 22 0 8.38 5.50 7.39 0.88 1.90 '-8.66
16. Sweden 1988 24 1 21.64 16.48 18.55 0.86 -3.74 60.97
1987 138 1 10.32 9.01 7.65 0.74 -27.70 50.5917. Switzerland 1988 170 1 9.69 8.51 6.55 1.68 -5.02 38.67
19. United 1987 157 25 14.80 14.00 9.14 0.62 -46.50 43.30
Kindgom 1988 178 18 15.26 16.25 11.84 0.78 -36.92 44.69
1987 3 0 6.47 6.35 1.11 0.17 5.42 7.64
18. Liechlentein 1988 3 0 7.04 7.62 1.10 0.16 5.76 7.74
1987 18 0 31.69 25.82 20.14 0.64 1.18 77.95
19. • 1irkey 1988 21 0 25.94 29.47 29.31 1.13 -81.56 61.77
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 7
HERFINDAHL INDICES FOR EUROPEAN BANKING MARKETS
ASSETS MEASURE
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989
Austria 0.043 0.038 0.039 0.038
Belgium 0.116 0.114 0.112 0.109
Denmark 0.046 0.053 0.049 0.054
Finland 0.124 0.100 0.100 0.096
France 0.078 0.043 0.049 0.038
Germany 0.019 0.020 0.021 0.022
Greece 0.637 0.654 0.673 0.527
Ireland 0.095 0.122 0.133 0.135
Italy 0.041 0.032 0.029 0.043
Luxembourg 0.027 0.026 0.027 0.026
Netherlands 0.145 0.147 0.191 0.153
Norway 0.015 0.070 0.052 0.067
Portugal 0.081 0.082 0.088 0.091
Spain 0.035 0.033 0.046 0.045
Sweden 0.129 0.299 0.238 0.243
Switzerland 0.078 0.076 0.073 0.072
Markey 0.092 0.094 0.098 n.a.
United Kingdom 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.023
Source: Authors own es..mates
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APPENDIX 7
HERFINDAHL INDICES FOR EUROPEAN BANKING MARKETS
DEPOSITS MEASURE
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989
Austria 0.058 0.056 0.053 0.049
Belgium 0.166 0.158 0.169 0.168
Denmark 0.051 0.054 0.059 0.051
Finland 0.130 0.168 0.137 0.124
France 0.009 0.011 0.013 0.038
Germany O.010 0.010 0.011 0.013
Greece 0.394 0.342 0.321 0.256
Ireland 0.110 0.154 0.183 0.182
Italy 0.036 0.056 0.034 0.037
Luxembourg 0.028 0.026 0.027 0.026
Netherlands 0.176 0.160 0.216 0.198
Norway 0.091 0.089 0.046 0.067
Portugal 0.090 0.102 0.111 0.105
Spain 0.032 0.033 0.048 0.047
Sweden 0.105 0.263 0.157 0.162
Switzerland 0.093 0.090 0.080 0.083
Turkey 0.132 0.164 0.147 n.a.
United Kingdom 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.020
Source. Authors c..,a estimates
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APPENDIX 8 MARKET SHARE OF BANKS ASSETS MEASURE [%] 1987 and 1988
N'
Number of
	 Missing
Banks in	 Observa-
Counlry	 Year	 sample	 lions	 Mean	 Minimum	 Maximum
1. Auslrin 1987 41 0 1.751 0.017 11.206
1988 47 0 1.578 0.037 11.027
2. Belgi„m 1987 37 0 2.538 0.046 21.005
1988 38 0 2.541 0.041 19.893
1987 25 0 2.713 0.071 24.3193. Denmark 27 0 2.660 0.070 32.480
1987 10 0 6.990 0.170 20.250
4.I'inland 1988 12 0 5.690 0.100 20.810
1987 142 0 0.472 0.005 7.389
S. France 1988 179 0 0.395 0.001 7.202
h. Grrm:u,y 1987 149 0 0.502 0.005 6.998
1988 162 0 0.486 0.003 7.468
1987 9 0 8.614 0.510	 ^ 27.9707. Grrrer
1988 10 0 7.623 0.750 24.711
1987 16 0 5.625 0.440 34.33
9 .Ireland 1988 17 0 5.385 0.300 41.86
1987 170 0 0.443 0.001	 ' 7.5611). 1111Y 1988 378 0 0.264 0.001 7.020
1987 84 0 1.108 0.055 7.497
lU. Lusen,hourg 1988 87 0 1.072 0.038 7.755
t 1. Nethriiands 1987 30 0 2.800 0.070 2 2 .500
1988 36 0 2.313 0.070 22.810
1987 28 0 2.54" 0.079 16.43(1
13. Norway 1988 29 0 2.265 0.120 1'_.525
1987 17 0 5.060 0.360 20.911
14. Portugal i988 i8 0 4.950 0.650 222.211
1987 10; 0 0.852 0.O10 7.333
15. Spain 1988 1 65 0 0..559 0.006 10.429
1987 22 0 3.448 0 .1197 23.210
Ih. Swrde" 1988 24 0 3.269 0.080 27. 6h0
1987 138 0 0.615 0.006 17.h4h
l7. Swilzrrland 1988 170 0 0.513 0.003 17.005
18. Uniled 1987 157 0 0.376 0.002 S.150
Kin ,lgon, 1988 178 0 0.363 0.001 8.660
1987 3 0 n.a n.a n.a
18. Lieehtenlein 1988 3 0 n.a n.a n.a
1987 18 0 4.480 0.470 2121
19. Tl,rkey 1988 21 0
1
4.326
1
0"50 21.31
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 8 MARKET SHARE OF BANKS DEPOSIT MEASURE [%] 1986 AND 1989
N•	 Dispesion
Number of
	 Missing
	
Standard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation !
Count ry 	Year
	 Sample	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1986 27 0 2.825 0.910 13.731 1.32 0.010 12.416
1989 48 0 1.723 0.665 2.706 1.57 0.024 11.495
2. Belgium 1986 26 0 3.330 0.790 6.980 2.10 0.100 26.450
1989 1	 33 0 2.951 0.510 6.410 2.17 0.006 25.270
1986 22 0 2.871 1.014 3.953 1.38 0.078 13.308
3. Denmark
1989 26 1 2.546 1.990 10.090 3.96 0 . 101 22.931
1986 9 U 7.243 1.775 14.380 1.99 0.280 25.960
4. Finland 12 0 6.510 1.470 8.150 1.25 0.080 21.510
] 986 96 0 0.615 0.098 0.589 0.96 0.014 8.960$. France 1989 138 1 0.466 0 .022 0.502 1.08 0.009 7.863
1986 115 2 0.419 0.152 0.873 2.08 0.002 5.8806. Germany
1989 149 1 0.352 0.091 0.860 2.44 0.002 6.6677
1986 9 0 9.760 6.450 18.380 1.88 0.330 58.9507. G^ercr
1989 3 0 17.90 2.600 28.300 1.58 0.500 50.600
1986 9 0 8.778 1.760 2.n57 0.23 0.881 :7.5-11
R. Ireland 1989 17 0 4.967 1.011 2.:,42 0.41 0.798 37.1 23
1986 55 0 1.238 0.395 2.244 1.81 0.002 8.03 19. tt:,ly 1989 169 0 0.396 0 .096 1.176 2.97 0.001 1-1.026
1986 61 0 1.418 0.857 1.593 1.13 0.009 8.64 1
Ill. Luxemhaurg 1989 U 1.164 0.567 1.465 21. 6 0.040 7.58
11. Netherlands 1 986 23 0 3.780 0.620 8.050 2.13 0.080 24 ,82
1989 29 0 3.006 0.480 7.530 2.50 0.120 2.374
1986 26 1 3.1x"0 1.120 5.240 1.66 0.020 20.84
13. Norway 1989 27 0 2.623 0.846 4.275 1.63 0.0 12 18.169
1986 6 0 7.410 3.520 2.600 0.35 0.330 27.150
14. Portugal 1989 18 U 5350 4.590 5.600 1,05 0.780 2-1.310
1986 37 0 1.246 1.087 2.131 1.71 0.203 6.884
15. shain 1989 156 0 0.554 0 .252 1.561 2.82 t	 0.091 I0.15 -1
1986 19 0 3.420 1.650 6.120 1.79 0.050 2I.5,
Ih. Sweden 1989 23 0 3.106 1.401 7.110 2.29 0.040 _14.4
1986 88 0 0.9-17 0.140 3.124 3.30 0.1106 19.816l7. Swih.erl:10tI 1989 160 U 0.553 0 .097 2.219 4.01 0.(X)3 18.430
IR. Uniled 1986 109 0 0.404 0.089 1.146 2.84 0.002 7.566
Kindgum 1989 171 0 0.354 0.063 1.036 2.93 0.002 8.052
1986 3 3 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
IR. Licehtentein 1989 3 3 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1 986 9 0 7.900 3.180 9.730 1.23 0.450 27.290
19.'ILrkey 1989 12 0 6.410 2.424 9.9U0 1.54 0.410 28.731
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 8 MARKET SHARE OF BANKS DEPOSIT MEASURE [%] 1987 AND 1988
N•	 Dispesion
Number of	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation /
Country
	 Year	 Sample	 tions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1987 41 0 1.646 0.730 3.129 1.90 0.022 12.659
1988 47 0 1.584 0.665 2.849 1.80 0.043 11.784
2. Belgium 1987 37 0 2.433 0.532 5.914 2.43 0.055 25.144
1988 1	 38 0 2.481 0.567 6.059 2.44 0.051 24.951
1987 25 0 2.754 0.774 3.814 1.38 0.069 14.2793. Urnmark
1988 27 1 2.201 0.611 9.480 4.69 0.01-0 15.086
1987 10 0 6.480 2.140 10.320 1.59 0.230 26.170
a. Fin(anJ 1988 12 0 6.620 1.153 8.760 1.32 0.110 24.110
1987 142 0 0.382 0.118 0.297 0.78 0.005 7.321
5. France 1988 179 0 0.219 0.091 0.386 1.21 0.006 7.641
1987 149 0 0.331 0.098 0.770 2.33 0.001 5.645fi. Grrnsm y
1988 162 2 0.323 0.086 0.779 2.41 0.001 6.100
1987 9 0 9.110 6.610 17.010 1.87 0.340 54.7607. Ga ecce
1988 10 0 8.724 4.650 15.830 1.81 0.490 53.080
1987 16 0 4.930 2.980 16.560 3.36 0.680 32.10
8.Ircland 1988 17 0 4.102 3.350 20.120 4.90 0.542 29.60
1987 170 0 0.432 0.095 2.046 4.74 0.003 14.2-54
9.Italy 1988 318 0 0.240 0.072 1.178 4.91 0.011 15.075
1987 84 0 1.009 0.654 1.361 1.35 0.054 7.435
In.l.uxrnd,°Ofg 1988 87 0 0.971 0.535 1.403 1.44 0.033 7.851
I l. Nethcrl:uulx 1987 30 0 2.630 0.510 6.810 2.59 0.040 23.75
1988 36 0 2.142 0.510 7.170 3.60 P	 0.041 24.51
1987 28 1 2.305 1.072 4.952 2.15 0.009 17.966
13. Noiw:,y 1988 29 0 2.210 0.975 3.371 1.53 0.037 11.590
1987 17 0 5.550 4.910 5.559 1.00 0.250 23.40
14 .l'ortugal 1988 18 0 5.560 4.720 5.740 1.03 0.350 24.51
1987 105 0 0.808 0.328 1. 153 1.43 ( ) .010 6.973
15. Spain 1988 165 0 0.547 0.237 1.538 2.81 U.0O9 10.720
1987 2' 0 3.190 1.194 10.25 3.2 1 0. 103 3'_. -50
Ifi. SweJen 1 98 13 24 0 3.006 1.320 6.88 2.219 0.080 33.35
1987 138 0 0.636 0.105 2.483 3.90 0.005 19.299
17. SwilzerlanJ 1988 170 0 0.514 0.089 2.118 4.12 0.003 17.866
18. United 1987 157 1 0.344 0.078 1.018 2.96 0.002 7.804
Kind go,n 1988 178 0 0.344 0.067 0.994 2.98 0.001 7.9UU
1987 3 3 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
18.1_eiehlentein 1988 3 3 ma n.a n.a ma n.a n.a
1987 18 0 4.670 2.700 7.990 1.69 0.420 29.25
19. Mirkey 1988 21 0 4. " .! 1
1
3.060 5.190 1.18 0.450 27.27
Source: Authors own estim_,es
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APPENDIX 9
GROWTH IN NARROW MONEY SUPPLY [ANNUAL % CHANGE]
Country 1986 1987 1988 1989
Austria 6.38 10.34 8.76 1.21
Belgium 7.78 4.69 5.52 5.39
Denmark 9.80 13.18 14.33 0.58
Finland 0.52 8.99 18.39 15.38
France 7.24 4.55 4.15 7.99
Germany 8.17 7.49 11.65 5.71
Greece 20.54 11.61 16.91 [1] 31.87111
Ireland 4.11 10.83 7.05 10.12
Italy 11.10 7.89 '8.09 12.11
Luxembourg 9.58121 10.37 [2] 7.92 [2] 13.6512]
Netherlands 7.09 6.69 7.33 6.93
Norway 3.15 49.99 22.59 67.5
Portugal 38.90 11.92 13.23 10.46 [3]
Spain 15.04 17.40 18.81 15.17
Sweden 14.85141 4.98141 8.37 [4] 10.89 [41
Switzerland 2.09 13.75 2.26 -2.56
Turkey 56.63 64.95 33.44 69.81
United Kingdom 12.29151 10.31151 12.49151 -5.18151
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SOURCE:—	 International Financial Statistics [ITS] Vol EXLIU, Nos, May 1991.
NOTES:— Narrow money measure is equal to the sum of currency outside banks and demand de-
posits other than those of the central government [Data calculated from line 34 of the table]
1. IFS provide no data for these years. Updates obtained from the Central Bank of Greece
Bulletin. 1990.
2. IFS provided no data for three years. Narrow money supply measures obtained from Insti-
tute Moneytime Luxembourg, Bulletin Times, September 1992.
3. IFS provided no data for this year. Narrow money supply mean obtained from Central Bank
of Portugal, Quotes Bulletin, 1991.
4. IFS did not provide data on narrow money supply for Sweden. Change in broad money [M2]
is used instead. The Swedish Riksbonte only publishes data on its broad money aggregate.
There was a change in the IFS series at the end of 1986 soave used the change in non—ïhterest
being M1 over the years as reported in the Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin, Table 11.1,
February 1990.
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APPENDIX 10 BANKS ASSETS SIZE [$ MILLION] 1987 AND 1988
N•	 Dispesion
Number of	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation
Country	 Year	 Sample	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1987 41 0 5264 1973 7666 1.46 51 34058
1988 47 0 4532 1722 6869 1.52 107 31748
2. Belgium 1987 37 0 7354 1243 14523 1.97 133 64802
1988 1	 38 0 7205 1309 14026 1.95 118 56730
1987 25 0 3968 1177 5521 1.39 104 354813. Denmark 1988 27 0 3885 1364 11443 2.95 97 47497
1987 10 0 8200 3922 9846 1.20 207 25176
4. Finland 1988 12 0 8292 1852 10913 1.32 150 30419
1987 142 0 8564 3840 15940 1..86 110 134209S. France 1988 179 0 8291 2350 14807 1.79 61 152631
1987 149 0 11889 2976 24569 2.07 126 1658876. Germany
1988 162 0 10874 2513 23323 2.14 71 167133
1987 9 0 4334 2820 7025 1.62 156 150807.Giercr
1988 10 0 5380 2922 849 1.27 230 23317
1987 16 0 2106 741 3975 1.89 162 12tî56
R. Ireland 1988 17 0 2024 794 4729 2.34 10 15501
1987 170 0 4629 1301 12351 2.67 5 755659.11419 1988 318 0 2597 661 9353 3.60 10 69141
1987 84 0 2903 1660 3597 1.24 145 19643
11l. Luxembourg 1988 87 0 2853 1455 3709 1.30 101 20638
11. Netherlands 1987 30 0 10554 1676 24587 2.33 264 83870
1988 36 0 8608 1845 25167 2.92 261 85176
1987 28 0 3168 1088 5462 1.72 98 20464
13. Norway 1988 29 0 2846 1131 4557 1.60 151 15739
1987 17 0 3256 2852 3171 0.97 229 13463
14. Portugal 1988 18 0 3269 2640 3338 1.02 430 14671
1987 105 0 3436 1361 6216 1.81 40 29729
15. Spain 1988 165 0 2445 1055 6593 2.70 26 455fî4
1987 22 0 5268 2214 11132 2.11 104 35172
16. Sweden 1988 24 0 5863 2352 15328 2.61 143 49901
0 3913 7fî6 16055 4.10 42 124575
l7. Switzerland 1988 170 0 3301 591 12927 3.92 21 109397
1R. united 1987 157 0 7632 1743 21794 2.86 42 164430
Kindgom 1988 178 0 7972 1625 23132 2.90 25 189026
1987 3 0 3085 3622 970 0.31 1966 3668
18. Liechtenlein 1988 3 0 2974 3420 982 0.33 1848 3654
1987 18 0 1226 864 2181 1.78 176 8309
19.'nirkey 1988 :.. 0 1480 1034 1753 1.18 120 7191
Source: Authors o",, estimates
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APPENDIX 11 INTEREST PAID / TOTAL FUNDING 1986 AND 1989
N+	 Dispesion
Number of	 Missing
	
Standard
Banks in
	 Obse rva-	 Standard	 Deviation /
Count ry 	Year	 Sample	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1986 27 0 7.06 6.65 8.08 0.87 4.93 13.35
1989 48 3 8.73 8.02 13.70 0.64 4.59 9.52
2. Belgium 1986 26 0 7.39 7.23 1.66 0.22 4.04 10.70
1989 1	 33 0 9.40 8.18 4.79 0.51 5.52 12.10
1986 22 0 6.33 6.17 1.06 0.17 4.84 9.663. Denmark
1989 26 1 7.27 6.99 1.33 0.18 5.37 10.57
1986 9 0 7.36 6.77 14.61 0.50 5.22 12.79
4. Finland 1989 12 0 10.72 10.02 12.10 0.77 7.16 13.06
1986 96 2 6.06 4.73 5.09 0.84 0.70 8.88
5. France
1989 138 2 7.82 4.98 10.84 0.72 0.24 9.01
6. Germany 1986 115 9 9.00 5.00 8.56 0.95 1.60 11.91
1989 149 14 9.62 7.20 6.43 0.67 0.90 12.18
1986 9 5 15.44 11.13 11.53 0.75 7.00 32.487. G^eecr
1989 3 2 12.15 12.15 n.a n.a 12.15 12.15
1986 9 8 9.40 9.40 n.a n.a 9.40 9.40
8. Ireland 1989 17 13 8.14 7.22 3.70 0.45 5.00 13.13
1986 55 0 10.05 4.84 14.78 1.47 2.56 13.909.lt:rly
1989 169 0 6.27 3.88 8.88 1.42 0.40 15.39
1986 6 1 1 7.70 6.56 3.82 0.50 4.74 13.85
1 0. Luxembourg 1989 74 0 10.03 9.09 4.83 0.48 4.65 12.43
11. Netherlands 1986 23 23 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1989 29 29 n.a n.a n .a n.a n.a n.a
1986 26 1 9.76 9.91 2.26 0.23 0.67 13.07
11. Norway 1989 27 0 11.00 10.20 153.4 3.74 0.90 14.86
1986 6 0 33.33 36.55 16.53 0.50 11.72 52.68
14. Portugal 1989 18 0 37.48 35.25 16.81 0.45 16.60 68.57
1986 37 0 7.12 6.61 1.95 0.27 4.96 12.45
15. Spain 1989 156 0 10.91 673 24.74 2.27 4.23 16 .00
1986 19 3 6.26 6.08 2.91 0.46 1.61 9.00
1/+, Sweden 1989 23 4 8.44 7.32 2.43 0.29 5.84 13.13
1986 88 1 4.87 4.85 1.73 0.36 0.40 9.0-4
17. Switzerland 1989 160 1 6.68 6.17 3.78 0.57 0.54 11.99
18. United 1986 109 80 8.45 9.19 1.47 0.17 5.46 10.04
Kindgotn 1989 171 121 10.22 10.31 1.75 0.17 4.99 15.18
1986 3 0 4.07 3.99 0.31 0.08 3.81 4.42
18. Liechtentein 1989 3 0 5.55 5.48 0.36 0.06 5.22 5.94
1986 9 0 17.66 19.01 4.23 0.24 9.31 22.44
19. Urkey 1989 12 0 25.04 23.05 l^ 46 0.42 13.85 55.63
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 11 INTEREST PAID / TOTAL FUNDING 1987 AND 1988 [%]
N•	 Dispesion
Number of	 hfissing	 Standard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation /
Count ry	Year	 Sample	 tions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 hfinimum Tfaximun,
1. Austria 1987 41 2 11.80 5.78 4.92 0.41 2.95 14.75
1988 47 3 9.13 5.70 4.67 0.51 3.78 13.04
2. Belgium 1987 37 0 7.49 6.92 2.97 0.40 3.76 13.30
1988 38 0 7.85 7.33 3.11 0.40 3.91 13.55
1987 25 0 7.08 7.01 0.84 0.12 5.36 9.623. Denmark
1988 27 1 6.50 6.53 0.49 0.08 5.61 7.41
1987 10 0 9.95 6.62 13.85 0.72 4.43 12.64
d. Finland 1988 12 0 10.55 7.58 11.27 0.94 5.17 12.46
1987 142 2 5.64 3.63 9.57 1.70 0.77 10.59S. trance 1988 179 2 6.16 4.27 8.21 1.33 0.25 9.34
1987 149 17 6.94 4.46 9.29 1.34 0.80 10.076. Gern,nny
1988 162 17 7.65 5.00 14.50 1.90 0.30 11.45
1987 9 5 17.73 10.55 17.01 0.96 6.76 23.09
7. G,ercr
1988 10 5 16.88 11.13 15.20 0.90 7.46 23.933
1987 16 12 9.11 8.66 1.31 0.14 8.09 11.04
8. Ireland 1988 17 12 8.13 '	 8.18 1.95 0.24 5.69 10.21
1987 170 0 7.18 4.34 9.54 1.33 0.45 10.47
9. Italy 1988 318 0 5.76 4.12 6.68 1.16 0.16 12.93	 -
1987 84 0 7.28 6.05 4.40 0.60 3.17 12.17
11). Luxemhourg 1988 87 0 7.64 6.58 3.85 0.50 3.79 10.63
11. Netherlands 1987 30 30 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1988 36 36 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1987 28 1 9.30 9.66 6.66 0.72 8.33 11.85
13. Norway 1988 29 1 9.41 9.20 5.80 0.62 9.01 12.28
1987 17 0 42.89 37.45 26.83 0.63 16.24 56.50
14. Portugal 1988 18 0 45.18 41.89 19.96 0.44 19.56 78.47
1987 105 0 6?4 6.02 1.27 0.20 4.53 1I.yh
15. Spain 1988 165 0 8.96 6.20 1.49 0.17 1.50 12.b7
1987 22 3 7.43 7.03 3.27 0.44 3.75 10.78
M. Sweden 1988 24 4 6.94 7.01 1.39 0.20 3.50 8.99
1937 138 1 4.62 4.71 1.75 0.38 0.25 10.9_'l7. Switzrrl:u'd 1988 170 1 4.63 4.57 2.19 0.47 0.41 10.40
IR. United 1987 157 120 10.78 9.08 16.40 1.52 2.83 13.73
ICindgom 1988 178 127 8.35 8.42 13.08 1.57 2.27 14.57
1987 3 0 3.79 3.72 0.38 0.10 3.45 4.19
18. Liechtentein 1988 3 0 3.88 3.84 0.09 0.02 3.83 3.98
1987 18 0 16.46 14.52 9.52 0.58 6.32 24.88
19. Turkey 1988 21 1 21 1 0 19.22 9.73 0.46 7.19 27.75
Source: Authors own estimi yes
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APPENDIX 12 STAFF EXPENSES TO TOTAL ASSETS RATIO 1987 AND 1988
N•	 Dispesion
Number of
	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in
	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation /
Country	 Year
	 sample	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1987 41 1 0.90 0.74 0.49 0.54 0.15 1.78
1988 47 1 0.88 0.78 0.46 0.52 0.15 1.87
2. Belgium 1987 37 4 0.53 0.41 0.47 0.89 0.01 1.53
1988 38 4 0.55 0.44 0.45 0.82 0.01 1.48
1987 25 1 1.86 1.83 0.46 0.25 1.10 2.743. Denmark
1988 27 0 1.78 1.71 0.57 0.32 0.13 2.71
1987 10 0 1.12 0.97 0.71 0.63 0.07 2.414. Finland
1988 12 0 0.94 0.88 0.60 0.64 0.06 2.07
1987 142 2 1.37 1.13 0.96 0.70 0.04 3.845. France 1988 179 5 1.45 1.15 1.19 0.82 0.05 8.54
1987 149 14 1.00 1.10 0.65 0.65 0.09 3.096. Germany
1988 162 14 1.01 1.08 0.68 0.67 0.08 3.46
1987 9 0 1.38 1.50 0.62 0.45 0.43 2.52%. Greece
1988 10 0 1.53 1.57 0.76 0.50 0.51 2.78
1987 16 14 2.36 2.36 0.07 0.03 2.31 2.41
8.lrcland 1988 17 14 1.77 2.38 1.11 0.63 0.48 2.43
1987 170 5 1.77 1.23 1.29 0.95 0.03 10.00
9. Italy 1988 318 3 1.77 1.22 1.04 0.59 0.01 8.18
1987 84 2 0.28 0.17 0.27 0.96 0.04 1.17
N1. Luxembourg 1988 87 1 0.30 0.19 0.28 0.93 0.04 1. 26
11. Netherlands 1987 30 1 0.85 0.82 0.50 0.59 0.07 1.89
1988 36 U 0.80 0.79 0.51 0.64 0.05 1.91
1987 28 0 1.24 1.33 0.38 0.31 0. 7 1.72
13. Norway 1988 29 1 1.34 1.37 0.45 0.34 0.20 1.89
5.151987 17 0 2.83 2.47 1.16 0.41 1.47
14. Portugal 1988 18 0 3.39 2.80 2.61 0.77 1.67 13. 2 2
1987 105 0 1.89 1.90 0.49 0.26 0.30 -1
 S1xlin 1988 165 1 1.78 1.78 0.69 0.39 00) 4.74
1987 22 0 1.21 1.04 0.62 0.51 0.62 1.92
16. Sweden 1988 24 0 0.81 0.71 0.48 0.59 0.16 2.02
1987 138 1 1.78 1.23 1.46 0.82 0.25 6.3;
l7. Switzerland 1988 170 1 1.96 1.19 1.87 0.95 0.28 12.86
19. United 1987 157 122 1.07 0.57 0.87 0.81 0.26 4.18
Kindgom 1988 178 131 1.06 0.60 0.92 0.87 0.22 4.10
1987 3 0 0.58 0.68 0.19 0.33 0.36 0.69
19. Liechtentein 1988 3 0 0.57 0.64 0.18 0.32 0.37 0.71
1987 18 18 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
19.71trkey 1988 21 21 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 13 LOANS - TO - ASSETS RATIOS [ %] 1986 AND 1989
N•	 Dispesion
Number of	 Miss ing	 Standard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation
Count ry 	Year	 Sample	 lions
	
Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1986 27 0 54.61 54.51 17.49 0.32 24.75 84.84
1989 48 3 59.39 60.93 18.58 0.31 12.05 96.16
2. Belgium 1986 26 0 34.84 34.62 15.22 0.44 9.27 68.75
1989 1	 33 0 39.40 35.99 17.38 0.44 14.48 81.77
1986 22 0 52.10 51.40 9.18 0.18 38.48 77.553. Denmark
1989 26 3 56.62 55.36 11.06 0.20 37.15 92.18
1986 9 0 50.40 48.68 17.17 0.34 26.50 79.33
a. Finland 1989 12 0 47.81 52.31 24.97 0.52 14.34 88.76
1986 96 0 48.36 50.81 13.41 0.28 1.91 85.11
S. France 1989 138 0 54.43 54.11 13.03 0.24 2.02 87.26
1986 115 0 54.63 55.90 21.50 0.39 2.33 95.345. Germany
1989 149 0 51.48 53.56 22.39 0.43 2.41 95.90
1986 9 0 41.30 38.94 7.51 0.18 32.32 53.177. C, ecce 1989 3 0 35.44 37.70 7.87 0.22 26.69 41.93
1986 9 0 64.68 62.72 10.71 0.17 53.82 82.60
8. Ireland 1989 17 0 57.40 60.93 20.47 0.36 2.04 79.73
1986 65 0 39.01 36.15 16.17 0.41 0.02 90.609. lt:^ly 1989 169 0 43.37 40.63 16.22 0.37 0.81 95.59
1986 61 0 36.76 37.41 14.87 0.40 6.71 65. ^U
Ill. Luxeml,ourg 1989 74 0 34.26 31.77 18.05 0.53 1.74 72.61
It. Netherlands 1986 23 0 51.51 52.93 17.01 0.33 8.95 79.6_
1989 29 0 47.23 52.43 19.13 0.41 14.25 75. î3
1986 26 0 73.59 72.43 7.02 0.10 56.18 88.67
13. Norway 1989 27 0 74.78 75.11 8.52 0.11 48.17 89.60
1986 6 0 49.20 46.73 16.25 0.33 29.46 70.98
14. Portugal 1989 18 0 36.86 33.95 11.44 0.31 24.94 61.87
1986 37 0 44.23 43.13 10.66 0.25 2 1. 34 57.44
15. Spain 1989 1.45 0 43.17 45.61 14.67 0.34 0.5'_ 96 .05
1986 19 0 54.16 54.40 12.20 0.23 28.43 78.51
U,. Sweden 1989 23 0 60.06 65.02 14.48 0.24 31.10 77.79
0 48.10 44.38 23.15 0.48 7.88 91.47
17. Switurla°d 1989 8160 0 53.14 52.84 23.53 0.44 0.57 91.33
IR. United 1986 109 0 52.40 51.40 23.43 0.45 4.92 98.17
Kindgom 1989 171 0 57.80 59.23 24.83 0.43 0.73 98.37
1986 3 0 23.50 20.64 7.71 0.33 17.63 32.23
1 8. Liechlentein 1989 3 0 27.13 23.65 10.56 0.39 18.75 38.98
1986 9 0 46.31 45.94 5.61 0.12 39.05 54.83
17.11,rkey 1989 12 0 43.96 43.12 12.65 0.29 24.71 64.15
Source: Authors c..vn estimai
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APPENDIX 13 LOANS -TO - ASSETS RATIOS [%] 1987 AND 1988
N .	 Dispesion
Number of	 MissingStandard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation
Country	 Year	 Snmple	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1987 41 0 53.23 56.21 20.50 0.38 9.92 90.25
1988 47 0 56.98 59.38 19.66 U.35 11.88 91.06
2. Belgium 1987 37 0 37.22 35.57 17.46 0.47 8.78 88.92
1988 38 0 38.92 36.61 17.90 0.46 11.94 79.22
1987 25 0 60.36 59.65 8.62 0.14 41.18 76.103. Denmark
1988 27 0 57.21 55.50 11.14 0.19 41.05 91.38
1987 l0 0 44.18 49.90 22.30 0.50 4.97 83.2_4
4. Finland 1988 12 0 46.98 52.28 25.91 0.55 12.89 87?0
1987 142 0 52.17 50.63 17.18 0.33 2.19 85.19
S, France 1988 179 0 53.98 54.47 14.24 0.26 1.50 83.27
1987 149 0 52.64 53.66 21.79 0.41 1.56 97286. Germany
1988 162 0 52.51 53.68 21.73 0.41 1.65 96.45
0 42.00 39.23 8.98 0.21 29.55 57.0-4
7. Greece
1988 10 0 42.58 39.62 9.54 0.22 28.05 58.71
1987 16 0 57.86 58.46 14.96 0.26 15.03 80.9'_
B. Ireland 1988 17 0 55.87 61.38 19.89 0.36 3.16 75.77
1987 170 0 40.07 36.77 17.59 0.44 0.40 96.2t)9. 1t:,1y 1988 318 0 39.66 37.95 13.84 0.35 0.80 95.76
1987 84 0 34.78 34.69 16.60 0.48 2.21 21.69
M. Lusrmb
°OfG 1988 87 0 33.61 31.28 16.84 0.50 1.90 67.87
11. Netherlands 1987 30 0 49.80 50.07 19.21 0.39 9.12 83.81
1988 36 0 50.46 5531 20.74 0.41 7.96 94.48
1987 28 0 73.20 76.25 9.41 0.13 47.48 59.78,
13. Norway 1988 29 U 74.62 75.84 8.42 0.11 54.21 89."
1987 17 0 43.39 39.03 11.22 0.26 28.53 70.41
14. Portugal 1988 18 0 40.93 35.91 12.27 0.30 23.58 70.48
1987 105 0 43.83 44.38 8.69 0.20 21.69 90.112
15. Spain 1988 165 0 45.10 45.95 13.82 0.31 L3-4 97_'-4
1987 22 0 55.94 59.68 14.20 0.25 25.89 76.22
1b. Sweden 1988 ,4 0 61.93 66.30 15.60 0.25 27.16 6p.169
1987 138 0 47.45 45.30 21.92 0.46 3.87 90.05
17. Switzerland 1988 170 0 52.64 52.24 22.51 0.43 0.91 90.94
Is3.Uni ted 1987 157 0 52.21 49.01 24.86 0.48 1.64 98.47
Kindgom 1988 178 0 56.07 56.15 24.89 0.44 2.45 98.36
1987 3 0 23.73 19.87 6.72 0.28 19.82 31.49
18, Liechtentein 1988 3 0 25.63 23.74 7.76 0.30 18.99 34.16
1987 18 0 43.41 44.18 10.36 0.24 26.95 71.54
19. Mir'--y 198F 21 0 41.70 40.56 13.19 0.32 14.49 68.14
So, rce: Autht-s own estimates
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APPENDIX 14 EQUITY - TO - ASSETS RATIO 1986 AND 1989 [%]
N+	 Dispesion
Number of	 !Missing	 standard
Banks in	 Observa-	 Standard	 Deviation
Count ry 	Year
	 Sample	 tions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation	 mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Ausirin 1986 27 0 3.09 2.80 1.29 0.42 0.14 6.43
1989 48 0 4.53 4.27 1.60 0.35 0.35 9.67
2. Belgium 1986 26 0 3.19 2.60 1.96 0.61 0.94 9.66
1989 33 0 4.77 4.19 2.62 0.55 2.11 13.08
1986 22 0 8.64 7.92 2.39 0.28 5.32 12.953. Denmark
1989 26 0 8.21 7.77 2.23 0.27 4.67 13.15
1986 9 0 3.66 4.22 1.47 0.40 0.85 5.42
4.1?inlarrd 1989 12 0 4.17 3.92 2.14 0.51 0.91 8.56
1986 96 0 4.21 2.90 5.64 1.34 0.79 52.67
5. trance 1989 138 0 5.14 3.86 7.85 1.53 0.64 89.84
1986 115 0 4.12 3.91 1.91 0.46 1.59 12.2 26. Germany
1989 149 0 4.49 4.17 2.60 0.58 1.48 20.90
1986 9 0 4.82 2.63 5.26 1.09 1.61 15.007. C" e^ce 1989 3 0 4.88 5.72 2.44 0.50 2.13 6.80
1986 9 0 4.44 4.20 1.21 0.27 3.11 b.63
R. Ireland 1989 17 0 10.80 5.19 22.26 2.0t, 2.57 96 .94
1986 55 0 5.81 3.22 3.54 0.61 1.38 9.42
^^' Italy 1989 169 0 11.38 3.98 17.14 1.51 0.80 81.20
1986 61 0 3.66 2.39 5.73 1.57 1.65 45.9_
111. Luxembourg 1989 74 0 3.60 2.71 3.92 1.09 1.27 30.51
11. Netherlands 1986 23 0 4.51 4.11 1.94 0.43 1.99 10.5`
1989 29 0 5.30 4.63 2.30 0.43 2.47 10.9'
1986 26 0 5.02 3.99 2.78 0.55 2.16 15.1;
13. Norway 1989 27 0 3.66 3.63 1.02 0.28 2.11 5.81
1986 6 0 4.92 4.67 1.63 0.33 2.95 7.10
14. Portugal 1989 18 0 2.69 3.39 1.A 0.31 2.49 6.15
1986 37 Il 5.75 5.63 2.14 0.42 0.94 th.4-
15. Spain 1989 156 0 7.96 6.27 8.47 1.06 L67 94 .71
1986 19 0 2.45 1.49 3.39 1.38 0.38 16.()()
16. Sweden 1989 23 0 2.24 1.54 1.94 0.87 0.94 9.5-4
1986 88 0 10.28 8.64 6.97 0.68 2.66 39?_l7. Switzerland 1989 160 0 12.06 10.30 8.34 0.69 2.50 40.55
IR. United 1986 109 0 7.56 6.14 4.16 0.55 2.74 26 .42'
Kindgom 1989 171 0 8.32 6.69 5.72 0.69 2.39 43.57
1986 3 0 8.39 9.98 4.26 0.51 3.56 11.62
IR. Liechtenlein 1989 3 0 8.98 10.69 3.87 0.43 4.55 11.69
1986 9 0 6.92 7.54 2.63	 0.38 2.78 10.30
19.1Urkey 1989 12 0 9.93 8.57 4.01	 0.40 6.07 18.56
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 14 EQUITY - TO - ASSETS RATIO 1987 AND 1988
N•	 Dispesion
Number of	 Missing	 Standard
Banks in	 Obse rva-	 Standard	 DeviationCount ry 	Year	 Sample	 lions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Attatria 1987 41 0 3.94 3.53 1.42 0.36 0.35 7.70
1988 47 0 4.24 3.99 1.43 0.34 0.38 7.33
2. Belgium 1987 37 0 4.51 3.54 3.15 0.70 1.59 13.02
1988 1	 38 0 4.86 3.85 3.08 0.63 1.77 15.00
1987 25 0 8.63 7.96 2.64 0.31 5.01 14.073. Drnn,ark 1988 27 0 8.63 7.78 2.41 0.28 4.92 13. 56
1987 10 0 3.45 3.95 1.19 0.34 0. 82 4.504. Finland 1988 12 0 4.52 4.27 1.27 0.28 2.85 6.85
1987 142 0 4.13 3.19 3.39 0.82 0.62 31.39
S. France 1988 179 0 4.29 3.55 3.22 0.75 0.10 26.82
1987 149 0 4.54 4.30 2.20 0.48 1.54 14.456. Germany
1988 162 0 4.53 4.12
^
2.33 0.51 1.54 16.80
1987 9 0 4.51 2.57 4.65 1.03 1.45 12_.79
7. G,ercr
1988 10 U 5.26 3.86 3.08 0.59 2.33 11.42
1987 16 0 5.72 5.49 2.34 0.41 2.17 11.32
R. Ireland 1988 17 0 10.31 5.57 20.21 1.96 2.28 88.42
1987 170 U 11.35 3.59 18.40 1.62 1.57 86.00
9 .Ilaly 1988 318 0 9.29 3.71 14.96 1.61 1.58 81.49
1987 84 0 3.71 2.76 4.48 1.21 1.66 40.57
111. Luxemhourg 1988 87 U 3.93 2.72 4.58 1.71 1.64 37.93
11. Netherlands 1987 30 0 4.75 4.23 2.24 0.47 1.51 1 2 .39
1988 36 0 5.10 4.16 2.55 0.50 1.30 12.51
1987 28 0 4.14 3.95 1.39 0.34 1.72 7.02
1 3. Norway 1988 29 U 3.22 4.00 2.68 0.83 1.17 6.19
1987 17 0 4.34 3.90 1.12 0.26 2.85 7.04
1 4. Portugal 1988 18 0 4.09 3.59 123 0.30 2.36 7.08
1987 105 0 5.88 5.48 2.08 0.35 0 . 8j (-3.fi715. Spain 1988 165 0 7.10 5.82 4.37 0.62 0.13 32.t)(-)
1987 22 0 2.33 1.83 1.59 0.68 0.36 7.92
tb. Swrdr" 1988 24 0 2 .06 1.65 1.32 0.64 0,56 5.72
1987 138 0 11.92 9.89 9.10 0.76 2.4 1 69. 1 3
l7. Switzrrlv,d 1988 170 0 12.72 10.39 9.52 0.75 2.44 63.83
1R.Ilniled 1987 157 1 8.54 6.92 5.17 0.61 0.20 30.58
Kindgom 1988 178 0 8.66 6.74 5.23 0.60 1.90 33.64
1987 3 0 10.54 12.43 4.96 0.47 4.9 1 14.27
1 8. Liechtenteiu 1988 3 0 9.48 10.75 4.45 0.47 4.53 13.15
1987 18 0 8.20 8.93 2.65 0.32 2.79 12.98
19.1Lrkry 1988 21 U W .44 9.Y 7.02 0.67 4.47 37.49
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 15 LOAN-LOSS RESERVES / LOANS [ %] 1987 AND 1988
N•	 Dispesion
Number of
	 Missing
	
Standard
Banks in	 Observn-	 Standard	 Deviation
Count ry
	Year	 Sample	 tions	 Mean	 Median	 Deviation mean	 Minimum Maximum
1. Austria 1987 41 41 n.a na n.a n.a n.a n.a
1988 47 47 n.a n.a n .a n.a n.a n.a
2. Belgium 1987 37 37 n.a n.a n.a n.a na n.a
1988 38 38 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1987 25 24 2.150 2.150 ' ' 2.150 2.1 _503. Denmark
1988 27 25 1.235 1.235 1.365 1.11 0 .270 2.200
1987 10 1 2.722 2.781) 1.564 U.57 0.360 5.710
4. Finland 12 0 2.457 2.255 1.536 0.63 0.140 ;.; 71)
1987 142 99 2.840 2.441 1.151 0.41 0.100 7.000
5.Franrr 1988 179 1.9 2.421 2.237 2.181 0.90 0.050 7.383
1987 149 80 0.728 0.518 0.615 0.84 0.040 3.5716. Germany
1988 162 156 1.461 1.116 1.449 0.99 0.062 3.894
1987 9 0 2.244 1.630 1.077 0.48 1.310 4.3207. Greece 1988 10 0 1.952 1.760 1.144 0.59 0.340 4.480
1987 16 14 3.065 3.065 0.219 0.07 2.910 3.220
8. Ireland 1988 17 15 2.870 2.870 0.297 0.10 2.660 3.080
1987 170 0 4.073 4.549 2.943 0.72 0.010 25.953
9.Italy 1988 318 0 3.380 3.548 2.157 0.64 0.090 12.36
1987 84 4 9.500 5.753 8.773 0.92 0.260 41.010
Itl. Luxen,hourg 1988 87 4 10.410 5.170 11.550 1.11 0.680 56.671)
11. Netherlands 1987 l	 30 30 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1988 36 36 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1987 28 0 2.336 2.558 1.047 0.45 0.184 3.5"_
13. Norway 1988 29 0 2.261 2.217 1.136 0.50 0.316 535'
1987 17 0 2.649 2.951 2.711 1.02 0.362 6.784
14. Portugal 1988 18 0 1.828 1.343 1.516 0.83 0.342 5.725
1987 105 1 3.414 2.935 1.826 0.53 1.020 10.1 60
1?. Spain 1988 165 4 3.844 2.770 6.037 1.57 0.070 55.bUxi
1987 22 U 0.571 0.555 0.387 0.68 0.100 1.421
16. Sweden 1988 24 0 0.656 0.660 0.550 0.84 0.009 1.602
1987 138 138 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
t^. Switzerland 170 170 n.a n.a n.a n.a ma n.a
1987 157 117 3.230 1.480 5.518 1.71 0.068 25.540t8. United
Kindgum 1988 178 125 2.590 1.190 5.661 2.19 0.009 29.3^0
1987 3 3 n.a na n.a n.a n.a n.a
18. Lirchtentein 1988 23 3 n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a n.a
1987 18 0 2.264 1.63U 2.618 1.16 0.097 8.350
19. Tltrkry 1988 21 0 3.1)61 2.140 3.369 1.10 0.001 12.6'10
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 16
Relationship between ROA and independent variables 1986 [including LLR[LOAN variable]
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.0041a 0.0042 0.0124a 0.0126a
[1.27] [1.29] [5.08] [5.29]
CR10 ASS 0.0005a 1.8 0.0005 1.8 -0.0005 2.0 0.0005 2.0
(1.06] [1.05] [-1.50] [-1.62]
MSASS -0.0170a 1.4 -0.01663 1.1 -0.0209a 1.4 -0.0189a 1.1
[-1.99] (-2.61] [-2.53] [-2.59]
NARMON 0.0003a 2.0 0.0003a 2.0 0.0002a 1.8 0.0002a 1.8
[3.69] [3.71] [2.68] [2.64]
ASSETS 0.00000 1.3 0.00000 13
[0.13] [0.51]
IPAY / FUND 0.00008 1.1 0.00008 1.1 -0.00006 1.1 -0.00006 1.1
[0.14] [0.14] [-0.23] [-0.23]
LOANS /ASS -0.0038a 2.1 -0.0038a 2.1 -0.0017a 2.4 -0.0017a 2.3
[-557] [-559] [-3.13] [-3.14]
EQUITY/ASS 0.0415a 15 0.0415a 1.5 0.0117a 1.2 0.0116a 1.2
[6.97] [6.98] [5.55] [5.54]
STAFF / ASS 0.0919a 1.9 0.0919a 1.9 0.0438a 1.4 0.04343 2.1
[4.21] (4.22] (3.56] [3.55]
LLR / LOAN -0.0007a 1.4 -0.0007a 1.4
[-3.28] (-3.31]
0.0022a -0.0022 -0.0058x -0.0057a
GOVT [-1.95] 1.5 [-1.95] 1.5 [-6.09] 1.4 [-6.09] 1.4
Observations
759 759 S
N`
435 435 164 164
R2 29.3 29.5 13.1 13.2
F 13.51 15.06 10.93 12.28
LM 0.088 0.082 1.703 1.612
SW 0.994 0.984 0.920 0.921
Source: Authors own estimates
446
APPENDIX 16
Relationship between ROA and independent va riables 1987 [including LLR/LOAN va riable]
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.1083a -0.10822 -0.05892 -0.0589a
[-10.46] [-10.51] [-8.40] [-8.51]
CR10 ASS 0.0020a 2.2 0.0020a 2.1 0.0011a 2.1 0.0011a 2.1
[11.59] [11.62] [10.00] [10.08]
MSASS -0.07232 1.7 -0.0706a 1.2 -0.0293 1.5 -0.0288 1.2
[2.27] [-2.61] [-1.12] [-1.25]
NARMON 0.0003a 1.3 0.000004a 13 0.000004a 1.2 0.000004a 1.2
[5.46] [5.46] [7.84] [7.84]
ASSETS 0.00000 1.5 - - 0.00000 13 - -
[0.10] [0.04]
IPAY / FUND 0.00004 1.0 0.00005 1.0 0.0004 1.0 0.0004 1.0
[0.05] [0.05] [0.59] [059]
LOANS/ASS -0.0153a 1.2 -0.0152a 1.2 -0.0111a 1.2 -0.0112a 1.2
[-6.19] [-6.20] [-7.89] [-7.90]
EQUITY / ASS 0.1032a 1.4 0.1031a 1.4 0.0768a 1.2 0.0768a 1.2
[6.82] [6.84] r8.461 [8.521
STAFF / ASS 0.0141a 1.2 0.0141a 1.2 0.01683a 1.1 0.0169a 1.1
[10.39] [10.40] [14.09] [14.10]
LLR / LOAN 0.00003 1.4 0.0003 1.4 - - - -
[0.90] [0.90]
0.0347a 0.03472 0.0222a 0.0222a
GOVT [8.45] 2.0 [8.48] 2.0 [7.37] 2.2 [7.37] 2.2
Obse rvations
1101
N'
627 627 238 238
R2 55.4 55.5 43.6 43.6
F 64.4 71.7 70.12 78.98
LM
0.4504 0.438 1.196 1.187
SW
0.985 0.990 0.989 0.987
Source: A.:thors own -*^tunates
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APPENDIX 16
Relationship between ROA and independent variables 1988 [including UY LOAN variable]
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF	 I VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.232a -0.0199a
-0.0188 a -0.01973[-3.12] [-2.84] [-4.48] [-4.87]
CR10 ASS 0.0004a 1.4 0.0004a 1.3 0.0003a 1.4 0.0003a 1.3
[3.70] [3.46] [5.18] [5.56]
MSASS -0.0179 1.7 0.0092 1.1 0.0624a 1.6 0.0502a 1.1[-0.52] [0.33] [2.27] [2.21]
NARMON 0.00043 1.2 0.0003a 1.2 0.0006a 1.2 0.0006a 1.2
[2.45] [2.36] [4.34] [4.40]
ASSETS 0.00000 1.6 _ _ -0.0000 1.5 - -
[1.33] [-0.79]
IPAY / FUND -0.0005 1.0 -0.0005 1.0 -0.0000 1.0 -0.0000 1.0
[-0.74] [-0.73] [-0.06] [-0.06]
LOANS/ASS
-0.0133a 1.5
-0.0132a 1.5 -0.0079a 1.6 -0.0079' 1.6
[-8.11] [-8.05] [-8.51] [-8.53]
EQUY1 Y / ASS 0.1032a 1.5 0.1031a 1 .5 0.0836a 1.3 0.0839a 1.3
[10.38] [10.37] [14.32] [14.44]
TAFF / ASS 0.0561[1.04] 1.6
0.0554
[1.03]
1.6 0.0070
[0.33]
1.7 0.0074
[0.35]
1.7
0.0003a 1.4 00003a 1.4 - - -LLR / LOAN [9.14] [9.11]
0.0167a 1.6 0.0162a 1.6 0.0099a 1.4 0.0099 a 1.4
GJVT [6.05] [5.91] [630] [6.32]
Observations 1541 1541 1541 1541
N' 807 807 272 272
R2 47.6 47.6 22.9 23.0
F 57.8 64.0 39.4 44.3
LM 0.141 0.138 0.025 0.028
SW 0.992 0.981 0.971 0.970
Source: tiuthors own estimates
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APPENDIX 16
Relationship between ROE and independent variables 1986 [including UY LOAN variable]
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE
VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.0958a 0.09393 0.01273a 0.1369a
[232] [2.30] [3.42] [3.75]
CR10 ASS -0.00002 1.4 0.0000 1.8 -0.00007 2.0 -0.0002 2.0
[-0.03] [0.01] [-0.13] [-0.38]
WASS -0.0057 2.0 -0.0244 1.1 -0.0454 1.4 0.0334 1.1
[-0.05] [-0.25] [-0.36] [0.30]
NARMON 0.0064a 13 0.00631 2.0 0.0015 1.8 0.0013 1.8
[5.57] [5.56] [1.47] [1.35]
ASS"ETS 0.0000 1.1 0.00000 13
[-0.39] [1.32]
IPAY / FUND 0.0085 2.1 0.0085 1.1 0.0093a 1.1 0.0093a 1.1
[1.14] [1.14] [2.21] [2.21]
LOANS / ASS -0.0024 1.5 -0.0024 2.1 0.0011 2.4 0.0009 2.3
[-0.28] [-0.27] [0.13] [0.11]
EQUITY/ASS -0.0942 1.9 -0.0932 M -0.0261 1.2 -0.0289 1.2
[-1.25] [-1.24] [-0.81] [-0.89]
STAFF / ASS 1.3240a 1.4 1.3230a 1.9 0.44261 2.1 0.4300a 2.1
[4.78] [4.78] [2.35] [2.29]
LLR / LOAN -0.0114a 1.5 -0.0113a 1.4
[-3.99] [-3.98]
0.0057 -0.0055 -0.0134 -0.0131
GOVT [0.40] 1.4 [0.39] 1.5 [-0.92] 1.4 [-0.90] 1.4
Observations
759 759 759
N'
435 435 164 164
R2 19.1 19.3 1.6 1.4
F 8.11 9.02 2.06 2.09
LM 0.025 0.019 1	 0.0119 1	 0.023
SW 0.969 0.968 1	 0.957 1	 0.958
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 16
Relationship between ROE and independent variables 1987 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE
VIF I	 VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -2.7972x -2.7461a -1.2106' -1.1476a
[-5.44] [-537] [-3.92] [-3.77]
CR10 ASS 0.0557a 2.2 0.0552a 2.1 0.0254a 2.1 0.0246a 2.1
[6.44] [6.40] (5.15] [5.03]
MSASS -6.0630a 1.7 -5.2400a 1.2 -4.5740a 1.5 -3.8990a 1.2
[-3.83] [-3.90] [-3.98] [-3.83]
NARMON 0.0005a 13 0.0005a 1.3 0.0005a 1.2 0.0005a 1.2
[17.47] [17.46] (23.65] [23.62]
ASSETS 0.00000 1 .5 - - 0.00000 1.3 - -
[0.99] [1.26]
IPAY / FUND 0.0097 1.0 0.0106 1.0 0.0133 1.0 0.0139 1.0
[0.21) [0.23] [0.45] [0.47)
LOANS / ASS -0.0937 1.2 -0.0862 1.2 -0.0619 1.2 -0.638 1.2
[-0.77] [-0.71] [-0.99] [-1.02]
EQUITY / ASS -2.1274a 1.4 -2.1805a 1.4 -0.7855 1.2 -0.8441a 1.2
[-2.83] [-2.91] [-1.90] [-2.13]
STAFF / ASS 0.4199a 1.2 0.4192$ 1.2 0.5175' 1.1 0.5182a 1.1
[6.24] [6.23] [9.86] [9.87]
LLR / LOAN -0.0009 1.4 0.0009 1.4 - - - -
[-0.61] [-0.61]
0.7585 a 0.7420a 0.3621a 0.3627a
GOVT (3.72] 2.0 [3.65] 2.0 [2.72] 2.2 [2.73] 2.2
Observations
1?01 7101 11)01
N'
627 627 238 238
RZ 52.1 52.1 50.4 50.4
F 56.6 62.7 92.0 103.2
LM 0.399 0.354 0.893 0.857
Shy 0.772 0.751 0.650 0.588
Source: Authors own estimates
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Relationship between ROE and independent variables 1988 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependant Variables
Independant [1] [2] [3] [4]
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE
VIF VIP VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.2079a 0.2325a 0.0799a 0.0897a
[4.25] [5.02] [2.36] [2.75]
CR10 ASS -0.0013 1.4 -0.0016a 1.3 0.0004 1.4 0.0003 1.3
[-1.63] [-2.21] [0.88] [0.63]
WASS -0.0105 1.7 0.1950 1.1 0.1510 1.6 0.2841 1.1[-0.05] [1.05] [0.68] [1.55]
NARMON 0.0023a 1.2 0.0022a 1.2 0.0023a 1.2 0.00226a 1.2
[234] [2.22] [2.18] [2.12]
ASSETS 0.0000 1.6 _ _ 0.0000 1 .5 _ -
[1s2] [1.07]
IPAY / FUND 0.0158a 1.0 0.0158a 1.0 0.0012 1.0 0.0013 1.0
[3.75] [3.76] [1.26] [1.26]
LOANS / ASS
-0.0603a 1.5 -0.0594a 1.5 -0.0529a 1.6 -0.0528a 1.6
[-5.58] [-5.50] [-7.04] [-7.02]
EQUITY / ASS -0.1305a 1.5 -0.1314a 1.5 0.0239 1.3 0.0198 1.3
[-1.99] [-2.00] [0.51] [0.42]
STAFF / ASS 0.6656 1.6 0.6597 1.6 0.9957a
1-1 0.9914a 1.7
[1.87] [1.86] [5.77] [5.75]
0.0007a 1.4 0.0007a 1.4 - - -
-
LLR / LOAN [3.77] [3.74]
0.1249a 1.6 0.1206a 1.6 0.0723a 1.4 0.0720a 1.4
GOVT [6.85] [6.69] [5.67] [5.64]
Observations 1541 1541 1541 1541
N' 807 807 272 272
R2 18.6 18.4 73 7.2
F 15.29 16.69 11.10 12.34
LM 0.007 0.004. 0.092 0.094
SW 0.890 0.891 0.828 0.829
Source: Authors own estimates
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ROA and Concentration 1986 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.02298 0.0042 -0.0130a 0.0066a 0.0061a 0.0025
[-5.01] [1.29] [-3.27] [2.95] [2.70] [0.92]
0.00048 1.7
CR5 ASS [5.82]
0.00005 1.8
CR10ASS [1.05]
CRSDEP 0.00023 1.6
4
CRIODEP 0.00001 1.7
HERFASS -0.0468a 1.5[-4.50]
HERFDEP -0.0094 1.5
-0.7
MSASS -0.0449a 1.1 -0.01661 1.1 -0.0451 1 .2 -0.0157 1.3 0.0102 1.3 -0.0176 1.3[-2.85] [-2.17]
-2.72 [-2.00] [0.591 [-0.99]
0.0018 1.8
0.00034 2.0 0.00174 1.6 0.0003a 1.2 0.0016a 1.4 0.0014a1[10.351 1.4NARMON [3.71] [11.63] [3.58] [11.56]
0.0014 1.1 0.00008 1. 1 0.0012 1 .1 0.0006 1.0 0.0005 1.1 10.0007 1.1
IPAY/FUND [1.17] [0.14] [1,00] [0.11] [038] [0.55]
-0.0064a 2.0 -0.00383 2.1 -0.0069 2.0 = 0.0039 1.2 -0.00653 2.0 -0.0070a 2.0
LOAN ASS -4.61 -5.59 -4.81 [-5.75] [-4.34] -4.72
EQUITY/' 0.0948a 19 0.0415 a 1.5 0.09791 1 .9 0.0414a 1.4 0.0941 3
l 'g
0.10041 1.9 
A SS [8.30] [6.98] [8.38] [6.95] [8.04] [8.33]
0.1435a 18 0.0919a 1.9 0.1334a 1 .8 0.0921a 1.0 0.13423 18 0.1264a 1.8
STAFFASS 3.27 4.27 2,97 [4.21] [3.00] 2.74
LLR/LOAN -0.0006 15 --,9.0007a 14 -0.0000 1 .5 -0.0007 14 -0.00005 1 '5
-0.0003 1.5 [-1.81] [-3.31] [-1.42] [-3.23] [-1.49] [-0.97]
GOVT -0.0089a 1.5 -0.0022 1.5 -0.0090 1 .6 -0.0022 1.8 -0.0165a 1.6 -0.0128a 1.5[-3.97] [-1.95] [-3.82] [-1.91] [-6.88] [-5.39]
Observation 759 759 759 759 759 759
435 441 435 441 435 435N*
RZ
59.2 29.5 57.1 29.3 575 54.7
F 50.76 15.06 46.52 14.90 47.31 42.33
LM 0.089 x.082 0.309
0.980
0.081
0.992
0.351
0.985
0.201
0.981SW 0.987	 i 0.984
Source: Authors own es,imates
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ROA and Concentration 1987 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.01842 -0.1082a -0.0217 -0.0425 -0.0042 0.0009
[-2.93] [-10.51] [-3.60] [-5.43] [1.46] [0.29]
0.0006a 1.7
CR5 ASS [4.66]
0.00202 2.1
CR10ASS [11.62]
CR5DEP 0.00062 1.7
S4
CR10DEP 0.0008a 1.7[6.85]
HERFP SS 0.0657a 1.43.55]
HERFDEP 0.1173a 1.6
4.4
MSASS -0.0272 1.2 -0.0706a 1.2 -0.0428 1 .2 -0.0598 1.3 -0.04212 13 -0.0623 1.4[-0.92] [-2.61] -1.43 [-2.01] [-1.33] [-1.93]
0.000004a 12 0.000003' 1.3 0.000004 1.2 0.00005a 12 0.000004 12 0.00004a 1.2
NARMON [6.76] [5.46] [6.90] [7.92] [6.99] [6.91]
0.0003 1.0 0.000005 1.0 0.00001 1 .0 -0.0002 1.0 0.0003 10 0.0003 1.0
IPAY/FUND [0.24] [0.05] [0.011 [-0.18] [0.30] [0.25]
-0.0180a 1.3 -0.0152a 1.2 -0.0123 1.2 -0.0107 1.2 -0.0144a 1.2 -0.0168' 1.2
LOAN/ASS -6.27 -6.20 •-4.56 [-4.01] [-5.26] -5.98
EQUITY/ 0.1342a 1.4 0.1031 a 1 .4 0.1308 a 1.4 0.1204a 1.4 0.1511a 13 0.1447a 1.3
ASS [8.191 [6.84] [8.03] [7.41] [9.35] [8.98]
0.0179' 1.1 0.0141' 1.2 0.0178a 1.1 0.0186' 10 0.0181a 1.1 0.0175a 1.1
STAFFASS 12.38 10.40 12.49 [13.58] [12.28] 11.78
LLR/LOAN 0.00082 1.4 0.0003 1.4 0.0008' 1.3 0.0007a 13 0.0009a 13 0.0008a 1.3[2.35] [0.90] [2.64] [2.08] [2.82] [2.65]
GOVT 0.0159a 1.7 0.0347a 2.0 0.0167' 1.7 0.0208a 1.8 0.0049
1'2
0.0081a 1.3[3.77] [8.841 [4.08] [5.03] [1.38] [2.24]
Observations 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 201
N* 627 627 627 627 627 627
RZ 45.9 55.5 46.7 48.4 44.9 45.7
F 49.01 71.70 50.69 54.06 47.19 48.71
LM 1.257 0.438 1.1-96 1.239 1.454 1.274
y N n w& n aga 0.899 0.862 0 RR1
Source: Authors own estimates
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ROA and Concentration 1988 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3) [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT -0.0113 -0.0197 -0.0095 -0.0165a -0.0056 -0.0038
[-1.90] [-4.87] [-1.70] [-2.68] [-1.56] [-126]
-0.0003a 1.7
CR5ASS [2.61] - - - - - - - - - -
0.0003a 1.3
CR10ASS - - [5.56]
0.0002a 1.4
CR5DEP - - - - [2.46] - - - - - -
0.0003a 12
CR10DEP- - - - - - [3.42] - - -
0.0912a 1.7
HERFASS- - - - - - - - [3.17] - -
0.0709a 2.1
HERFDEP - - - - - - - - - - [3.52]
0.0139 1.1 0.0502 1.1 0.0158 1.1 0.0118 1.1 -0.0074 1.3 -0.0372 1.7MSASS [0.49] [0.42] [0.56) [0.42] [-0.25]
0.0005a 1 .5 0.00063 1 ,2 0.0005a 1.5 0.0004a 12 0.0005 a 1.3 0.0005a 1.3
NARMON [3.13] [4.46] [3.05) [2.45] [3.18] [3.23]
-0.0004 1.0
-0.0000 1.0 -0.0005 10 -0.0005 1.0 -0.0005 1	 10 -0.0005 1.0
IPAY/FUND [-0.72] [-0.06] [-0.74] [-0.75] [-0.73] [-0.73]
-0.0139a 1.5
-0.007 1.6 -0.0134a 1.5 -0.0125 1.6 -0.0128 1.6 -0.13-1 1.5
LOAN/ASS [-8.52] [-8.53] [-8.16] [-7.52] [-7.67] [-8.1ij
EQUITY/ 0.10463 1.5 0.0839a 1.3 0.1054a 1.5 0.10433 1 .5 0.1069a 1 .5 0.1053a
1
1.5
ASS [10.49] [14.44] [10.58] [10.51] [10.77] [10.631
0.0693 1.6 0.0074 1.7 0.0713 1.6 0.0606 1.6 0.0806 1.6 0.0713 1.6STAFF/ASS [1.29] 0.35 1 [1.32] [1.13] [1.50] [1.33)
~0.0003a 1.4 0.0003' 1.4 0.0003a 1.4 0.0003a 1.4 0.0003a 1 .4 0.00033 1.4
LLR/LOAN [9.28] [9.11] [9.41] [9.19] [9.58] [9.60]
GOVT 0.0174a 1.9 0.0099a 1.4 0.0152a 1.5 0.0131a 1.4 0.0167' 1.6 0.0179a 1.8[5.71] [6.32] 1 [5.57] [5.02) [5.92] [6.15]
Observation 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541 154 1
N' 807 807 807 807 807 807
2 47.1 46.6 47.1 47.5 47.4 47.6
F 62.9 64.00 62.8 63.9 63.6 64.1
LM 0.145 0.138 0.152 0.142 0.155 ( ,
SW	 I	 0.993	 I	 0.991 I	 0.989 1	 0.989 i
	
0.979	 I	 • i.978	 I --
Source: Authors own estimates
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ROA and Concentration 1989 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
epen ent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.0206a 0.0131a 0.01701 0.0131a 0.0103a 0.0095a
[6.73] - [2.66] [6.29] [3.21] [5.421 [6.521
-0.00031 1.2
MASS [-4.49] - - - - - - - - - -
-0.00009 1.1
CRIOASS - [-1.10]
-0.00021 1.1
CR5DEP - - - - [-3.74]
-0.00009 1.1
CRIODEP-- - - - - - [-1.35] - - - -
-0.0340 1.7
HERFASS - - - - - - - - [-1.62] - -
-0.0235 2 .1
HERFDEP- - - - - - - - - - [-1.88]
0.0147 1.1 0.0001 1.1 -0.0015 1.0 -0.0019 1.1 0.0116 1.4 0.0208 1.7MSASS [0.91] [0.01] [-0.09] [0.11] [0.62] [1.00]
0.00007 1 . 1 0.00004 1 , 1 0.000008 1 , 1 0.00003 1.1 0.00002 1 , 1 0.00002 1,2
NARMON [0.18] [0.89] [0.18] [0.81] [0.57] [0.42]
0.0011a 1.2 O.00lOa 1.2 0.00111 
1
1.2 0.00101a 1?
-
O.0011a 1.2^ 0.00103a 1.2
IPAY/FUND [2.71] [2.41] [2.64] [2.42] [2.44] [2.41]
-0.0105a 1,6
-0.0108 1.6 0.01018a 1.6 -0.0109 1.7 -0. r'110a 1.7 -0.010i 1.1
LOAN/ASS [-10.061] -10.33] [-10.08 [-1j,12] [-10.10]
EQUITY/ 0.0912a 1.4 0.0887a 1.4 0.0897a 1.4 0.0886a 1 , 4 0.0884a 1.4 0.0888a 1.4ASS [12,641 [13.06] [13.38] [13.07] [13.06] [13.12]
0.1607a 1.5 0.16393 1 .6 0.1561a 1.4 0.1622a l.6 0.1556a 1.6 0.1581a 1.5STAFF/ASS [4.64] [4.61 4.43 4.59 S ^ 4.49
-0.0005a 1 ,3
-0.004a 13 -0.0005 1 ,3 -0.004a 1.3 -0.0004 1.3 -0.0004 1.3LLR/LOAN
-5.14]
-4.36 -4.951 [-4.40] [ -4.49] 1 [-4.45]
GOVT 0.0006 1,7 0.0021 1 ,6 0.0008 1.6 0.00160 1.6 0.0007 1 . 6 0.0003 1 ,8
[ -0.26] [0 .69] [0.40] [0.77] [0.331 [0.02]
Observations 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268
N` 716 716 716 716 716 716
R2 39.5 37.2 38.8 37.3 37.4 37.5
F 37.86 34.5 36.75 34.57 34.71 w	 34.88
LM 0.30 1.40 0.50 1 .20 - 0.80	 ' '	 0.60
1	 0.884	 0.885Sw 0.970 0.882 1	 0.974 1	 0.870
Source: Authors own estimates
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ROE and Concentration 1986 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.0475 0.0939a 0.0588a 0.0869a 0.0845a 0.0769a
[1.63] (230] [2.39] [3.02] [6.05] [4.80]
0.0008 1.7
MASS (1.70]
0.0000 1.5
CR10ASS (0.01]
CR5DEP 0.0006 1.6
a
CR10DEP 0.0001 1.6
HERFASS 0-G735 . 1.51.14]
HERFDEP 0.1178 1.5
-0.1468
47
MSASS -0.1350 1.1 -0.0245 1.3 -0.1462 1.2 -0.0334 1.2 13 -0.1615 1.3[-1.35] (-0.25]
-1.43 [-0.34] [-1.37] [-1.51]
0.0079a 1.8 0.0063a 1.4 0.0077a 1.6 0.0065a 1.7 0.0069' 1 '4
0.0074' 1.4 
NARMON [8.43] [5.561 [8.64] [6.27] [8.34] [8.83]
0.0079 1.1 0.0085 1.1 0.0078 1.1 0.0087 1.1 0.0072 1.1 0.0075 1.1
IPAY/FLTND [1.03] [1.14] [1.02] [1.17] [0.93] [0.97]
-0.0068 2. 0 -0.0024 2.0 -0.0076 2.0 -0.0024 2.0 -0.0086 2'0
-0.0061 2.0 
LOAN ASS -0.76 -0.27 -0.86 [--ü.27] [-0.96] -0.68
EQUITY/ 0.0691 1.9 -0.0932 1.9 -0.0648 1 .9 -5.0931 1.5 0.0460 19 -0.0465 1.9
ASS (-0.96] [-1.24] (-0.90] (-1.23] [-0.63] [-0.64]
1.3432a 1.8 1.3230' 1 . 8 1.3276a 1 .8 1.3223a' 1.9 1.3043a 1.8 1.3314a 1.8
STAFFIASS 4.85 4.78 4.79 (4.78] [4.70] 4.80
LLR/LOAN -0.0005a 1.5 -0.011 3 3 1.4 -0.0005 1.5 -0.G114 14 -0.0004a 1.5 -0.0004a1(-2.261 1.5-2.501 (-3.98]
-2.44 (-4.00] [-2.14]
GOVT -0.0134 1.5 0.0055 1.6 -0.0125 1 .6 0.0066 16 -0.0136 16 -0.0147 1.5(-0.98] [0.39] [-0.85] [0.45] [-0.91] [-1.03]
Observations 759 759 759 759 759 759
N' 435 441 435 441 435 435
R2 25.1 19.3 25.0 19.3 24.7 24.9
F 12.46 9.02 12.4 9.04 _2.23 12.36
LM 0.000 0.019. 0.000 0.048 0.000 0.000
0.976Sw 0.975 10.968 '	 •85 û 975
Source: Authors own estimates
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ROE and Concentration 1987 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependent
Variables
[1] j2] [3] [4] [5] [6JIndependent
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE
I VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.68358 -2.74613 -0.5857 -0.48431 0.1630 -0.0153
[-2.37] [-537] [-2.09] [-1.30] [1.26] [-0.11]
0.02643 1.7
CR5 ASS [4.27]
0.05528 2.1
CR10ASS [6.40]
CR5DEP 0.02158 1.7
a
CR10DEP 0.01518 1.7
HERFASS 4.50948 1.4[5.39]
HERFDEP
1.3 -6.22803 13
7.2920a
-7.2090a
1.6
1.4WASS -4.46408 1.2 -5.24003 1.2 -4.7780 1,2 -43900[-3.27] [-3.90] f -3.44 [-3.10] [-436] [-4.95]
1.2 0.0005a
  
1.3 0.0005a 1.2 0.0005a 1.2 0.0005a 1.2 0.0005a 1.2NARMON (18.14] ] [18.37] [18.89] [18.39) [18.42]
0.0172 1.0 0.0106 1.0 0.0085 10 0.0079 1.0 0.0230 1 '0
0.0186 1.0
IPAY/FUND [0.36] [0.23) [0.18] [0.16] [0.49] [0.40]
-0.2259 13 -0.0862 1.2 0.0038 1.2 0.0111 1.2 -0.0961 1.2 - - 0.2'370 1.2
L AN	 S -1.71 -0.71 !	 0.03 [0.09] [-0.78] -1.87
EQUITY/ -1.5669a 14 -2.1805a 1.4 -1.5592 1 4 -1.4350 1.4 -0.8315 l '3
-1.2509 1,3
ASS [-2.08] [-2.91) [-2.06] [-1.86] [-1.14] [-1.72]
0.4976a 1.1 0.4192a 1.2 0.5084a 1,1 0.55331 1.0 0.4648a 1.1 0.4.î43 a 1.1
STAFFASS 7.48 6.23 7.67 [8.47] [6.98] 6.50
LLR/LOAN 0.002 1.4 -0.009 1.4 0.006 1.3 0.004 1.4 0.009
1 '3
0.005 1.3[0.15] [-0.61] [0.42) [0.27] 0.0745 [0.36]
GOVT 03931a 1.7 0.7420a 2.0 0.3322 1 .7 0.2189 1.8 [-0.46]
1 '2
0.1209a 13[2.02) [3.65] [1.75] [1.11] [0.61] [0.75]
Observations 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201 1201
N' 627 627 627 627 394 627
RZ 50.0 52.1 49.9 48.9 51.1 51.9
F 57.78 62.74 57.37
10.5159
55.29 60.15 62.17
LM 0.499 0.353	 _ 1 0.632 0.432 0.374
Sw 0.654 0.672	 ( n Fay 0.608 0.649 0.676
Source: Authors own estimates
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ROE and Concentration 1988 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.2308a 0.2325a 0.2176a 0.2063a 0.1532a 0.14221
[5.93] [5.02] [5.95) [5.09] [6,46] [6.98]
-0.0018a 1.7
CRSASS [-2.65] - - - - - - - - - -
-0.00161 1.3
CR10ASS - - [-2.21]
-0.0014a 1.4
CR5DEP - - - - [-2.46] _
-0.0011 12
CR10DEP - - - - - - [-1.87] - - - -
-0.1794 1.7
HERFASS [-0.94] - -
-0.05861 2.1
HERFDEP- - - - - - - - - - [-0.44]
0.2256 1.1 0.1950 1.1 0.2111 1.1 0.1704 1.1 0.1710 1.3 0.1477 1.7MSASS [1.21] [1.05] [1.14] [0.92] [0.86] [0.66]
0.0009 1.5 0.0022a 12 0.0011 1.5 0.0021a 1.2 0.0019 1 .3 0.0021a 1.3
NARMON [0.84] [2.22] [0.97] [2.18] [1.83] [2.05]
0.0157a 1.0 0.0158a 1.0 0.0158a 1.0 0.0159a 1.0 0.0159a 1.0 0.0159a 1.0
IPAY/FUND [3.75] [3.76] [3.76] [3/3) [3.77] [3.77]
-0.562a 1.5 -0.0594 1.5
-0.05941 1.5 -0.0613 1.6 -0.0588 1.6 -0.0571a 1.5
LOAN/ASS [-5.25] [-5.50] [-5.52] [-5.56] [-5.35] [-5.28]
EQUITY/ -0.1336a 1.5 -0.13143 1.5 -0.1391' 1.5 -0.1375a 1.5 -0.14571 1.5 -0.14-3- 1.5ASS [-2.04] [-2.00] [-2.13] [--2.10] [-2?2] [-2.191
0.6082 1.6 0.6597 1.6 0.5949
1 '6
0.6305
1 '6
0.5722
1 '6
0.5893 1.6 
FSTAF ASS [1.72) [1.86 [1.68) [1.78] (1.61) [1.66]
0.0007a 1.4 0.0007' 1.4 0.0007a 1. 0.0007a 1.4 0.0006 1 .4 0.00063 1.4GOVT [3.82] [3.74] [3.73] [3.66) [3.45] [3.39]
LLR/LOAN 0.1053a 1.9 0.1206a 1.6 0.1204a 1.5 0.1332a 1.4 0.1258 11 1.6 0.1286' 1.8(5.271 f6.69 [6.73] [7.73] [6.76] [6.66]
Observations 1541 1541 1541 1541 1541 1531
N` 807 807 807 807 807 807
2 18.7 18.4 18.6 18.2 17.9 17.8
F 16.99 16.69 16.85 16.50 16.15 16.05
LM 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.006
SW , 386 1.891 0.888 0.892	 1 0.893 1	 0.896
Source: Authors own estimates
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ROE and Concentration 1989 [including LLR/LOAN variable]
Dependent
Variables
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE
VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF VIF
CONSTANT 0.4791 0.07401a 0.3751 0.5670 0.2122 0.2058
[2.07] [2.00] [1.84] [1.86] [1.50] [1.88]
-0.0071 1.2
CR5ASS [-1.48] - - - - - - - - - -
-0.0100 1.1
CR10ASS - - [-1.63]
-0.0043 1.1
CR5DEP-
- -
- [-1.16] - - - - - -
-0.0066
-0.00CR10DEP- - - - - - ] - - -
-0.7120 1.7
HERFASS - - - - - - - [-0.45] - -
-0.6078 2.1
HERFDEP - - -
0.5550
-
1.1
-
0.1570
-
1.0
-
0.5500
-
1.1
-
0.4240
-
1.4
[-0.65]
0.7410 1.70.5650 1.1MSASS [0.46] [0.45) [0.13] [0.45] [0.30] [0.48]
-0.0011 1.1 0.0005 1.1 -0.0011 1.1 -0.0007 1.1 -0.0006 1.1 -0.0009 1.2
NARMON [-0.36] [-0.17] [-0.34] [-0.24] [-0.21] [-0._81
0.0337 12 0.0322 1.2 0.0330 12 0.0321 1.2 0.0312 12 0.0309 12
IPAY/FUND [1.05] [0.01) [1.03]	 . [1.00) [0.97] [0.96]
-0.1199 1.6 -0. 1 416 1.6
-0.1288 1.6 --0.1455 1.7 -0.1316 1.7 -0.1258 1.6
LOA.1/ASS [-1.51] [-1.77] [-1.62] [-1.80] [-1.62) [-1.58]
EQUITY/ 0.2177 1.4 0.1887 1.4 0.1786 1.4 0.1665 1.4 0.1473 1.4 0.1571 1.4
ASS [0.43) [0.37] [0.35] [0.33] [0.29] [0.31]
1.2510 1.5 1.8150 1.6 1.2420 1.5 1.533 1.6 1.2380 1.6 1.2850 1.5STAFF/ASS [0.51) 0.69 0.471 [0.581 !0.471 {0.49]
0.0158a 1.3 0.01691 1.3 0.0163a 1.3 0.0169a 1.3 0.0173a 1.3 0.0173a 1.3LLR/LOAN [2.28] [2.48] [2.35] [2.47] [2.50] [2.53]
GOVT -0.2321 1.7 -0.1782 1 .6 -0.1973 1 . 6 -0.1669 1.6 -0.1984 1 .6 -0.2191 1.8
[-1.47] (-1.15) [-1.27] [-1.07] 1 [-1.25] [-1.33]
Observations 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268
N` 716 716 716 716 716 2716
R2 2.0 2.0 1.8 0.9 1.6 1.6
F 2.12 2.18 2.03 1.38 1.90 1.92
LM 0.70 1.30 0.70 0.90 0.40 0.40
Sv
-
, 0.880 0.889 0.880 0.884 0.882 0.883
Source: Authors own estimates
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Pooled Estimates of the SCP relationship, ROA [LLR/LOAN included]
Dependent
Va riables [I] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]Independent
Variables ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA ROA
MASS [2.27]2 2
0.00048
CRI OASS [7.03]
0.00013
CR5DEP [2•80]
CRIODEP 0.0003a
6 .01
HERFASS 0.02343
2.58
HERFDEP 0.01903
[2.04]
MSASS 0.0042 -0.0118 0,0003 -0.1028 -0.0072 - 0.0069[0.32] [-0.95] [0,02] [ -1.02] [ -0.51] [ -0.48)
NARMON 0.0000048 0.0000048 0.0000043 0.0000043 0.0000043 0.000004a
9.57] [9.01] F9.481 (9.90] [9.45] 9.65
1PAY/F3 jND 0.00009 0.00008 0,0001 0.00001 0.00009 0.00009
(0.22) [0.21] [0.24] [0.031 [0.22] [0 .24]
LOAN/ASS -0.01013 -0.00873 -0 , 00983 - 0.00863 -0.00993 - 0.0099a
-11.96 [- 10.67] f -11.52 [- 10.49) [- 11.75 ] -11.64
0.12028 0.10848 0.11908 0.10848 0.12108 0.12088EQUTI'Y/ASS 20.43 [19.001 r20.22 [18 . 89] [20.691 r20.64
0.01943 0.01823 0.01928 0.01908 0.01908 0.01923
STAFF/ASS rl8.771 18.3=; 1 118.65 (19.421 [18.251 r18.53
0.00028 0.0002 8 0.00U28 0.00023 0.00023 0.00023
LL	 OAN [11.29] [12.06 [11.34] [12.11] [11.37] [11.34]
0.0011 0.0006 0.0011 -0.0006 0.0011 0.0011[0.95] [0 .54 1 [0.93 1 [0.561 [0 .96] [0 .97)GOVT
0.0044 -0.01613 0.0019 -0.00833 0.00518 0.00553
YR86 [1.711 [-4.58 1 (0 .76] (-2.89] [2.77] [2.99]
YR87 0.0067 -0.01318 0.00443 -0.0047 0.00743 0.00763
- 1.721 ;
YR88 0.0045 -0.01593 0.0020 -0.0979a 0.00563 0.00583(1.93] [-4.45] [0.89] [ -2.74] [3.86] (3.97]
0.0029 -0.01763 0,0004 -0.00943 0.00418 0.00433YR89 [1.21 1 ( -4.85) [0 .191 [-3.22] [2.71] [2.741
Obse rvations 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769
N' 2291 2S 2591 2585
R2 52.7 54.0 52.8 53.7 52.8 52.8
F 166.45 174.72 167.47 172.56 167.27 166.87
-L 1.908 1.813 1.834 2 .057 1 .833 1.871
S^r 0.980 0.9 1G9 0.984 0.986 0.971 0.979
t	 range 1.0-2.9 1.I -3.2 0.8-2.3 0.8-2.9 0.9-2.8 1.2-3.1
Source: Authors own estimates
46o
NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
N* = missing values.
1.	 Equations were also estimated without the yearly binary variables and F—tests were
undertaken to evaluate the evidence of seasonality in the results.
Equation 1 F — test 1.34
Equation 3 F — test 1.57
Equation 5 F — test 1.06
Equation 2 F — test 2.29
Equation 4 F — test 2.33
Equation 6 F — test 1.19
The 5 % critical value for an F distribution with the relevant degrees of freedom is 2.37 so in all equa-
tions we reject the null hypothesis of no seasonal affects.
Source: Authors own estimates
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APPENDIX 17
Pooled Estimates of the SCP relationship, ROE [LLR/LOAN included]
Dependant
Variables [11 [2] [3] [4] (5]. [61
Variables
Ind	 nt
ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE ROE
MASS (2.0 ][z.o7]
0.0079a
CR10ASS [3.36]
0.0032a
CRSDEP [2.12]
CRIODEP 0.0025
1.44
HERFASS 1.9450a
5.59
HERFDEP 1.5873a
[4.44]
MSASS -1.3811x -1.5087x -1.3827x -1.3535a -2.3851x -2.3753a[-2.76] [-3.02] [-2.76] [-2.67] [-4.471 [-4.25]
NARMON 0.0005a 0.0005a 0.0005a 0.0005a 0.0005a 0.0005a
[31.69] [31.34] r31.751 [31.94] [31.55] 31.95 1
IPAY/FUND 0.0307 0.0306 0.0299 0.0289 0.00313a 0.0322a
[1.961 [1.951 [1.911 [1.84] [2.01] [2.06]
LOAN/ASS -0.0626 -0.0475 -0.0554 -0.0551 -0486 -0.0454
-1.921 [-1.441
-1.69 [-1.661 [-1.50] -1.39
-0.2578 -0.3161 -0.2684 -0.2759 -0.2012 -0.2201EQUM/ASS
-1.14 -1.37 81 19] -0.90 -0.98
0.5715a 0.5581a 0.5724a 0.5789a 0.5378a 0.5527a
STAFF/ASS r14.371 r13.941 r14.42 [14.64] [13.471 r13.89
0.0007 0.0005 0.0007 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007
LLR/LOAN [1.04] [0.79] [i.04] [0.93] [1 .21] [1.15]
GOVT -0.0093 -0.0118 -0.0093 -0.0099 -0.0092 -0.0086[-0.21] [-0.27] [-0.21] [-0.22] [--0.21] [-0.19]
0.0787 -0.1949 0.0859 0.0912 0.0914 0.1226
YR86 [0.80] [-1.37] [0.911 [0.79] [130] [1.74]
YR87 0.1741 -0.1053 0.1918 0.1933 0.1854a 0.2040a
[1.86] [-0.74] [2.24] [1.74] [3.051 [3.28]
YR88 0.0639 -0.2326 0.0717 0.0704 0.1058 0.1226a[0.71] [-1.61] [0.83] [0.61] [1.90] [2.18]
0.0433 -0.2541 0.0536 0.0538 0.0903 0.1005YR89 [0.461 (-1.73) [0.60] [0.46] [1.541 [1.68]
Observations 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769 4769
N'
2585 2591 2585 2591 2585 2585
R2 43.5 543.7 43.5 43.5 44.3 44.0
F 115.21 115.79 115.23 114.54 118.86 117.30
LM 1.903 1.793 1.904 1.943 1.629 1.742
Shy 0.612 0.605 0.597 0.589 0.518 n.565
VIF range 1.0-1.3 1.0-1.3 1.0-1.4 1.0-1.4 ; 0-1.4 ^" .0-1.3
Source: Authors own estimates
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NOTES:
t = statistics in paratheses
a = values significant at the 5% level
N* = missing values.
1.	 Equations were also estimated without the yearly binary variables and F—texts were
undertaken to evaluate the evidence of seasonality in the results.
Equation 1 F — test 1.32
Equation 3 F — test 1.51
Equation 5 F — test 2.71
Equation 2 F — test 1.70
Equation 4 F — test 1.52
Equation 6 F — test 2.80
The 5 % criticalvalue for an F distribution with the relvant degrees of freedom is 2.37 so in all equa-
tions we reject the null hypothesis of no seasonal affects.
Source: Authors own estimates
463
APPENDIX 17
Pooled Country Estimates of the SCP relationship, ROA as dependent variable, [LLR/LOAN variable included]
Finland France Germany Greece Italy
CONSTANT
-0.0009
-0.0044
-0.0582 0.0733 -0.0209
[-0.13] [-1.81] [-2.25] [3.08] [-0.28]
0.03191 0.0096 1.5090 -0.0624 4.8250
HERFASS [0.57] [2.83] [1.38] [-2.00] [1.93]
0.0033 0.0242 0.2978 -0.0055 -0.6560
MSASS [0.73] [1.34] [1.65] [-0.43] [-0.61]
0.00004 0.0002 0.0024 removed high -0.0124
[0.47] [0.69] [2.87] correlation [-0.72]NARMON
-0.0141a 0.0019 0.0001 -0.0629a 0.00003
IPAY/FUND [-4.07] 1.77 0.23 f -2.981 0.06
0.0066a
-0.0009 O.00€3 -0.0144 -0.0322a
LOANS/ASS [2.86] [-1.87] [1.80] [-0.55] [-3.51]
0.0152 0.0303a 0.1936a 0.12931. 0.0910a
[0.58] [9.13] [4.82] [2.12] [8.40]
-0.2607a 0.0254a 0.2662a -0.4966a -0.5733a
[-4.70] [2.07] [2.12] [-2.16] [-4.04]
STAFF/ASS
0.0003 0.00001
-0.0011 -0.0047a -0.000009
LLR/LOAN [0.77] [1.37] [-0.98] [-1.99] [-0.05]
0.0005
-0.0001 0.0021 -0.0019 0.0019GOVT [0.73] [-0.11] [1.45] [-0.74] [0.74]
Observations 43 555 675 31 722
N' 1 395 547 16 11
RZ 55.1 37.8 34.2 475 47.2
F 6.46 11.65 8.20 14.39 18.00
LM 2.342 4.115 1.009 1.766 2.477
SW 0.978 0.981 1	 x.954 1	 0.994 0.983
VIF range 1.2-3.3 1.4-6.1' ' 0-2.4 1	 1.3-24.1 2.1-1154.1
Source: Authors own estimates
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Pooled Country Estimates of the SCP relationship, ROA as Dependent variable, [LLR/LOAN variable included]
Norway Portugal Spain Sweden- UK
CONSTANT
-0.0169 0.4138a 0.0113 0.5132a 0.0386
[-1.46] [2.27] [1.85] [5.73] [1.35]
remove virt-
0.0428 0.2100 0.0841 ually a -1.5800
HERFASS [0.37] [0.14] [2.02] constant [-1.46]
0.0625x
-0.4596a
-0.0233 0.0798 0.0117
MSASS [2.67] [-3.18] [-0.81] [0.15] [0.22]
0.00008a 0.0001
-0.0005 0.0000 -0.0006
NARMON
[2.13] [0.03] [-1.69] [0.09] [-1.55]
10.0005
-0.1951a 0.0020 -0.9360 0.0233
IPAY/FUND [0.40]
-6.>> 1.21 -1.76 0.621
-0.0176
-0.3483a
-0.0012 -0.5631a 0.0030
LOANS/ASS [-1.30] [-5.5r. [-0.291 [-4.91] [0.43]
0.4515a removed hieh 0.1385a -1.1710 0.2.î59a
[8.77] correlation [14.28] [0.60] [4.54]
FQT MASS
0.2234
-0.2320 0.3275a	 0.0132 0.0291
[0.77] [-0.73] [4.18]	 [1.84] [0.22]
STAFF/ASS
0.6;,09
-0.00003
-0.0003a 0.00006 -0.0014a
LLR/LOA,N [0•- 3] [-0.76] [-2.72] [0.03] [-7.81]
removed
-0.0014 0.0117 virtually a -0.0155 n.aGOVT 0._..[-	 ] [0.93] constant [-0.54]
Observations 110 59 463 88 615
N` 5 0 28 16 460
R2 48.1 63.5 35.7 53.1 56.9
F 11.79 9.69 28.80 3.98 20.53
LM 3.268 1.222 2.281 1.965 2.141
SW 0.914 0.367 0.990 0.974 0.948
VIF range 2.'. _3S 1.4-64.4 1	 1.1-3.9 1	 1.1-1.9 2.0-3.2
Source: Authors own estimates
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S2DMS
S3DMS
S4DMS
S5DMS
S1DMS
0.932
0.708
0.352
0.265
S2DMS S3DMS
	 S4DMS
0.753
0.337 0.494
0.252 0.474
	
0.673
Appendix 18
Correlation Coefficients - Pooled Data 1986 to 1989
ROA	 MASS	 NARMON IPAY/ LOAN/ASS EQUI/ASS STAF/ASS
FUND
MASS
NARMON
IPAY/FUND
LOAN/ASS
EQUI/ASS
STAF/ASS
GOVT
0.039
	
0.180	 0.190
-0.007 -0.007
-0.096 -0.035
0.294 -0.071
0.270 -0.015
	
0.012	 0.007
-0.002
	
-0.008	 0.000
	
-0.026	 0.018	 0.336
	
0.024 -0.004
	 0.049	 0.041
	
0.011	 0.032
	 0.002
	 -0.002
	 0.001
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